# THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND GERMANY SINCE 1898

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To
My Parents
AND
GRAND PARENTS
WITH
FILIAL DEVOTION

#### PREFACE

THE author's purpose of writing this dissertation is twofold: first, to present the historical facts as they are in the diplomatic relations between China and Germany during the different periods after 1898; and second, to disclose to the world the example of Germany whose aggressive policy toward China in the beginning had left nothing of permanent value save hatred and animosity, although her new status in China as a non-extraterritorial Power has gained for her the growth of an amicable feeling between the two peoples and a rapid increase of trade, which none of the special privileges enjoyed by Germany before the World War had been able to procure. It is also of interest to observe that Germany was the first among the foreign Powers to start the international scramble for concessions and leased territories in China and she was also the first great Power to sign the equal treaty with China after the World War, abolishing extraterritoriality and other special privileges which she enjoyed before the War.

The relinquishment of extraterritoriality is to Germany by no means a loss, but a gain. The Chinese merchants are more willing and have more confidence to deal with German traders now than before because they are assured that if trouble should later come up, their cause will be tried before a Chinese court and decided in accordance with Chinese laws. It is not because Chinese courts will show more favor to their own countrymen but rather because the Chinese merchants have a right to expect that if they carry on trade in China, Chinese laws shall be applied to govern the security of transactions. This will explain the fact that Germany now is ranked second only to Great Britain, so far as imports to China are concerned.

In concluding this preface, the author wishes to make grateful acknowledgment of her indebtedness to Professor Westel W. Wiltoughby, formerly head of the Department of Political Science of

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F. D. D.

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### CHAPTER I

### EARLY RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND GERMANY BEFORE 1898

A general review of the early relations between China and Germany will be of great interest to students of history as well as to those of political science and international law. The first stage of the Sino-German relations was unofficial. About 1615 there were two Catholic Jesuit priests of the German nationality preaching in China, Schaal and Koffler.1 The latter succeeded in persuading the ex-empress of the late Ming Dynasty to accept the Christian faith and baptized her after the Imperial Ming family had escaped to Kwangtung. With the accession of the Manchus to the throne of China at Peking, Schaal was appointed the president of the tribunal of mathematics. After the death of the first Manchu Emperor, Schaal became the instructor of the young Emperor, the celebrated Kang Hsi. In 1664, Schaal and another German Catholic priest (a Jesuit), Verbiest, were accused by a mandarin of very high rank of perverting the old customs of the Empire and were later arrested by the Court, imprisoned and bound with heavy chains. However, they were both released shortly afterwards and declared innocent.

In spite of this attempted persecution, the Catholic missionaries were permitted to preach Christianity again by the year 1671.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> For an account of the earliest activities of the German missionaries in China, see Charles Gutzlaff: Chinese History, Vol. II, pp. 121-5. See also G. E. Burkhardt: Kleine Missions-Bibliothek, Vol. III, Die Evangelische Missions in China und Japan, pp. 151-3; Georg Franzius: Kiautschou, Deutschlands Erwerbung in Ostasien, pp. 121-2.

Verbiest, being more subtle than Schaal, found great favor with the young Emperor, Kang Hsi, and soon became his tutor in metaphysics, mathematics and physics. What was more surprising was the fact that he participated in the direction of the most intimate affairs of the nation as a private counsellor of the Emperor. Mention must be made that these early German missionaries came under the command of the Roman See, since the German Empire was not in existence then. Thus the German Catholic missionaries were the first pioneers to begin the Sino-German relations in an unofficial way. Ever since they have continued to preach in China.

Before the year 1820 trade had begun between China and Germany, marking the second period of the relations. Sometimes German goods came to China on land by way of Siberia through Russia during the eighteenth century. In 1836 the Russian Government levied a transit tax on foreign goods. Thus trade between China and Germany was greatly hindered. So gradually German textiles were carried to China by English ships, though they were very slight in comparison with her exports to other European countries. Matches, dyes, hardware and sewing needles were some of the exports to China. In Germany, the Hanseatic League, a commercial organization, tried to promote trade between Chinese and German ports. Some members of the League were of the opinion that German trade in China was not successful because of the difference between the tastes of the Chinese and the Germans for in many cases the German articles did not meet the needs of the Chinese.2

During this same period missionary work was gaining ground in the coastal cities like Canton, Hongkong, and the Island Macao in the South.<sup>3</sup> Aside from doing their religious work, the missionaries like Gutzlaff, a German, Bridgeman Parker, an American and Callery, a French, during the Opium War of 1839–42 between China and Great Britain, served as interpreters and secretaries for Great Britain, the United States and France in the negotiation of the Treaties of Nanking with China. This participation in negotiations by missionaries for their own countries (except Gutzlaff, a German

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See Frederich Hirth: Chinesische Studien, Vcl. I, pp. 104-5. <sup>2</sup> See K. S. Latourette: A History of Christian Missions in China, pp. 170-5.

for England) was viewed and highly praised by both the Catholic and the Protestant missionaries "as marking a new era in missions and advantage was at once taken of them."4 This action on the part of the missionaries marked the beginning of co-operation between the missionaries and their respective governments for furthering their mutual interests in China, as we shall later see.

An evangelical campaign was begun by German Catholic missionaries in China about 1835. At that time Gutzlaff, the German missionary who participated in the negotiation of the Treaty of Nanking for Great Britain, had a friend from the Basel Mission in Germany, visiting him and this representative wrote home asking the Mission to send two more men to penetrate into the interior of China. Gutzlaff, after finishing the negotiation of the Nanking Treaty for England, went to Hongkong developing a plan to evangelize the whole of China.<sup>5</sup> In order to regain the former prestige of the Roman Catholic scientific center in China, he desired to have a German astronomer and a mathematician come to China. Furthermore, he wished to penetrate the Chinese Empire by employing Chinese Christians stationed in each province with churches, which would be assisted by unions in Europe. Thus he aroused much enthusiasm in the native Christians. By 1850 he had several scores of Chinese preachers who sent him reports of their distribution of Scriptures and the formation of Christian churches in the eighteen provinces, Kansu being only excepted. On the other hand, he wrote voluminously back to Germany giving detailed description of his enterprise and urging its support. By 1847 in responses to his appeal, the Rhenish Missionary Society and the Basel Missionary Society sent Roster, Genahe, Hamberg and Rudolf Lechler to Hongkong<sup>6</sup>.

In 1849-50 Gutzlaff was himself in Europe speaking of his activities in China, preaching and organizing unions. A Berlin Missionary Society was formed to aid Gutzlaff by sending its agent to China in 1850. At the same time a Berlin Women's Missionary

<sup>4</sup> See K. S. Latourette: A History of Christian Missions in China, pp.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> See Burkhardt: Kleine Missions-Bibliothek, Vol. III, Die Evangelische Missions in China und Japan, p. 179 c.; D. Julius Richter: Das Werden der Christlichen Kirche in China, p. 324, ff.

6 Ibid, pp. 182-4; Latourette: A History of Christian Missions in China,

pp. 243-55.

Society for China was also organized. This Society sent a representative to Hongkong to establish a mission for girls who were abandoned by their parents. This still exists to-day. Gutzlaff, during his stay in Germany, urged the Moravian Unitas Fratnum, a missionary society to preach to the Mongolians in China. An appeal was issued by this devoted body for volunteers to the most difficult and remote region. Three men were selected out of thirty who responded. These three planned to reach Mongolia by way of Russia and Siberia. They left Europe in 1853. Being unable to obtain passports, they went through England and India. Reaching Calcutta and failing in their efforts to enter Tibet, they settled down in the Himalayas to learn Hindustani, Tibetan, and Mongolian languages instead of preaching. It should be noted that the above stated Protestant missionary societies, namely, the Berlin Missionary Society, the Basel Evangelische Society, the Rhenish Society and the Berlin Women's Missionary Society, had concentrated their work in Hongkong and Kwangtung since 1850 and did not expand into new regions until 1897 when the German fleet occupied Kiaochow after the murder of two German Catholic priests in Shantung in November, 1897.7

The third period in the Sino-German relations began when China as one party and Prussia and the Northern German States as the other entered into formal diplomatic relations by signing the Treaty of Tientsin on September 2, 1861.8

Thus Germany's entry into China through formal diplomacy marked Germany (though before its unification in 1871) as the fifth world Power to come into China since 1842. Graf Eulenburg was authorized to negotiate a treaty for Prussia and the members of the German Zoll and Handels-Verein, consisting of Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover, Wurtemberg, Baden, Electoral Hessen, Grand Ducal Hessen, Brunswick, Oldenberg, Luxemberg, Grand Ducal Saxony, Saxe, Meinigen, Saxe-Altenburg, Saxe-Coburg, Gotha, Nassau, Waldeck, Pyrmont, Alhalt-Dessau-Kothen, Anhalt-Bernburg, Lippe, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, Schwarzburg, Sondershousen, Reuss elder

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> See, for the missionary activities in South China before the occupation of Kiaochow, Latourette: A History of Christian Missions in China, pp. 400-3.

<sup>8</sup> See, for the text of the Treaty, China Maritime Customs: Treaties, Conventions, etc., Between China and the Foreign States, Vol. II, p. 115 ff.

line, Reuss younger line, the cities of Frankfort, Meisenheim and Hamburg, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-Strelitz and the Hanseatic cities of Lubeck, Bremen and Hamburg. Eulenburg's sudden arrival at Shanghai was a surprise to the Chinese authorities.9 He went to Tientsin asking the High Commissioner of Trade, Chung How, to open negotiations. In return this official notified Eulenburg that the Treaties of 1858 compacted by China with Great Britain, Russia, France and the United States provided the rules for the conduct of the trade of all Western nations; therefore Chung How declined Eulenburg's request. Being dissatisfied with this answer, Graf Eulenburg sent two members of his staff to Peking to prepare a residence in order to facilitate his transferring the negotiations to the capital. Realizing Eulenburg's firm determination to make a treaty, Chung How, the High Commissioner of Trade, and Chung Lun, another official, opened negotiations with Eulenburg at Tientsin. By the middle of August an agreement was reached and signed by Eulenburg, Chung Lun and Chung How on September 2, 1861. China by this treaty granted Prussia and the other Northern German States the right to trade and to have consular jurisdiction at the treaty ports, but China declined to allow the Prussian envoy to reside at Peking at once on the ground that unrest still existed in China at that time, and postponed this right of residence for five years.10 However, Prussia could send her chief consul, consuls and vice consuls to reside at the treaty ports, enjoying the same privileges that the consuls of other nations were enjoying in China. Passports could be obtained by German subjects travelling in the interior of China with the exception of Peking from the Chinese authorities and the German consuls. Rights to study Chinese, teach German, buy Chinese books and sell German books in the provinces were granted by China to subjects of Prussia and other Northern German States. Furthermore, China recognized the right of the Prussians and Germans to embrace Christianity in China. Lastly the Treaty of Tientsin gave German subjects the right to join the staff of Englishmen, Frenchmen and Americans in the Customs Service of China. In 1861 there were three

10 See H. B. Morse: International Relations of the Chine II, p. 116.

<sup>•</sup> See M. von Brandt: China und Seine Handelsbeziehungen zum Auslande, mit besonderer Berucksichtigung der Deutschen, p. 36 ff.

10 See H. B. Morse: International Relations of the Chinese Empire, Vol.

Englishmen, three Americans, one Frenchman and one German. The Prussian Government was requested to nominate ten Germans in 1869. By the year 1873 the executive branch of the Customs Service consisted of eight Americans, fifty Englishmen, twelve Frenchmen, eleven Germans and four of other nationalities while there were in 1912 fourteen Americans, one hundred and forty-five Englishmen, thirty-two Frenchmen, thirty-eight Germans, sixteen Russians, thirty-three Japanese, fifty-nine of other nationalities and twenty-six Chinese.

After the unification of Germany in 1870, the German Catholic missions, because of the struggle between Bismarck and the Roman Catholic church, were stationed at Steyl in Holland not far from the German frontier. These missions in 1879 began sending two missionaries, one of whom was Anzer, to Shantung to establish a mission which later proved not only to be important religiously, but also to be significant in extending the German power in China.11 In 1887 a secret society in Shantung led the anti-Catholic riots in that province. Bishop Anzer of the Society of the Divine Word appealed to the German authorities in 1890 to force China to open Yenchow in Shantung to missionaries. After touring through the entire province of Shantung, the German Consul at Tientsin aroused so much animosity in his crude treatment of the officials of the Tsungli Yamen (Foreign Office) that Yenchow was not opened to the German missionaries until 1896. This haughty attitude of the German Consul and the desire of the German missionaries to expand their missionary work against the will of the Chinese authorities may be two of the causes of the Anti-Missionary Movement in Shantung which eventually led to the murder of two German Catholic priests in November, 1897.

The German envoy in the spring of 1876 demanded the revision of the Treaty of Tientsin, but as China was involved in the Yünnan case with Great Britain, the question was dropped for the time being. But Herr von Brandt again on December 1, 1876, sent to the Tsungli Yamen an ultimatum presenting three specific minor demands. The latter opened negotiation in the spring of 1877, while Herr von Brandt mentioned no revision of the Treaty of

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> See Georg Franzius: Kiautschou, Deutschlands Erwerbung in Ostasien, p. 124 ff.

Tientsin, but insisted on the execution of the provisions of the existing treaty. These initial actions brought the question of likin and the transit passes into discussion. In order to increase the provincial revenue, the Chinese provincial authorities attempted constantly to limit inland trade into likin channels by restricting the use of the transit passes. On the other hand, the legations firmly resisted. In November, 1879, the representatives of Great Britain, Germany, America, Netherlands, Peru, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Denmark, Spain, France, and Belgium sent a joint delegation to the Tsungli Yamen, asking China to make propositions regarding the transit and the likin, but they were not successful in their attempts. Again a set of regulations for inland transit was submitted to the diplomatic representatives in April, 1880, by the German Minister, Herr von Brandt and was later sent to the Tsungli Yamen. However, it was dropped again because of the objections raised by the Tsungli Yamen. 12

On March 31, 1880, the Supplementary Convention between China and Germany was signed.<sup>13</sup> By this agreement shipping facilities were given to Germany by China, at Woosung in addition to the ports opened to fcreign trade by the Chefoo Convention; namely, the harbors of Ichang, Wuhu, Tatung, Wusueh, Lukikow and Shasi in Hupeh, Anking in Anhwei, Wenchow in Chekiang, Pakhoi in Kwangtung, Hukow in Kiangsi, and Woosung in Kiangsu. In return Germany agreed that the Chinese Government should have the right of appointing consuls to all the towns of Germany in which the consuls of other states are admitted and that they should enjoy the same rights and privileges as the consuls of the most favoured nation. China granted an extension of tonnage dues and privileges, while Germany agreed to the conditions attached to the privileges accorded by China to other Powers, known as the most favoured nation treatment. Next China agreed to the establishment of bonded warehouses, while Germany agreed to present the ships' manifests imposed by other treaties. Germany consented to the pilotage regulations; China reduced the

<sup>12</sup> See Manuscripts on Diplomatic Affairs now kept by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 外交部 檔案.
13 See China Maritime Customs: Treaties, Conventions, etc., Between China and the Foreign States, Vol. II, p. 193 ff.

duty on her coals. China exempted German ships undergoing repairs from the payments of tonnage dues; Germany agreed that no Chinese flags would be used by German ships, while China promised that no Chinese ships would use German flags. Germany obtained the exemption of import duty for the materials of the ships broken up, while she agreed that German travellers should take out passports for travel in inland for identification. Thirteen months were set as a limit for the validity of passports and transit passes. Lastly China exempted deck materials from duty. In short China granted Germany the most favoured nation treatment, while Germany accepted the conditions attached to it as existed in the treaties entered into by China with the other Powers.

The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 was viewed with serious apprehension by the treaty Powers when it broke out in the summer of 1894, as it was thought that it might affect their rights and privileges in China. The successive crushing defeats forced China to sue for peace. Throughout the year 1894 China four times appealed to the Powers to intervene on her behalf. The first attempt of Russia and Great Britain in asking the other Powers for a general intervention turned to be a failure on account of Germany's refusal. Again, early in February, 1895 when China asked for help, England, France and Russia were ready to intervene. But the German Government again stood aloof.

After learning through the Japanese Ambassador, Viscount Aoki, that Japan would demand the cession of Formosa and the Pescadores Islands, an indemnity of 200,000,000 Kuping taels, the cession of the Liaotung Peninsula and the recognition of the independence of Korea at the beginning of March, Germany suddenly decided to act alone. At once the German Government instructed her Ambassador in Tokyo, Herr von Gutschmid, to recommend to Japan that she conclude peace with China immediately upon moderate terms, warning her that her acquisition of the southern part of the Liaotung Peninsula would provoke intervention by the Powers. This warning the German Ambassador delivered to the Japanese Government on March 8, two days after he received instructions from home government. In reply Japan

<sup>14</sup> See George Nye Steiger: China and the Occident, The Origin and the Development of the Boxer Rising, p. 45.

expressed her appreciation for this "friendly information" giving assurance that her demands would not be high. Nevertheless, Japan did not let this warning from Germany influence her negotiations beginning March 18, with China for the Peace of Shimonoseki. 15

On April 17, when China was signing the Peace of Shimonoseki with Japan, the Russian Foreign Minister informed the German Ambassador that Russia still intended to prevent Japan from occupying the Liaotung Peninsula. In case Japan refused to comply with this advice, military actions would be necessary. Russia counted on the support of Germany and France. To this request Germany enthusiastically sent her reply saying that she had instructed her ambassador in Japan and her admirals in Chinese waters to coöperate with the Russian representatives. France also gave her consent.

Thus, on April 23, the three ambassadors in Tokyo called on the acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Baron Hayashi, to recommend that Japan renounce her permanent occupation of the Liaotung Peninsula. The Russian and the French Ministers delivered their instructions in a conciliatory manner, while the German Envoy, faithful to the instructions he had received, pressed on the Japanese Minister with the threat that if Japan did not comply with the recommendation of the three intervening Powers, the latter would resort to force which they deemed necessary. Again, on April 29, these three ministers asked the Japanese Government to answer their respective governments within ten days before the date arranged for the exchange of the ratifications of the Peace of Shimonoseki. On May 1, Japan in reply promised to return the Liaotung Peninsula to China after the exchange of the ratifications, while she would retain Port Arthur as a compromise. reply proved to be very unsatisfactory to the three Powers. Japan had to yield on May 5, promising to renounce her possession of the entire Liaotung Peninsula including Port Arthur. Thus China and Japan exchanged their ratifications on May 8, in Chefoo, China. On May 13, Japan renounced her permanent possession

<sup>15</sup> See Erich Brandenburg: From Bismarck to the World War, pp. 53-60; G. N. Steiger: China and the Occident, pp. 46-7; Mingchien Joshua Baw The Foreign Relations of China, p. 33.

of the Liaotung Peninsula in a proclamation issued by the Em peror, while China agreed to give Japan an additional indemnity amounting to 30,000,000 taels. Thus the success of the Tripartite Intervention helped China to hold her territorial integrity. 16

The crushing defeats that China suffered from the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 revealed to the world the whole weakness of the Chinese Empire in government and military organization. Thus at the end of the war, the international struggle for concessions began, marking a new era in China's diplomatic relations with other nations. This struggle on the part of the world Powers was prompted by the fear of each nation that unless she should at once seize them, any chance of getting concessions from China otherwise would be improbable. Of the three Powers that intervened in the negotiations for the Peace of Shimonoseki between China and Japan for maintaining the peace of Eastern Asia, France was the first one to exact her share of compensation from China, by receiving a delimitation of the boundaries between Tonkin and China much in her favor by signing two separate conventions with China on June 20, 1895. Furthermore, France obtained a part of Kianghung and the opening of Lungchow, Mengtsz, Hokow and Szemao for trade, special mining privileges in Yünnan. Kwangsi, and Kwangtung, and the right of extension of the Annan Railway to China.17

Germany was the second Power in the Tripartite Intervention in 1895 to demand compensation. She, being very late in colonization, was very anxious to follow the footsteps of Great Britain, France, Russia and the United States in getting concessions from China. Waiting for a chance she instructed her Consul in Shanghai, Dr. Steubel, to secure a concession in Hankow, one of the most important commercial centers in China, for her subjects to live and trade. Negotiations were carried on by Dr. Steubel, the German Consul in Shanghai and Yun, the Super intendent of Foreign Trade in Hankow. After getting the approval of their respective superior authorities, they concluded the

Steiger: China and the Occident, p. 52 ff.

<sup>16</sup> See Erich Brandenburg: From Bismarck to the World War, pp. 53-65; G. N. Steiger: China and the Occident, pp. 45-8; M. J. Bau: The Foreign Relations of China, p. 33.

17 See M. J. Bau: The Foreign Relations of China, pp. 37-40; G. N.

Convention for the Concession at Hankow on October 3, 1895.18 By this Convention China ceded an area of 600 mow or 100 Chinese acres in the market-town, Hankow, to the German Government in perpetuity. For this Germany promised to pay an amount of 121.32 taels each year to the Hanyang District Magistrate as land tax for the lease. The German Consul would bring about the transfer of the land in the Concession from the Chinese into foreign ownership, Chinese were not allowed to reside in the Concession, and the German Consul was to be the chief administrative officer. Compensation was fixed according to the rules made for Germans or other foreign subjects concerning the purchase of land in the Concession from the Chinese. The same held for private temples, ancestral halls, guild halls and public temples. The Chinese authorities were to effect the compulsory expulsion of the Chinese owner upon the application by the German Consul. In case any foreigner other than German subjects desired to buy land in the Concession, he should first obtain the sanction of the German Consul, who alone was entitled to apply to the Chinese authorities for issuing a title-deed. The Chinese Government would establish a mixed court and other public buildings on her former land in the Concession. China had to cancel her former plan for building roads and railway tracks in the German Concession, which was in the boundaries of the Treaty Port of Hankow. Chinese jurisdiction was exercised by a Chinese judge upon foreigners residing in the German Concession, who had no consuls of their own country represented in China. In cases where a German or another foreigner was the plaintiff or the injured party and in cases dealing with violation of the orders in force in the German Concession on the part of the Chinese, the Chinese judge was to decide only in the presence of the German Consul or his representative. Appeal could be made to the Superintendent of the Customs through the medium of the German Consul, against the decision of the Chinese judge. The establishment of the German Concession would not interfere with the rights of the non-German foreigners who had previously acquired lands within the present German Concession. Thus by this Convention China

 $<sup>^{18}\ {\</sup>rm See}\ {\rm J.\ V.\ A.\ MacMurray:}$  Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, pp. 42-4.

gave up her land as well as her sovereignty in the Concession to the German Government as she had done to the British Government.<sup>19</sup>

While the German Consul was getting the Concession at Hankow for Germany, the German Minister at Peking was negotiating the Concession at Tientsin for the German Government with the Tsungli Yamen (Foreign Office) in Peking. On October 30, the Convention for the Concession at Tientsin was signed by the German Consul at Tientsin, von Seckendorff and the Chinese Superintendent of Trade of the Northern Ports. By this Convention China ceded to Germany the Concession at Tientsin in perpetuity, and the local Chinese authorities were to apply force in compelling all the Chinese in the Concession to sell their land or houses in case they were unwilling. The German Consul at Tientsin was to pay on behalf of the German Government, seventy-five taels for all the lands in the Concession regardless of the situation of the various plots. The Chinese cemetery of the Canton, Fukien and Chekiang Guilds covered with tombs in the Concession would remain unmolested, and the ceremonies for the dead would not be interfered with. Furthermore, these guilds did not need to pay any taxes nor were they be forced to sell. For the fixing of expropriation value of houses within the German Concession a German-Chinese Commission was to be created. Three months were set as a limit for the Chinese to move out of the Concession by selling their houses and lands to the Germans. One tael was to be paid by the German subjects to enable the Chinese to remove their ancestral tombs out of the German Concession in case they desired. After the sale of his house or land the Chinese owner was to send to the Chinese local authorities a copy of the contract of the sale regarding transfer of the plot to German ownership for the fixing of the official seal to be forwarded to the German Consul for safekeeping. An annual payment of 1,000 big cash as land tax per mow (Chinese acreage) was to be paid by the German Consul to the office of the City Magistrate beginning with the purchase of land by the German authorities. In case the German authorities

 $<sup>^{19}\ \</sup>mathrm{See}\ \mathrm{J.}\ \mathrm{V.}\ \mathrm{A.}\ \mathrm{MacMurray:}$  Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, Vol. I, pp. 46–50.