THIRD EDITION

POLITICS MIDDLE EAST

James A. Bill
Robert Springborg

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Preface

During the second half of the 1980s there were dramatic developments in the Middle East. The 95-month war between Iran and Iraq ground down to a bloody, uneasy halt. The Soviet Union, under military and economic pressure, pulled its troops out of Afghanistan, a country they had occupied since late 1979. In neighboring Pakistan, President Zia el-Haq died in a mysterious plane crash, and a woman, Benazir Bhutto, was elected head of the Islamic Republic there. In Iran, the Islamic revolution commemorated its tenth anniversary in February 1989; in June its inspirational leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, died and, in a smooth transition, was replaced by new leadership consisting of Khomeini's revolutionary colleagues. Qaddafi of Libya, Assad of Syria, and Mubarak of Egypt survived politically, as did King Hussein of Jordan, Hassan of Morocco, and the handful of shaikhs and sultans who directed their countries along the fringes of the explosive Persian Gulf.

The thorny, punishing Arab-Israeli imbroglio entered a new phase. In December 1987, the Palestinians in Gaza and on the West Bank began full-scale protests and demonstrations against their Israeli occupiers. By late 1989, over 800 unarmed Palestinians had died and over 35,000 were wounded in the *intifadah,* an uprising which maintained its momentum as casualties mounted. In 1988, the Palestine Liberation Organization formally recognized Israel's right to exist, effectively passing the baton of responsibility for the conflict to Israel. In nearby Lebanon, chaos and violence continued to reign supreme.

The United States staggered to and fro in the Middle East in the 1980s. The Reagan administration saw 241 marines die in one

bombing in Lebanon in 1983. It sent aircraft to attack Mu'ammar Qaddafi's home and headquarters in 1985, secret envoy-adventurers to Iran in 1986 in a crude attempt at diplomacy with revolutionary Iran, and ships to the Persian Gulf to escort Kuwaiti tankers in 1987. In its early months, the new administration of George Bush chose to adopt a more cautious, studied approach to the region.

Despite these tumultuous times, this third edition of *Politics in the Middle East* is similar to earlier editions because it analyzes problems, issues, and processes that transcend particular events and that chronologically and geographically cut across the region. This latest edition, nevertheless, contains a number of fundamental changes. These stem largely from the fact that the place of one of the original authors, Carl Leiden, has been taken by Robert Springborg. This change has resulted in both organizational and substantive changes.

While chapters 1, 3, 4, 5, and 8 have been revised and updated, chapters 2, 6, 7, and 9 are completely new. Chapter 2, entitled "States, Beliefs, and Ideologies," combines two chapters on religion and ideology from earlier editions. The chapter on violence and the military has been replaced by Chapter 6, a broader-gauged discussion entitled "Institutions of Government: Militaries, Bureaucracies, and Legislatures." Throughout the book, more attention has been given to processes of state formation, and more emphasis has also been placed on interactions between economics and politics.

This latest, revised product, however, is not only the result of personnel changes. It is also shaped by numerous suggestions by colleagues across the country who have used the book in the classroom. Their reactions and, most important, the comments and suggestions of their students lie behind many of the revisions. We feel that in responding to this valuable input, we have produced a better book. This judgment, however, must be left to others.

The system of transliteration in this study generally follows the format used by the *International Journal of Middle East Studies.* We have decided to delete all diacritical marks with the exception of the ayn (') and the hamza (') when they appear in the middle of a word. This decision may upset a number of careful scholars of Middle Eastern history and linguistics. It is done, however, to assist students and nonarea specialists who have expressed their reluctance to plow through numerous dots and dashes, which to them appear randomly sprinkled over the pages

of the text. Arabic, Persian, or Turkish words commonly used in English are spelled as they appear in *Webster's Third International Dictionary* or in *Webster's Geographical Dictionary.* Well-known proper names are presented as they generally appear in English or as they have been transliterated by the individuals themselves—for example, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, King Farouk, Nuri al-Said, King Hussein, and Kemal Ataturk. This approach, of course, leads to occasional inconsistencies. In response we quote T. E. Lawrence, who, in the preface of his *Seven Pillars of Wisdom,* writes, "Arabic names won't go into English, exactly, for their consonants are not the same as ours and their vowels, like ours, vary from district to district. There are some 'scientific systems' of transliteration, helpful to people who know enough Arabic not to need helping, but a wash-out for the world."

The wisdom and personal support of many individuals have been indispensable to creating this book. Over the years, scholars such as Manfred Halpern, George Lenczowski, and Gabriel Almond have had a great impact on our thinking. More recently, we have benefited from the work of Ervand Abrahamian, Fouad Ajami, Shahrough Akhavi, James Akins, Nazar Al-Hasso, Abbas Amanat, Hooshang Amirahmadi, Lisa Anderson, John Duke Anthony, Ahmad Ashraf, Mohammed Ayoob, George W. Ball, Ali Banuazizi, Peter Bechtold, Joel Beinin, Leonard Binder, Ralph Braibanti, Carl Brown, Louis Cantori, Nazli Choucri, William Cleveland, Juan Cole, Munther and Mohammed Dajani, Dale Eickelman, Herman Eilts, Kail Ellis, John Esposito, Tawfic Farah, Robert Freedman, Shafeeq Ghabra, Grace Goodell, Yvonne Haddad, Shireen Hunter, J. C. Hurewitz, Farhad Kazemi, Nikki Keddie, John Limbert, David Long, William Roger Louis, Ian Lustick, Charles MacDonald, Hafeez Malik, David Menashri, Roy Mottahedeh, Robert G. Newman, Richard Norton, Monte Palmer, John Peterson, James Piscatori, R. K. Ramazani, Bernard Reich, Thomas Ricks, William Rugh, Emile Sahliyeh, Oles Smolansky, Robert Stookey, Antony Sullivan, Michael Suleiman, Joseph Szyliowicz, Metin Tamkoc, Mark Tessler, Robert Vitalis, John Voll, John Waterbury, Marvin Weinbaum, John Williams, Rita Wright, and Marvin Zonis.

Scholars and teachers such as Bruce Borthwick, John Damis, Manochehr Dorraj, Gene Garthwaite, Arthur Goldschmidt, Jerrold Green, Eric Hooglund, Tareq Ismael, Yasumassa Kuroda, John Lorentz, Abbass Manafy, Phebe Marr, Robert Noel, Hossein Razi,

Gregory Rose, Eliz Sanasarian, and Farzin Sarrabi-Kia have used the book in the classroom or have offered suggestions that have been especially useful. Published reviews of earlier editions by Amir Ferdows, Michael Hudson, Don Peretz, and Frank Tachau were extremely constructive. Specific expertise and assistance have also been provided by Abdul-Reda Assiri, Steven Dorr, Clement Henry, Metin Heper, Jim Hitselberger, Michael Humphrey, Samir Khalaf, Jacob Landau, Ira Lapidus, Fred Lawson, Ann Lesch, William Millward, Emile Nakhleh, Mehdi Noorbaksh, Jerry Obermyer, Othman Rawwaf, Glenn Robinson, William Royce, Hisham Sharabi, Patricia Springborg, and Andrew Vincent. Helma Neumann expertly and expeditiously word-processed several drafts of Chapters 2, 6, 7, and 9.

We also express gratitude to Marguerite Bouraad-Nash whose meticulous reading of the entire manuscript resulted in numerous constructive suggestions that have improved our book immeasurably. Finally, we thank our editors, John Covell, formerly of Little, Brown, and Dick Welna of Scott, Foresman for their superb support throughout the production of this latest edition.

James A. Bill
Robert Springborg

Contents

Chapter One

Political Development and the Challenge of Modernization

The politics of turbulent change and revolutionary upheaval dominate the Middle East as mankind steadily approaches the year 2000. The dialectical clash between the challenging forces of modernity and the persistent strength of tradition is a fundamental reality in the region. Old human relationships and social structures are crumbling, while new systems remain to be formed. In the midst of such incoherence, many hold a vision of a promising but unknown future; others seek to return to a more familiar past. From Morocco and Algeria on the west to Afghanistan and Pakistan on the east, the peoples of the Middle East find themselves confronted by economic hardship, political crisis, and personal insecurity.

Politically, traditional rulers, revolutionary command councils, authoritarian military leaders, and religious governing elites live side by side. No form of government seems immune to coups and countercoups. Internal violence sparked by sociopolitical dissatisfaction and interregional warfare dominated by the persisting Arab-Israeli conflict have become an integral part of the scene. Lavish wealth exists alongside of abject poverty, both between and within societies. Homeless Palestinians are scattered about the region, while militarily powerful Israel stubbornly resists the growing pressures for the creation of a Palestinian state.

The effects of the developmental challenge in the Middle East extend far beyond the confines of the area itself. The international impact of the oil embargo of 1973, the Lebanese civil war of 1975, the Iranian revolution of 1978–1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the Israeli attacks on Lebanon in 1982, and the violence in the Persian Gulf in the late 1980s are among the cases

in point. The continuing impact of the message of revolutionary Iran and the broad appeal of the Islamic revival in the region will have a deep influence in the Third World throughout the 1990s.

At the level of everyday living, change is highly evident, and ancient customs and lifeways are under heavy siege. This is particularly true with respect to the related areas of occupation, transportation, recreation, and education. Stenographers and typists are rapidly replacing calligraphers and scribes; the carpet and metal industries have been transformed by the machine; and factories and assembly lines are taking the place of town workshops and cottage industry. In the realm of transportation, donkeys and camels have already lost their centuries-long domination to automobiles and trucks. Airplanes and airports are omnipresent. Throughout the Middle East, herdsmen and shepherds listen to transistor radios, and television sets now adorn village teahouses. The urban young increasingly flock to movie houses, dance halls, bowling alleys, pool halls, and ski resorts. The patterns of dress are also in a stage of interesting transition. Veiled women go about their shopping in tennis shoes, and street cleaners ply their trade in reasonable facsimiles of sport coats.

Countering this drive to modernity has been a growing trend to recapture important practices of the past. Throughout the region, there is a noticeable return to the veil by significant numbers of young women—women of all social classes. Middle Easterners seem to be increasingly engaged in a search for their roots. The resurgent strength of Islam must be viewed in this light. Social change in the Middle East therefore is marked by a curious and even bizarre blend of tradition and modernity. The jagged course of change has left in its wake a number of imbalances, inconsistencies, inequalities, and enigmas: discotheques and mosques, modern luxury hotels and squalid mud huts, nuclear energy programs and the fuel of animal droppings, F-16s and old rifles and daggers, palaces and tents, computerized libraries and omnipresent illiteracy.

Central to the entire problem of change as it is manifested in the Middle East are the related issues of modernization and political development. The revolution of modernization and the politics of development are two of the most critical problems confronting Middle Eastern peoples and cultures. It is here that they are caught in a grim struggle for survival, justice, and happiness. The extraordinary importance of these issues is perhaps matched only by the great difficulty involved in coming to grips intellectually

with them. The following section will present some of the definitions and distinctions essential to any serious analysis of the processes of modernization and political development in the Middle East.

The Challenge of Modernization

C. E. Black defines modernization as "the process by which historically evolved institutions are adapted to the rapidly changing functions that reflect the unprecedented increase in man's knowledge, permitting control over his environment, that accompanied the scientific revolution."[1] Dankwart Rustow writes that modernization is a process of "rapidly widening control over nature through closer cooperation among men."[2] And Marion J. Levy, in a major hypothesis in his work, asserts that "the greater the ratio of inanimate to animate sources of power and the greater the multiplication of effort as the effect of applications of tools, the greater is the degree of modernization."[3] Modernization is most concisely defined as the process by which men and women increasingly gain control over their environment.

The process of modernization has, of course, always occurred in society. In the past, the wide variety of responses to environmental challenges produced some very disparate results; this legacy is evident today in much of the developing world, including the Middle East. In the twentieth century, rapid communication not only facilitates the discovery that stages of modernization other than one's own are possible but also enables the experiences of certain cultures to be transmitted to other contexts.

Perhaps the most dramatic dimension of modernization is the technological revolution, which carries with it impressive trends in the areas of industrialization, economic development, and communication. In the Middle East, the constant physical transformations that seem to occur everywhere are outward evidence of technological development. Skyscrapers, highway grids, airports,

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[1]C. E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 7.

[2]Dankwart A. Rustow, *A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 3.

[3]Marion J. Levy, Jr., *Modernization and the Structure of Societies* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 35.

hotels, dams, petrochemical plants, and steel mills continually sprout throughout the area. One author refers to this rapid change in the economic and material aspects of life as the "Edifice Complex."[4] Spurred by the discovery and exploitation of petroleum and natural gas, these economic and technological factors provide the driving force of modernization.

Closely related to technological advancement are the strides that have been made in education. The grip in which the clerics traditionally have held education in the Middle East has begun to be broken. Literacy programs multiply in the area, while the numbers of school buildings and educational facilities increase at an amazing rate. The result of all this activity has been a heightened consciousness and an expanded scientific and technical knowledge. Acting as a catalyst to all this, of course, are technological forces such as advances in communications and the mass media, which provide the means by which information can be transmitted more quickly, effectively, and universally.

The developments in the Middle East in technology and education have a number of organizational and psychological implications. Organization is becoming more elaborate and specialized, and formal institutions are beginning to replace informal, personal administration. As values and expectations become more secular, important shifts in attitudes are occuring. Traditional emphasis on the spiritual and magical waxes and wanes.

The patterns that constitute the modernization syndrome are mutually reinforcing. This reinforcement accelerates modernization even in societies in which resources are scarce and in which the population largely continues to follow traditional lifestyles. Technological progress promotes educational advancement, which in turn influences attitudes and values that are reflected in organizational settings. Moreover, value systems and organizational styles that are in a state of transformation are highly supportive of continuing and deepening technological and educational change. It is easy to see why modernization is a major obsession of the peoples of the Middle East.

Modernization is inevitable and omnipresent. In the words of

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[4]Norman Jacobs, *The Sociology of Development: Iran as an Asian Case Study* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 74.

Marion Levy, it is a "universal social solvent."[5] Those societies that are relatively more modernized have tended to be located in the West, and hence the process has sometimes been unfortunately referred to as Westernization. The inevitability and universality of modernization are products of the increasingly interdependent world in which we live. Although the societies in the Middle East will all struggle in one way or another to modernize, not all will succeed to the same degree. The unevenness of the success of modernization in the various Middle Eastern societies is in itself a source of tension and conflict.

Modernization is an unsettling, disruptive, painful process. The comforts of traditional habits are lost as these habits are uprooted. In modernizing societies, new processes and institutions seem always to be trapped in a state of becoming, and, as a result, the expected uncertainties of the past have given way to the more frightful and unknown insecurities of the present. In the Middle East, where most of the societies have seriously begun to modernize, any slowing or reversal of the process causes great stress. Yet the uneven supply of national resources, the shortage of technical skills, and the weakness of political leadership are all severe impediments to continuing modernization. Modernization is a process in which expectations necessarily race beyond their satisfaction. However, satisfaction must never lag too far behind. In most Middle Eastern societies, the gap between sharpened aspirations and their attainment threatens to become a chasm. The consequent frustrations directly promote social upheaval and political unrest.

The direction and depth of the drive for modernization are determined largely within the political system. The political elites of the various Middle Eastern societies make the basic decisions that shape the strategies of modernization. Modernization in turn affects the capacity of the political system to respond to political challenges. For reasons such as these, the important issue of political development is closely interwoven with the problem of modernization.

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[5]Marion J. Levy, Jr., *Modernization: Latecomers and Survivors* (New York and London: Basic Books, 1972).

The Concept of Political Development

One survey of the literature on development tallies ten different definitions of political development.[6] There is much confusion about the relationship between the concept of modernization and that of political development. Often the terms are treated as synonymous. In other instances, they are sharply distinguished from each other. In this study, we view the two processes as analytically distinct but actually interrelated. It is in this sense that we will study them in the Middle East.

Alfred Diamant writes that "political development is a process by which a political system acquires an increased capacity to sustain successfully and continuously new type of goals and demands and the creation of new types of organizations."[7] S. N. Eisenstadt provides a similar definition when he discusses a political system's ability to meet changing demands and then "to absorb them in terms of policy-making and to assure its own continuity in the face of continuous new demands and new forms of political organization."[8] Eisenstadt goes on to state that "the ability to deal with continuous changes in political demands is the crucial test of such sustained political development."[9] This concern for the capacity of a political system to meet new challenges is also evident in the Social Science Research Council Committee's work on development. The developmental capacity of politics "is a capacity not only to overcome the divisions and manage the tensions created by increased differentiation, but to respond to or contain the participatory and distributive demands generated by the imperatives of equality. It is also a capacity to innovate and manage continuous change."[10]

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[6]Lucian W. Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), pp. 33-45. For a penetrating analysis of the major intellectual attempts to confront the issue of development, see Leonard Binder's chapter, "The Crises of Political Development," in L. Binder *et al.*, *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 3-72.

[7]Alfred Diamant, "The Nature of Political Development," in *Political Development and Social Change*, ed. Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), p. 92.

[8]S. N. Eisenstadt, "Initial Institutional Patterns of Political Mobilization," *Civilizations* 12 (1962), reprinted in *Political Modernization*, ed. Claude E. Welch, Jr. (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1967), p. 252.

[9]*Ibid.*

[10]James S. Coleman's words in Binder et al., *Crises and Sequences*, p. 78.