




MALAYSIA

MALAYA/INDONESIA RELATIONS

31st AUGUST, 1957

TO

15th SEPTEMBER, 1963



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DI-CHETAK DI-JABATAN CHETAK KERAJAAN
OLEH THOR BENG CHONG, A.M.N., PENCHETAK KERAJAAN
KUALA LUMPUR

1963

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There has always been a strong desire on the part of the Malayan people for very close and friendly relations with the people of Indonesia not only because of the sentimental and blood ties which bind a major part of the population of the Federation of Malaya with that of Indonesia but also because, apart from Thailand, Indonesia is the nearest neighbour of the Federation with which close cultural and economic relations existed. Even before the outbreak of the Second World War (despite being separated by different colonial masters) close ties were maintained and there was a free flow of visitors between the Malayan mainland and the Netherlands East Indies. When the Indonesian people fought for their independence from the Netherlands soon after the end of the Second World War the people of Malaya gave not only moral and material support but hundreds of Malaysians went over to Indonesia to join the Indonesians, fighting side by side with them, and many sacrificed their lives for the sake of the independence of the people for whom they had the closest regard and affection. After the attainment of Indonesian independence many of these volunteers settled down in Indonesia becoming Indonesian citizens.

2. The regard and esteem for Indonesian national leaders became a source of guidance and inspiration to Malayan people in their struggle for independence.

3. The strong moral support and backing which the Indonesian leaders gave to the independence movement in the Federation was highly appreciated by Federation leaders and it became a basic principle in the Federation's foreign policy after independence to forge the closest links with Indonesia. Even before Merdeka, the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, in 1955 in his capacity as Chief Minister, paid an official visit to Indonesia to foster further goodwill and friendly ties with Indonesia.

4. Early in 1957 it was decided to open a Federation Mission in Djakarta and an officer of the newly formed External Affairs Service of the Federation Government was sent to establish a Mission, thus creating history by forming the first Mission overseas in a country other than a member of the Commonwealth. On 31st August, 1957 on the attainment of independence this Mission was converted into a full Embassy, one of the first to be established after Merdeka. Enche' Senu bin Abdul Rahman was sent as the Federation's first Ambassador in Djakarta while Dr Mohamad Razif became Indonesia's first Ambassador in Kuala Lumpur. In September, 1962, Enche' Senu was succeeded by Dato' Kamaruddin bin Haji Idris while Dr Mohamad Razif was succeeded by Lt-General G. P. S. Djatikusumo in April, 1963. In November, 1958, a Consulate was also established in Medan to meet the growing need of trade and cultural relations.

5. In November, 1958, Tun Abdul Razak, the Deputy Prime Minister, then in his capacity as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Education, led a goodwill mission to Indonesia, and in a major speech after his arrival affirmed our faith in the ability of the Indonesian nation to give inspiration to the Federation

people and strongly urged the strengthening of relations between the two countries. This sentiment was reciprocated by Mr Ruslan Abdul Gani, a Minister in the Indonesian Government who declared that the Federation and Indonesia were historically inseparable and that their friendship was inspired by ideals of freedom and justice. Throughout the visit members of the mission were treated with the greatest kindness and courtesy both by President Sukarno and other leaders as well as by the Indonesian people. The splendid success of this first goodwill mission from an independent Malaya to Indonesia was considered a happy augury for future relations between the two countries.

6. At the end of the visit a Joint Communiqué* was issued which proposed, *inter alia*, the conclusion of a Treaty of Friendship which would not only serve to give formal expression to the close friendship which existed between the two countries and of their desire to strengthen it further but also provide the basis for cooperation and collaboration towards the growth of a common language and a common culture.

7. Soon after this decision was reached steps were immediately taken to draft the text of the Treaty and, when in April 1959 the late Dr Djuanda, then Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia, paid a State Visit to the Federation, the opportunity was taken to finalise and sign the Treaty at Kuala Lumpur. The Treaty was warmly welcomed not only in Indonesia and the Federation but also by the rest of the world, because it formally signified the establishment of the close ties which are so essential for the well-being and peace in this region of Asia. It also represented the common desire of both peoples to bringing about mutual cooperation on matters affecting both countries, thereby providing the basis for much closer relations between them, a happy augury for peace, stability and progress in the area.

8. This was the first treaty signed by the newly independent Federation of Malaya and to date the only one of its kind. This treaty symbolised the very strong and sincere desire among the Malayan people to work closely with the Indonesian people. The text of the Treaty is attached as an Appendix† to this paper.

9. During his State Visit, the late Dr Djuanda received a tremendous welcome and was given every courtesy and hospitality as befitting the Prime Minister of a very close and esteemed neighbour and a very good friend of the Federation. He was personally received on arrival by the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman who spent much time with him even after Tunku Abdul Rahman resigned temporarily from the office of Prime Minister. Dr Djuanda's visit was climaxed by the investment of one of Malaya's highest honours, the Seri Mangku Negara, by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, and Dr Prijono who accompanied Dr Djuanda was made a Panglima Mangku Negara.

10. The existence of the Treaty of Friendship and Cultural Agreement gave bright prospects of very close and friendly relations with Indonesia and on its part the Federation Government lost no time in taking action to implement the various clauses contained in the Treaty. Groups of civic workers and other leaders were sent to Medan and Jakarta not only to study developments there

* Appendix I.

† Appendix II.

but also to maintain friendly contacts with the Indonesian people especially with local leaders and the man-in-the-street.

11. On their part Indonesia sponsored an art exhibition in Kuala Lumpur in February 1959. It was held at the National Art Gallery and participated by about 90 artists. The exhibition was attended by more than 6,000 persons.

12. In 1960 Indonesia sent a troupe of artistes to show examples of the rich and variegated culture of Indonesia. These cultural shows drew large audiences and revealed the close interest which the Malayan people have for Indonesia and there was no doubt that the shows provided a better understanding and appreciation of Indonesian life and culture. In 1962 the Indonesian Government kindly agreed to second one of their leading artistes, Bing Selamat, whose name is a household word in Southeast Asia, for a period with Radio Malaya in order to train Malayan musicians and artistes. In the Koran Reading Competition in 1961 Indonesia sent a delegation together with their Minister of Religious Affairs, Kiai Hj. Wahib Wahab, who brought a proposal for the holding of an Afro-Asian Koran Reading Competition to be held in Djakarta the following year. From 1962 onwards Indonesia sent no further delegation to the Annual Koran Reading Competition. The Federation Government also received a number of scholarships from the Indonesian Government.

13. In October, 1960, General Abdul Haris Nasution, Chief of Staff of the Indonesian National Army, together with his wife and a group of other officials, visited the Federation and was given every courtesy and hospitality. His programme in the Federation included visits to various military establishments and meetings with the Prime Minister and high officials, both of the Government and Armed Services of the Federation. After his return to Djakarta General Nasution wrote to the Deputy Prime Minister expressing his gratitude for the courtesy and hospitality which was shown to him and he expressed the hope that the close ties of blood and friendship between the two nations would last forever.

14. Early in 1961 disastrous floods occurred in West Java rendering tens of thousands of Indonesians homeless and destroying thousands of acres of rice fields. As an expression of sympathy for those who suffered in the floods the Federation Government gave assistance in food and clothing. The Prime Minister personally wrote to his counterpart, the late Dr Djuanda, expressing his sympathies.

15. One of the most important clauses in the Treaty of Friendship and Cultural agreement related to the closer collaboration and cooperation in enlarging and developing the Malay and Indonesian languages so that the differences between the two could be reduced to the minimum. It was hoped that in the future the two nations would have one common language thus paving the way for greater understanding between the peoples of the two countries. The Federation Government therefore proceeded with its plans for the introduction of reforms which would facilitate this objective.

16. In December 1959 a delegation led by the Director of Dewan Bahasa, Tuan Syed Nasir Ismail, went to Indonesia for discussions with the Indonesian Language Implementation Committee. After deliberations lasting several days agreement was finally reached between the two official delegations as to a new spelling system to

be introduced in both countries, and it was agreed further that as soon as the respective governments had given approval to the new system there would be a simultaneous announcement of the date for the adoption of the new spelling system and the effective date on which it was to be implemented. It was then hoped that the date would not be later than January, 1961. When the proposal was put to the Federation Government it quickly gave approval to the recommended spelling system and to its adoption from the date which would be agreed upon between the two governments. This was made known to the Indonesian Government, but the Indonesian Government had made no decision as to the adoption of this new spelling system.

17. Early in 1959, the Prime Minister made a major proposal for closer association and cooperation among the nations in Southeast Asia, which was within the scope of the Treaty in so far as it concerned relations between the Federation and Indonesia. This proposal was the setting up of an organisation which would provide the basis for facilitating cooperation and collaboration in the economic, cultural and social fields. Even before the matter was put officially to the Indonesian Government, the Indonesian Government spokesman as well as the Indonesian press launched a scathing attack on the whole concept. Despite the unfavourable reaction, in October, 1959, the Prime Minister wrote to President Sukarno as well as to other Southeast Asian leaders outlining in greater detail what he had in mind and proposing a meeting to be held early in 1960 at a place to be decided upon in order to examine further the proposal and to exchange views.* President Sukarno replied in January, 1960, rejecting the proposal of a multilateral relation among nations in Southeast Asia because he believed that it would only give rise to undesirable speculations on the part of other nations and that it would prevent the attainment of the desired objective of close cooperation. Instead, the President favoured bilateral arrangements.†

18. Despite the refusal on the part of Indonesia to associate with the Prime Minister's proposal the Federation Government went ahead and, eventually, the Association of Southeast Asia or ASA as it later became commonly known was formed, the members, apart from the Federation, being the Philippines and Thailand. The progress of this Association since its inception has amply demonstrated to the world the value of close multilateral association in the economic, social and cultural fields.

19. In 1957 the PRRI rebellion broke out in Indonesia. In conformity with the spirit of friendship and in accordance with international practice the Federation Government adopted a position of strict non-involvement and considered the rebellion to be purely an internal matter for the Indonesian people. Furthermore, the Indonesian Government did not declare a state of insurgency.

20. This attitude of the Federation Government came under bitter criticism by the Indonesian Government who urged the Federation Government to adopt the extraordinary stand of taking active measures to assist the Indonesian Government in its campaign to suppress the rebellion.

21. One of the questions which was brought up by Indonesia during this period was that concerning the grant by the Federation

* Appendix III. † Appendix IV.

Government of political asylum to a number of rebels. Towards the latter part of the rebellion some Indonesian rebels, realising that their cause was bound to fail, escaped to the Federation to seek asylum here rather than give themselves up to the Indonesian Government who then had not yet issued their amnesty offer. For purely humanitarian reasons the Prime Minister acceded to their request but only after obtaining an undertaking from them that they would not participate in any further activities aimed at overthrowing the Government with which the Federation Government was in the closest and friendliest terms. This was strictly in conformity with international law and practice.

22. During the early part of the rebellion a number of Indonesians who were alleged to be taking part in the rebellion had been visiting and staying in the Federation. In this regard, the Federation Government was placed in a very awkward and difficult position, because these visitors were in possession of valid travel documents issued by the Indonesian Government which the Federation Government was bound to honour; but the Indonesian Government alleged that the Federation by this action was actively giving help to the rebels. This problem was put to the Indonesian Government and eventually they decided to cancel the travel documents of persons believed to be actively engaged in the rebellion and in the spirit of close cooperation and friendship the Federation Government took immediate action by refusing entry into the Federation of holders of such disowned or cancelled documents. A close liaison was kept with the Indonesian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur in this regard.

23. In January 1960, 30 Indonesians were found to have landed illegally in Penang and were arrested. The Indonesian Embassy claimed that these people were rebels and requested that they be handed over to the Indonesian authorities. The Federation Government could not accede to this request because that would be tantamount to recognising a state of insurgency in Indonesia in which case the proper procedure would have been to intern these alleged rebels. It was explained to the Indonesian Charge d'Affaires in Kuala Lumpur that in the interest of close relations between the Federation and Indonesia no action should be taken which would indicate that the Federation was giving cognizance to a state of civil war in Indonesia. The Indonesian Charge d'Affaires appreciated this stand and expressed gratitude for it. Accordingly, the 30 Indonesians were regarded as illegal entrants and were prosecuted in accordance with the law. Subsequently, they were told to leave the territorial limits of the Federation.

24. On 28th January, 1960, Dr Subandrio, the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, acting in accordance with the clause of the Treaty of Friendship which provided that the two countries agree to consider the signing of an Extradition agreement, wrote to the Federation's Minister of External Affairs proposing that an extradition treaty be concluded between Indonesia and the Federation.* Having an extradition treaty is a common practice between close neighbours on the friendliest relations and the proposal normally would have received a favourable consideration if not for the fact that the letter referred to above contained the unprecedented request for an extradition of political refugees.

* Appendix V.

25. Accordingly, the Federation's Minister of External Affairs drew the attention of the Indonesian Government to the irregularity of such a treaty, for extradition arrangement should only cover criminal offenders.* No reply has since been received to this letter but apparently, from comments which appeared in several leading Indonesian newspapers, this reply has been regarded by the Indonesian Government as substantiating their allegation that the Federation Government was actively aiding and abetting the Indonesian rebels.

26. In October 1960, a request was received by the Federation Government from a group of Indonesians who were formerly members of various Indonesian diplomatic missions in Europe who, during the rebellion, had defected to the rebel movement to be given political asylum in the Federation. At first the Federation Government turned down the request but, owing to repeated pleas and taking into account their pathetic plight, the Federation Government acceded to their request after obtaining an undertaking from them that they would not engage in any political activities.

27. It is clear that in keeping with the Federation's policy of maintaining the most cordial and closest relationship with Indonesia, the stand of non-involvement adopted during the rebellion was in the best interests of both countries. The policy of non-interference in the rebellion enabled the Indonesian Government to have a much freer hand in dealing with their internal situation and the granting of political asylum to certain Indonesian rebels, whose number indeed was very small, while consistent with humanitarian considerations, ensured that these so-called rebels would not participate in activities which would be harmful to the Indonesian Government. Indeed, it was this act of the Indonesian Government which made it possible for the Indonesian authorities to contact them in the Federation and offer them amnesty which the majority of them accepted.

28. In this connection it may be mentioned that prior to Merdeka a number of Malaysians had left their own shores for Indonesia to escape arrest by the authorities for activities aimed at overthrowing the then government. Some were communists who were connected with the terrorist movement during the Emergency, while some were nationalists, many of whom when in Indonesia came under the influence of extremists and communists and became their fellow-travellers. Prominent among the latter group was one Ibrahim bin Haji Yaacob who was connected with the Kesatuan Melayu Muda, a body declared illegal soon after the outbreak of World War II. He became a prominent member of the Partai Nasional Indonesia changing his name to that of Iskandar Kamil and with Indonesian support led a movement aimed at making the Federation a part of Indonesia. Even after Merdeka, Ibrahim bin Haji Yaacob continued his activities and it was known that he was in contact with extremists and communists in the Federation. He has been leading a movement called the Kesatuan Melayu Merdeka based in Medan which has as its objective the overthrow of the present government. Among its activities is the operation of a radio station spewing propaganda lies and hatred against the Malaysian Government.

* Appendix VI.

29. In 1957 the Indonesian Government issued a decree extending the territorial waters of Indonesia up to 12 miles from the outermost limits of Indonesian territory and that all waters separating the Indonesian islands were declared territorial waters. Thus, the Indonesian Government did without the normal courtesy of informing, if not consulting, its neighbour whose territorial waters are affected by this claim, despite the fact that in certain parts of the Straits of Malacca Indonesian territorial waters as now claimed overlapped Federation territorial waters which conform with the practice of three miles. In addition, the Indonesian Government closed certain areas which they certainly knew were traditional fishing areas for Malayan fishermen. Thus by this act they had deprived hundreds of fishermen of their livelihood. Those who dared to continue to fish in their traditional fishing grounds were arrested by the Indonesian authorities and molested and their catch and other properties confiscated.

30. Since August, 1957, there has been a long series of incidents in the Straits of Malacca which had placed small boats plying in the Straits of Malacca either for fishing or trade in considerable danger. These incidents had taken the form of intrusions by Indonesian gunboats into Federation waters in the most blatant manner followed by acts of piracy and other misdeeds. In some cases Malayan traders and fishermen were severely manhandled and some were brought to Indonesia and imprisoned or fined without proper trial.

31. Strong protests were made to the Indonesian Government from time to time without avail. In 1960 alone there were 31 violations of Federation territorial waters by Indonesian gunboats, defence motor launches and patrol crafts. In some cases these craft came so close to the Federation's coast that the nature and type of crafts could easily be identified by people standing along the shore. In addition cases of piracy in the Straits of Malacca have increased considerably due to the fact that pirates were able to seek shelter in the Indonesian waters where the authorities appeared to connive at their activities. In 1961 there were 21 cases of piracy and in 1962 the number of incidents increased to 24 and there might well have been a number of such incidents which were not reported to the Government. If not for the fact that the Federation Government have provided protection to small crafts and fishing in the Straits such incidents would have affected a considerable number of people whose livelihood depend on fishing and coastal trading in the Straits of Malacca.

32. Despite Indonesia's coolness towards the Federation's policy of strict non-involvement during the PRRI rebellion in Indonesia, the Federation Government pursued a policy of active friendship towards the Republic of Indonesia. This support has not been more convincingly displayed than in the question of Indonesia's claim over Irian Barat (West New Guinea).

33. At the 821st Plenary Meeting of the 14th Session of the United Nations General Assembly held on Monday, 5th October, 1959, Dr Ismail bin Dato' Abdul Rahman, leader of the Federation delegation, referred to colonialism in general and to Dutch colonialism in West Irian in particular. He said *inter alia*:

"The Government of the Federation of Malaya condemns colonialism in any form, be it in West Irian, Algeria, Hungary

or Tibet. The Federation of Malaya is pledged actively to support subject peoples of nations in their legitimate aspiration to self determination and independence.

"Although the question of West Irian has not been included in the agenda of this Session of the General Assembly, my delegation nevertheless feels it necessary to express the profound regrets of the Government of the Federation of Malaya that no amicable settlement of this question is yet in sight. I should like once again to reiterate that, in the view of my delegation, the question of West Irian is one of vestigial colonialism, and it is in this light that we must express our concern in this matter."

Dr Ismail then referred to the Federation's relations with Indonesia in the following terms:

"One of the greatest events in the life of our young nation had been the conclusion this year of a Treaty of Friendship with Indonesia—the first of its kind entered into by the Federation of Malaya—reflecting our desire to restore those ties of race and culture with Indonesia; ties which were interrupted by the accidents of history."

34. However, the Federation Government was not content merely to pay lipservice to the ideal of freedom from colonialism and offered its good offices available to both parties in the West Irian dispute, the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, wrote to President Sukarno on 20th September, 1960 to inquire whether the Federation could assist in bringing about a solution to the dispute which was fraught with immense danger to world peace and stability and, in particular, to the peace and stability of Southeast Asia, and he further put forward certain proposals which he considered would provide the basis for negotiation leading to a settlement of the dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands over West Irian.

35. The essence of the Prime Minister's proposal was to transfer West Irian to the United Nations as a trust territory with the purpose of an eventual transfer of the territory directly to the Republic of Indonesia and furthermore that the Trusteeship should not exceed a certain specified period.* The late Dr Djuanda, who was then acting President of the Republic of Indonesia in the absence of President Sukarno who was abroad on vacation, replied to the Prime Minister's letter agreeing in principle to the proposal put forward and specifying that the period of trusteeship should not exceed that of one year.†

36. In November, 1960, the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, went on an official visit to Canada and the United States. In his conversation with the leaders in Canada and in the United States the Prime Minister particularly stressed on the importance of finding a solution to the West Irian problem which he considered should not be left unsettled. A conflict would provide an opportunity for the communists to exploit the situation for their own ends. He told these leaders of his proposal for the settlement of the dispute and requested their full support and backing in his efforts to mediate between Indonesia and the Netherlands.

* Appendix VII. † Appendix VIII.

37. The Prime Minister also met the late Mr Dag Hammarskjöld the then Secretary-General of the United Nations and similarly expressed to him his fears regarding the security and peace of his part of the world if the West Irian problem remained unsettled. The late Mr Dag Hammarskjöld appreciated the position and promised his wholehearted support in the efforts of the Prime Minister. The efforts of the Prime Minister had made a deep impression on the United States Government which realised the need for the United States to take a much more active interest in this dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands for the sake of peace in this region of Asia.

38. On his way back from his official visit the Prime Minister proceeded to the Netherlands and held preliminary discussions with the Netherlands Prime Minister, Dr Jan de Quay, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Luns, and the States Secretary for Netherlands in New Guinea, Mr Bot. At the end of his preliminary talk a Joint Communique was issued which revealed that the Netherlands Government was willing to subject their policy in Netherlands New Guinea to the security and judgment of the United Nations. This willingness on the part of the Netherlands did not by itself provide a solution to the West Irian dispute, but it indicated a significant departure from their hitherto intransigent position, a departure which could serve as a starting point from which further negotiations could be held which would facilitate convergence of Indonesian and Netherlands views on the West Irian problem. This willingness to subject their policies in Netherlands West New Guinea would facilitate the introduction of the United Nations into the problem. Bearing in mind the willingness of the Indonesian to agree to a U.N. Trusteeship as an intermediate step leading to the eventual transfer of Netherlands West New Guinea to Indonesia, it represented a step forward in the realisation of the Prime Minister's proposal for the solution of the West Irian dispute, to which the Indonesians had given their approval.

39. Unfortunately, however, before the Prime Minister could report to the Indonesian Government the substance of his discussions with the Netherlands Government, in fact before he arrived at Kuala Lumpur from Holland, the Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr Subandrio, quick to find fault, attacked the efforts of the Prime Minister claiming that he had acted without referring the matter to Indonesia. According to him, the only solution to the West Irian dispute was a quick transfer of the administration of the territory to Indonesia and that it would serve no purpose to introduce the U.N. into the dispute, despite an agreement to the contrary from Dr Djuanda in the capacity of Acting President. He stated that the only U.N. intervention in the matter which he could agree to was the supervision of the transfer of West Irian from the Netherlands to Indonesia.

40. A sustained attack by the Indonesian press on the efforts of the Prime Minister to mediate in the West Irian dispute followed the statement made by Dr Subandrio. This press campaign ranged from mild reproach to bitter insinuations. "*Suluh Indonesia*" an organ of the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI), rejected internationalisation of West Irian and said that Indonesia was determined to recover West Irian with or without other people's assistance. It stated that foreigners should not,

despite their goodwill, be welcome to the Indonesian people. "Berita Indonesia" accused the Prime Minister of not consulting the "leaders with authority" such as President Sukarno, Tun Djuanda, Leimena, Subandrio and Maladi. The "Merdeka" alleged that the Prime Minister had treated Indonesia as the accused before a court and as the guilty party in the dispute. According to "Merdeka" the Prime Minister was an agent of the British and of SEATO and only the Indonesian people and the Indonesian armed forces could solve the problem.

41. When the Federation Government made representations to the Indonesian Government over the Indonesian press campaign against the Prime Minister and Dr Subandrio's premature criticism of the Prime Minister's peace efforts, Dr Subandrio addressed a letter dated 30th November, 1960, to the Prime Minister in which he stated, *inter alia*:

"Rakjat dan Pemerintah Republic Indonesia sangat menghargai segala usaha Jang Mulia itu."

The letter was conveyed to the Prime Minister by a Mr Suska, Head of the Directorate of Asian Pacific Affairs in the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. At a meeting held in Kuala Lumpur on the 1st December, 1960, Mr Suska informed the Prime Minister that the Federation Government had misunderstood Indonesia's position on this matter. When asked whether it was not true that once the principle of trusteeship was accepted, any claim of sovereignty must be surrendered, Mr Suska agreed that this was so. It appeared that the Indonesian Government had reconsidered their position and would not after all agree to allow the United Nations to take over the territory of West Irian in trust for a period of one year and then turn it over to Indonesia.

42. As a gesture of goodwill towards Indonesia, so that unfavourable public reaction in Indonesia might be prevented, the Prime Minister informed Mr Suska that the contents of Tun Djuanda's letter would not be divulged to the public. Mr Suska was relieved and gave the assurance that no more press statements would be issued.

43. The Prime Minister then wrote a letter to President Sukarno on 3rd December, transmitting a report of his endeavour to obtain a settlement of this long and vexing problem of Irian Barat.* President Sukarno replied to the Prime Minister on 14th December.†

44. On the 5th December, 1960, a press report appeared in Djakarta to the effect that a senior Indonesian Government official had declared that the Indonesian Government believed that the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, had misused his rights as a mediator. A demarche in the form of a Note Verbale was immediately sent by the Ministry of External Affairs to the Indonesian Ambassador requesting the Indonesian Government to refute this statement. In delivering the Note to the Indonesian Ambassador, the Permanent Secretary for External Affairs, said that if the Indonesian Government chose to remain silent then the Federation Government would interpret such silence as an endorsement of that statement, and that should there be a deterioration in Federation-Indonesian relations as a consequence, the Indonesian Government alone would be held responsible.

45. On the 7th December, 1960, a spokesman of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry issued a press statement denying that a senior Indonesian official had made such a statement to the press. The Foreign Ministry spokesman added, "if such reports were published in Malayan newspapers then such reports were not originating (sic) from the Government of the Republic of Indonesia."

46. Despite the Indonesian rebuff over the Prime Minister's attempts to mediate in the West Irian issue, the Federation Government consistently refused to grant facilities to the Netherlands Government in cases where the approval of such facilities would be in the opinion of the Federation Government serve to increase tension in the area. Even after the West Irian issue had been settled when the Netherlands requested permission for their ships to stopover in Malaya en route from West Irian to Europe, the Federation Government would not give its approval. The Federation Government also made it quite clear to the British Government that it would take an unfavourable view of Netherlands troops going ashore at Singapore. As a result of the Government's firm attitude in this matter, Dutch troops did not land on Federation or Singapore soil but proceeded to Europe without delay. This is clear proof of the Federation Government's determination not only to preserve a strict policy of non-involvement in the Netherlands/Indonesia dispute but also to avoid taking any step which might offend against Indonesian susceptibilities.

47. Indonesia was giving the appearance of seizing control of West Irian by force of arms and began equipping herself with weapons bought largely from Russia. Guerilla fighters were dropped into Netherlands West New Guinea and the situation in the area became very tense, but fortunately the United States took active steps to bring about an amicable solution to the problem largely through the effort of Mr Elsworth Bunker and eventually, the Bunker plan was accepted by both parties thus settling the whole dispute peacefully. The Bunker plan did not differ materially from the proposal made by the Prime Minister.

48. In May 1961, the Prime Minister put forward his historic proposal for the formation of Malaysia. H.M.M. Ambassador in Djakarta took steps to inform the Indonesian Government of this proposal and the initial Indonesian reaction was not unfriendly, which raised hopes in the Federation that the Indonesian Government had adopted a policy of genuine friendship and cooperation towards the Federation. On November 13, 1961, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr Subandrio, in a letter to the New York Times regarding West Irian *inter alia* wrote as follows:

"As an example of our honesty and lack of expansionist intent, one fourth of the island of Kalimantan (Borneo) consisting of three Crown Colonies of Great Britain, is now becoming the target of the Malayan Government for a merger. Of course, the people there are ethnologically and geographically very close to the others living in the Indonesian territory. Still, we do not show any objection toward this Malayan policy of merger. On the contrary, we wish the Malayan Government well if it can succeed with this plan."

49. On the 20th November, 1961, in a statement made to the General Assembly of the United Nations on the question of West Irian, Dr Subandrio said *inter alia*:

"We are not only disclaiming the territories outside the former Netherlands East Indies, though they are of the same island, but—more than that—when Malaya told us of its intentions to merge with the three (sic) British Crown Colonies of Sarawak, Brunei and British North Borneo as one Federation, we told them that we had no objections and that we wished them success with this merger so that everyone might live in peace and freedom.

For the sake of clarification, I may tell this Assembly that three-quarter of the island of Borneo is Indonesian territory, while the remainder constitutes the aforementioned three (sic) British Crown Colonies. Naturally, ethnologically and geographically speaking, this British part is closer to Indonesia than, let us say, to Malaya. But we still told Malaya that we had no objection to such a merger, based upon the will for freedom of the peoples concerned."

50. At the end of December, 1961, i.e., approximately 5 weeks after Dr Subandrio's statement to the United Nations General Assembly in which he referred to the Malaysia Plan, the Central Committee of the Partai Komunis Indonesia passed a Resolution on Malaysia to the effect that Malaysia was a form of neo-colonialism and that its purpose was to suppress "democratic and patriotic movements" of the people in the territories concerned and that it was a threat to peace and security in the area. The P.K.I. then called on the Indonesian people and Government to heighten national vigilance against the establishment of Malaysia and to support the resistance of the people in the territories which Malaysia was to comprise. The text of the resolution is attached as an Appendix.*

51. The Resolution by the Central Committee of the PKI is one of the key factors in any assessment of the motivations of Indonesian policy towards Malaysia. The Resolution referred to Malaysia suppressing "the democratic and patriotic movements of the peoples in these 5 territories which aimed at the attainment of genuine national independence and freedom from imperialism."

52. Since the phrase "democratic and patriotic movements" in Marxist-Leninist jargon means precisely Communist and pro-Communist movements, the reason for the opposition by the PKI, the world's largest Communist Party in the non-Communist world, to Malaysia is obvious; this opposition is the direct result of the challenge which Malaysia poses to the overall Communist strategy in Southeast Asia. It is also noteworthy that the slogan "neocolonialism" in relation to Malaysia received its first public and definitive expression in the above resolution. Before long the PKI-instigated campaign against Malaysia succeeded in increasing tension between Indonesia and the Federation and in inciting Indonesian leaders, through the powerful Communist press and mass "front" organisations, to "confront" the Federation.

* Appendix XI.

53. The PKI's opposition can be related to international Communist opposition to Malaysia in particular that of Communist China. When in 1959 Communist China annexed Tibet the Federation was in the forefront in condemning Communist China's aggression against the Tibetan people and the Federation was one of the principal sponsors of a Resolution in the United Nations General Assembly Session in 1959 condemning Communist China's denial of fundamental rights to the Tibetan people. In October, 1962, Communist China mounted a major offensive on the Sino-Indian Border annexing parts of Indian territory. The Federation immediately reacted to this act of aggression. The Prime Minister was forthright in his condemnation of Communist China and immediately launched a Fund to assist India to repel the Communist incursion into her territory. It is therefore significant that in the opposition to Malaysia, Indonesia was strongly supported by Communist China. In April, 1963, Liu Shao Chi, the Communist China's Vice Chairman, visited Indonesia where he declared that Indonesia and China were "comrades in arms" and praised Indonesia's "just stand" in opposing the "neo-colonialist scheme of Malaysia and supporting the revolutionary struggle of the people of North Borneo". Before leaving Djakarta on 20th April Mr Liu together with President Sukarno issued a Joint Communiqué which categorically declared their opposition to Malaysia and their determination to work together for the destruction of Malaysia.

54. Gradually, the Indonesian Press took its cue from the Communist Press and eventually, Malaysia was unanimously described a "neocolonialist tool of the imperialist powers." Early in 1962 the PKI implemented its Central Committee Resolution on December 1961 by launching an intensive attack against the Malaysia Plan. For example, on 4th October, 1962, "Harian Rakjat" revealed the sinister designs of the PKI when it predicted that Malaysia would not materialise by the 31st August, 1963, because of the victory of the Party Ra'ayat, Brunei, led by Sheikh A. M. Azahari, and the Philippine claim to North Borneo. The evolution of Indonesian policy towards Malaysia clearly demonstrates the role of Indonesian Communism in arousing national hostility towards Malaysia.

55. However, as late as November, 1962, the official Indonesian attitude to Malaysia appeared to remain uncommitted. Mr Ruslan Abdul Gani, who was then Vice Chairman of the Indonesian Supreme Advisory Council, was reported to have said on his return from an unofficial visit to the Federation on 1st November, 1962, that he saw "positive and negative points in the plan to merge Singapore and the British Borneo territories into a Malaysia Federation." "The plan is still developing. Personally, I welcome any new country around us that wants to get rid of colonial chains," he added.

56. It was not until a few days after the revolt in Brunei broke out on the 8th December, 1962, and as mass rallies inspired and led by the PKI took place in Djakarta and elsewhere in Indonesia that a reversal in the Indonesian official attitude rapidly became apparent.

57. On 11th February, 1963, the Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr Subandrio, at a press conference held at his home officially declared Indonesia's opposition to Malaysia.

58. On 13th February, President Sukarno declared that Indonesia's opposition to the proposed Malaysia Plan was not because of Communist influence but because Malaysia represented forces of neo-colonialism. On the other hand, Indonesia supported the Brunei rebels because they were fighting for independence against "Malaysian neo-colonialism". He added "nations who will become strong and famous nations should be ready to face moments of danger. To members of the armed forces I have stated that we are standing on a principle of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. We are supporting all nations who are struggling for their independence. What is the reason for our opposition to Malaysia? Malaysia is neo-colonialism and we do not agree with this." President Sukarno also described the Malaysia Plan as an attempt "to save rubber, tin and oil for the imperialists" and went on to say "that's why now I declare officially that Indonesia opposes Malaysia." President Sukarno stressed that if the Prime Minister, and the Federation leadership continued their present policy, Indonesia would have no choice but to face it with political and economic confrontation.

59. On 19th February, President Sukarno issued the following order to his troops: "You have carried out your duties successfully (in West Irian) but other duties are still not finished. Your fatherland still calls you to defend the Republic. Our struggle is not over yet. The Republic is still being undermined by threats while the enemy is besieging us. Therefore, keep on the alert and I order you to keep your weapons in your hands."

60. On 19th February, an Indonesian naval patrol intercepted a Malayan fishing vessel, towed it to Belawan harbour in Northern Sumatra and took the crew into custody. The Commander of the First Navy Maritime District (North and Central Sumatra) was reported by Antara to have ordered his forces to "burn on the spot" any Malayan fishing boat caught in Indonesian waters.

61. The Indonesian Government justified its so called "confrontation" against the Federation for an ever-increasing number of reasons. These included the charges that the Federation had always been hostile to Indonesia, that the Federation had tried to "annex" Sumatra during the PRRI revolt, that Malaysia is a "neo-colonialist" plot, that the Federation was trying to "encircle" Indonesia, that Malaysia is against the "Revolution of Mankind" and the "New Emerging Forces", that Malaysia would be used as a "base for foreign domination", that Malaysia would become a "haven for the economic subversion of Indonesia", etc. This farrago of lies and distortions was rapidly built up through the press, radio and statements by leaders of the Government and pro-Sukarno political parties and organs. But this smokescreen of wild and emotional charges could not obscure the following facts:

- (a) Before the proposal for the establishment of Malaysia was made Indonesia had never expressed concern over the presence of British bases in Southeast Asia. The first public expression of hostility in Indonesia towards the Anglo-Malayan Treaty of Defence and Mutual Assistance was made in December 1961 in the Resolution of the PKI Central Committee. It is also a fact that practically all the turgid Marxist-Leninist jargon contained in that Resolution

has since been parroted by the entire Government-controlled press and radio and by the Indonesian leaders themselves.

- (b) The Indonesian Government's complicity in the Brunei rebellion was expressed when the Federation Government announced on December 11, 1962, that groups of Brunei rebels had received military training in Indonesian Borneo. This was later admitted by the Indonesian authorities.
- (c) The Indonesian Government officially support a fictitious "sovereign" state described as "The Unitary State of Kalimantan Utara" (comprising Sarawak, Brunei and Sabah) which has a spurious propaganda organisation including its own radio station.
- (d) The Indonesian Government is using Sheikh A. M. Azahari as a tool of Indonesian propaganda.
- (e) The Indonesian Government began to advocate openly the use of force by "freedom fighters" against "neo-colonialism" in "Kalimantan Utara" and this was reinforced by "physical confrontation", i.e., the threat of force by Indonesia herself.

62. This brazen interference in the internal affairs of the Borneo States was accompanied by virulent press and radio attacks on the Federation Government and on the person of its Prime Minister. The object of these attacks was clearly to arouse hatred against the Federation Government and thereby to incite the people, as the Deputy Secretary-General of the Indonesian Government-sponsored National Front Convention suggested on the 18th February, 1963, "to act to topple their own Prime Minister". Dr Subandrio himself was responsible for one of the most venomous attacks on the Prime Minister when he accused the Prime Minister of seeking to annex Sumatra in 1957 because "he needs Indonesia badly to face Chinese equality with the Malays inside Malaya".

63. One of the most blatant insults to the Federation was made by President Sukarno during an official Reception given by him in honour of the delegates to the Asian-African Journalists Conference held in Djakarta in April, 1963, when he called upon the gathering to sing a popular version of a tune which had become the National Anthem of the Federation. In August, 1957, when it was announced that this tune had been selected to be the National Anthem of the Federation the Indonesian Government issued a decree banning the singing or playing of this song in Indonesia. By this action the President had shown to the journalists present and to the whole world the contempt he had for the Federation.

64. In February, 1963, the Vice President of the Philippines, Mr Emmanuel Pelaez on his way back to Manila from the Anglo-Philippines Talks, proposed a Summit Meeting among President Macapagal, President Sukarno and the Prime Minister in order to discuss the differences which had arisen as a result of the proposal for the formation of Malaysia with a view to arriving, if possible, at an amicable solution in the interest of peace and security and good neighbourly relations in the area and especially among the Malay nations. The proposal for the Summit Meeting was immediately welcomed by the Prime Minister, but on the other hand