

STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY AND STATECRAFT

By

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PREFACE

How rulers and statesmen have used or ought to use their powers, particularly in the sphere of foreign affairs, is the central theme of the studies collected in this volume. With one exception they have been previously published, though not all in their present form. My thanks are due to the editors, publishers and societies who have generously given permission to reprint.

Franco-German Relations, 1870-1914, is a revised and enlarged version of the Creighton Lecture delivered in 1923. Published in the same year and reprinted in 1928, it has been out of print since Paternoster Row went up in flames in December 1940. *The Diplomatic Background of the First World War*, an attempt to summarise the voluminous evidence of recent years on the development of the European situation after 1871, is new, as are the conversations with two German ex-Foreign Ministers, Kühlmann and Jagow, which are appended to it. *British Policy before the War in the Light of the Archives*, an address delivered at Chatham House in October 1938 and published in *International Affairs*, January 1939, was occasioned by the completion of *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, edited by Gooch and Temperley. The appended conversation with Lord Grey took place early in 1929, when the writer was preparing two lectures on his foreign policy for the Hochschule für Politik at Berlin. Portions of *Prince Bülow and his Memoirs* appeared in the *Contemporary Review*, December 1930, and February 1931, and in *History*, July, 1933. *Kiderlen-Wächter, The Man of Agadir*, is expanded from an article in *The Cambridge Historical Journal*, 1936. *British and Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, is an expansion and continuation of a brochure published by G. Bell and Sons for the Historical Association in 1936: it appeared in its present form in the *Contemporary Review*, October 1940-May 1941. *Political Autobiography* grew out of an address delivered to the Royal Society of Literature in 1936 and published in its Transactions, Vol. XV. It began to appear in its enlarged form in the *Contemporary Review*, November 1941. *The French Revolution as a World Force* was delivered at the fourth of the Unity History Schools, held at Birmingham in 1920. It was published by the Oxford University Press in the volume of addresses on that occasion entitled *The Evolution of World*

Peace, edited by Dr. F. S. Marvin, of which a cheap edition appeared in 1933. *Politics and Morals*, the Merttens Lecture for 1935, a discussion of the problem of *raison d'état* raised by the teaching of Machiavelli and his disciples, was published by the Hogarth Press in the *Day to Day Pamphlets*. The Europe of 1935 has been swept away, but readers can bring the survey up to date for themselves. *Hobbes and the Absolute State*, delivered in 1940 as the annual lecture on a *Master Mind* at the rooms of the British Academy, was published as a brochure by the Oxford University Press and included in Vol. XXV of its Proceedings. Its relevance to an Age of Dictatorships does not need to be pointed out.

G.P.G.

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FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS 1871-1914

I

THE war of 1870, though contrived by Bismarck, was begun by Napoleon III, and defeated France had to pay his debts. The military hegemony of Europe passed from Paris to Berlin, but in the moment of victory the Iron Chancellor committed the greatest mistake of his life. After vetoing the annexation of Austrian territory in 1866 and thereby rendering possible a speedy reconciliation, he allowed the soldiers to have their way in 1871. "After this war," he declared on the morrow of Sedan, "we must expect another aggression, not a durable peace, whatever conditions we impose. France will consider any peace a truce, and will try to avenge her defeat directly she feels strong enough, alone or with allies." Outside France the annexation of Alsace and a portion of Lorraine was generally regarded as the natural punishment of the Power which had declared war and had been beaten. Where is the nation which, with bitter memories like those of the invasions of Louis XIV and Napoleon, would have returned empty-handed from a sanguinary struggle, and would have left in the possession of its defeated enemy rich territories which had formed part of its own vanished empire? If France had won, she would doubtless have annexed part of the Rhineland. It is a crime to transfer masses of human beings from one allegiance to another against their will, but amputation is the common practice of conquerors. The peace-makers of 1919 had no title to cast stones at the peace-makers of 1871: both alike built for the day, not for the morrow.

Bismarck was dimly aware of the unwisdom of the settlement which he was called upon to sanction. "I did not want too many Frenchmen in my house," he exclaimed. "Personally I was opposed to the annexation of Lorraine," he confessed to a French diplomatist, "but the military influences were too strong." His plan, which received the weighty approval of the Grand Duke of Baden, was to content himself with Alsace, to dismantle Metz, and to exact a larger indemnity; and it was a calamity for France, for Germany and for the world that it was not adopted. Perhaps he could not have

got his way, for the Generals even resented leaving Belfort to France. But he never fought for his policy, and he deserves graver condemnation for the neglect of the *imponderabilia* than the soldiers whose horizon was bounded by strategical considerations. It is possible that Alsace, German in blood and language, might gradually have been reconciled by admission to the federal empire on equal terms with Baden and other South German states. Lorraine, on the other hand, was bound to prove as indigestible as Posen, and Germany, efficient, but heavy-handed and unimaginative, never learned how to win the allegiance of racial minorities.

France never accepted the situation.¹ The thirty-six deputies of the lost provinces in the Bordeaux National Assembly unanimously protested against the cession, and 50,000 inhabitants left their homes within the year allowed for option. A far larger number followed later, particularly from Lorraine, until nearly a third had gone. The story of Franco-German relations since 1871 is mainly the record of France's endeavour to regain her lost territories and of Germany's attempt to retain them. The one remembered the aggression of 1870, the other the settlement of 1871, and the writers of school-books in both countries took good care that the children should inherit the passions of their elders. The statue of Strassburg in the Place de la Concorde was draped in black. There was no finality about the settlement, for the provinces which had been won by the sword might be lost in the next encounter. Family and business ties were severed, French propaganda was active, and the excellence of German administration evoked no gratitude. There were pauses between the rounds, but the wrestlers never left the arena. Each of them sought and found allies, until almost the whole of Europe was involved in their vendetta.

While Bismarck kept France in quarantine by alliances or understandings with other Powers, the French rebuilt the fabric of their national life with unexpected rapidity. In no responsible quarter was there a notion of challenging Germany to another conflict for a long time to come. "The *revanche*," writes René Pinon, "was the natural and spontaneous reaction, the appeal to the future, arising from the abuse of force. It lived as a sacred ideal in the soul of the nation, but has never been part of the Government programme." France had to

¹ See Linnebach, *Deutschland als Sieger im besetzten Frankreich*, 1871-3, and Herzfeld, *Deutschland u. das geschlagene Frankreich*, 1871-3.

pay the indemnity, terminate the occupation, frame a constitution, restore her finances, reform her army and find an ally before she could make fresh plans ; but the tradition of *les frontières naturelles*, inherited from the Monarchy, the Revolution and Napoleon, lived on. "Our policy is peace," declared Thiers ; "a reorganized France will always be necessary to Europe." The gospel of work was to restore her strength, her prosperity and her self-respect. One of the chief lessons of history is the resilience of nations. The transition from war to peace was eased by the conciliatory methods of Manteuffel, the Commander-in-Chief of the army of occupation.

The Monarchists possessed a majority in the French Assembly, but they were divided. The future lay with the Republicans, whose leader, in peace and in war, was Gambetta. The first President could be none other than the veteran Thiers, but it was the hero of the National Defence who represented France to herself and to the world. Perhaps in his own good time, it was whispered, in some manner then undreamed of, he might be able to win back the provinces. By tongue and pen he kept courage and hope alive. He founded a journal, *La République Française*, as "a tribune from which the appeal for our rights and our ravished provinces may be made before Europe day by day. France is at the mercy of Germany. We are in a state of latent war ; neither peace nor liberty nor progress is possible." France, he proclaimed in a celebrated speech at St. Quentin, must resume her rôle in the world. "Let us not speak of the foreigner, but let him be ever in our thoughts. Alors vous serez sur le chemin de la revanche." "Bismarck," he wrote with piercing foresight, "has transformed a divided and impotent Germany into a great, disciplined and powerful empire, but the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine is the death-germ of his work. In such an advanced civilization moral conquest never follows material conquest. Till they have repaired their error no one will lay down his arms. The peace of the world will remain at the mercy of an incident."

Next to the great tribune Paul Déroulède was the most popular man in France. Enlisting as a private in 1870 he had been wounded, taken prisoner at Sedan, escaped, rejoined the French forces, and fought to the end of the campaign. In 1872 he published a little volume entitled *Chants du Soldat*, which, like the *Nouveaux Chants* three years later, were hummed by young conscripts at their work as Körner's stirring lyrics had

been sung in Germany sixty years earlier. His songs, with their simple vocabulary and obvious rhymes, printed in pocket editions for a few sous and in illustrated editions for a few francs, sold by scores of thousands and fostered the moral convalescence of France. The opening poem of the first volume was entitled

VIVE LA FRANCE

Oui, Français, c'est un sang vivace que le vôtre !
 Les tombes de vos fils sont pleines de héros.
 Mais, sur le sol sanglant où le vainqueur se vautre,
 Tous vos fils, O Français, ne sont pas aux tombeaux.

Et la revanche doit venir, lente peut-être,
 Mais en tout cas fatale, et terrible à coup sûr ;
 La haine est déjà née, et la force va naître :
 C'est au faucheur à voir si le champ n'est pas mûr.

Perhaps the most popular of the series was the salute to the *poilu*.

Dans la France, que tout divise,
 Quel Français a pris pour devise
 Chacun pour tous, tous pour l'État ?
 Le Soldat.

Dans nos heures d'indifférence,
 Qui garde au cœur une espérance
 Que tout heurte et que rien n'abat ?
 Le Soldat.

Qui fait le guet quand tout sommeille ?
 Quand tout est en péril, qui veille ?
 Qui souffre, qui meurt, qui combat ?
 Le Soldat.

O rôle immense ! O tâche sainte !
 Marchant sans cris, tombant sans plainte,
 Qui travaille à notre rachat ?
 Le Soldat.

Et sur la tombe obscure et fière,
 Pour récompense et pour prière,
 Que voudrait-il que l'on gravât ?
 Un Soldat.

The few Frenchmen who accepted the situation were regarded with angry contempt. When the Alsatian Scheurer-Kestner, then a young man, visited Grévy, the first President

of the Chamber, he received an unwelcome homily.¹ "My children, it is grievous to have lost one's country; but the régime which weighed so long on France could only leave disaster behind. I know you are for war. I tell you, who voted against the peace—France must not think of war. She must renounce Alsace. The tears rolled down our cheeks. The President took us by the hand and added, Do not believe the madmen who tell you the contrary, and who are the cause of our troubles being increased by a hopeless struggle. Resenting the reference to Gambetta we went away broken-hearted, as if an evil genius had taken from us the remainder of our courage. That day I took Grévy's measure. Since then I have only had official relations with him." Grévy, however, never ventured to say in public what he said in private, and no French Minister of the Third Republic ever dared to accept the Treaty of Frankfurt except under protest.

Bismarck had no illusions. When the French Chargé, in his first interview in August, 1871, expressed his confidence that relations would improve, the Chancellor replied that he was glad to hear such language but could not believe that France sincerely desired peace. "I do not think you wish to break the truce now. You will pay the first two milliards, but in 1874, when the other three are due, you will fight us." "France," added the Chargé in reporting the conversation, "is recovering too quickly. He thought that he had finished with her for twenty years at least, and he is becoming alarmed." When Gontaut-Biron took up his duties at Berlin early in 1872 he received a cordial welcome from the Emperor and Empress; but the Chancellor, though at first polite, took no pains to hide his suspicion. The despatches of the first Ambassador of the Republic depict a relationship of tension and protests in which each party suspected the other of designs to renew the struggle.

Arnim's despatches from Paris were no less pessimistic. Thiers, he reported on May 6, 1872, desired a long peace, since France was not in a position to wage a new war. Later, when she had recovered her strength, declared the President, she would naturally seek compensation for her losses; and if Germany were ever in difficulties with other Powers she would find her chance by bartering her aid if not by war. "There can be no doubt," wrote the Ambassador on October 3, 1872, "that of the 38 million Frenchmen not one hundred thousand

¹ *Souvenirs de Jeunesse*, 262-4.

regard the present frontier as permanent. The instinct for revenge, indeed, is so deep that they are insufficiently conscious of the unfavourable diplomatic and military situation to prevent them one day being suddenly carried away by their passions. The German Empire can no more co-exist with the France of to-day than Rome with Carthage." Bismarck replied to these gloomy vaticinations that France was not dangerous without allies, that the Republic was much less likely to find friends than a monarchy, and therefore that the French Royalists should not be supported. "The frankness with which hatred of Germany is proclaimed and encouraged by all parties," he added on February 2, 1873, "leaves us in no doubt that any Government will regard the *Revanche* as its principal task. The only question is how long the French will need to organize their army or their alliances before they think they can resume the struggle. Directly that moment arrives the Government will be compelled to declare war on us." The danger appeared to be increased in 1873 by the fall of Thiers, whom Bismarck liked, respected and trusted, for he had opposed the war of 1870. His successor was Marshal MacMahon, distrusted by Bismarck as an Ultramontane, with the Orleanist Duc de Broglie as Foreign Minister, which the Chancellor interpreted as a step towards a royalist restoration. When Arnim, who favoured the French Royalists and had no love for Thiers, was recalled in 1874, Bismarck gave Hohenlohe, his successor, the maxim for his guidance that France must not obtain sufficient strength at home or consideration abroad to secure allies.

While the payment of the indemnity in two years instead of four and the consequential evacuation was an unwelcome surprise in Germany, the increase of the army and the refusal of public opinion to accept the Treaty of Frankfurt as anything more than a truce angered Bismarck and alarmed the military authorities. In 1873, when some French Bishops indulged in violent comments on the May Laws and the *Kulturkampf*, the Chancellor decided that a sharp warning was needed. It was not enough that the Bishops were ordered by their Government to abstain from attacks, he declared to the French Ambassador: they must be punished. "It is a question of our security. Your Bishops foment revolt in the empire, and that we cannot stand. If you allow these proceedings to continue, you will make war inevitable; and we shall begin it before the clerical party gains power and declares war. That is why I

dislike your projects of restoring the monarchy. I mistrust the influence which your clericals would have on the Comte de Chambord." The threat was repeated in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, which declared that from the moment France identified herself with Rome she would become the enemy of Germany, and that peace could not subsist with a France subject to the Vatican. "If France supports the Catholics in Germany," he added ominously, "I shall not wait till she is ready, as she will be in two years, but I shall seize a favourable opportunity." Moltke declared in January, 1874, that another war was inevitable before many years, and Bülow, the Foreign Minister, warned the Ambassador that the repetition of episcopal imprudences might lead to very grave complications. On February 10, 1874, Queen Victoria wrote to the Emperor William urging him to keep the peace despite French provocations, and received the reply, "We shall not make war."

The Bishops were muzzled though not punished, and the rest of 1874 passed without incident, except that in the first general election in Germany fourteen out of fifteen members from the Reichsland protested against the annexation, demanded a plebiscite and left the Reichstag. The Chancellor had no desire to attack France, but he did not intend to allow another attack on Germany. "We wish to keep the peace," he observed in 1874 to Hohenlohe; "but if the French so order their preparations that in five years they will be ready and determined to strike, then in three years we shall begin war." Since the Treaty of Frankfurt imposed no limit on French armaments he could only proceed by warnings and threats.

Incensed by French intransigence Bismarck lashed out at the Francophiles of the Rhine provinces.¹ The purpose of the annexation, he proclaimed in the Reichstag, was not to make them happy but to build a bastion against the everlasting irruptions of the French. "We conquered these lands in a war of self-defence. Our soldiers shed their blood not for Alsace-Lorraine but for the German Reich, for its unity, for the defence of its frontiers. We took the lands in order that the French in their next attack, which God grant may be distant but which they are planning, should not have the Weissenburg salient to start from, but that we should have a

¹ There are useful chapters on Alsace-Lorraine in Wahl, *Deutsche Geschichte*, 1871-1914, especially vols. 1 and 4, cp. Schneegans, *Memoiren*.

glacis on which we can defend ourselves before they reach the Rhine." The Glacis speech of 1874 was grist to the mill of the French propagandists, who seized on it as a confession that Berlin had no interest in the happiness or welfare of the populations. Yet at this very moment the provinces were conceded a Diet of thirty members, in which the so-called Autonomists, led by Schneegans, a Strassburg journalist, for some years played an active though unpopular part.

In 1875 the nerves of Europe received a formidable shock.¹ At the end of February the Chancellor was informed that France was ordering a large number of cavalry horses in Germany, and, after forbidding their export, he wrote for explanations to Hohenlohe. The Ambassador replied that France had no present intention of war, but that all parties hoped to reconquer the provinces when she found allies. War was neither near nor distant: nobody could say. A few days later, on March 12, the French Chamber, outstripping the proposals of the Government, increased the battalions in a regiment from three to four. The German Staff calculated that the increase would be 144,000, which would make the French army larger than their own. "This means an attack very shortly," observed Moltke to the Belgian Minister; "we must not wait till they are ready." Opinion was genuinely alarmed. "Faites vous forts, très forts," remarked Gortchakoff to the French Ambassador. Bismarck, he added, saw the hand of France in everything. On April 5 the *Kölnische Zeitung* expressed its fear of a Franco-Austrian alliance with the backing of the Pope and a clerical Monarchy in France. On April 8 the *Post* published an article headed "Is War in sight?" which created the first dangerous crisis since 1871. War, it declared, was in sight, for France was preparing a war of revenge, but it was still possible that the clouds might disperse. It was widely believed that the article was inspired by the Chancellor; but the supposition was unfounded, for it was written by Rössler on his own responsibility. Bismarck told Hohenlohe that he was surprised by the article, but he welcomed it as calculated to awaken Germany to the danger and to frighten France. On April 11 the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* declared that, though the fears of the *Post* in regard to

¹ J. V. Fuller, "The War-Scare of 1875," *American Historical Review*, January 1919, states the case against Bismarck. K. Herzfeld, *Die Deutsch-französische Kriegsgefahr von 1875*, and Rachfahl, *Deutschland und die Weltpolitik*, i, 45-76, defend him. The most illuminating discussion of a complicated problem is in the *Life of Lord Odo Russell*, ch. 5, by Winifred Taffs.

Austria and Italy were groundless, its anxieties about French armaments were correct. "The burden is too heavy even for the richest country to bear for long," added the semi-official organ; "they can only be preparations for the object which no clear eye can fail to see." The *Preussische Jahrbücher* declared that arms must decide.

On April 15 Gontaut-Biron, who had been away from Berlin, returned to his post and explained to the Foreign Minister that the horses had not been ordered by the War Office, that the simultaneous reduction of the size of the battalion would reduce the increase of the army to about 30,000, and that there was no thought of attack. Bülow appeared to be satisfied; and the same evening the Emperor, always since 1871 an influence for peace, meeting the French Military Attaché at a reception, observed, "On a voulu nous brouiller . . . Maintenant tout est terminé, tout à fait terminé." Unfortunately the danger was not over, for Gontaut-Biron learned from friends that Bismarck was not yet pacified. "Von Krieg ist gar keine Rede," he remarked to Lucius von Ballhausen on April 11; but on April 21 at a dinner at the British Embassy the French Ambassador heard from the lips of Radowitz, a Foreign Office functionary, words which filled him with terror. When he complained of the German press campaign and spoke of the pacific intentions of France, Radowitz replied, "Can you answer for the future? France is bent on revenge. Why then should we wait till she is strong and has found allies?" Radowitz's own official report of this conversation omits these words and suggests that he was merely explaining the ideas which found utterance in the German press.¹ The Ambassador, however, believed that he was expressing the views of the Chancellor, who had used very similar words, and feared that a preventive war might be launched at any moment. His report alarmed Decazes, the Foreign Minister, who forwarded a copy to the representatives of France abroad, with instructions to bring it to the notice of the Governments. At the same time he ordered the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg to appeal for a public promise by Russia to draw the sword in the event of a German attack. The Tsar had already told Le Flô that there was no danger, and that, if there were to be, he would tell France himself. He now replied, "I shall not draw the sword, nor will you." He added that he was shortly to visit Berlin. Meanwhile Decazes explained to Hohenlohe that France did

¹ *Die Grosse Politik*, i, 275-7.

not want war and could not wage it. If Germany invaded French territory, he added, she would withdraw her troops without fighting.

On May 5 the French Foreign Minister received a fresh shock, when Hohenlohe informed him of a despatch just received from the Wilhelmstrasse. The German Government, it declared, was not entirely convinced of the inoffensive character of French armaments, and the General Staff considered war as the ultimate object of recent military measures. Decazes, fearing that the next step might be a demand for the reduction of the army, informed Blowitz of the situation, and on May 6 a despatch from its famous Paris Correspondent entitled "A French Scare" appeared in *The Times*, revealing the threats and arguing that Russia alone could prevent a conflict. The despatch aroused consternation throughout Europe; but on the previous day Schuvaloff, the Russian Ambassador in London, had passed through Berlin and explained to the Emperor and Bismarck his master's attitude. On May 7 William I expressed a wish in writing that the offending German editors should be reprovved for alarming Europe and destroying the gradual growth of confidence that peace would not be disturbed. Lord Derby instructed the British Ambassador at Berlin energetically to support Russian representations, and Andrassy, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, assured Russia of the approval of Austria. Annoyed at what he called British credulity Bismarck informed the British Ambassador that the project of a German attack was a legend; and when the Tsar and Gortchakoff reached Berlin on May 11 they were met with peaceful assurances. The six weeks' crisis was over. The French President wrote to thank the Tsar for his timely aid, and Decazes spoke cheerfully of the resurrection of Europe.

That a preventive war was advocated by the army chiefs in Germany, and that cool observers like Lord Derby and Odo Russell believed in the danger, is beyond dispute; but we cannot be certain what was in Bismarck's mind. The Tsar believed that he invented the danger of a French attack in order to demonstrate the need of keeping him at the helm. The statement in his *Reflections and Recollections* that "the myth of a German attack" was a conspiracy against him engineered by Gontaut-Biron is ridiculous, but there is no ground for the belief that he had resolved to fight and was only restrained by the veto of Russia. If he had really desired to go

to war, he would have done so. "Bismarck," observed the Duc Decazes, "wants us to believe that he wishes for war, but he does not wish for it himself." He was however gravely and even neurotically alarmed by the reports from his secret agents abroad. Though he did not share the bellicose views of Moltke, he desired France to know that Germany was watching her very closely, and that she would be wise to abstain from military or diplomatic measures which pointed towards a renewal of the struggle. But a policy of intimidation may easily lead to war without actually intending it. His resentment against Gortchakoff and Derby, and his fruitless request for the recall of Gontaut-Biron, showed that something had gone awry. The spectre of a coalition had appeared, and he was conscious that by playing with fire he had partially forfeited the confidence in him which Europe had begun to entertain. Everyone was asking apprehensively what he would do next. Gortchakoff acidly remarked to Lord Odo Russell that the Chancellor was suffering from nerves as a result of over-eating, over-drinking and over-working. It was certainly not his finest hour.

The conflagration in the Balkans which began soon after the war-scare of 1875 claimed Bismarck's attention for the next three years and thereby diminished the tension in the West. He continued to dread the royalist movement in France, and feared that MacMahon's clerical sympathies might lead him to attempt a *coup*. "If the French Government can permanently free itself from clericalism," he wrote to Hohenlohe in 1876, "good relations would be easy and there would be less chance of the *revanche*." He declined an invitation to take part in the exhibition planned for 1878, despite the desire of the Emperor and the Crown Prince to accept it. His fears seemed to be confirmed by the anti-Republican demonstration of May 16, 1877, when the President dismissed the Ministry of Jules Simon and summoned the Royalist leader the Duc de Broglie; and he observed that the France which stood behind MacMahon would not be able to avoid war. There were two nations in France, he declared. The provinces were pacific and only wanted to work; Paris, on the other hand, loved noise and conflict, and it was Paris which determined the character of the press.

II

A *détente* began with the triumph of the Republicans in the French elections of December, 1877, which removed the fear of a clerico-monarchical restoration. The recall of Gontaut-Biron, with whom the Chancellor had hardly been on speaking terms since the crisis of 1875, was hailed by him as an olive branch, though his departure brought tears to the eyes of the aged Emperor. The appointment of the Comte de St. Vallier, who had established excellent relations with Manteuffel during the occupation of French territory, confirmed the favourable impression of the Dufaure Ministry and of Waddington, the new Foreign Minister. On February 4, 1878, the Ambassador reported that the members of the Bundesrath saw in his appointment "a new era," and the Chancellor showed himself particularly amiable in their first interview. An invitation to take part in the Congress of Berlin was accepted, and Bismarck went so far as to offer the presidency to Waddington, in whom he expressed the same complete confidence that he had felt for Thiers. Even in Alsace-Lorraine there was a slight temporary *détente*.

When Waddington learned during the Congress of Berlin that Great Britain had secured the occupation of Cyprus from Turkey, he told Beaconsfield that he must withdraw; but Salisbury was ready with a *solatium*. "You cannot leave Carthage in the hands of barbarians. Do what you like there." The advice was supported by Bismarck, and on his return Waddington secured from Salisbury a written assurance of *désintéressement* in Tunis. No action was taken at the moment, but the conversations at Berlin opened a new chapter in Franco-German relations. In January, 1879, Bismarck invited St. Vallier, whom he described as "notre drapeau de paix et d'entente," to Friedrichsruh, where he urged the seizure of Tunis. "I think that the pear is ripe and that it is time for you to gather it. I do not know if it tempts you, but I must repeat what I said last year to M. Waddington. My desire is to give you pledges of goodwill in matters which concern you and where German interests do not collide with yours. It is only fair, for I appreciate the efforts which he and you have made to restore confidence between our two countries. Neither the Emperor nor I want another war on our hands. I believe that the French people need some satisfaction for their *amour-propre*, and I sincerely desire to see them obtain what they