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*Edited by*

ROBERT M. STEWART

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ROBERT M. STEWART

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*Chico, California*  
*May 1995*

R. M. S.

# INTRODUCTION

Western social and political philosophy, since its beginnings in the writings of Plato and Aristotle, has been concerned primarily with a set of basic questions about the nature of authority and political obligation, the idea of liberty and its proper limitations, conceptions of the just and good society, and the best form of government. These problems naturally arise when the perceived interests of individuals, groups, and institutions come into conflict, particularly in times of general social change and political instability, as people become increasingly aware of new possibilities. The legitimacy of power is questioned, as is the basis of supposedly binding relationships between particular persons and governments. Individuals, groups, or nations demand more freedom, a recognition of rights, greater justice in the distribution of goods, or a larger share in political decision making. Very abstract questions about social relationships and values come immediately to the forefront of debate: What is freedom? How do we determine what rights people have? Is there a standard of justice that transcends the civil laws of actual states? Is popular government possible, or even desirable? Of what kind, and under what conditions?

Philosophers traditionally have attempted systematic answers to these and related questions. Indeed, until the development of political science as a separate discipline, political philosophers sought to explain social phenomena and political behavior, often in an historical context, as well as to clarify problematic concepts, evaluate existing institutions, and argue for social ideals. The evolution of empirical social science, together with the more limited conception of the scope of philosophy now prevalent, has led philosophers interested in social and political problems to focus mainly on conceptual and normative issues. In fact, until the early 1970s, there was relatively little interest among contemporary English-speaking philosophers in substantive questions of social and political relations. The resurgence of this interest is a welcome development, whatever its explanation. Real-world concerns, changing conceptions of philosophical method and its relation to practice, and the publication of several important large-scale works, such as John Rawls's *A Theory of Justice* and Robert Nozick's *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, are certainly part of the reason. A growing interest among Anglo-American philosophers in Continental thought is also evident. While most analytically trained philosophers have worked within the liberal tradition (very broadly understood), significant research is being done by those sympathetic to Marxism, phenomenology, and Critical Theory.

What is important to see, however, is that contemporary political and social phi-

losophers are, for the most part, concerned with many of the same questions that occupied the ancient Greeks and the early modern philosophers. It is, of course, true that there are significant differences between many of the concepts employed, for example, by Plato and by Hobbes. But both were concerned with the rational justification of certain political institutions, the problem of reconciling individual welfare with social constraints and the common good, and the understanding of human behavior in social contexts. Questions about freedom, justice, and democracy are interpreted differently by the great philosophers; yet there is enough of a conceptual overlap that it is fair to say that the history of political philosophy reveals a continuing debate over many of the same general issues.

For the social contract theorists of the early modern period—Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and others—the problem of political obligation was fundamental. They aimed to give a general account of why individuals are obligated to obey the laws of certain governments, at least under some conditions. If we assume at the outset, as they did, that human beings have a natural right to liberty, then it is most unclear how such an obligation could arise. Is it grounded in morality, in rationality, in the common good? Exactly how does it come about that I must obey my government under any conditions, even when it is generally just and beneficent? Anarchists, obviously, deny that there is any moral obligation or rational case for allegiance. If it could be shown, however, that all rational persons consent, or would agree, to submit to the laws of certain governments, under specifiable conditions, then the anarchist will have been refuted without denying his assumption of a basic right to liberty. The selections in the first part of this book address these issues from different perspectives.

Most of us believe that freedom of the individual is a basic value, if not in some sense a natural, right. But what do we mean by words such as “liberty,” “force,” and “coercion”? Or, to put it somewhat differently, what kinds of things constitute restrictions upon or denials of freedom? Does liberty involve not being hindered from doing whatever we want to do? Whatever we might wish to do? Or only what it would be, in some sense, rational for us to do? Certainly, it is necessary to have some restraints on freedom. People disagree, however, about what restrictions should be placed on individual liberty, even when they mean the same thing by the term. This suggests that some value certain kinds of freedom—specific liberties—more than others do. Philosophers such as John Stuart Mill have tried to give an account of what makes freedom valuable, under what conditions, and for whom; an adequate theory of this type can serve as a basis for rational and principled restraint when liberty conflicts with other basic values. The second part of this book includes readings that deal with these conceptual and normative questions.

Justice is sometimes said to be the primary virtue of social institutions. Most philosophers would agree that it is, at least, one of the most significant respects in which legal and political arrangements, as well as economic systems and social hierarchies, may be evaluated. We tend to think, moreover, that there is some kind of connection between justice and equality. Yet the precise relationship between these concepts is a matter of sharp dispute. This is especially obvious when we debate questions of distributive justice—who is entitled to what share of the benefits of social cooperation, and who must bear what burdens. Libertarians such as Nozick follow classical liberals (particularly Locke) in defending a right to private property based on conceptions of legitimate acquisition and voluntary transfer. Egalitarians—of whom Rousseau, Rawls, and Ronald Dworkin are representative—emphasize the arbitrariness and deprivation that appear to be a necessary part of such a system of



“natural liberty.” They argue for more equal distributions of wealth and opportunity through political means, based on conceptions of the equal worth of human beings. In the third part of this collection the central problems of distributive justice are taken up by a diverse group of authors whose work has been influential.

Many of us believe that democratic forms of government are most conducive to promoting justice and liberty and the easiest to justify to those who question their authority. But what makes a government truly democratic? It is impossible to have direct votes of all citizens on most political decisions, outside of the smallest units of political organization. Can we remedy this by electing representatives? Is it possible for someone else, against whom I might have voted, to represent my interests? What is representation? If we can arrive at an adequate conception of representative democracy, we must still show that it is the most desirable form of government, at least for certain societies. What intrinsic or extrinsic features of democratic procedures and institutions make democratic governments most desirable? The final part of this volume includes selections dealing with these fundamental questions.

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# I

## POLITICAL OBLIGATION AND CONSENT

The first important discussion of political obligation in Western thought is to be found in Plato's *Crito*. Socrates, condemned to death by the Athenian democracy, must decide whether to take an opportunity to escape arranged for him by friends. He knows that he is innocent but believes that it is never right to return a wrong with another wrong. In an imaginary dialogue with the Laws, Socrates confronts several arguments for the position that it would be an act of injustice for him to escape. The first involves a paternal conception of the state, according to which citizens are in the position of children, owing their existence and upbringing to their father, the Laws; violence against the state is akin to, but greater than, a sin against one's parents, whom one must either persuade or obey. Of more interest to modern thought, however, are the other two central arguments: that acts of disobedience would destroy the Laws and the state, without which the good life is impossible, and that Socrates, having freely chosen to remain in Athens upon attaining adulthood, agreed "in deed if not in word" to obey its laws—an agreement without exceptions for what might be faulty decisions by its courts. The former can be interpreted as a broadly utilitarian argument, while the latter is a clear statement of the view that the obligation to obey one's government rests on individual consent.

Locke, in the second of his *Two Treatises of Government*, accords consent a central place in his argument for limited political obligation. By nature, men are equally free, apart from the moral constraints of natural law, which require us to preserve ourselves and others. Since the right to punish violators of the law of nature belongs to everyone as well, Locke is concerned to show how government might legitimately acquire a monopoly to perform that function. In the state of nature, people will tend to be partial to their own interests and overly zealous in matters of punishment, but reason will lead them to agree to form a political community as the proper remedy. Unlike Hobbes, however, Locke distinguishes clearly between the state of nature and the state of war, and insists that absolute monarchy is worse than life outside civil society; hence, it cannot be within the terms of the original contract. Political power, defined as the right to make and enforce laws for the preservation of property (rights) and the defense of the commonwealth, is thus the result of a voluntary transfer of individual rights. Exercise of unlimited power by a government is thus not, strictly speaking, use of political power at all. The government that civil society creates will be characterized by a separation of powers and its policies determined by majority rule. A monarchy or legislative body that seriously abuses its

trust may be justly overthrown. Thus Locke attempts to explain the origin, extent, and end of civil government in broad outline. To account for the duty of allegiance that individuals have with respect to particular governments and the obligation of resident aliens to obey the law, he invokes a distinction between express and tacit consent, arguing that the latter may be given through the acceptance of an inheritance or even the mere use of the roads or being within the boundaries of a particular commonwealth.

Hume's essay "Of the Original Contract" calls into question the theoretical usefulness of the contractarian model. Conservative theories of divine right, he points out, would seem to have the defect of justifying all government to the degree that they justify any. The liberal contract theory, on the other hand, is at best true only as an explanation of the origins of society; no one knows of any actual promise to establish government—indeed, most states rest on usurpation or conquest. Hume distinguishes two kinds of moral duties—those instinctive or natural and those conventional or social. The former class of duties includes those related to love of children, gratitude, and pity, while the latter arise from a sense of what is necessary for society and the general welfare, for example, justice, fidelity (promise keeping), and allegiance (obedience to the magistrate). There is no reason, Hume argues, to found the duty of allegiance on that of fidelity, because both are based on social utility. What else could ground the obligation to keep a promise? Utility thus directly provides a justification for allegiance, and the contract argument is seen to be unnecessary as well as unsound.

Hanna Pitkin distinguishes four different questions that political theorists who address the general problem of political obligation often confuse: (1) that of the limits of obligation (when is one obligated to obey, and when not?), (2) that of the locus of sovereignty (whom is one obligated to obey?), (3) that of the difference between legitimate authority and mere coercion (is there any real difference?), and (4) that of the justification of obligation (why is one obligated to obey even a legitimate authority?). Plato and Locke, she maintains, begin with arguments about actual consent in their attempts to deal with these questions; yet they are driven in the final analysis to what she terms a "nature of government" justification. In the *Crito*, Socrates says that we are obligated to keep our agreements if they are right, which seems to mean more than that they are voluntary and informed. Socrates believed that he was right to consent to the laws of Athens because they were generally good ones. Pitkin argues that Locke also ultimately rested his case on considerations of the nature of government, since tacit consent by itself is no guard against a tyranny that permits free emigration. Locke would insist that men in the state of nature agree to form a commonwealth in order to best preserve their rights; a tyranny, as we noted earlier, would violate the original agreement, and therefore those born into one would presumably not need to consider consenting. In the second part of her essay "Obligation and Consent," reprinted here, Pitkin applies the nature of government theory to some important cases and examines its relations to traditional consent theory in the light of recent developments in analytic philosophy.

A. John Simmons provides a critical assessment of another argument that is—if not itself a version of consent theory—closely related to the standard contractarian argument. The principle of fair play, as expressed in some early articles of H. L. A. Hart and John Rawls, concerns schemes of social cooperation that are just and mutually beneficial, yet can only succeed if there is general support, everyone (or most everyone) doing his or her part, which involves some sacrifice of one kind or another. A further feature of this sort of arrangement is that individuals have an

incentive to become “free riders”—when most others do their part, one can still benefit from the scheme without doing one’s own. In this kind of situation, one might argue, someone who has voluntarily accepted the benefits of the scheme is bound by considerations of fairness to do his share. Simmons examines this view in detail and discusses its relevance to questions of political obligation.

# *Crito*

PLATO

*The scene is Socrates' cell in the Athens prison on a morning in 399 B.C., where he is awaiting the carrying out of the death sentence that the court had pronounced on him a few weeks earlier, after convicting him of the offences of religious heresy and of corrupting the young. The time is shortly before dawn: Socrates is still asleep, and his old friend Crito is sitting beside the bed. He has come to visit Socrates unusually early, bearing the news that he is likely to be required to drink the fatal hemlock the following day. Crito wants to persuade him to agree to his friends arranging for him to escape from prison before it is too late. The conversation that follows is between the two men after Socrates has woken up.*

SOCRATES: Why have you come at this hour, Crito? Or, isn't it still early?

CRITO: It certainly is.

SOCRATES: About what time is it?

CRITO: It is early light, just before dawn.

SOCRATES: I am surprised that the prison guard answered you.

CRITO: He is used to me now, Socrates, because I come and go here so often—partly too, he has had some favours from me.

SOCRATES: Have you just arrived, or have you been here for some time?

CRITO: For quite some time.

SOCRATES: Then why didn't you wake me

immediately, instead of sitting silently beside me?

CRITO: Heavens no, Socrates. I wouldn't have chosen to be in such a sleepless and distressed state as I am—and yet I have been wondering at you, as I observed how peacefully you sleep; and I purposely didn't wake you, so that you could continue as peacefully as possible. Often indeed throughout my life have I counted you happy for your temperament, but most of all now in your present plight, for the easy and gentle way you bear it.

SOCRATES: Well indeed, Crito, it would be inappropriate for a man as old as myself to show distress if the time has now come when he must die.

CRITO: And yet other people of your age, Socrates, are caught in similar plights, but their age doesn't spare them from being angry at the fate which has come on them.

SOCRATES: That's true. But now why have you come so early?

CRITO: Bearing bad news, Socrates, not for you, as it seems, but for myself and for all those close to you bad news and heavy news, which I think that I would find it the heaviest to bear.

SOCRATES: What news is this? Has the vessel arrived from Delos, the one whose arrival marks the time when I must die?<sup>1</sup>

Plato, *Crito*, translated by A. D. Woozley, from *Law and Obedience: The Arguments of Plato's Crito*. London: Duckworth, 1979. Reprinted with permission of the translator.

CRITO: It hasn't arrived yet, but I think it will get here today from what is reported by some people who have come from Sunium and left it there. It is clear, then, from their news that it will get here today, and it will have to be tomorrow that you end your life.

SOCRATES: Well, with the gods' help, Crito, if this is their pleasure, let it be so. But yet I don't think the boat will come today.

CRITO: How do you tell that?

SOCRATES: I'll tell you. It is the day after the one when the boat arrives, I believe, that I have to die.

CRITO: Well, that's certainly what those who are in charge of these things say.

SOCRATES: Then I do not think the boat will arrive during the day which is coming on us, but on the next day. And I tell that from a dream I had a little while ago during the night. And you're likely to have been timely in not waking me.

CRITO: What then was the dream?

SOCRATES: I thought a woman approached me, who was beautiful and comely, wearing white clothes, and she addressed me and said: 'Socrates, On the third day thou art to come to the rich land of Phthia.'<sup>2</sup>

CRITO: That was a strange dream, Socrates.

SOCRATES: And yet a perfectly clear one, as it seems to me, Crito.

CRITO: Only too clear, very likely. But, my dear Socrates, even now listen to me and let yourself be saved. As for myself, if you die, it will be not one disaster only: apart from being bereft of an intimate friend, such a one as I shall never find again, I shall also appear to many people, who don't know you and me well, as one who was able to save you, if I had been willing to spend what it would cost, but neglected to do so. And yet what could be a more shameful reputation than that—to be thought to value money more than friends? For most people will not believe that it was you yourself who were not prepared to get away from here, although we were eager to do it.

SOCRATES: But why should we, my good Crito, care so much about popular opinion? For the most enlightened people, who are

more worth considering, will believe that things have been done in just the way they have been done.

CRITO: But surely you see, Socrates, that one has to pay attention to popular opinion. Your present predicament makes it clear enough that the people are capable of performing, not the smallest of ills, but just about the greatest, if one is discredited among them.

SOCRATES: Crito, would that the people were able to perform the greatest ills, so that they were also capable of performing the greatest goods—that would be splendid. But, as it is, they can do neither: they cannot make a man wise, and they cannot make him foolish, but they act quite haphazardly.

CRITO: Well, let that be so. But tell me this, Socrates. You're not, I hope, concerned for me and the rest of your friends, lest, if you do escape from this place, common informers will make trouble for us for having snatched you out of here, and that we shall be required either to lose all our property or to pay heavy fines, or even to suffer something further in addition? If you do have some such fear, please forget it; for we have the right to run this risk in rescuing you, indeed an even greater risk, if need be. But be advised by me, and do as I say.

SOCRATES: Yes, I am concerned about those things, Crito, and many others too.

CRITO: Then don't be afraid of it—and in any case the sum isn't great for which some people are willing to rescue you and get you away from here. Then don't you see how cheap these informers are, and that it wouldn't need much money to fix them? You already have at your disposal my money—which will be enough, in my opinion; and furthermore, just supposing that out of some anxiety for me you think you shouldn't spend my money, there are these visitors to Athens who are prepared to spend theirs. One of them has actually provided sufficient funds for this very purpose, Simmias from Thebes, while Cebes is ready to do it, and many others too. So, as I say, don't from fear on that account hesitate to save yourself, and don't let what you said in court make diffi-

culties for you—I mean that, if you were to go away, you wouldn't know what to do with yourself.<sup>3</sup> For, in general, there are many places where they will welcome you if you go there; and, in particular, if you want to go to Thessaly, I have people there who have been guests of mine, who will esteem you very highly and will provide you with security, so that nobody in Thessaly will cause you any trouble.

What is more, Socrates, I don't think that what you are trying to do is right, throwing your life away when saving it is possible; and you are striving to have the very thing happen to you for which your enemies would strive, and indeed did strive when they were wanting to destroy you. In addition I, at any rate, think you are betraying your sons, whom you would go away and abandon, when you could bring them up and educate them—as far as you're concerned, they will fare in whatever way they happen to fare; but in fact, very probably, they will happen to fare in that kind of way which does usually befall orphans after the loss of their parents. For either one shouldn't have children, or one should share and go through with the trouble of raising and educating them—while you seem to me to be choosing the easiest way out. But, whatever a man of virtue and courage would choose that is what one should choose, at least if one claims to have cared for virtue all one's life. For I am ashamed, both on your account and for us your close friends, that the whole affair concerning you should seem to have been managed with a lack of courage on our part: there was the way your case came into court, when it was possible for it not to have gone into court at all, there was the way the actual course of the trial went, and lastly there is this, the crowning absurdity, that through a faint-heartedness and failure of courage of ours you appear to have got away from us—we didn't save you and you didn't save yourself, when it was perfectly possible and manageable if we had been the slightest help at all. So realise, Socrates, that at the same time as the bad outcome there is the disgrace for you and us. But consider—although it's

no longer the time for considering, the time for that is past: there is only one thing to consider. Everything must be carried out in the course of the coming night; but, if we delay, we cannot do it, and the possibility is no longer there. All ways round, Socrates, be persuaded by me, and do as I say.

SOCRATES: My dear Crito, your concern for me would count for a lot if there were some truth behind it; otherwise, the greater it is, the harder it is to handle. So, we have to consider whether we must do what you recommend or not—given that this is not now for the first time the case, but that it has always been my way not to follow the call of anything else in me rather than that of reason—that is, whatever seemed to me best on reflection. Certainly the considerations which I used to declare previously I cannot reject now, when this misfortune has fallen on me; they seem to me to be very much what they were, and I respect and honour the same ones as before. If we have no better ones to proclaim in the present situation, be sure that I certainly shall not agree with you, not even if the power of public opinion were to scare us like children even more than already, by visiting us with imprisonment and death and confiscation of wealth. How then are we most temperately to consider the matter? Perhaps, if we take up the argument which you give about the opinions of others. Was it always well said or not that one should pay attention to some opinions, but not to others? Or was it fine to say it before the requirement that I die arose, but now it has become clear that it was said ill and for the sake of argument, and that it was really childish nonsense? I am eager to pursue this enquiry with you, Crito, in order to see whether the principle seems any different to me, given my present position, or whether it is the same, and whether we should say goodbye to it or should obey it. In my opinion something of this kind was always asserted by those who thought they had something to say, something, that is, like what I said just now, that of the opinions which men hold some should be taken seriously, and others not. In heaven's name,



Crito, doesn't this seem to you to be well said? I ask you because you are not likely, as far as human prospects go, to die tomorrow, and the present calamity would not distort your judgment. Now consider—does it not seem to you to be justifiably enough said that one should not respect every opinion that men express, but only some and not others—and again not every man's opinions, but only those of some and not of others? What do you say? Isn't that a fair claim?

CRITO: Yes, it is.

SOCRATES: Then the good opinions one should respect, the bad ones not?

CRITO: Yes.

SOCRATES: And are good opinions those of wise people, bad ones those of foolish people?

CRITO: How else?

SOCRATES: Well then, how well said was the following? When a man is in physical training and practising at it, does he pay attention to favourable and unfavourable comments and opinions from everybody, or just to those of that one individual who happens to be his physician or his trainer?

CRITO: To the latter only.

SOCRATES: Then he should fear the criticisms and welcome the praise just of that one man, and not of the many others.

CRITO: Obviously.

SOCRATES: This then is the way he must practise and train and eat and drink, whatever way seems right to the one man, the one with knowledge and expertise, rather than in the ways that seem right to all the others.

CRITO: That's so.

SOCRATES: Well then. If he doesn't obey the one man, and shows no respect for his opinion and his praise, but listens to what is said by the many who have no expert knowledge, will he not come to some harm?

CRITO: How can he avoid it?

SOCRATES: What is the harm, and where does it aim—at what part of the disobedient person?

CRITO: Obviously at his body; for that is what is being ruined.

SOCRATES: You're right. Then are the rest of things like that, Crito—to save us going

through them all individually? Especially concerning the just and the unjust, fine and shameful, good and bad, about which we are deliberating—should we follow the opinion of the many and fear that? Or should we go by the opinion of the one man, if there is such a man with expert knowledge, before whom we should feel shame and fear more than before all the others taken together? If we don't follow him, we shall destroy and mutilate that part of us which is improved by right conduct and ruined by ill conduct. Isn't that so?

CRITO: I certainly think so, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Well then, if we take that part of us which is improved by healthy living and corrupted by unhealthy living, and if we ruin it by not adhering to the opinion of those who really know, is life worth living for us with that part corrupted? And that part of us is our body. Isn't that so?

CRITO: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then is our life worth living with a body that is in bad condition and corrupted?

CRITO: No way.

SOCRATES: But is our life worth living with that part of us corrupted, where what is *morally wrong* mutilates, and what is *right* benefits? Or do we think to be less important than the body that part of us, whatever it is in us, with which right and wrong are concerned?

CRITO: Certainly not.

SOCRATES: Instead it is more valuable?

CRITO: Yes, much.

SOCRATES: In that case, good sir, we should not at all take into account here what most people will say about us, but only what the man says who knows about right and wrong—I mean the one man and the real truth. So, in the first place, you are not making a correct proposal here, when you propose that we must take into account popular opinion about the right, the fine and the good and their opposites. 'And yet,' somebody might say, 'the people do have the capability of putting us to death.'

CRITO: Indeed, that's clear—for it would be said, Socrates. You're right.

SOCRATES: But, dear friend, this line of argument which we have just been through seems to me to be still just as it was before. And this in turn is what you must examine to see if it still holds good for us or not, namely that it is not living but living well that is to be most highly prized.

CRITO: But it does hold.

SOCRATES: And the proposition that living well is identical with living honourably and justly—does that hold or not?

CRITO: Yes, it does.

SOCRATES: Then, following on what we have agreed, this has to be examined—whether it is right for me to try to get away from here without being released by the city, or whether it is not right. And if it seems right, then let us try; but, if it does not, we are to drop it. As for the considerations which you mention about the spending of money and about reputation and about the upbringing of children, I'm afraid those are really the notions of those many people who, without any understanding, would lightly kill a man and indeed bring him back to life again, if they were able to. But we, on the other hand, since the argument thus persuades us, should consider nothing else at all save what we just now mentioned, namely whether we shall be acting rightly in laying out money and giving thanks to those who will get me out of here—by 'we' I mean rescuers and rescued alike—or whether we shall really be acting wrongly in doing all those things. And, if it appears that we would be doing what was wrong, then surely we must not take into account as against doing wrong either our having to die if we stay here and do nothing, or our having to suffer anything else.

CRITO: I think that what you *say* is good, Socrates—but do look at what we are to *do*.

SOCRATES: Let us examine it together, good friend, and, if you have any counter-argument to my argument, produce it and I shall do what you say. Otherwise, stop right now, dear man, saying the same thing over and over, that I must get away from here against the city's will; I attach much importance to acting in this matter having per-

suaded you, rather than against your will. Now consider the basic principle of our enquiry, to see if for you it is satisfactorily stated, and try to reply to my questions in what you think to be the best way.

CRITO: I'll certainly try.

SOCRATES: Do we say that on no account are we to act unjustly if we can help it? Or that in some cases one is to act unjustly, in others not? Is it the case that there is no way in which doing what is unjust is either good or honourable, as we have many times agreed in the past? Or have all those things that we used to agree on been discarded in these last few days? Have you and I at our age, Crito, been all this time earnestly conversing with each other and failing to notice that we are no different from children? Or isn't it above all the case that things are as we used to maintain before—that, whether the public says so or not, and whether we have to bear a fate that is harder even than our present, or whether we get an easier fate, acting unjustly is utterly bad and shameful for the man who does it? Is that what we say or not?

CRITO: It is what we say.

SOCRATES: In no circumstances then must one act unjustly.

CRITO: No, indeed.

SOCRATES: Then a man who has been unjustly treated must not act unjustly in return, as most people think—for in *no* circumstances must one act unjustly.

CRITO: Apparently he should not.

SOCRATES: Well, what about this? Must one treat people badly, Crito, or not?

CRITO: Certainly not, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Well. For a man who has been treated badly to give back bad treatment in return—is that, as most people say, just, or is it unjust?

CRITO: It is not just at all.

SOCRATES: For perhaps treating men badly does not differ at all from treating them unjustly.

CRITO: That's true.

SOCRATES: Then one must neither return unjust treatment to any men nor treat them badly, no matter what treatment one gets