

TADHANA

*The History
of the
Filipino
People*

Ferdinand
E. Marcos

TADHANA

*The History
of the
Filipino
People*

Ferdinand E. Marcos

PREFACE

As President I have had access to information not available to the professional historian and have met with men who made history but never wrote the story behind such history.

Thus I remember learning of the Philippine-American War of 1898 to 1902 on the lap of a soldier-grandfather, conversing with the first Philippine Republic's President Emilio Aguinaldo concerning his alleged order for the execution of Andres Bonifacio, the founder of the Katipunan, then finally delivering a eulogy on Aguinaldo's funeral.

So this is a story that wrote itself. It is the product of a deeply felt need to explain, if only to myself and my children, how we became one people, a national community—even farther than that, where we began, and where we are going.

These are questions which have been, for as long as I can remember, a huge and heavy burden. While I realize that the same questions must have weighed on the minds of countless other men, for me they have become a dark, brooding presence that would accost me at every turn, often when I was unprepared, and always when I was alone. As a young student in high school I chanced upon some stray bits of information about Philippine history, including the fact that all the native written literature of our ancestors were deliberately destroyed by the Spaniards in the early years of the colonial period. For some reason I have not found, unless it is simply a natural vulnerability to sorrow, I have since grieved over this fact, over its terrible and absolute finality. That I grew up in a period which took special delight in the culture and history of another country did not help any. In college, the sense of alienation from my own country's past and my own people's virtues and memories was aggravated by the content of our formal education. As it had been in high school, which drenched the consciousness with the Gettysburg Address, July Fourth and the Battle of Bull Run, in college special value was accorded to readings on the infallibility of American intellection, on the thought processes that operated in Oliver Wendell Holmes or Benjamin Cardozo.

Where was the Filipino in all this?

As it must have been for other Filipinos, this was for me a crisis of identity. I thought that in a study of our history, the history of the Filipino people, we could dispel the crisis, resolve the questions that ambushed our thoughts, and finally clasp our bodies to their cultural moorings. No professional historian, I have since nonetheless strived to learn from every possible source the story of our people.

My view of our story as a people follows a conceptual framework that considers our earliest ancestors as having participated in man's universal evolution before commencing the particularization process that would, over the centuries, produce a racial identity. From this point follows the development of the Filipino people into a unique and distinct nation.

The early stages of this development process involve five distinct periods: 1) the beginnings of the archipelago (up to the Pleistocene or Glacial Period) which shows the Philippines being constituted through the history of rock formation and volcanic processes; 2) man's past in the Philippines (ca. 250,000 B.C. to ca. 9,000 B.C.), when the archipelago participated in the development of the human species and its early culture; 3) the coming of the Austronesians (from ca. 9,000 B.C. to ca. 1500 B.C.) which reveals the Philippines as the staging ground for the epic peopling of the oceanic world; 4) the constitution of a Southeast Asian culture area in which the Philippines would occupy a primordial place (ca. 1500 B.C. to ca. 200 A.D.); and 5) the beginnings of Proto-Filipino forms (from 200 A.D. to 1565) which show the Philippines as evolving its own unique patterns of culture or ways of life reflected in the *baranganic* and allied systems, the folk religions, and the communal-trade economy.

History may be viewed, in line with Jakob Burckhardt's thesis, as the continuous interaction among the three most important forces in man's creative activities: State, Religion, and Culture. In any historical stage, one or more of these powers may predominate and play the most important role, thus determining in general the pattern and quality of the period in which a people live.

The broad sweep of our history as a people acquires a distinct rhythm when so viewed. Thus, a first stage in our history can be defined in terms of the development of a *proto-Filipino Civilization* from the earliest times up to 1565, when the Spaniards finally established themselves in the archipelago. This was a period when the most predominant force in the historical process was Culture.

The proto-Filipino civilization which had been evolved before 1565 was also slowly attaining political sophistication as it developed ethnic states of varying dimensions. This proto-Filipino cultural continuum was in contact with Southeast Asia, Asia and the Middle Eastern and Mediterranean world. The various ethnic states were sufficiently strong for this type of contact. But when

the Spanish vanguard of Western civilization suddenly appeared from the East to establish itself in the archipelago, a new type of socio-political organization based on the concept of the nation-state penetrated the area and gave rise to a contact situation which wiped out practically all the ethnic states, with the exception of the Muslim varieties in the South and remnant "traditional" groups elsewhere. This period of contact clearly changed the complexion of Philippine historical development. The central role was played by religion—whether this be in the Christianized pale (Catholic Church) or the areas left free from the colonial penetration (Muslim and traditional groups).

This period of the preeminence of Religion (1565-1896) would see the Philippines develop into a national community and begin the creation of a state of their own as a result of reaction to the colonial experience. Between 1565, when the *adelantado* Miguel Lopez de Legazpi established the first settlements of the Philippine *Conquista*, and 1896, when the Filipino people got formally constituted in a Revolution against Spain, the Philippines went through a period of religious preponderance over practically all institutions of Society, Culture and State.

Thus, while the trend in world history seemed to be liberation from all medieval constraints of religion (particularly those related to the influence of "men of religion" in the affairs of the State), the Philippines was caught within these centuries in a web of religious forces which would impede its development in almost all aspects of life. However, by creatively reacting to these forces, the Filipino people were nevertheless able not only to become a "national community" but also to start the process of creating a state of their own to realize their dream of becoming one united nation.

The first part of this second volume, encompassing the period 1565 to 1663, deals with the encounter of the Spanish variety of Western civilization and our own indigenous proto-Filipino culture. At the outset, the "clash" was one of arms which was very early determined by religion, principally because Spain was then militant not only against Islam but even against

a segment of Christianity itself, Protestantism. This insured the "mediatory" role of the friars within the colonial framework established by Spanish ingress into the Philippines.

The second part, from 1663 to 1765, shows more specific reactions from the indigenous peoples, both from those who had been incorporated into the Colonial State and from those who remained outside (organized either as "sultanates" or simply "barangays"). From 1765 to 1815, the conditions in the Philippine field of historico-political forces constituted a "fulcrum," a transition from an "isolated colony" into a colony almost forcibly opened up to the winds of economic changes in the 19th century. This is the third part. The fourth part, from 1815 up to 1872, delineates the transformation that would take place in the archipelago as a result of increasingly intensive contacts with the outside world which was being buffeted by the effects of European industrialism. Affected by these are both the "external" dichotomy between the Colonial State and the "unchristianized" groups (including the Muslims and traditional groups) and the "internal" polarity between the same state and the incorporated indigenes in the process of giving substance to a counter-society and a counter-culture against the dominance of Spain.

The period from 1872 to 1896 constitutes a fifth part, which looks into the ideology of the "counter society" as it got defined against the colonial order, the ideology of the "national community." This idea was transmitted to the masses from 1892 to 1896, during the preparatory organization of the Katipunan's revolt. The conjunction of this ideology refined among the principalia-ilustrado class and the elemental yearnings of the peasant and working masses brought about the first link-up, as it were, between the base of society and the new elements of political authority. This *union sacrée* of all the levels of indigenous society with a view to national emancipation became an invincible force. And the Colonial State became all the weaker because of its preoccupation with the conquests and incorporation of the Muslim areas.

Thus, it would appear at the end of the 19th century that the process which started in 1565 had at last come to a head. The result was the constitution of the Filipino "national community" hankering for a state which would carry it successfully to the stage of becoming one united nation. This would become the sacred trust of the fire of Revolution. Basic to the attainment of this new level of ethnic and political unity was a fundamental act of moral and political liberation: that of cutting the bonds which linked the Filipino people to the "intermediaries" of the Colonial State, the friars and the men of religion in general. For the first time, too, the Muslim, Christian and other indigenous Filipinos have been seen walking side by side in their trek through history—a fact of heritage that has always been treated as separate elements by historians so far.

The development of the Filipino state, which began with the Revolution of 1896 and culminated in the Malolos Republic, was thwarted by a new external and powerful challenge from the American advent. The Filipino state was aborted in 1901 with the collapse of the Philippine Republic under Aguinaldo. But the Filipino struggle for a state continued during the period of American rule which "promised" the state in due time. As reflected in their literature and movements, the Filipinos never lost sight of the national community vigorously confronting the colonial power through armed resistance and, later, by active participation in the administration of local and national affairs, ending in their almost complete takeover of the state in the Commonwealth period. Important in this struggle were the mediatory role of the Filipino oligarchic class and the persistent pressures of non-Christian societies, particularly the Muslims whose armed resistance strengthened the need for unity and the search for a secular, humanistic, and Filipinistic basis of cohesion. The united resistance against the Japanese indicated the presence of cohesiveness in the national community.

The progress of the national community in the postwar period was affected not only by the aftermaths of war and the need for immediate reconstruction but also by the oligarchic

control of the state. The transformation of the oligarchic role from positive mediation in the American period to a negative element in the national life after 1946 created a new internal challenge to nationhood. The response of the Filipino people was reflected in a nationalist-radical movement demanding the overthrow of "neo-colonial" and "feudal" interests and control in society and the state. But the apparent trend towards extremism in popular movements which precipitated the crisis before 1972 created the need for re-examining the problem of dichotomous orientation. The national community recognized the necessity of resolving the problem through the blending of modern and traditional values and the balancing of national and foreign interests. The search for the Filipino identity to solve the centuries of ambivalence in national attitudes, values, and actions gained real purpose and direction in the New Society.

All these vicissitudes of polity came to a head in September 1972 with the establishment of "constitutional authoritarianism." The New Society constructed at this time serves to strengthen the baranganic culture and retrieve its cultural elements which, at bottom, are composed of ethno-linguistic cultural communities.

* * *

As conceived by me, *Tadhana: The History of the Filipino People* consists of four volumes:

Volume One—Foundations of Filipino Culture, from ca. 250,000 B.C. to 1565

Volume Two—The Formation of the National Community, from 1565 to 1896

Volume Three—The Promised State, from 1896 to 1946

Volume Four—Towards the New Society, from 1946 to the present.

Owing to the fact that research for the first volume is not confined to historical source material but must instead devote special care to other areas, such as geology, archaeology, anthro-

pology, linguistics and oral traditions, it has not been possible to bring forth Volume One at this time. The second volume covers the period of religious preeminence from the advent of Spain in the archipelago up to the beginning of the Filipino people's act of national redemption in the Revolution against Spain. From this volume, I now extract Part One, which deals with the first century of Spanish colonization, from 1565 to 1663. Hopefully, over the following months, the four other Parts will follow individually as a series of single books: Part Two, "Reactions," 1663-1765; Part Three, "Transition," 1765-1815, Part Four, "Transformation," 1815-1872; and Part Five, "Triumph," 1872-1896.

I like to believe that what we achieved in 1896 is crucial to our development as a people. Furthermore, it seems to me that from the Revolution ensued a "new society" for the Filipinos. Every distinct epoch, in fact, entailed its own "new society," so that our history may be viewed as essentially a series of new societies, each bringing change, if only in texture, mood or pattern. Our own New Society has brought its own change, this time, I believe, a change in attitude and in the degree of national purpose. What Casimiro Diaz lamented among our people has been, to my mind, largely excised by that change.

I have chosen Tadhana as the title of this History because to my mind the story of a people is not merely a heritage but a destiny; it is their condition and their goal, their past informing their future. Implicit in Tadhana of course is heritage, but it is an active heritage, not an inert mass of artifacts and memories, because by common purpose it is harnessed to mobilize the national will and the national pride for the attainment of ideals. A sense of history cannot but stir a people to improve their lot.

F.E.M.

Malacañang

Manila

September, 1976

CONTENTS

1	Introduction	The World of the Sixteenth Century
15	Chapter One	The Western Islands
41	Chapter Two	Early Encounter
89	Chapter Three	The Indigenous Power Set-Up
115	Chapter Four	The New Power Structure
215	Chapter Five	New Christians Against a New Commonwealth
239	Chapter Six	The Southwest Monsoon: Kampilans and Caracoas
329	Chapter Seven	At the Source: Peoples Upstream
385	Chapter Eight	Summing-Up: "Liberty, A Gift of Priceless Value"
397	Glossary	
403	Bibliographical Notes	
417	INDEX	

THE WORLD OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

In 1493, the Roman Pontiff divided the known world into two between Portugal and Spain.

Till then, the human community had been divided, in the words of the Scriptures, "in sundry times and divers manners." Men in conflict or in harmony had wandered across lands and seas for centuries to discover, trade or conquer. King or soldier, merchant or statesman, they had carved out territories and established boundaries upon the earth to possess and protect. At the end of the thousand years which spanned the Middle Ages, voyages and wars had produced and unmade civilizations, established dynasties and epochs, and fragmented the planet into states and kingdoms. It took a pope of Christendom, Alexander VI, to put order into men's rival claims and arbitrate their contests for possessions and domains. This Spanish Borgia, at once

fascinated and repelled by the rivalry of Portugal and Spain for gold and lands, by means of an imaginary line proclaimed the formal division of the world into East and West.

In the famous Bull *Inter Caetera*, this pontiff of Rome decreed in 1493 that Spanish explorations and conquests should be limited to lands situated west of this imaginary line drawn from pole to pole, 100 leagues from the Cape Verde islands. The following year, by the Treaty of Tordesillas, the "Catholic Kings" Ferdinand and Isabella reluctantly agreed to move the "line of demarcation" to 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands. In 1506, Pope Julius II was persuaded by the Portuguese king to confirm the treaty. The two countries then quibbled on its application, but by and large agreed on the effects of the division in the Western Hemisphere, although its application in the Pacific and Asia was not quite settled. Owing however to the successes of the Portuguese fleets in the Indian Ocean, the pope Leo X, in the Bull *Praeelsae Devotionis*, awarded to Portugal in 1514 all territories which could be reached by sailing east. It was an ambiguous settlement, for how was the world to be divided in the East if the two world powers were there to meet?

In this curious situation then the events that had shaped and moved mankind's affairs through the past centuries found an uneasy culmination. Like the Portuguese and Spaniards now in their time of adventure, men had carried themselves between Asia and Europe, singly or in hordes, in various quests of body and spirit. Asiatic nomads had troubled large areas in Europe; Alaric and his Visigoths had sacked Rome; German tribes had ravaged and settled on Roman lands. Religion and warfare had created Constantinople and Byzantium, Gregory the Great and St. Benedict, Bede and Canterbury. Islam had risen and Moslem rulers had sat on the thrones of ancient lands. Charlemagne had won an empire and a legendary fame; Alfred the Great had laid the foundations of England; serfdom and knighthood had grown side by side. The Holy Roman Empire had flourished and waned, the Church had been divided into West and East factions; Teutons in "holy wars" had marched in the Crusades to push the frontiers of Christianity; Saladin had confronted the

Christian hordes with his own. Tartar irruptions had brought legions to territories east and west whose dimensions were without precedent and produced Genghis Khan. In the hands of the Genoese and the Venetians voyaging by sea had become a science. The Magna Carta had been produced. National monarchies had risen from the debris of feudalism. Castille and Aragon in Spain had developed the *cortés*, the precursor of parliaments in France and England. Frederick "Barbarossa" had climbed to power and become a German legend. French and English disputes had produced the Hundred Years' War and Joan of Arc. Pretensions to the English throne had launched the Wars of the Roses. The Black Death had ravaged European populations more efficiently than the weapons of war.

Neither sufficiently instructed nor intimidated by catastrophe, man had persisted in faction and strife. Now, in the sixteenth century, the race for dominance sharpened as the invisible line through the Cape Verdes marked the lanes where the contestants might sprint and show their prowess.

* * *

"The History of the World," Hegel remarked in his *Philosophy of History*, "travels from East to West, for Europe is absolutely the end of History, Asia the beginning." While history might indeed have begun in the East, it is not certain even now that it is anywhere near its end—in Europe or elsewhere, Spengler and other prophets of cultural decline notwithstanding. Hegel was of course speaking of the highest form his Universal Spirit had taken in the Germanic *monarchy* of his time, in his view the synthesis of the earlier phases of *despotism* in the East and *democracy* and *autocracy* in the Mediterranean world of the Greeks and Romans. This view of historical dialectics may have been compelling at one time or another; in Hegel's monarchy as in Marx's communism, the synthesis assumes an almost predestined finality, leaving scant room for creative action and further development. We know now, however, that neither history nor

dialectics really stops even where we believe it has ceased or prefer it should end.

History, instead, is a continuous process—a fact that becomes even more evident if one recalls that Hegel himself pointed out, and his disciple Benedetto Croce emphasized, that history is the story of liberty, no matter how much we may quibble over the nature, the extent and even the desirability of this human ideal. There is indeed a relentless thrust toward human liberation in history. But alongside this thrust and basically informing it, another ceaseless movement can be perceived—a dialectical interaction between East and West, which destroys the Hegelian notion of human civilization rising like the sun in the East (*ex oriente lux*) and setting in the West. One's epoch is always the modern one and, for a European intellectual conditioned by the style and temper after the cultural shock over the fall of Rome, it was quite natural that Hegel considered his own period the last, but a glorious, one. The same certainty is already to be found in Saint Augustine's *City of God*, with the difference that the end was not any monarchy in the here and now but a blissful state in the hereafter. But as late as our time, long after those prophecies of doom or of a heavenly place, there is good reason why the certainty should be instead that terrestrial life, therefore history, will continue indefinitely and East and West will carry on their ancient dialogue, their mutual challenges and responses, within the slow but perhaps inevitable movement towards the unification of the world.

Until Ferdinand Magellan, by his discovery of the Philippines on March 16, 1521, proved conclusively that the world was round and showed that all its land masses, new and ancient, could be knit together by a system of ship routes, dialogue between the East and the West had been carried to some distance through intermittent trade and other contacts or through sudden irruptions in quest of hegemony and empire. What gave rise to the polarity? Was it Persia's march across the Hellespont to civilize and chastise the unruly and *polis*-dwelling Greeks whose cousins were subjects of the King of Kings in "Asiatic" Ionia? In any case, the

first Western historian, Herodotus, viewed the Persian attempt at imperial expansion as a Manichæan struggle between Eastern despotism and Western liberty. But the response from Hellas, although arguably "only" Macedonian (hence partly "barbarian"), was no less despotic in tone and intent, for all its Olympian dimensions. Its result was an empire whose frontiers reached as far as the Indus, moving deeper into Asia than Persia had ever cut into Europe. In the Philippines, we have a trace of that Alexandrian penetration in the legend that our ancient Manila rulers descended from Iskandar, the apotheosis of the great Macedonian conqueror in the Indies.

Rome did not quite follow Alexander into Asia, although the emperor Trajan, sailing on the Persian gulf, thought he could have stretched his course to India had he been younger. Though young, however, his successors could do no better than allow the trade contacts initiated by the Greeks to continue with India and, through Southeast Asia, with China. In October A.D. 166 a commercial mission or embassy was received in the court of emperor Huan-ti from Antun, whom Western historians know better as the philosopher-emperor Marcus Aurelius. Thereafter, contacts became less intense. Under the Sassanids, Persia had a renewed period of glory and Rome, thus isolated from the Far East, would occupy itself with the more pressing task of keeping the Empire in the West. But then it would increasingly fall prey at once to internal decay (precipitated, for Edward Gibbon, by Christianity) and to barbarian forces around it. Was Rome's fall indirectly brought about by the strengthening of China, as that country hurled the Hsiung-nu, the Huns, at the lands of the Visigoths near the Black Sea and drove these first Teutonic invaders to Roman grounds and rocked the Empire to its very foundations? More important than the answer to this is that the Huns themselves afterwards became equally the scourge of Europe, and even more important that Europe, both Western and Eastern, would be born out of the collapse of Rome, from the turbulence and ferment that followed this great release of pure nomadic energy from the steppes.

But which, in relation to Hegel's East, was now the West, Byzantium or that extreme western peninsula of the Eurasian continent? Both were of course Christian—although, except doctrinally, no less than the Copts or the Nestorians farther East. It was nonetheless Western Europe which claimed the honor of succession of Greece and Rome, relegating two other descendants of the Roman Empire more or less to the East—Islam and Orthodox Christianity. Fostered by Russia as the Third Rome after the fall of Constantinople, this Orthodox Christian civilization would always be felt antithetical to Western Europe. It would be half Asiatic to Westerners, but simply a different and original civilization to Russians like, for instance, Danilevsky. In *Russia and Europe*, Danilevsky considered the Russian-Slavic civilization creative in four fields: religious, scientific-technological, political-economic, and esthetic, unlike Western Europe which excels only in the political-economic and scientific-technological. Russia was destined to save the world from Western dominance, an idea which reversed the opinion of the West that the conquering instinct filled tartarized Muscovy.

In terms of world history, Russia and the West constitute a new, a very recent, polarity in which the East is involved only partly. Islam, however, belongs to the much older polarity between East and West, and was, in fact, the first major oriental challenge to nascent Western Europe. Was this Asia's belated rejoinder to the Graeco-Roman attempt to bridge the two cultural poles of the Old World? If so, what a magnificent structure it became, even if it may not have succeeded in the enterprise. The Islamic world spans Europe from the Balkans and Africa from the West above and below the Sahara to our own land, the Philippines, through the Middle East, India, Indochina and Indonesia. Europe's answer was not long in coming, also couched in religious language although the meanings were, often enough, clearly cultural or economic. For the Crusades were as complex as faith and the human heart. Muslims and Christians fought each other for the same God revealed and conceived in different ways, in varying cultural contexts, while they learned from and traded with each other.