

INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL SCIENCE

FOREWORD

There is no longer any serious controversy among educators and informed laymen as to the need for conveying to the rising citizenry an understanding of the social world. The almost universal inclusion of social studies in school curricula is proof of the recognition that among the primary functions of contemporary education is the orientation of the young with reference to the society of which they are a part. There is still considerable difference of opinion, however, among the experts concerning the ways and means by which the schools might best discharge this obligation.

No normal young person can grow up in our civilization and participate in the daily affairs of his family and community without imbibing a great deal of the knowledge and coming to share most of the basic values of the society in which he lives. By the time he reaches the college level the student may be expected to have some familiarity, based upon personal experience, with the major social issues confronting us and to have some convictions with reference to the conflicting programs for dealing with these problems. Hence the student never approaches the study of social science with the same degree of ignorance and the same unbiased frame of mind with which he begins his study of the physical and the biological universe. Whereas in his initial contact with physics, chemistry, and biology he is relatively ignorant and neutral, in the case of the social sciences he is filled with preconceptions and ready to give the final answers to questions that still baffle the experts.

A large and important part of the work of an introductory course in the social sciences must therefore necessarily be directed toward aiding the student to unlearn what he thinks he already knows. This may frequently involve the unsettling of his dogmatic convictions, to be followed by the attempt to get him to view questions as open which he may have considered as already

closed, and to guide him in acquiring a new perspective of his society and its problems. It is probably impossible for anyone ever to view any acute social issue with the same detached and dispassionate objectivity with which the natural scientist views his subject matter in the laboratory. Complete self-effacement also carries with it a corresponding disinterestedness which in matters social is both impossible and undesirable. There are indeed many subjects of interest to social scientists in which personal biases and interests play a minor role, but they generally are subjects on which we must content ourselves with the most external and mechanical knowledge. If we would go beyond this superficial knowledge and attempt to obtain some genuine insights, however, we must get an intimate acquaintance with our subject matter, which in social phenomena involves some degree of participation in and extension of our personal experience into the situations we hope to study.

Most of the crucial questions to which students of social science must be introduced in social science courses are regarded as controversial by some elements in our society. Hence, it appears well-nigh impossible to write a thoroughly objective textbook in the social sciences, and if such a book were to be written it would probably be so devoid of interest to anyone that no one could be induced to read it.

Although the authors of this volume have attempted to present the most authentic knowledge that is available on their respective topics, I could not claim for them that their work will be found wholly unbiased on all the issues they have treated. It is possible to say something much more complimentary and significant about their work, however, namely, that they have made diligent efforts to make their biases explicit and bring them out into the open where they may be viewed in relation to other conceivable biases and in the light of the facts established by the consensus of the competent.

There are already many textbooks available designed to furnish an introduction to the social sciences for junior college and college students. Each perhaps represents the procedures which its authors have found most nearly in accord with their preconceptions both as to the nature of social science and the best methods of teaching it. While no apology is therefore necessary

on the part of the authors of the present work for adding another book which incorporates their preferences and the fruits of their extensive experience, for the use of their own classes, it is appropriate that the editor address a word to other teachers indicating why they too might find the volume suited to their students.

This work is designed not as an introductory outline or syllabus in the social sciences but as a complete text, requiring only a limited and inexpensive library of supplementary readings which may be judiciously selected from the bibliographies following each chapter, in case it is desired to induce students to familiarize themselves with a wider range of source materials.

Unlike a number of other volumes now in use, this work employs the "problem approach" to the social sciences. It thus has a closeness to the life of our time and presumably to the actual experiences and situations confronting the student. This essential quality is generally found wanting in textbooks designed on a formal and abstract pattern. The authors of this volume believe that more sound theoretical knowledge of a subject matter can be gained by analyzing actual problems the genuineness and reality of which the student recognizes on the basis of his own experience, rather than by confronting him with a highly systematized body of formal propositions of the meaning and relevance of which he may be only remotely and faintly aware.

This work, moreover, proceeds on the assumption that in an introductory text it is not desirable to deal with the academic disciplines constituting social science as rigorously separable subjects. The authors believe that the distinctive concepts, methods, and problems of economics, political science, sociology, and related sciences can be more effectively presented in more advanced courses and that what is required in an introduction is a realistic view of our total social scene with emphasis upon the common elements which bind the social sciences together. This is another reason why the authors have chosen concrete problems for analysis in which all of the relevant interests of the different social sciences are brought to bear upon the subject matter.

While the authors have made diligent efforts to incorporate the most recent findings of fact and interpretation into the treatment of the wide range of problems which make up their text, they realize that our social world is in a state of continuous flux and

that what is acceptable today may be outmoded very shortly. They have tried to look behind the headlines of the moment and to deal with the basic and continuing problems of our society, from a long-range perspective, exemplifying in the analysis of each problem the characteristic mode of approach of the social scientist. Just as the work which they now offer in print is the product of many years of experimentation and constant revision, so they expect that the relentless march of events, and their own and others' experience with this text, will call for further revisions in the future. What they now offer, however, represents the product of continuous and fruitful collaboration of many minds, each trained in some one of the social science disciplines and enriched by the experience of many years of participation in a pioneer educational enterprise in the development of the social science course in the Chicago Junior Colleges.

LOUIS WIRTH

The University of Chicago
August, 1941

PREFACE

The two-volume work of which this is a condensation was first published in September, 1941. Although originally it was intended to provide an introduction to social science for the junior colleges in the city of Chicago, it has found a favorable reception and received wide acceptance throughout the country. The suggestion was expressed by many in diverse institutions, however, that a one-volume book, suitable for one semester's rather than a year's work, was highly desirable. The present edition is a response to that suggestion. The authors confronted the alternatives of covering the subject matter contained in the two-volume edition less intensively or of selecting from the contents of the larger work those sections which were regarded as most indispensable and as constituting a basic foundation which all students might be expected to have for the understanding of the social world in which they live. They chose, and I believe wisely, the latter alternative. The problems selected for inclusion in this one-volume edition are those which were believed to have a peculiar relevance to our time. They are those on which in the coming months and years the American people will have to decide the road they wish to travel and on which, therefore, they should have the available authentic information and the most penetrating analysis.

If an introduction to social science was a necessary part of the education of the student when the original two-volume work was published on the eve of America's entrance into World War II, it is even more vital today, when we stand on the threshold of what is at least potentially a new epoch in history. It is, of course, trite to say that we live in an age of transition, for every period is a period of transition. It appears not to be an exaggeration to say, however, that the changes that are going on in the world at large and in our own country are so profound and of such vast scope as to defy comparison with almost any previous crisis in

modern times. Intelligent personal adjustment and full participation in the responsibilities of citizenship in a democracy call for a wide dissemination of the best knowledge accessible to us, particularly concerning those problems with which the social sciences deal. It is hoped, therefore, that this book, both as a textbook in the schools and colleges and as a guide to the intelligent and interested citizenry, will be of aid in preparing us for the transition from war to peace and in the building of a better America and a better world.

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PART I

CHAPTER 1

PERSONAL MALADJUSTMENT

Personal and Social Disorganization. A well-known sociologist once said that a wholesome personality somehow manages to satisfy the fundamental human wishes (for security, recognition, love, and new experience), either in the waking state or, at least, in his dreams. This is essentially correct. A disorganized personality cannot be called wholesome. Such a personality does not solve the conflicts between contrary wishes that normally arise in his experience. He suppresses one wish in order to satisfy another. An organized person, on the other hand, is one who manages to satisfy the fundamental wishes by solving the conflicts that come along in one of a number of ways. One who has either lost the capacity for solving his conflicts, or has come to solve all conflicts in one particular way, is considered a disorganized personality.

Disorganized personalities, such as criminals, mendicants, tramps, drug addicts, alcoholics, or insane individuals, multiply in disorganized societies. Indeed, the number of these personalities in a given society serves as an index of the amount of organization that exists. The more of these personalities the less organization there is, and vice versa. That is because in a well-organized society human wishes are capable of satisfaction in a number of ways. In such a society, no one needs narrow his choices down to one particular solution. A disorganized society is one in which the normal forms of control no longer operate, the normal ways of satisfying wishes no longer are easily available. Thus a disorganized society promotes personal disorganization. When disorganized individuals multiply, they test the modes of control which a society must exercise in order to maintain itself. Hence disorganized individuals promote social disorganization.

A normal individual is one who, in a society like ours, can compete with his fellow citizens for the satisfaction of the basic human wishes. In the paragraphs that follow we shall consider a number of social types of personality who have failed in their attempt to compete for the satisfaction of their wishes. The feeble-minded, considered first, are a group of individuals who do not know how to solve their conflicts and adjust themselves in a world of competitive strivings. The insane, considered next, have lost the capacity for solving conflicts, except in one way, by escaping from the competitive life which we must all face. The homeless individual solves his problem by leaving the community in which he belongs by birth or long residence. The mendicant solves his conflicts by exploiting the social traits of those who have been moderately successful in the struggle for goods and services. The drug addict and the alcoholic solve their conflicts by effecting an artificial state of pleasure (an "inner glow"), instead of trying to get normal satisfaction for their wishes in a world of social competition. Finally, the criminal is an individual who, though generally able to compete, is unwilling to do so. He is also unwilling to escape either bodily or mentally from his social environment. Hence his particular adjustment lies in wresting satisfaction from a reluctant society by a show of force, or cunning, or both.

Types of Mental Disorganization. The types of mental abnormality which we shall consider in this chapter are (1) the amentias, or types of mental defectiveness, or types of feeble-mindedness; (2) the dementias, or psychoses (as they are technically called) or the insanities (as they are popularly known); and (3) the psychopathic personalities. All these abnormalities have certain features in common. They are individual disorders or deficiencies. They have vast social implications. They show the extent to which social influences enter into individual adjustments, and prove to what extent the individual must be reckoned with in discussing social problems.

Individual Differences and Mental Testing. A recent study in a large American city brought out the fact that about 29 per cent of the pupils in the first grade of grammar school were not advanced enough mentally to start learning to read. In some communities as many as 42 per cent of the pupils were in this

predicament. The importance of this fact to us is that it indicates the existence of individual differences in our population. This is not a new discovery. What is more, the belief that individual differences can somehow be tested is not especially new. The earliest record of mental testing is found in Greek history.¹

During the period of the Trojan war, a Greek named Ulysses paid no heed to the call to arms. He was visited by the authorities, and found plowing up the beach and sowing salt. Someone thought of a way of testing his mentality. His infant, Telemachus, was placed in the horses' path, as he kept on plowing. Ulysses quickly turned aside, and the test was regarded as conclusive.

The testing of human intelligence goes back many years. Francis Galton, in 1883, pioneered with a scale of mental measurements in England. J. McK. Cattell, an American psychologist, advanced the approach to the study of individual differences and in 1893 proposed to measure intelligence. Binet and Henri, French psychologists, constructed a crude intelligence test in 1895. It was not until 1905, however, that the first adequate test of intelligence was constructed by the Frenchmen, Binet and Simon. Binet, a psychologist, and Simon, a physician, conceived the idea of measuring human intelligence in terms of "mental age." If there is such a thing as physiological age, or economic (earning) age, or social (confirmation) age, or educational age, why not mental age? Preparing a series of verbal and motor performance tests, Binet and Simon standardized their tests by age groups, assigning each test a value in terms of mental months. The tests were arranged in such a way as to increase in difficulty year by year. The value of each test was one year, or twelve months, divided by the number of questions (or other tests) assigned to that year. The total number of tests successfully passed thus gave the subject's mental age in "mental months." Dividing the actual or physiological age in months by the mental age in months, Binet and Simon obtained a ratio showing the relation of the two ages to each other. Multiplied by 100, to avoid fractions, this ratio yielded an I.Q. (intelligence quotient) in round numbers.

$$\text{I.Q.} = \frac{\text{M.A. (mental age)} \times 100}{\text{C.A. (chronological age)}}$$

¹ F. L. Wells, *Mental Tests in Clinical Practice*, World Book Company, Yonkers-on-Hudson, N. Y., 1927.

The Binet-Simon test is an individual test. It has been widely adopted, and in this country has been used in the Terman and Kuhlmann revisions, named after the psychologists who standardized them for American use. In group tests, that is, tests given to a number of people at one time, the tendency is to measure the responses which psychologists consider basic to human intelligence, and to assign the individuals tested percentile ranks, based on total scores instead of I.Q.'s. Percentile ranks show how the achievement of each individual compares with that of others of his age group, educational group, or social group.

Thus it is fair to say that intelligence tests, used as a criterion of individual differences, serve as a standard of measurement in terms of brightness units. Following is the usually accepted table of I.Q.'s and their technical, psychological equivalents.

TABLE I

<i>I.Q.</i>	<i>Psychological Designation</i>
0 to 24	idiots
25 to 49	imbeciles
50 to 69	morons
70 to 79	borderline defectives
80 to 89	dull normals
90 to 109	average normals
110 to 119	bright individuals
120 to 129	superior individuals
130 to 149	very superior individuals
150 and up	geniuses

On the basis of standard tests, it has been found that the following distribution of intelligence may be assumed for the entire population:

TABLE II

<i>I.Q.</i>	<i>Per Cent of Population</i>
55-65	0.33
66-75	2.30
76-85	8.60
86-95	20.10
96-105	33.90
106-115	23.90
116-125	9.00
126-135	2.00
136-145	0.55

It is well to remember that I.Q.'s may change from time to time. The mental age may advance out of proportion to the physiological age which, beyond a certain point, is considered constant.

Criteria of Mental Efficiency and Deficiency. There are no people who do not possess at least some intelligence. Intelligence means "ability," and ability in its simplest terms refers to activity. Since there are no individuals who do not act, there are no individuals who are not intelligent. Individuals do differ in degree of intelligence, and it is the degree that is important. Narrowed down to basic conceptions, intelligence implies four types of ability: (1) the ability to learn quickly, (2) the ability to perceive a situation as a whole (instead of partially and incompletely), (3) the ability to adjust oneself to a new situation, and (4) the ability to take and maintain a given direction. It is important to note that intelligence depends on applications to everyday life. It is primarily social in reference, receiving expression in general information, school work, economic proficiency, and even moral reactions.

By mental deficiency we mean an arrested or sluggish development of so-called "mental" abilities. This, of course, implies inability to meet socioeconomic demands in the way in which normal, efficient individuals meet them. In terms of mental age equivalents, it is of some interest to note the following grades of feeble-mindedness:

TABLE III

<i>Mental Age</i>	<i>Types of Feeble-mindedness</i>
0 to 2 years	idiocy (low, middle, and high)
3 to 7 years	imbecility (low, middle, and high)
8 to 12 years	moronity (low, middle, and high)

A low-grade idiot has a mental age of less than a year. He is relatively helpless, although he can walk. A middle-grade idiot has a mental age of one year. He feeds himself, but eats everything he can place inside the mouth. A high-grade idiot, mental age two years, eats discriminatingly, that is, he can tell food from nonedible objects. A low-grade imbecile, mental age three to

four years, cannot work. He plays a little, and in certain cases may try to help others. A middle-grade imbecile, mental age five years, does only the simplest types of tasks. A high-grade imbecile, six or seven years old mentally, does tasks of short duration. He will wash dishes, run short errands, dust around objects. A moron of low-grade type is eight to nine years old mentally. He does light work, makes up beds, scrubs, mends, lays bricks, cares for the bathroom. A middle-grade moron, aged ten years mentally, makes a good institution helper, and can be depended on for routine work. High-grade morons, eleven to twelve years old mentally, are in some respects a greater problem than those of lower mentality. They can do fairly complicated work with only occasional oversight. They can use machinery. They can care for animals on farms. They require no supervision at work, but they will not plan their work. It will be noticed that the concept of feeble-mindedness has definite psychological implications, determinable by test, and that a literary use of the concept is necessarily inaccurate.

Extent and Causes of Mental Deficiency. According to a report of the U. S. Bureau of the Census, the institutional population of epileptics and feeble-minded individuals of the country rose from approximately 62,000 to 109,000, between 1926 and 1936, an increase from 48 to 73 per 100,000 population. However, these figures do not include many mental defectives housed in private institutions and many who are kept in their own homes. On the basis of studies of various kinds, it has been estimated that the total number of feeble-minded individuals in the United States is in the neighborhood of a million. This is much less than some estimates, based on statistical surmises, have led us to believe. These surmises ran from nineteen to fifty million at one time. It is obviously incorrect to call one-sixth to two-fifths of our population feeble-minded.

To what can we attribute the causes of mental deficiency of so large a number of Americans as even one million? It is now generally believed that amentia in its various forms is due to a variety of causes. In some cases injury (trauma) at the time of birth is held responsible. Infectious diseases prevailing in the mother's body during the child's embryonic development may be causal. Disturbances in the endocrine glands (such as the

thyroid, pituitary, and so on), toxic influences (alcoholism, lead poisoning, and the like), and malnutrition have been associated with feeble-mindedness. In all these cases, it will be noticed, the causal factor is presumed to influence the structures on which intelligence depends, rather than to influence behavior as such. Low mentality has been assumed to be inherited through the germ plasm. Intelligence depends on a great many unit characters. To assume that all these factors are equally and simultaneously involved in a grand hereditary scheme is somewhat dangerous. Psychologists are now inclined to recognize that hereditary influences apply to the brain and nervous system, the endocrine glands, and so on, which may have an effect on intelligence. That intelligence as such is inherited is not considered likely. The studies of such families as the Kallikaks and the Jukes did not, as was thought once, establish a clear case for heredity. On the contrary, it is now believed that the work on these families left much to be desired; and that further research might show that environment had as much influence as heredity in those family histories.

Social Aspects of Mental Deficiency. The two primary elements found in feeble-mindedness are (1) arrested mental development, leading to the limitation of ability, or what psychologists call "performance," and (2) inability to meet the ordinary problems of life, leading to poor social adjustment. These elements do not imply that a mentally defective individual is not a member of society, or is not entitled to consideration as such. The truth of the matter is that much calumny and undeserved discrimination have been heaped on the mental defective, because of failure to recognize this simple truth. Mental defectives have some social intelligence, especially the imbeciles and the morons. They have vocational possibilities. They get married, and lead quiet family lives. They are not sexually dangerous, as a rule, in spite of what newspaper usage of the term "moron" leads people to believe. As a matter of fact, the feeble-minded are sexually inert, and in some stages even indifferent. It is true that those classified psychologically as morons make up a sizable percentage of the delinquents and criminals who are apprehended, thus reducing the average intelligence of prison populations in statistical studies. But they also make up a part of our