

DANIEL BELL

THE WINDING PASSAGE



Essays and Sociological Journeys

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1960-1980



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For Nathan and Lochi Glazer

*la vie è lunga e 'l cammino è malvagio,
e già il sole a mezza terza riede.*

**The way is long and the road is hard,
and already the sun is at mid-tierce.**

Canto xxxiv, 96-97

Preface

These are the essays of a prodigal son. They are essays written in my middle years, midway in the journey of our life, in that dark wood, seeking a return to the straight way of my ancestors. I know that the world I live in is vastly different from theirs, yet the duplex nature of man remains largely the same, now as then.

The first twenty years of my working life, from 1940 to 1960, were spent primarily in journalism, though for three years, from 1945 to 1948, I taught social science in the College of the University of Chicago, working with an extraordinary group of young thinkers—David Riesman, Edward Shils, Milton Singer, Barrington Moore, Morris Janowitz, Philip Rieff—in a common course, and from 1952 to 1956 I was an adjunct lecturer in sociology at Columbia University. The wartime years were spent as managing editor of *The New Leader*, a period of frenetic intellectual activity, one of whose privileges was meeting and getting to know a remarkable group of European émigrés who had fled to America after the fall of France, such old Mensheviks as Raphael Abramovitch and Boris Nicolaevsky, and such young anti-Fascists as Nicola Chiaramonte and Lewis Coser (or Louis Clair,

as he then signed himself). From 1948 to 1958, I was a writer on *Fortune*, except for the year 1956-57, when I worked in Paris as the director of seminars for the Congress for Cultural Freedom, years made vibrant, and sad, by the Polish and abortive Hungarian revolutions. My contacts with those Communists who had lived through the brutal Stalinist years, had retained their idealism, and had turned against the Russian tanks to seek what a decade later would be called "socialism with a human face," gave me a vivid sense of what the "cold war" was about at first hand. On *Fortune*, I wrote primarily about labor, though over the years I began to write on a wider variety of social topics as well.

My writings in those years were primarily political and topical, dealing mainly with economics, changes in the occupational and class structure, and the expanding role of big business and government. I started a book, entitled *The Monopoly State*, which, strangely, anticipated some of the theories of corporate capitalism proposed by New Left writers a quarter of a century later, but I abandoned it after several hundred pages, when I realized that I was simply rereading some old Marxist categories, those of "finance capitalism" of Hilferding or the theory of "organized capitalism" of Bukharin, and applying them in a procrustean way to a more complex reality. (When I see these recurrent efforts by new New Leftists eager to discover the "secret" of capitalism, repeated without reference to or memory of past effort, I understand the pith of Charles Frankel's remark that it is not Marxism that creates each new generation of radicalism, but that each new generation seeks to create its own Marx.) I wrote many columns for *Commentary*, in its Study of Man department, conducted by Nathan Glazer, reviewing sociological studies in various areas, and I completed a monograph on *Marxian Socialism in the United States*, which was published in 1952 in the compendium *Socialism and American Life* and later reissued independently in 1967, with a new introduction, as a paperback by the Princeton University Press. A long essay on *Work and Its Discontents* was published as an elegant small book. And, together with my friends Richard Hofstadter and Seymour M. Lipset, I wrote (and later published in two collections of essays) studies of McCarthyism and the radical right, essays which grew out of a seminar we had conducted at Columbia University. I was, as the saying goes, politically *engagé*, and my numerous writings of the time reflect those diverse and bustling concerns.*

For the past twenty years, I have been an academic: ten years at Columbia and ten years at Harvard. Inevitably, my temperament has drawn me to

*A bibliography of my writings to 1960 has been compiled by Douglas G. Webb of the University of Toronto, who has been engaged in a study that he calls *From Socialism to Sociology: The Intellectual Careers of Philip Selznick, Seymour Martin Lipset, Nathan Glazer and Daniel Bell, 1932-1960*. Mr. Webb's compilation shows that from 1940 to 1950, I wrote 210 pieces. From 1950 to 1960, I wrote 116 articles. If one adds the "unsigned" columns in *Fortune* on labor, in this period, "this adds approximately 100 pieces to the bibliography," or a total of 426 articles and reviews in those twenty years. I must express my deep appreciation to Mr. Webb for his stupendous task, and my bewilderment, as well, in rereading some of those portentously assured writings of my callow years.

other, activist concerns. For eight years, from 1965 to 1973, I was the coeditor with Irving Kristol of *The Public Interest*, a magazine we founded to deal seriously, but not technically, with issues of domestic public policy. I served on the President's Commission on Technology, Automation and Economic Progress from 1964 to 1966, and helped draft the commission's report, *Technology and the American Economy*. From 1966 to 1968, I was cochairman, first with William Gorham and then with Alice Rivlin, of the government panel on social indicators, and supervised the study, *Toward a Social Report*, that was directed by Mancur Olson. In 1965, I became the chairman of the Commission on the Year 2000 (an enterprise of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences), a group that pioneered, for better or for worse, the spate of futurist studies that have flooded the American scene like the red tide in this past decade. More recently, I have been, from 1976 to 1979, the U.S. representative on the intergovernmental advisory committee of the OECD project, *Interfutures*, which has been looking at the common problems of the advanced industrial societies within a ten-year period. I am now a member of the President's Commission for an Agenda for the 1980's.

Yet my interests have been more scholarly, reflective, and academic. One idiosyncratic clue is the length of the essays I write. Writers, like runners, develop "natural" lengths. The man who runs the 100-yard dash will rarely be a good half-miler; wind capacity and the sense of pace are necessarily different. In my first two decades as a writer, I found that my natural length was a 3,000- to 5,000-word essay, something I could do in a week. In the later decades, it has been the 30,000- to 40,000-word essay, a length that could be completed during the summer.* It may be that advancing age makes one wordier, but I prefer to assume that such length is a function of thought.

Secondly, my subjects have tended to be more theoretical, philosophical, and methodological. I have, in these past years, written many essays on policy and polemical subjects: on forecasting, the university, ideology, the race issue, and the like. Yet my major interest has been the recasting of sociological theory. Though I do not write in the formal or abstract fashion of a Talcott Parsons or a Jürgen Habermas (there is a distinction between abstract formulation and generalization) and remain closer to the historical

*When I left *Fortune* in 1958 Mr. Luce was puzzled at my decision and asked for the reasons, with the thought that he might be able to match a rival offer. There are, I told Mr. Luce, four good reasons for going back to academe—June, July, August, and September. Mr. Luce thought that more money might compensate for time, but I decided otherwise. I have never regretted that decision, and when I look back at the fortunate opportunities I have had to change careers several times, and the education this has given me, I regret the *loss* of such opportunity today for young people. When I listen to some of my colleagues today who have been in the lockstep of student, graduate student, young instructor, and then tenured professor without the crosshatch of experience that might leaven their large generalizations about "the State," "capitalism," "revolution," I regret not only the loss to themselves but even more, to their students, for whom such abstractions take on the "reified consciousness" of reality, with no sense of what the world is about.

and empirical terrain, my ultimate intentions are still theoretical. The two sociological books I have written in this past decade, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* and *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism*, are based on the methodological repudiation of a "holistic" view of society, be it Marxist or Functionalist. A Marxist or a Functionalist views society as some kind of historical period or closed system, integrated through the mode of production or a dominant value system, and believes that all other, superstructural or peripheral, realms are determined by or predominantly influenced by this principle of "totality" or "integration."

Against these holistic views, I have argued that society is better understood as being composed of diverse realms, each obedient to a different "axial" principle which becomes the regulative or normative standard, the legitimating principle, of action in each realm. In a modern *economy*, the axial principle is "functional rationality," or efficiency—the idea that in the techno-economic realm the criterion for using a process or a product is whether it can be made cheaper, better, more efficiently, that one can measure costs, and provide a clear principle of substitution (either in the production functions of capital and labor, or in the substitutions of different metals or minerals or energy sources). In the Western *polity*, the axial principle is equality—equality before the law, equality of opportunity, equality of rights—and this principle serves to legitimate the demand for "entitlements" which has been a feature of Western polities for the past fifty years. And in the *culture*, the axial principle is the enhancement or the fulfillment of the "self." The gratification or the "realization" of the potential of the individual self is the legitimate norm that shapes the life-styles of social groups, or the search for novelty and experimentation in the expressive areas of the culture.

But the methodological crux is not only the differences of realms, but the idea that each realm has a different rhythm of change. In the techno-economic realm change is linear because there is a clear principle of substitution: that of lesser cost, greater extractive power per unit of energy, more productivity. In the polity, one tends to see alternative possibilities (but not in any determinate sequence) of centralization and decentralization, elite and mass, oligarchic control or extensive participation. In the culture, there is either the continuity of tradition, in stable societies, or, as in contemporary society (and as in Hellenistic and Roman times), a principle of syncretism, or indiscriminate mingling or borrowing of diverse cultural styles. At different historical periods, there may be a larger degree of integration of realms (as in twelfth-century Europe, or at the apogee of bourgeois society in the last third of the nineteenth century); at other times, such as the present, there may be large discordances and contradictions.

There are some crucial methodological consequences to these arguments. For one thing, it is difficult to "periodize" history in accordance with some necessary "intrinsic" unity, or to say that there are determinate sequential stages of historical development. For another, it becomes too formal and abstract (that is, lacking in historical content) to conceptualize society in terms of some "general theory," in which a single principle of order

defines the "functional requisites" of a society. This is not to say that large-scale conceptual schemes are useless or wrong. Depending upon the question, one may find it useful to posit "modes of production" as the conceptual prism for understanding a particular time, and to think of society in terms of the Asiatic mode of production, of slavery, feudalism, and capitalism. Given other questions, one might use "modes of domination" as the conceptual prism, and think of societies in terms of patriarchal, patrimonial, and legal-rational systems of domination, as Max Weber did. But over historical time, *there is no necessary historical congruence* of the two schemes. The use of one or another (or different conceptual themes, using "civilizations" as the regulative unit; or cultural styles, such as Gothic, Baroque, Mannerist, and Modern) depends upon the theoretical questions one is asking. The substance of this argument, to use Kantian language, is that there is no given "constitutive" order to the structure of societies; what one knows is a function of the conceptual scheme that one self-consciously applies to the reality one is exploring.

This methodological argument underlay a set of substantive conjectures about the nature of social change and the character of modern society. In my book on postindustrialism (strictly speaking, I should not have called it postindustrial *society*, since I was only dealing with a dimension of society), I was seeking to identify a new principle, the codification of theoretical knowledge, which was reshaping the relation of science to technology, and of innovation to economic change. It was not a forecast of things to come, which would have to be an empirical set of observations. But, as a new principle, it could have large-scale consequences for modern society, *if* that principle should spread. As I also specifically pointed out, technology does not determine changes in other realms of a society but poses questions of management, especially for the political order.

In *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism*, working from the same methodological assumptions, I sought to show how bourgeois capitalism, as the sociological form of the modern economy, and avant-garde modernism, as the victorious feature of culture, had common roots in their repudiation of the past, in their dynamism, in the search for novelty and sanction of change. Yet, inevitably, the different axial principles of these realms (the techno-economic realm segmenting a person into "roles," the culture emphasizing the achievement of the whole person) brought the bourgeois economic system into sharp conflict with the modernist culture (just as the bureaucratic structure of the economic enterprise begins to clash with the equality and participatory ethos of the polity). Thus one discerned contradiction in the fundamental structures of modern society.

Within the realms, other contradictions have developed. The bourgeois ethic was one of prudence, delayed gratification, and emphasis on work. Yet from the 1920s modern corporate capitalism, being geared to mass production and mass consumption, has promoted a hedonism that has undercut the very Protestant ethic which was the initial motivation or legitimation for individuals in bourgeois society. Indeed, the corporation itself is a contradiction, for in the realm of work and production it requires individ-

uals to live by one norm, yet in the realm of consumption and play, it fosters another. The further, deeper contradiction is the collapse of a traditional bourgeois culture in the arts, and the victory of modernism and the avant-garde to the point where a new "cultural mass" has today taken over the trappings of modernism when, as an aesthetic movement, modernism has in fact become exhausted.

I have always believed that theory should be exemplified in substance, and both *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* and *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* emphasized historical and contemporary events as conclusions that could be demonstrated by using those conceptual prisms. In recent years I have come to believe that the epistemological assumptions of the social sciences are now more problematic. The ebbing away of positivism and functionalism has left sociology with the choice of being historicist, and limiting the range of its generalizations; or formalist, seeking invariant structures independent of the history of culture; or interpretive, seeking meanings and eschewing causal explanation. (Even Marxism finds itself in this cleft, with a historicist-Hegelian wing on one side, and a structuralist-formalist wing, for example, Althusserian, on the other.) In a number of unpublished papers, beginning with one on the philosophy of science for an international seminar in Berlin, in September 1975, and most recently in a paper on "The Quest for Certainty," for the Einstein Centennial symposium in Jerusalem in March 1979, I have been trying to establish a new set of relevant distinctions regarding the appropriate modes of inquiry for problems within the natural and social sciences.

What, then, of the essays in this book, essays "midway in the journey of our life"? They are largely reflective, or explorations in the history of ideas. There is no unifying theme or single thesis. Why, then, collect them within a single set of covers? The simplest reason is to make them more easily available to those who are interested in these ideas. Many of them have been published in journals not easily available (for example, "The Return of the Sacred," in the *British Journal of Sociology*) or in books that are out of print (for example, "Veblen and the Technocrats," the introduction to *The Engineers and the Price System*.) Another is practical. It is said that Diderot's *Encyclopedia* was the first bourgeois encyclopedia because it was organized on the utilitarian principle of placing essays in alphabetical order rather than on the more intellectual principle of grouping them under common themes, as in the *trivium* and *quadrivium*, or as Mortimer J. Adler has sought to do in the *Propaedia* volume of *Britannica* 3. By bringing these essays together under the name of the author, a utilitarian purpose is served.

But beyond that, I would hope, there are other gains. These are explorations of ideas and a presentation of argument, a reasoned exposition of an intellectual position. I hope that the essays will provide pleasure—an old-fashioned word, I must admit—to the reader, and also some instruction.

There are, however, a number of distinct themes which run through some of these essays, and it might be helpful to make these explicit. The first, in the analysis of social change, is the distinction between the social

and the cultural, between the kind of changes that occur in institutions and those in the realm of ideas. Most of sociological theory, as I have indicated, looks at social change in holistic terms, as a succession of systems or periods or dominant modes, in some determinate sequence. Thus, apart from Marxism, the most influential theory of social change, that postulated by Émile Durkheim and elaborated by Talcott Parsons, sees such change as a process of "structural differentiation," in which original nuclear or molecular units differentiate and specialize (just as economic activities divide into wholesale and resale functions when distributions grow) and thus require a greater degree of coordination and bureaucratic controls. In the realm of culture, this idea has been used by Robert Bellah in his influential discussion of religious evolution, in *Beyond Belief*.

As I have indicated, I believe that changes in culture arise in a very different way, and follow a very different trajectory, than do changes in social structure. This is a theme that appears in the first essay, on "Technology, Nature, and Society," and it reappears in the last, "The Return of the Sacred." In the latter essay, I point out that one of the mistakes sociologists have made in dealing with religion—which all Enlightenment thinkers predicted would disappear by the twentieth century—is the use of the word "secularization" to describe the process of social change. By failing to distinguish between changes in institutions (such as the church) and changes in ideas (such as doctrine), they have failed to understand why one has seen the recurrence at various times of religious beliefs, moods, revivals, even though the world seems to be progressively disenchanting, to use Max Weber's term. Secularization, I argue, is too gross a term, for it sees social change as a one-way street, and fails to make the necessary distinction of levels. Thus, I propose to divide the term, to keep the word "secularization" in dealing with institutional matters (which was its original meaning, for the shrinking of ecclesiastical authority in a temporal realm) and to use "profanation" to deal with changes in ideas. Since I believe that social change operates on a double level, I propose the pairs *sacred and secular* and *holy and profane* to describe the different patterns of change.

A different kind of theme appears in such diverse essays as the one on ethnicity and the one on "The New Class: A Muddled Concept." This is the question of what are the most appropriate social units to describe contemporary social structure. Most sociologists, in one way or another, use the idea of *class* as the central term to describe social structure. Marxism, in fact, can almost be summed up in the phrase that all social structure is class structure. I have no quarrel with the term class.* I think it is the most

*This is in no way to assume that the term "class" is unambiguous. In principle there are three different "locations" of the term class, and within each of them one can distinguish three further subdivisions.

One way of thinking about class is to derive it from the *structure of production* in any society. And here, there are three distinct differences: *occupations* (e.g., from managers and professionals to unskilled and manual, which is the usual census distribution); *property relations* (e.g., with capitalist and proletariat comprising the main classification in modern Western society); and *authority relations*, a distinction first used by Ralf Dahrendorf in his *Class and*

powerful means we have for understanding Western society in the two centuries from 1750 to 1950. But I do quarrel with the effort to expand this as a master term in looking at *all* social structures. And I would argue that it is increasingly limited as a way of comprehending not only the complexities of Western societies but also the communal and tribal societies of the non-Western worlds.

The European world before industrial capitalism was organized primarily as a series of "vertical orders," what Max Weber has called *Stände*, and what Marx, before he generalized his notion of class in *The Communist Manifesto*, acknowledged as "estate society." In this social structure, there was a landed order, a military order, an ecclesiastical order, a legal order (*parlements*), and a bourgeois mercantile/artisan order, largely within the free cities or *burgesses*. Each of these orders was hierarchical and graded. Before the eighteenth century, individuals lived within an intricate system of codified rights and duties that were sanctioned by tradition, custom, or law. The rankings of lords, vassals, and serfs were inherited, and independent of money. The distinctions of master, journeymen, and apprentices were fixed in the guilds, and even the guilds themselves, as in Florence, were rigidly ranked as to rights and precedence.

Industrial capitalism blew this structure apart, or, more specifically, the bourgeois economic order expanded to almost envelop the entire social structure, so that the internal divisions within that order, the crude ties created by exchange, between capitalist and worker, became the major divisions within society. The idea of "class" arose because these divisions were so loose, and contractual, as against the intricate system of rank and rights that had preceded it.

But from that perspective, the idea of "class" arises out of what in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century political terminology was called "civil society"—an aggregation of individuals outside the State. And the idea of

Class Conflict in an Industrial Society (1965). This mode is primarily Marxist, but which of these, especially the second or third, is the most faithful to the master, I will have to leave to the textual disputants.

A second way, following Max Weber, is to think of economic class in terms of *market relations*. As elaborated by Norbert Wiley, there are three kinds of markets. One is credit markets, in which the basic class relationships are those of debtors and creditors, usually in agrarian societies, as well as in classical times. (Aristotle's discussion of class in the *Politics* is focused on the agrarian struggles of the landed debtors and their creditors, and the original meaning of the Latin word *proletariat* was "without land or property.") The second is labor markets, in which individuals sell their labor power to others. And the third is commodity markets of goods and services: of producers and consumers, of landlords and tenants, of professionals and clients. For Weber, the different kinds of market relations, at different historical times, defined different *kinds* of economic classes.

And the third major distinction would be the idea of *social class*. This might involve *rank*, as a formal set of distinctions, which one can see in the *chiny* (or ladder) system instituted by Ivan Grodny in Russia, or the informal distinction between gentlemen and commoners in nineteenth-century England. Or a different dimension would be *prestige*, based on social evaluations of "old families," or the ranking of occupations in modern society. And a third would be *life-style*, in the sense that Veblen used the term, wherein emulation becomes the basis of higher or lower rank in the social hierarchy.

class makes strong sense to the extent that "civil society" predominates as a social form. But in contemporary times, we have seen the re-emergence of the State as the dominant social unit of political society, and the State, given the compulsion to formulate an interest over and above any single set of interests, to think of the "national interest," or the "system as a whole," is not necessarily a tool of any specific class. In fact, to the extent that a society is a political democracy, the State is in the double bind of being an *arena*, where the competitive play of interests takes place (as against the economic divisions within the market or private enterprise), and also a *directive force*, having to forge policies for the society as a whole.

With the emergence of State-directed societies, the idea of class becomes less and less relevant. I have sought (in my book on postindustrial society, and in the essay on "The New Class") to revive the term *situs* (from the Latin, meaning location), to emphasize the competitive "vertical orders." In the Communist world, these *situses* are the governmental bureaucracy, the military, the factory managers, the collective farm heads, the cultural watchdogs, as units competing for power and privilege. In the Western world, particularly as postindustrial areas expand, while the professional and technical classes may divide into what I have called *estates*—scientific, applied engineering, administrative, and cultural—it is not likely that these estates would share a sufficient set of interests to cohere as a class; but that the major structural units of society would be the *institutional situses* in which these professionals would be distributed: corporations, the military, governmental agencies, social-educational complexes, and the like.

In a different respect, the emphasis on class has until recently overshadowed the understanding of what is today loosely called ethnicity—national, cultural, linguistic, religious, communal, tribal, or primordial attachments. In the nineteenth century, as I point out in the essay on "National Character Revisited," a large number of influential thinkers regarded race (meaning simply peoples, or those of "common blood" or "common descent") as the primary source of attachments and divisions in society. Moses Hess, who converted Friedrich Engels to communism and who was one of the original triad in the birth of Marxism (given both the dialectic and the trinity it stands to reason that *ur-Marxism* had a triad), broke with Marx on that issue and, in his prescient *Rome and Jerusalem* (1862), one of the first "Zionist" tracts, argued that the race struggle is first and the class struggle secondary—a point that is particularly apposite to the Middle East today. But given the intensity of the labor struggles in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the growth of the mass socialist parties in Western Europe, and the victory of Bolshevism in Russia, the idea of class became predominant—particularly with its view of the ultimate, if not inevitable, victory of the proletariat.

Today that emphasis on class has diminished. One factor has been the shrinkage in Western societies of the industrial working class, the traditional proletariat, though a number of neo-Marxist theorists argue that the white-collar classes, lacking autonomy in their jobs, will be proletarianized.

A second has been the argument, first proposed by Ralf Dahrendorf, that the labor question has become "encapsulated," and can no longer be generalized to become the polarizing division in modern society.

The other aspect has been the resurgence of ethnicity. One can look at it in two ways. First, almost all societies in the world today, with the exception of Japan, Sweden, and one or two smaller countries, are "plural societies," in that there are huge admixtures of crosscutting "ethnic" groups which are competitive with each other on ethnic rather than class lines.* One can see this in Canada, Belgium, northern Ireland, as well as most African societies. Second, the centrality of the *political* arena, rather than the *market*, as the allocator of reward and privilege forces each group in the society to organize on political lines in order to hold or gain relative advantage. In effect, ethnicity has become politically "salient"—this is the argument I make in the essay in this volume—though I am fearful of some of the consequences of this new, highly emotional divisiveness.

The further, more striking fact is that ethnicity, and history, and traditional power rivalries have a larger explanatory range than Marxism and class in understanding the bewildering conflicts between the Soviet Union and China, between China and Vietnam, and between Vietnam and Cambodia. The paradox is that Marxism, as a conceptual set of ideas, is of least use in explaining the internal structures and the national conflicts of the Communist states themselves.

A persistent concern of most sociologists (is it our culture of narcissism?) has been the role of the intellectuals. Curiously, in the hundred years of writing on the subject there has been little agreement on terms. For Edward Shils (as earlier for Julien Benda), the function of the intellectual (if he is to be concerned with intellect, and therefore with scholarship) is to be the moral guardian of the society, maintaining the continuity of tradition and of disinterested truth, and to be above political battle. For S. M. Lipset, the intellectual, because he is creative, necessarily innovates and is a force for change in the society. A diffuse left-wing tradition, drawing upon the Russian origins of the term *intelligentsia*, sees the intellectual as critic, or rebel against society. (The confusion is compounded in the Soviet Union today since the term *intelligentsia* is used as a census category to denote all non-manual, or "mental," work.) A counter-left-wing tradition, going back to Bakunin and the anarcho-syndicalist Waclaw Machajski, sees the intellectuals as a group using the working class primarily as a tool in order to put itself into power as a new class. This idea was revived by Milovan Djilas, in his book *The New Class* (1957), to designate the altered character of the Soviet regime.

*The very fact that Japan is a homogeneous society (though it has a pariah class of its own, the *burakamin*) makes it easier for that society to reach consensus and practice group solidarity—the factors that sociologists such as Ezra Vogel point to as accounting for much of Japan's economic success. But that very homogeneity, which is often overlooked in the preachments of management consultants to American enterprise to copy Japanese methods, makes it difficult to apply the Japanese style in our diverse society.

In a piquant twist, Irving Kristol has in recent years used the term "The New Class" to designate that sector of the educated classes—primarily in the universities, the media, and the government agencies—which is hostile to the business ethos and which favors the expansion of government because it is the means of exercising its own power in society. And almost twenty years ago C. Wright Mills, in a famous "Letter to the New Left," wrote off the workers and peasantry as a force for social change in the advanced industrial societies, and assigned this role to the students and the intellectuals—a theme that has been revived most recently in the *theses* of Alvin Gouldner, for whom Marxism is the "false consciousness" of the intelligentsia!

All of these debates have taken place on what may be called the "ideological" level. On the occupational-structural level, we have seen the expansion of the professional and technical classes in the society; in the United States today, these groups now comprise almost 25 percent of the labor force; they are concentrated in engineering, teaching, and the health fields—though the managerial and administrative classes have expanded hugely as well. Thirty-five years ago, following the lead of Berle and Means, who had argued that ownership of property had become less meaningful than managerial control, James Burnham wrote *The Managerial Revolution*, arguing that this sweeping change would be true of *all* Western societies. For Burnham, World War II—the conflict between Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and the United States—was not a war of democracy against fascism, but the *first war* between the managerial societies, as World War I had been the last war between the capitalist countries. In the time since Burnham wrote, we have seen the expansion of what J. K. Galbraith has called the "techno-structure" of business and society, the expansion of what Ralf Dahrendorf (following Karl Renner) has called the "service class" of the society (meaning not *services*, but the bureaucrats, managers, administrators, the "service class" of public and private organizations), and the enlargement of the sectors that I have called postindustrial.

How does one make sense of, or order, these complex developments? The essays in this book undertake such an effort. The essay on "Veblen and the Technocrats" traces some of the first ideas of the role of the *technicians* as men who would wield power in a syndicalist or corporate society. The essay on "The 'Intelligentsia' in American Society" tries to deal with the conflicting ideological and moral roles assigned to the intellectuals—and includes, as well, an extended discussion of the "New York Jewish Intellectuals." The short essay on C. Wright Mills, entitled "Vulgar Sociology," takes issue with the simplisms of Mills's equation-and-convergence theory. And the long essay on "The New Class: A Muddled Concept" seeks to make a set of distinctions about the different kinds of intellectuals in the society and to examine the problem on the structural and cultural levels.

The final group of essays I have entitled "Culture and Beliefs." They are more personal than any of the other essays. They deal, in one way, with the tension of the *parochial* and the *universal* which confronts any sentient indi-

vidual in a society, but especially the Jewish intellectual who, by his very history, is deracinated. In the larger context, they deal with the problem of the antinomian self and "the Law," (or, in Hebrew, that of *Halakha*, which is translated as "the commandments" but also as "the Way").

The antinomian individual, in modern times, appears with the Protestant Reformation. Antinomianism is the assertion of the conscience of the individual against institutions (the Church) or the Law. It is the basis of individualism. It is also the basis of the "self" that becomes unrestrained and seeks the lineaments of its own desires as the touchstone of sensibility and even of moral judgments.

The burdens of the Law are always evident. They are constricting. The Law is used by institutional authority to protect its own privileges. And the Law can be arbitrary, unreachable, or unfathomable—as Kafka's parables make painfully clear.

But antinomianism, too, has become problematic—if not more so than the burdens of the Law. Antinomianism is quick to defend heresy at any cost, on the presumption that heresy must be right and orthodoxy wrong. (In doing so, it makes the error of confusing orthodoxy, which means "right reason," with conformity. When heresy becomes *a la mode*, orthodoxy, paradoxically, is the stronger standpoint for criticism of society.) Antinomianism sanctions all forms of challenge and experiment, so that in the end, nothing is sacred. Antinomianism (as I seek to point out in the essay "Beyond Modernism, Beyond Self") exhausts itself in the search for novelty, and finally comes to fear the boredom and isolation of a life given over to the unrestrained self. Is it not a paradox that the term critics have used to describe the loss of community in modern society, *anomie* or a *nomos*—without law, or without restraint—has the same source as *antinomian*?

"The Winding Passage," as the reader may know, comes at the end of a long journey; it is the movement out of the netherworld to the fires of redemption. To get there, one has had to descend through nine circles, each of which exhibits the dark side of the nature of man. In this descent, there is a puzzle which each reader must solve for himself. For Dante, who is the *vade mecum* in this voyage, the first five circles—Limbo, Lust, Gluttony, Avarice, and Prodigality—form the upper Hell, the first of three main divisions, which is called Incontinence or Concupiscence. The two lower parts of Hell are the seventh level, Violence, and the eighth level, Fraud, leading to the ninth, or the winding passage itself.

The sixth circle is Heresy, but Heresy, a plateau in the stages of descent, stands apart from the three main divisions of Incontinence, Violence, and Fraud. And while Dante and Virgil, as they leave each circle, move to the left, only after the sixth circle do they go *a la man destra si fu volto*, turning to the right. "It is particularly striking," Professor Charles Singleton writes in his detailed explication of the text, "because the two wayfarers have always turned to the left," and, with one other minor exception, "will continue to do so."