KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS

Case Studies in the Relationship Between Epistemology and Political Philosophy

edited by Marcelo Dascal and Ora Gruengard

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Introduction

Marcelo Dascal and Ora Gruengard

Many philosophers have put forth both a theory of knowledge and a political philosophy. The studies in this book address the work of a sample of these thinkers, past and present. Each chapter undertakes to clarify—and eventually criticize—the kind of connection, if any, obtaining between a philosopher's epistemology and his political philosophy.

In one way or another, the underlying issue in each case is this: Given that a philosopher has expressly put forth certain doctrines in epistemology and political philosophy, how does the adoption of one such doctrine in one field *rationally* constrain in any way the kind(s) of doctrines that are adopted by him in the other? For instance, is there an identifiable rational connection leading from Russell's views on the conditions of human knowledge to his claims about the conditions of human freedom, as has been argued by Noam Chomsky? Does Paul Feyerabend's "methodological anarchism" in the philosophy of science commit him to the adoption of anarchism (or of what he calls democratic relativism) as a political position? Or is the former perhaps required by the latter? Does "methodological individualism"—the requirement that the "behavior" of social complexes such as groups and institutions be solely explained in terms of the behavior of individuals—entail political individualism, or vice versa? To what extent is Popper's critical rationalism indeed an overall framework covering his views both on science and on politics?

Each chapter deals with questions of this kind and related ones, mainly from the assumed perspective of the philosopher on whom it is focused, and takes into account his own conception of the connection—if any—between his epistemology and his political philosophy. As a whole, however, the collection goes beyond the individual cases. As a sample of case studies it helps to reveal recurrent patterns of connection and enables us to analyze their significance in a way that is less dependent on the biases of a single philosopher or interpreter. Furthermore, the analysis and comparison of the kinds of philosophical reasoning that purport to establish—or to discover—systematic connections between theories that belong to *prima facie* unrelated disciplines may shed some light on the meta-philosophical issues of the

nature of philosophical reasoning and of the coherence that holds together philosophical systems.

This introductory chapter is devoted mainly to the implications of the findings of the case studies for these general and meta-philosophical questions. Anticipating our conclusions, we might say that the present sample shows that the level at which the connections between theoretical options in the two domains are brought into sharpest focus is neither the level of sheer logical necessity nor that of mere historical or otherwise merely circumstantial contingency. It is, rather, an intermediary level, for which we employ the term "strategy."

The bulk of this introduction elaborates upon this approach and illustrates connective strategies in the cases studied in this book as well as in other well-known examples. But first, we wish to explain why we characterize our interest in this inquiry and its results as a search for "rational connections," and to discuss the considerations that have led us to select this particular set of case studies.

A Non-Reductionistic Approach

Traditional answers to the question about the relationship between epistemological and political doctrines are of two kinds, which correspond to different conceptions of the history of ideas. They focus either on connections of a structural/logical or of a genetic/causal nature. Neither of these approaches excludes the other. Because they emphasize different connections, what is usually found in the literature are studies which combine, in various proportions, both. What turns out to fit better the case studies here assembled, however, is a third *kind* of approach, not reducible to a combination of the former two, though sharing some features with each of them. The search for the rationale of the connection between philosophical positions, marked by the use of terms such as "reasonable" and "rational," indicates what it shares with the first approach. The emphasis on the specificity of the problems with which each philosopher is trying to cope, which puts a premium on a "token-token" rather than "type-type" analysis and fully acknowledges the historicity of the criteria of reasonableness, points to its similarity with the second approach.

Other approaches usually rest content with highlighting thematic similarities or dissimilarities between doctrines, disciplines, and authors, and with the ability to explain them in terms of logical and genetic relationships. Our analysis of the case studies purports to show that such relationships can be further clarified by considering the variety of *argumentative* environments within which both authors and their interpreters establish, justify, or simply rely upon them. Argumentation lies, of course, at the core of the philosophical game and it is via the critical assessment of arguments that the rationality of philosophical theories and systems is usually judged. Yet as the present studies reveal, it is not just a matter of logical inferences. This is why the question of whether there are rational connections between

a philosopher's epistemological and political theories cannot be construed as a matter of purely logical relations between these theories *qua* articulated bodies of conceptual constructs. It rather involves a more complex relationship whose terms are the thinker's "problem-situation," the tacit criteria of rationality he or she takes for granted, his or her presuppositions, and the explicit theories he or she puts forth. Such a relationship cannot be elucidated by focusing exclusively on the question whether and how *the theories* are connected. One must rather stress such questions as: Does giving one's assent to a certain theory in one domain determine or otherwise constrain— by one's standards of rationality—one's theoretical options in the other? What is the connection—if any—between the problems in epistemology and political philosophy that the philosopher's respective theories are sup- posed to solve? Does the success of a solution in one of them function as an argument for proposing a similar solution in the other?

Obviously, in an inquiry of this sort, the explicit statements of the philosopher about the connections of the two theories he holds must be taken into account. But interpreters of the philosopher's positions can and should go beyond his explicit statements about those connections. After all, philosophical reasoning, despite the philosophers' claim to self-awareness, is only partially explicit, like the reasoning of ordinary humans. Sometimes philosophers knowingly avoid giving reasons which are relevant but im- permissible according to their putative methodology. They may even give methodologically acceptable reasons which are only excuses for choices actually motivated by other considerations. Sometimes they are not fully aware of their own reasons, biases, and problem-situations. As it is often the case with other mortals, interpreters may find in their statements, both the "official" ones and those expressed off the record, links that the philosophers themselves have never paid attention to: a recurrent structure, a pervasive model, a frequent metaphor, a consistent use of the same rule, and so forth. We believe that interpretations which take these possibilities into account are relevant to the understanding of a philosopher's positions, perhaps even more relevant than the philosopher's explicit arguments and self-perception of his considerations and method of reasoning. Interpretations such as these are particularly important in the case of reasoning which links two apparently separate domains, since the philosophers themselves may deny the connection. They are perhaps even more important when one of the domains is a battlefield of conflicting norms and interests, as politics often is, while the other is at least seemingly neutral, as epistemology aspires to be.

Licensing the interpreters to go beyond the philosopher's own perception of the connections between his theories paves the way either to the discovery of (possibly hidden) internal *reasons* for a philosopher's holding his two theories or to the explanation of their being in the same package in *causal* terms, e.g., by reference to some external connection (such as the fact that both theories symbolically fulfill the same unconscious wish, serve the same class interests, have their origin in the same authority). Though in our

invitation to the contributors we did not exclude the latter possibility, nor the option of "no connection," all of the authors of the studies in this book undertake to explain the philosophers' particular choice of epistemological and political theories as *inherently* connected. Contributors generally applied the so-called principle of charity, assuming, further, that each philosopher's package of positions was somehow supported by reasoning and argumentation, rather than being merely the product of arbitrary circumstances. As could be expected, some of them maintain that a given philosopher's reasons are not convincing or even are defective. None, however, explains this flaw by resorting to unconscious motives or to considerations such as political opportunism or mere lip service paid to some authority (an allegation previously leveled against some of the philosophers here discussed). Perhaps this reflects some bias in our invitation's formulation of the exploratory questions to be addressed in each study. More probably, it reflects the currently prevailing norms of philosophical interpretation. Be that as it may, such a result certainly reflects the belief of at least fourteen contemporary philosophers of different backgrounds, positions, and styles that major epistemological and political doctrines can—and perhaps should—be connected "rationally."

But it also shows that there is ample variation and flexibility in the understanding of what counts as a "rational connection" between theories. Indeed, the interpretations here offered differ considerably from the standard ones. Differing conceptions of epistemology and politics, as well as a corresponding diversity of links between them are revealed. A variety of criteria for what counts as a reason or a rational connection emerges, which turns out to be much richer than anything one can find in textbooks and monographs devoted to these thinkers. Moreover, the variety of problems these philosophers are here shown to have been trying to cope with proves to be richer than anything we had envisaged when we undertook this project. And yet, as we try to show below, these results can be usefully analyzed in terms of a small number of argumentative strategies.

The Sample

A few comments on the way this volume was put together are now in order. We have selected as topics for the chapters of this book the work of a number of major philosophers who have contributed both to epistemology and to political philosophy. We invited several colleagues, some of them well known for their scholarly interpretations of the works of the selected philosophers, to write a chapter. Each scholar was requested to analyze the connection, if any, between the epistemological and political views of one or more of the selected thinkers. Our guidelines did not specify which data, besides the key relevant texts, should be taken into account. We suggested that the thinkers' political activities, though not our primary concern, might be taken into account, if necessary, only insofar as they were deemed to spell out the philosopher's political theory. No attempt was made to impose

a unified approach. Each commentator was left free to rely upon his or her own conception of what are 'epistemology', 'political philosophy', and 'rational connection'. Indeed, in order to somehow prevent bias in favor of a given approach, we deliberately chose interpreters representing different points of view and styles of analysis; contributors even differed in their attitude—critical or sympathetic—toward the views of the philosopher they discuss.

Inevitably, however, there was some bias. Accessibility and familiarity led us to focus our attention on the Western philosophical heritage. Preference for theories which do not rely on divine assistance or a ready-made realm of Ideas, independent of human reasoning, induced us to concentrate on modern philosophy (with the exception of Aristotle), leaving aside philosophers who accept either revelation or some forms of intellectual intuition as a source of knowledge and norms. And, since we were interested in the strategies linking two *different* domains, our sample includes mainly philosophers for whom epistemology and politics are at least *prima facie* separate fields. Finally, limitations of space have forced us to reduce the size of the sample to fourteen case studies, namely: Aristotle, Hobbes, Hume, A. Smith, Condorcet, Hegel, J. S. Mill, Marx, Nietzsche, Neurath, Heidegger, Foucault, Habermas, and Feyerabend. The omission of Spinoza, Locke, Kant, Rousseau, Dewey, Popper, Nozick, Rawls, and others is not due to our underestimation of the relevance of their contributions for the present study, but rather to the lack of space.

Among those philosophers to whom a chapter in this anthology could not be devoted, some are indirectly represented via the reaction to their views by others. This is the case, for instance, of Locke (via the criticism of Nietzsche and Foucault) and of Kant (via the reaction to his views by Hegel). The thinking of other philosophers played an instrumental role in motivating this project. In this regard, we should mention Popper's attempt to connect his epistemological and political views through the principle of rational criticism: under closer scrutiny the apparently seamless connection lost much of its tightness. This incited us to probe deeper into the nature of such connections in Popper's as well as in other cases. Though no chapter is devoted to Popper, his strategy is discussed in some detail in this introduction.

The inclusion of Smith, Condorcet, and Heidegger needs justification, since their celebrity is due neither to their epistemologies nor to their political theories. Smith, who is known as the founder of economics, is an interesting case for two reasons. His political reasoning and conclusions are different from those of Hume, though their epistemologies are quite similar. They are also quite different from the liberal laissez-faire ideology, with which his name is sometimes wrongly associated: the latter applies to politics a principle Smith himself invokes only in economics, namely the blissful "invisible hand." Condorcet, who is known as a political activist and victim of the French Revolution, combined epistemological fallibilism with a resilient political optimism, which he did not give up even in the turmoil of the

revolution: his unshakable belief in the possibility of solving political and social problems scientifically was grounded in his faith in his probabilistic conception of science in general, and of the social sciences in particular. In this respect, Condorcet too stands in opposition to Hume.

Whereas Smith and Condorcet represent lesser known variants of the frequent fallibilism-*cum*-liberalism package, Heidegger, *qua* supporter—be it only momentarily, as some of his defenders claim—of the Nazi movement, is perhaps the representative of a one-member class (as far as famous philosophers are concerned). Even though he did not develop a full-fledged political theory and was in fact a critic of traditional epistemology, his case is of interest here for several reasons. First, his political views and activities in Nazi Germany remain a source of deep embarrassment for those who admire his thought, and who see in it an expression of humanism and anti-authoritarianism: are these two strands connected, and if so, how? Second, Heidegger's case raises the question of whether the rejection of traditional epistemology is, as such, conducive to or compatible with right-wing totalitarianism. In this respect his case contrasts significantly with that of Nietzsche. The latter was more aggressively "deconstructionist" than Heidegger, and yet—despite claims to the contrary by some interpreters—never supported political views which resemble Nazi ideas and ideals. It also contrasts with the case of Feyerabend, another anti-epistemologist. The latter rejects traditional epistemology for utterly different reasons and favors opposite political ideals, and yet is ready to admit—in the name of both his (anti-)methodological and his political views—something that Heidegger never did, namely the legitimacy of an opponent's perspective. Whereas Feyerabend goes as far as to admit that racist ideologies such as anti-Semitism (which he opposes) might be as reasonable as his own preferred humanism, if viewed from a perspective which is no less "legitimate" than his own liberal outlook, Heidegger can hardly be credited with a similar attitude toward his own beliefs.

No doubt issues that are considered by some philosophers as real and important are judged by others as trivial, and sometimes as pseudo-problems. It is therefore inevitable that different commentators on the same philosopher tell different stories about the connections, their rationale, and the problem-situations that brought them about. Since our purpose was not to determine the "correct" interpretation, nor to offer our own alternative, we discuss in what follows the individual cases as they are interpreted in the studies here assembled. It should also be stressed that it has not been our purpose to pass judgment on the rationality of the philosophers' arguments and on the moral acceptability of the political positions attributed to them.[1]

Strategies of Connection

The cases studied here exemplify various ways of linking epistemology with political theory. None of these ways, however, consists of purely deductive inferences. In no case can one rightly claim that accepting one

theory while rejecting the other involves inconsistency. Indeed, each theory in either field is compatible with more than one theory in the other field. But one should not hastily conclude that there is no rational connection between the philosopher's theories in a broader sense. For the assumption that one theory is true, or at least reasonable, can serve as a rationale for the acceptance of the other as a reasonable theory, as well as for the rejection of theories which are inconsistent with the former—at least from the perspective of the theories' author. By a "rationale" we mean a reasonable though defeasible argument. This term is intended to suggest that the linkage relies on additional assumptions that are not part of either theory; if such assumptions are denied, or supplemented by others that change their implications, the argument might be defeated. By saying "at least from the perspective of the theories' author" we do not, however, claim that if the philosopher's presuppositions are accepted the connection becomes strictly inferential. His perspective does not consist only of propositions to which he would be ready to give his assent. It also includes the problems with which he tried to cope and the goals that their solutions are to serve. Hence, accepting one theory while assuming that the other is right, or accepting both theories by the same rule, should be regarded as a reasonable solution, though not necessarily the only possible one, to the problems with which the thinker tries to cope.

Two examples may clarify this point. From the perspective of the Scottish skeptics the lack of any objectively valid criterion for the correctness of rules in either epistemology or politics was a serious problem. Hume believed that consistent rules in scientific as well as in political matters are practically indispensable, and he wanted their choice to be rational. He decided, according to Don Herzog's interpretation (Chapter 3), to solve the problem in both fields by employing a single principle: adopt the rules that people are naturally inclined to use, for these rules, which depend on the mind's tendency to make associations, are both simple and universally acceptable. Smith, on the other hand, was intrigued, as Sergio Cremaschi suggests (Chapter 4), by the gap, in both domains, between the rationalistic values and the empirical data. Smith wanted to bridge those unattainable ideals and the inclinations of the human mind. He decided to apply to politics a solution which follows the example he believed Newton had set for science, namely, to postulate an intermediate domain—"nature"—which is indeed determined by laws, but laws that are only probable and approximate, lying between the necessary laws of rational reality and the contingent content of human experience. He thus postulated the existence of "natural sentiments" in the social realm, and based his theory of justice on the rules that govern this nature, rather than on the mind's inclinations.

These examples show that the linkage of epistemology and politics can be a strategic move, rather than an attempt to form a comprehensive theory which includes both. Such a move is, however, reasonable only because there are prior possible links between these fields. In Hume's case, the natural tendencies of the mind which leave their impact in both; in Smith's

case, the assumption that the political, no less than the physical, is a domain which can be studied scientifically. Nevertheless, the *actual* adoption of such possible links can be viewed as strategically motivated, though the philosophers whose theories we discussed above did not necessarily think in strategic terms.

"Strategy," as the term is nowadays used in both psychology and the philosophy of science, describes quite adequately reasonings that are not reducible to strictly logical inferences, but rather are guided by some heuristics, of which the reasoner himself is not always fully aware. Adoption of the strategic approach in the case of the philosophers discussed in this book has several advantages. It permits the discovery of a kind of coherence in the philosophical enterprise as a whole, despite the variety of approaches and styles of both the philosophers and their commentators. In particular, it solves the problem of the diversity of their conceptions of "epistemology," "politics," and "rational connection." It allows, further, a reduction of the great variety of connections the commentators have created or found to a small number of strategies. It justifies, finally, viewing the cases studied here as a sample from which something concerning the nature of philosophical reasoning in general can be learned.

We distinguish between two broad kinds of strategies: the "hard" ones, which tie the two domains to each other within some sort of a system; and the "soft" ones, which just establish some link between them. The hard strategies do not necessarily imply more logical rigor than the soft ones, though the links they seek to establish are presented as more direct, systematic, and inferential than those based on the latter kind of strategy. Within each kind two sorts of recurrent strategies have been identified: the "common core" and the "subordination" strategies (both hard), and the "mediating domain" and the "analogy" strategies (both soft). Several versions of each of these strategies can be further distinguished. We shall describe and illustrate each kind of strategy in the following sections, mainly through examples from the present collection. It will become apparent that the same philosopher often employs more than one of these strategies, since none is, in itself, sufficiently effective. Nor is the list exhaustive, presumably not even for the present sample. We only highlight some salient strategies and invite the reader to look for additional ones.

The Common Core Strategy

The common core strategy connects the two domains via a core common to both, as their shared source, basic feature, function, precondition, or the like. Hobbes, for example, found two common features. The first is a characteristic which is common, according to his view, to all existing things— the *conatus*, or the drive for self-preservation (and self-enhancement). The other is specific to humans, namely the knowledge of causes and effects, which is, according to Hobbes, the only possible kind of knowledge. Physical knowledge is not only the most eminent example of knowledge, but also the most basic one, since Hobbes's materialism maintains that all genuine

knowledge is reducible to physics (as conceived by him). The *conatus* motivates both the wish to know (since knowledge is power) and behavior. Ethics, and therefore also politics, is, just like physics, a matter of knowledge—the ability to infer rightly effects from causes (including actions), and causes from effects. As being good is nothing but being appetitive, and being bad is equivalent to being aversive, moral knowledge is the knowledge about which actions have appetitive results and which lead to aversive ones. Given that the *conatus* is common to all humans, there is also a common good and a common bad. Political knowledge is the knowledge of their causes. It involves, like any knowledge, logical inferences. But while everybody has, in the modern idiom, the competence for such inferences, most people perform poorly when either a long chain of deductions is needed or an immediate good is more salient than a greater but remote one. Given that in the state of nature everyone is endangered, peace is a very salient common good, and that is why everybody is capable of seeing the advantage of the social contract, i.e., of the investment of individuals' powers in the hands of the sovereign. Most people, however, are not able to infer the right means for peace maintenance, and that is why they should accept the absolute authority of the intellectually superior sovereign. The conventionalism of Hobbes—the sovereign determines which religion, for instance, is true—is consistent with this view, for divergence of beliefs causes controversies and wars.

This theory is, or seems to be, consistent, but it has also an argumentative function, and this is why we treat this quite coherent theory as a strategy. Let us examine more closely Hobbes's argumentation. Hobbes believes that his materialism justifies the claim that all knowledge is reducible to physics, whose laws govern cognitive as well as emotional processes, and therefore also determine what is politically appropriate. It is this reductionism which supports his claim that there is only one kind of knowledge. Hobbes, however, does not need such a reductionism in order to support his political claims. The validity of the consideration which should lead people to adopt the Hobbesian political formula does not depend on the question of whether there is any physical explanation to the fact that they perform such a consideration. Moreover, the claim that human wishes are physically determined is irrelevant to the sovereign's policies. The sovereign's ability to make complex inferences about politically relevant causes and effects does not depend on his knowledge of their physical basis. In fact, Hobbes's sovereign is supposed to know even less than the future Skinnerian psychologist: the latter will know the environmental conditions which mold behavioral patterns and will thus be able to control behavior, whereas the former is supposed to know only which conditions prevent conflicts, and he is only able to enforce rules.

The reduction to physics is, however, useful because it can help Hobbes to support his political solution, which is not the only possible solution to the political problem he tries to solve, and certainly not the most appetitive: if all true knowledge is reducible to physics then every belief which cannot

be translated into physical terms is the result of either an invalid inference or an intentional inducement by the powerful of a false belief. When common values and ideals are involved, the second alternative is more plausible and useful. It permits one to claim that any opposition to the proposed solution on the grounds that it violates some allegedly inalienable rights or natural laws actually relies on beliefs which have been induced by some powerful authority for its own interests. Inducement of beliefs by the Hobbesean sovereign is preferable, for he will do it for the common interest, and with better knowledge of the appropriate means. Seen from this perspective Hobbes is closer to Skinner than to the legal positivists. Skinner uses the same reductive strategy when he claims that people consider freedom and dignity as values only because of prior conditioning. His wise king, the psychologist, will condition them more knowingly and more efficiently, and for more general interests. But he will do it without relying upon slogans which are irreducible to behavioristic language (and would therefore be invalid), while the Hobbesean sovereign (though not the philosopher) cannot avoid appeal to non-physical terminology.

The common core strategy is not always reductive, however. Aristotle, for whom the common core is the human soul, is insistently anti-reductionist. He disagrees with the Platonic reduction of all knowledge to theoretical *epistēmē* as well as to the reduction of all forms of social organization to that of the state. He also denies Plato's claim that there is only one kind and one source of good, and rejects his thesis that the knowledge of the good, regarding any object, is epistemic. Aristotle believes that the knowledge of temporal, changeable matters is necessarily doxastic (a matter of opinion), though he maintains that some opinions are better than others: in technical issues, the opinion of the person who excels in *technē*, and in moral and political matters, the opinion of the one who excels in *phronēsis*. He therefore rejects the Platonic ideal of a state governed by a philosopher who excels in *sophia*—a state in which each person is assigned to a class and a role according to his or her epistemic competence (or incompetence). By making the human soul, rather than *epistēmē*, the common core of both his ideas about knowledge (he did not have an epistemology in the modern sense, which is narrowly concerned with questions of validity) and his political theory, Aristotle is able to find support for an alternative political theory. The rational part of the soul, which is specific to humans, is responsible, on the one hand, for all kinds of knowledge, and, on the other, for the human ability to choose a course of action according to an opinion about the good. It is also responsible for the human capacity to speak, *logos*, the capacity which enables them to form a state. The state, unlike the social units of which it is composed—economic organizations (villages) that are composed of biologic units (families)—is thus specific to humans. Though it too is formed to provide for vital needs, its end is not just life, but the good life. People have different opinions about the good life and the means to achieve it, and this should be taken into account in the good state. But Aristotle is neither an individualist nor a relativist; for him good is the perfection of the characteristic which differentiates the species of a given

individual from other species. The *differentia specifica* of humans is the rational part of the soul, and the good of the state, i.e., its product, should also involve rationality. Though it is not the arena of the highest function of this part—i.e., theoretical knowledge (whose perfection is the virtue of the best man, and preoccupation with it is the best life)—the state is nevertheless an arena of rationality. It is the practical *phronēsis*, the capacity to choose reasonably and prudently, to form good arguments and persuade, which is to be perfected in the good state. The good statesman is the one who excels in this capacity, and the citizens of the good state are all virtual statesmen. They elect as temporary ruler the one who has convinced them with his ideas about the common good, and each citizen has the chance to persuade and to be elected in the next election.

This theory too is quite coherent, though its parts are not tied together as tightly as in Hobbes's case. But it can also be seen as a strategy: Aristotle is as anti-democratic as Plato, for he too wants to exclude the *demos* from political activity. But he does not share Plato's conception of knowledge, and therefore cannot apply the Platonic epistemic criteria for exclusion. So Aristotle uses a common core, namely his own theory of the human soul, in order to rank people according to the degree of perfection of the various functions, hierarchically ordered, of its rational part. This enables him to invent the notion of "a slave by nature," who may have *technē* but lacks *phronēsis* and therefore needs a master to tell him what to do; and he assigns to such slaves the chores assigned by Plato to the epistemically incompetent class. It also enables him to exclude the Platonic philosopher from the political sphere, as someone who should prefer a contemplative life. Yet Aristotle shares the Platonic ideal of a moral, just state governed by the wise. As his conception of knowledge does not allow him to connect *sophia* with practical issues, he establishes in the rational part of the soul a sub-part whose function is related to virtues as divergent as prudence and eloquence. His ethical principle of the middle way allows him to argue that prudence is morally relevant; his rhetorical and logical theories are supposed to teach how to distinguish good eloquence from demagoguery. His conception of justice as distributive, finally, can support the idea of the distribution of political power among the wise citizens.

Aristotle certainly wants to improve the Greek model of the polis-state, but he accepts its basic structure. He does not want to dissolve the kinship groups and the existing economic frames as Plato had suggested, so he argues that these were pre-political, indeed pre-human, "necessary for life," forms of social organization. The state, which is superimposed on them, should accept them as given. The linkage of knowledge with politics through the common core of the human rational soul (an idea which was, perhaps, inspired by the analogy Plato drew between the soul and the state), and the integration of different virtues in a single category of practical knowledge, allow him to combine his preferences—as well as his objections to many of Plato's ideas—with the ideals he had inherited from him.

The examples of Hobbes and Aristotle both show that the common core strategy enables the establishment of a multiplicity of ties that link the two