

A DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY

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£ 6.95

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Second edition

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Routledge & Kegan Paul
London

*First published in 1976 by
Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd
11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE*

*Reprinted and first published as a
paperback in 1978
Reprinted in 1979, 1980 and 1984
Second edition 1986*

*Phototypeset in Linotron Times
by Input Typesetting Ltd, London
and printed in Great Britain
by Billing & Sons Ltd, Worcester*

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

*Lacey, A. R.
A dictionary of philosophy.—2nd ed.
1. Philosophy—Dictionaries
I. Title
190'.3'21 B41*

ISBN 0 7102 1003 5

Preface

This book aims to give the layman or intending student a pocket encyclopaedia of philosophy, one with a bias towards explaining terminology. The latter task is not an easy one since philosophy is regularly concerned with concepts which are unclear. It is one main part of philosophy to clarify them rather than to use them. What I have tried to do is to take some of the commonest terms and notions in current English-speaking philosophy and to give the reader some idea of what they mean to the philosopher and what sort of problems he finds associated with them.

A work of this size cannot do justice to individual philosophers. The entries devoted to them offer only the barest outlines of their work, followed by the most philosophically important of their publications or, occasionally, those of other interest. Where possible, the original title and publication date is given, sometimes followed by the standard title of an English translation, or by a brief indication of the work's topic. Where applicable, each of these entries ends with cross-references to all other entries where the philosopher is mentioned unless cross-references are already given in the text of the entry. It is important to remember that both the description of a philosopher's activity and the list of his writings are by no means exhaustive. The choice of eighty or so philosophers represents, with some inevitable arbitrariness, a compromise between importance and popularity.

In the book as a whole, epistemology and logic occupy far more space than, say, ethics, politics or aesthetics. This is because the former subjects are the central ones. Terms and concepts from them are constantly used in discussing the latter subjects, while the opposite process occurs rarely, if at all. Mathematical logic needs a dictionary to itself, and only those terms are included which occur widely in philosophical and traditional logic. Much the same applies to linguistic theory. I have also generally avoided terms associated with only one author, for which a standard edition or commentary is best consulted.

Many philosophical terms, such as CONFIRMATION, also have a meaning in ordinary language and a technical meaning associated with a particular outlook. I have only occasionally mentioned the ordinary

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language one and I have not usually mentioned certain fairly obvious ambiguities of a kind common to many words. 'Entailment' may mean the relation of entailment, a proposition entailed, and a proposition saying that something entails something else. More important, many words are too complex for even the philosophically significant ambiguities to be covered completely. I have tried to give the dominant sense or senses in current, or currently studied, philosophy, and especially those senses which are technical, or reflect or give rise to philosophical problems. The short definitions that begin many of the longer entries should be taken only as attempts at giving the general character of the term in question.

The wide-ranging reader must be prepared to find almost any term used in ways I have not mentioned. In particular, it can only mislead to offer brief and precise definitions of philosophical '—isms.' I have thus tried instead to bring out something of the general spirit of such terms, which often refer to features or aspects rather than to people or systems. Precision is similarly inapposite in recommending the use of a term like 'the causal theory of meaning' rather than 'causal theories of meaning'. Context or even whim will often decide whether one talks of different theories, or of variants of a single theory. Words like 'principle', 'law', 'rule', 'thesis', 'axiom', again, are usually used almost indifferently in phrases like 'the principle of . . . '.

The cross-references are denoted by small capitals (italic type simply picks terms out), and are of two kinds, within entries and self-standing. The former are given only when they seem useful. The term referred to is often mentioned in an approximate or abbreviated, but obvious, form. For example, the entry called 'conversion' might be referred to as 'converse'. The self-standing cross-references are not a guarantee that a term is treated fully, but they may be thought of as forming a sort of index. Terms with more than one word normally appear only once. *RUSSELL'S PARADOX* appears under *R* but not under *P*, and the discussion of innate ideas can be traced through *IDEA*. Cross-references which occur, preceded by 'See also', at the ends of articles may refer to the article as a whole, not just the last paragraph.

No single principle underlies the bibliographies. An item may be the original source of a notion, or a good, elementary, or accessible discussion, or a recent discussion from which previous ones can be traced, or a bibliographical source. I have mentioned certain reprintings of articles, but have not tried to be exhaustive, because space forbids and they are constantly being added to. I do not claim to have read everything mentioned, though I hope I have not mentioned things without adequate reason. The absence of a work is not of course a point against it. It may mean no more than that I have not come across it. Readers lucky enough to have access to P. Edwards (ed.), *The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, 8 vols, 1967, will no doubt use it anyway, so I have hardly ever referred to it, though I am immensely indebted to it myself. J. O. Urmson (ed.), *The Concise Encyclopaedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers*, 1960. and D. Runes (ed.), *Dictionary of*

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Philosophy, 1942 (mainly its logical entries) have considerably helped me, and may also help the reader. The intermittent 'recent work in . . .' surveys in the *American Philosophical Quarterly* may also be mentioned.

Finally it is a pleasure to acknowledge the great help I have received from my friends and colleagues. Mr D. A. Lloyd Thomas, Dr D. M. Tulloch, and Dr. J. L. Watling have between them offered detailed comments on the entire manuscript, and each has made very significant contributions to both the merits of the work and the morale of its author. For similar comments on smaller portions I am greatly indebted to Dr W. A. Hodges, Miss R. L. Meager, Mr. J. D. Valentine, and Professor P. G. Winch. Many other colleagues have helped me by answering queries and discussing individual points. I am also of course indebted to many philosophical publications, especially those mentioned in the bibliographies. The following among my non-philosophical colleagues have gone to great trouble in assisting me to communicate comprehensibly: Mrs J. H. Bloch, Prof. D. F. Cheesman, Dr G. Darlow, Dr D. R. Dicks, Dr M. R. Hoare, Dr E. Jacobs, Mr T. B. Taylor, Miss E. C. Vollans, Dr G. H. Wright. None of these, naturally, is responsible for what I have said, especially as I have occasionally gone my own way, and have made many alterations since they saw it. Mrs Helen Marshall has helped me to make a considerable number of improvements in my style and Dr Ted Honderich has been of great assistance to me in various ways in the later stages. I am also grateful to the Philosophy Department of Bedford College for allowing me two sabbatical terms to work on this book. And I am grateful to numerous typists and secretaries who have come to my aid in time of need.

Preface to second edition

This edition contains twenty-five new entries: Abstraction, Agglomeration, Ancestral, Cambridge change, Charity (principle of), Determinates and determinables, Dualism, Functionalism, Genidentity, Goldbach's conjecture, Heap (paradox of), Hermeneutic, Holism, Materialism, Memory, Newcomb's paradox, Polish notation, Prisoner's dilemma, Quale, Qualities (primary and secondary), Relativism, Santayana, Satisfice, Whewell, Zombie. Twenty-four cross-references have been added and two deleted. I have made various corrections, amendments and additions throughout, and have added to many of the bibliographies.

My main debt of gratitude is to Dr J. L. Watling for discussing in detail with me substantial parts of the new material. I am also grateful to many of my philosophical colleagues, especially Dr D. M. Edgington, Dr S. Guttenplan, Prof D. W. Hamlyn, Dr W. A. Hodges, Dr C. Hughes, Dr R. M. Sainsbury, Mr A. B. Savile, Dr. R. Spencer-Smith, and to Mrs M. Blackburn of the University of London Library, for help

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on smaller portions or points of detail, and I have tried to benefit from the many points made by reviewers and private correspondents.

Finally I am grateful to King's College Philosophy Department for allowing me a sabbatical term part of which was devoted to this work.

Abelard (Abailard), Pierre. 1079–1142. Born near Nantes, he lived and worked in France writing mainly on theology, logic and metaphysics, and ethics. His theology is sometimes thought to be rationalistic, subordinating faith to reason, though interpretations differ. He steered a middle course between realism and nominalism over UNIVERSALS, and his ethics particularly emphasized intention. His writings are of uncertain date, but include in theology *Theologia Christiana* and *Sic et Non*, in logic and metaphysics *Logica Ingredientibus* and *Dialectica*, and in ethics *Ethica* (or *Scito Teipsum*).

About. See REFERRING.

Absolute. See IDEALISM.

Abstraction. Process by which allegedly we form concepts on the basis of experience or of other concepts. On being confronted with red things, each of which has many other properties, we abstract the redness and so form a concept of red. Having done the same with blue, yellow, etc., we then abstract from these concepts themselves the concept of colour, and so on. Empiricists like Locke use abstraction to help specify how we build up our concepts on the basis of experience. It is unclear, however, that Locke properly distinguishes such things as forming a concept on the basis of repeated presentations of a quality, abstracting genera from species, abstracting determinables from DETERMINATES. *Abstractionism* is the view that the mind does operate in this way.

J. Locke, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, 1690, eg. II 1, II 11, III 9. (Criticised by G. Berkeley, *A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*, 1710, Introduction.)

J. R. Weinberg, *Abstraction, Relation, Induction*, 1965. (Historical.)

P. T. Geach, *Mental Acts*, 1957, pp. 18–44. (Criticises abstractionism).

Acceptance, acceptability. See CONFIRMATION, LOTTERY PARADOX.

Access

Access. It has often been held that we alone have access to our own thoughts and sensations (*private access*) or that we alone have access by the most reliable route (*privileged access*). See also PRIVATE LANGUAGE.

N. Malcolm, 'The privacy of experience', in A. Stroll (ed.), *Epistemology*, 1967. (Discusses an ambiguity, and then the issue itself.)

A. R. Louch, 'Privileged access', *Mind*, 1965. (Debate in dialogue form.)

W. Alston, 'Varieties of privileged access', *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 1971, reprinted in R. M. Chisholm and R. J. Swartz (eds), *Empirical Knowledge*, 1973.

Achilles paradox. See ZENO'S PARADOXES.

Acrasia (Akrasia). See INCONTINENCE.

Action. The doing of something or what is done. We talk of the action of rain, and of reflex actions, but action of the central kind is what is done by rational beings. Only they can *perform* actions. Acting usually involves moving in some way, or at least trying to move. This raises the problem how actions are related to movements. How is my raising my arm related to my arm's rising? What one intends is relevant here, and this involves the ways in which what happens can be viewed (cf. INTENSIONALITY). The same event may be viewed in many ways, e.g. making certain neurones in the brain fire, tightening one's arm-muscles, flexing one's finger, moving a piece of iron, pulling a trigger, firing a gun, heating a gun-barrel, shooting a man, shooting an ex-farmer, shooting the President, assassinating the President, earning a bribe, grieving a nation, starting a war.

How many of these are actions? How is an action distinguished from its consequences? Are pulling the trigger and starting the war one action, or two actions, or an action and one of its consequences, or what? Actions may be unintentional, as when one frightens a bystander, or involuntary, as when one unwillingly reveals one's feelings by gasping, but perhaps something can only be an action when it is something an agent *could* set out to fulfil. Firing neurones might be an action if deliberately achieved by flexing one's finger, or even if the agent merely knew he *could* achieve it thus.

Further problems concern omissions, and cases of inaction, and negligence. Also can actions be caused? How is acting related to 'inner' mental events like silent thinking, to concepts like choosing, willing and trying? (Cf. BASIC ACTION.)

The relations between acts and actions are complex and disputed. 'Act' seems more of a technical term, especially in phrases like 'mental act' and SPEECH ACT, and less connected to responsibility. etc. See also EVENT.

G. Langford, *Human Action*, 1971. (Elementary discussion. Extensive bibliography.)

- W. D. Ross, *The Right and the Good*, 1930, pp. 6–7.
 A. I. Melden, *Free Action*, 1961. (Raising one's arm, etc.)
 A. B. Cody, 'Can a single action have many different descriptions?', *Inquiry*, 1967. (Cf. R. E. Dowling's discussion and Cody's reply, *ibid.*)
 A. Kenny, *Action, Emotion and Will*, 1963. (Chapter 7 distinguishes actions from relations.)
 W. Cerf, Review of J. L. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*, *Mind*, 1966, pp. 269–76, reprinted in K. T. Fann (ed.), *Symposium on J. L. Austin*, 1969, pp. 359–68. W. D. Ross, *The Right and the Good*, 1930, pp. 6–7. G. H. von Wright, *Explanation and Understanding*, 1971, p. 69. J. L. Mackie, 'The grounds of responsibility', in P. M. S. Hacker and J. Raz (eds), *Law, Morality, and Society*, 1977, p. 176. (Different views of act/action distinction.)
 I. Thalberg, *Perception, Emotion and Action*, 1977. (Attempts common approach to various problems in these areas.)
 A. R. White, 'Shooting, killing, and fatally wounding', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1979–80.

Action (philosophy of). See MIND.

Aesthetics. Roughly, that branch of philosophy concerned with the creation, value and experience of art and the analysis and solution of problems relating to these. Also called *philosophy of art*. The primary topic is the appreciation of art, and major problems centre on what makes something a work of art. Must it exhibit certain formal e.g. geometrical, properties (*formalism*), or express certain emotions, attitudes, etc. (*expressionism*), or do other things? What in fact is the role of pleasure and emotion, and are special types of them involved? Is there a special kind of value involved? Does the work of art embody special properties, like beauty, sublimity, prettiness, and if so, how are these related to its other properties? How relevant are the object's function, the context of production and the artist's intentions? Does it matter how a work was produced, whether difficulties had to be overcome, and whether it was a forgery? These latter questions, involving the artist, are balanced by questions about the appreciation of beauty, and other qualities, in nature, and how this relates to appreciation of art.

Many problems in aesthetics are parallel to problems in ethics. How are aesthetic terms and judgments to be analysed? Can such judgments be true or false, and how, if at all, can they be justified? Are there objective canons of taste? The relations between art and morality are especially relevant in literature, which can portray moral situations, and which has, like other arts, moral or psychological effects. Questions about the moral justification of producing works of art belong to ethics. Aesthetics, however, can ask whether a work's moral or psychological content is relevant to its aesthetic merit, and whether any subject-

Affirmation of consequent

matters, such as pornography, are intrinsically inimical to aesthetic merit. Further questions cover the relations of art to wit and humour.

Metaphysical issues arise over the nature of a work of art. Is it a UNIVERSAL, or a paradigm, or a particular object, or is the answer different for different arts? Must a work of art be unique, or could it be created independently by different artists? And how is a work of art related to performances of it, where these are relevant? Philosophy of mind introduces questions about emotion, enjoyment, etc., and also about imitation or representation in the various arts: e.g. to what extent does fiction 'imitate' life? Fiction also raises questions of meaning and reference, which involve philosophy of language. What am I referring to when I mention Mr Pickwick? Can statements in fiction be true or false? Other questions concern phrases like 'gay tune', 'imaginative portrait': are the adjectives being used literally here?

Judgments on particular works of art do not properly belong to aesthetics, but general questions, like those about the 'golden section', concerning ways of achieving aesthetic value may. It is, however, no longer as obvious as it once seemed that positions on general aesthetic theory and judgments on particular works are independent of each other. (Cf. ETHICS for some considerations analogous to those in this paragraph.)

- E. F. Carritt, *The Theory of Beauty*, 1914. (Introduction from point of view of what makes something a work of art.)
- W. Charlton, *Aesthetics: An Introduction*, 1970. (General introduction, with some emphasis on metaphysical issues.)
- R. L. Saw, *Aesthetics: An Introduction*, 1972. (Rather discursive. Emphasizes more purely aesthetic issues.)
- J. Hospers (ed.), *Introductory Readings in Aesthetics*, 1969. (Aimed at non-philosophers.)
- E. H. Gombrich, *Art and Illusion*, 1960. (Emphasizes problems about representation.)
- R. G. Collingwood, *The Principles of Art*, 1938.
- R. Wollheim, *Art and its Objects*, 1968.
- C. Radford, 'Fakes', *Mind*, 1978. (Relevance of forgery.)

Affirmation of consequent. Fallacy of arguing that if the consequent of a conditional statement is true, so is the antecedent, e.g., 'If all cats are black, Tiddles is black; and Tiddles is black; so all cats are black.'

Agglomeration. If I can go out and I can stay in, the conjunction 'I can go out and I can stay in' must be true, but 'I can go out and stay in' does not follow. 'Can' is therefore called conjunctive but not agglomerative. An important ethical issue concerns whether 'ought' is agglomerative.

- B. A. O. Williams, R. F. Atkinson, 'Consistency in ethics', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, supplementary vol., 1965.

Albert the Great. c.1200–80. Born in Germany, he worked mainly there and in Paris (and taught AQUINAS in the 1240s). He contributed to empirical science, and was a pioneer in reconciling Greek and Arabic science and philosophy with Christianity. He also translated Aristotle from Greek to Latin. He studied PLATO and ARISTOTLE partly through the eyes of the Neoplatonists and the Arabs. He wrote, among other things, commentaries on Aristotle and other Greek authors, and on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard and at the end of his life a *Summa Theologiae*.

Alienans. An adjective is called alienans if it cancels the noun it qualifies in either of the following ways: a bogus policeman cannot be a policeman, and an alleged policeman need not be one. See also ATTRIBUTIVE.

Aliorelative. See REFLEXIVE.

Alternation. See CONJUNCTION.

Ambiguity. The property, had by some terms, of having two or more meanings. Ambiguity is not the same as *vagueness*. 'Bald' is vague (how many hairs can a bald man have?) but not ambiguous. An ambiguous term can be quite precise in each of its senses. Also it can be argued that ambiguity applies to terms, vagueness to concepts. 'How ambiguous is "ambiguous"?' is a favourite philosophical question. Ambiguity may apply to words, phrases and sentences, considered in the abstract, or to utterances considered as uttered on a given occasion.

'Bank', connected with rivers and money, may be treated as two words with the same sound but different meanings or as one word with different meanings. Philologists would call 'bank' two words if its uses have different etymologies, but philosophers often arbitrarily treat it as one word or two. Such words, especially when treated as one word with different meanings, are often called *equivocal*.

Phrases or sentences can be ambiguous while none of the words in them is so. In 'little girls' camp' either the girls or the camp may be little. This is sometimes called *amphiboly*.

The ambiguity of 'Jack hits James and Jill hit him' depends not on the *meaning* of 'him' but on who is being referred to by 'him' on the particular occasion of utterance. This and amphiboly are often called *syntactical ambiguity*. 'Ambiguity' itself is sometimes used in wider, sometimes in narrower, senses.

It is often hard to decide when to call a word ambiguous. 'Him' in the 'hitting' example is not really ambiguous, though it is sometimes said to have *ambiguity of reference*. Some words seem to have senses which differ, but are related. A healthy body is a flourishing one, while a healthy climate produces or preserves health and a healthy complexion is a sign of it. 'Healthy' is therefore often said to have *focal meaning* (Owen). Its senses 'focus' on one dominant sense. Words like 'big',

Amphiboly

which are syncategorematic (see CATEGORIES), have something like focal meaning, in that it makes a difference what standards we use in applying them. A big mouse is not a big animal, so that to call something 'big', without further ado, can be ambiguous; see ATTRIBUTIVE.

When the ambiguities of an expression can be predicted according to a rule the expression has *systematic ambiguity*. On the theory of TYPES 'class' is systematically or *typically ambiguous* because its meaning varies according to the type to which it belongs.

Other kinds of ambiguity, or related notions, include analogical and metaphorical uses of expressions, e.g. God is sometimes called 'wise' in a sense different from, though analogous to, that in which men are wise. Since many terms are ambiguous in this way when applied to God and men, this can be regarded as a case of systematic ambiguity; it is also related to focal meaning.

Some pervasive ambiguities are given special names, such as *process/product ambiguity* of words like 'vision' which can mean power of seeing or something seen, or 'statement' which can mean act of stating or what is stated. Many philosophically important terms have this ambiguity. See also OPEN TEXTURE.

W. V. Quine, *Word and Object*, 1960, §§ 27–9. (Various kinds of ambiguity, § 26 discusses vagueness.)

W. Leszl, *Logic and Metaphysics in Aristotle*, 1970, part II, chapter 1. (Kinds of ambiguity in Aristotle.)

G. E. L. Owen, 'Logic and metaphysics in some earlier works of Aristotle', in I. During and G. E. L. Owen (eds), *Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century*, 1960, and 'Aristotle on the snares of ontology', in R. Bambrough (ed.), *New Essays on Plato and Aristotle*, 1965. D. W. Hamlyn, 'Focal meaning', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1977–8. (Discussions of focal meaning and its significance in Aristotle (small amount of Greek in Owen). Cf. esp. § 2 of latter, and also (for a related concept) R. Robinson, 'The concept of knowledge', *Mind*, 1971, p. 20.)

Amphiboly. See AMBIGUITY.

Analysis. See PHILOSOPHY.

Analytic. The analytic/synthetic distinction is first explicitly made by Kant. A proposition is analytic, on Kant's view, if the predicate is covertly contained in the subject, as in 'Roses are flowers'. A proposition where the predicate is attached to the subject but not contained in it is synthetic, as in 'Roses are red'. The contradictory of a synthetic proposition is always synthetic whereas the contradictory of an analytic proposition is usually called 'analytically false'. Kant's distinction was partly anticipated by Leibniz, who distinguished 'truths of reasons' from 'truths of fact', and had the idea of containment, and by Hume, who distinguished 'relations between ideas' from 'matters of fact'.

Kant's distinction can easily be extended to conditional propositions, which are analytic if the consequent is contained in the antecedent, e.g. 'If this is a rose, it is a flower', and otherwise synthetic. Some other kinds of propositions raise difficulties, for instance, existential propositions like 'There exist black swans', and the notion of containment is hard to analyse. In general in 'Red roses are red' the containment is straightforwardly verbal. But in what sense precisely is the predicate 'contained' in the subject in 'Roses are flowers', or the consequent in the antecedent in 'If all men are mortal and Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal'?

Because of this difficulty Kant himself proposed an alternative definition now often adopted: a proposition is analytic if its negation is, or is reducible to, a contradiction or inconsistency; otherwise the proposition is synthetic. A proposition which is true because it exemplifies a certain logical FORM, as 'Bachelors are bachelors' exemplifies the form 'x's are x's', can be called *explicitly analytic*. A proposition which is true because of certain definitions, as 'Bachelors are male' is true because of the definition of 'bachelor', is *implicitly analytic* or *true by definition*. Explicitly analytic propositions, and sometimes implicitly analytic ones too, can be called *logically true* or *logically necessary*.

A proposition like 'Nothing is both red and green all over' seems to be true in virtue of the meanings of the words involved, but not true by definition: 'red' is not *defined* in terms of 'not green', nor 'green', in terms of 'not red'. This proposition therefore may be called analytic in a sense even wider than that of 'implicitly analytic'.

Recently the analytic/synthetic distinction has been attacked, especially by Quine, who argues that any clear account of the implicitly analytic would require notions like meaning, definition and synonymy, which themselves presuppose the implicitly analytic. He also alleges that the point of calling something analytic is to give a reason why it cannot be revised in the light of experience, and then claims that no statements are immune to such revision. Some statements are revisable with little effect on others (suppose 'I see a cat' is taken as true: it could be revised, i.e. rejected as false, by simply dismissing the experience as a hallucination). The rejection of other statements, such as the laws of logic, would profoundly affect our whole way of talking, but Quine thinks it is still possible. Scientific laws form an intermediate case. Thus Quine ends by saying that 'analytic' even in the narrow sense of 'explicitly analytic' cannot be applied absolutely, but at best as a matter of degree to those statements we are least willing to revise. Controversy still rages over this: is it simply that any sentence now expressing a logical truth could one day change its meaning and fail to do so, or is there more to it than this?

The distinction has also been attacked, in a less fundamental way, by Waismann, who claims that it is not a sharp one, and that statements such as 'I see with my eyes' and 'space has three dimensions' cannot be unambiguously classified in accordance with it.

A further problem about the analytic/synthetic distinction, for those

Analytic

who accept it, is how it relates to the A PRIORI/empirical and necessary/contingent (see MODALITIES) distinctions. It is normally assumed that nothing can be both analytic and empirical, or both analytic and contingent (but see Bunge, and also A PRIORI). Kant, though he took 'analytic' in the wider sense, as 'implicitly analytic', treated analytic propositions as trivial and uninformative, like TAUTOLOGIES. He and others have claimed that the propositions of mathematics, etc., must be synthetic a priori, while logical positivists and others have vigorously denied that anything can be both synthetic and a priori. Often the synthetic a priori, which is in practice generally assumed to coincide with the synthetic necessary, is defended merely by interpreting 'analytic' in a narrow sense. Thus the issue at least partly depends on distinguishing senses of 'analytic' and giving reasons for preferring one to another. It is still disputed whether a substantial notion of synthetic a priori is needed for statements like 'Nothing can be red and green all over', or 'If A exceeds B and B exceeds C then A exceeds C'; and also whether the laws of logic themselves can properly be called analytic. How too should we classify the statement itself that no synthetic statement is a priori?

Certain problems concern the relation between sentences and the statements they are used to make. Does 'The fat cow which I see is fat' make an analytic statement, although it apparently implies the synthetic statement that I do see a cow? And does 'I exist', since it cannot be uttered to make a false statement, make an analytic statement?

All the above must be distinguished from the question of the analytic and synthetic *methods*, deriving from Greek mathematics. See also MODALITIES, SENTENCE.

I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Introduction, § 4.

W. V. Quine, 'Two dogmas of empiricism', in *From a Logical Point of View*, 1953, chapter 2.

H. P. Grice and P. F. Strawson, 'In defense of a dogma', *Philosophical Review*, 1956. (Defence of analyticity against Quine.)

F. Waismann, 'Analytic-synthetic' (in six parts), *Analysis*, 10, 11, 13, (1949–1953); reprinted in his *How I See Philosophy*, 1968.

D. Mitchell, *Introduction to Logic*, 1962, pp. 159–64. (Claims that 'analytic' properly applies to *sentences*.)

M. Bunge, 'Analyticity redefined', *Mind*, 1961. (Defends notion of analytic a posteriori.)

A. Quinton, 'The a priori and the analytic', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1963–4. (Distinguishes several senses of 'analytic' and rejects synthetic a priori for each of them.)

L. Resnick, 'Do existent unicorns exist?', *Analysis*, 23, 1963, pp. 128 ff. ('Fat cow' example. Cf. J. J. Katz, *Linguistic Philosophy*, 1972, pp. 146–73; pp. 156–7 claim analytic sentences are not true.)

R. Descartes, *Reply to Second Objections* (to his *Meditations*), last few pages. (Analytic and synthetic methods.)

R. Robinson, 'Analysis in Greek geometry', *Mind*, 1936, reprinted in

his *Essays in Greek Philosophy*, 1969. (Greek origins of analytic and synthetic methods).

J. F. Harris and R. H. Severens (eds), *Analyticity*, 1970 (Readings. Includes Quine, Grice and Strawson, and bibliography.)

Analytical hypothesis. See TRANSLATION.

Ancestral relation. If a relation connects every two adjacent terms in a series there must be a relation which connects any two terms in the series. This relation is the ancestral of the original one. 'Ancestor of' is the ancestral of 'parent of'. See also DEFINITION.

And. See CONJUNCTION.

Angst, Angoisse. See EXISTENTIALISM.

Anselm, St. 1033–1109. Born in Aosta, he studied in France and became archbishop of Canterbury in 1093. He originated the 'ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT' for God's existence in his *Proslogion* (his *Monologion* contains related proofs of God's existence). He also wrote on truth (*De Veritate*) and on logic and problems such as that of universals (*De Grammatico*).

D. P. Henry, *The Logic of St. Anselm*, 1967. (Henry has also translated the *De Grammatico*, 1964.)

Antilogism. An inconsistent set of three propositions. The two premises of a valid SYLLOGISM with the CONTRADICTION of its conclusion, or more generally three propositions, any two of which entail the contradiction of the third. Also called *inconsistent triad*. The *principle of antilogism* says that if two propositions together entail a third, then either of them and the contradiction of the third together entail the contradiction of the other, e.g. if 'All men are mortal' and 'Socrates is a man' together entail 'Socrates is mortal', then 'All men are mortal' and 'Socrates is not mortal' together entail 'Socrates is not a man'.

Antirealism. See REALISM.

Apodictic. See MODALITIES, IMPERATIVES.

Aporetic. Raising and discussing problems without solving them.

A posteriori. See A PRIORI.

Apperception. In Leibniz, reflective consciousness rather than mere passive perception. In Kant, consciousness of oneself as a unity, on the empirical or transcendental level. Other writers use the term in fairly similar senses. Perhaps the unifying thread in its main senses is aware-

A priori

ness of the self as that which judges. It plays little part in contemporary philosophy.

A priori. *A priori* and its opposite *empirical* or *a posteriori* apply primarily to concepts, notions or ideas and to propositions, statements or judgments. Roughly, *a priori* means 'prior to experience' and *empirical* means 'based on experience', the experience of the five senses and perhaps introspection. However, the terms are ambiguous. An *a priori* concept may be any of the following: (i) A concept we can acquire without our being presented with an instance in experience, and without having to construct it from concepts so presented. We construct *unicorn* from *horse* and *horn*. (ii) A concept we *must* so acquire because experience could not supply us with it. Here there are the concepts of validity and negation. (iii) A concept we can acquire without any experience at all, or never acquire but have always had. Substance and cause may be examples. (iv) A concept we can apply without using experience. We do not use the senses to find whether an argument is *valid*.

Questions about the temporal order in which we actually acquire concepts are psychological, but they are often confused with philosophical questions about how we can or must acquire them, or what justifies us in applying them. Perhaps some concepts must in some sense be *a priori*, if we need concepts before having experiences, in order to classify or distinguish the experiences. Much depends here on what we mean by 'having' a CONCEPT. *A priori* concepts are sometimes called *innate ideas*, and it is disputed how far 'innate' is a justified term. Interest in innate ideas has increased because of the claims of certain linguists, notably Chomsky, to the effect that we have an innate tendency to learn and use certain grammatical structures more easily than others.

With propositions experience may enter in two ways, giving us the concepts involved, and telling us that the proposition is true. An *a priori* proposition may be any of the following: (i) A proposition we know from birth. (ii) One we know, or can know, as soon as we acquire the relevant concepts. For example, once we acquire the concepts *red* and *green* we can know that nothing is simultaneously red and green all over. (iii) One we cannot understand without knowing it to be true. (iv) One we cannot learn from experience. Kant especially emphasized this. The relations between these senses are complex, and psychology and philosophy can be entangled here. A mere belief, held from birth but which experience could refute, would be instinctive but not *a priori*.

The concepts in an *a priori* proposition may or may not be themselves *a priori* in any one sense. When they are all *a priori* the proposition can be called *absolutely a priori*, e.g. 'No proposition is both true and false'; otherwise the proposition is *relatively a priori*, e.g., 'Nothing is simultaneously red and green all over'. 'Relatively *a priori*' could also apply to the everyday sense in which an empirical proposition is knowable independently of a given context, as when a detective says, 'I haven't yet found any clues, but I know *a priori* that money is a motive