

PATTERNS OF PEACEMAKING

by

DAVID THOMSON, Ph.D. (Camb.)

RESEARCH FELLOW, SIDNEY SUSSEX COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

E. MEYER, Dr. Rer. Pol.

and

A. BRIGGS, M.A. (Camb.), B.Sc., Econ. (London)

FELLOW OF WORCESTER COLLEGE, OXFORD

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“ It is becoming more and more clear that the peaceful order we hope to set up is not something that will spring quite suddenly out of a large conference. It will depend on the thought and work put into it before the war is over.

The meeting at Dumbarton Oaks should, therefore, be seen as part of a pattern of peace. The work was begun at Hot Springs and went on to Atlantic City and Bretton Woods. More meetings of the kind will be necessary as the pattern grows. But this is the right way to go to work.”

(*Lord Halifax*, broadcasting to the people of the United States,
on August 26, 1944.)

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**PATTERNS
OF PEACEMAKING**

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PREFACE

This book began, at the end of 1943, as an attempt to make a systematic survey and analysis, as objective as possible, of the tendencies most likely to govern peacemaking. The authors intended to avoid making any specific recommendations of their own as to how the labours of peacemaking should be undertaken, and to confine themselves to a study of how they were likely to be undertaken in the light of past experience, contemporary proposals, and the present alignment of political powers in the world. But in the process of study, discussion and writing, all three authors arrived at certain more definite conclusions. At the same time, the course of events and the increasingly clear trend of official policies seemed to justify more positive assertions and more constructive suggestions than had at first been thought possible. The book, therefore, takes its present hybrid form : of systematic analysis carried forward to certain statements and even recommendations. It is hoped that it has gained and not lost thereby : and that no conclusions have been pressed further than both the analysis and events themselves justify. If these hopes be realized, the book may be more than a mere record of the movement of opinion during the closing phases of the Second World War.

It has been found convenient to use certain words which have acquired well-established usage in political and sociological writing : such as " patterns of settlement ", " climate of opinion ", " utopian ideas ", and the rest. The authors realize both the dangers and the temptations of such metaphors and jargon. But they have tried to give them precise and consistent meanings, and to avoid their abuse. Their justification is the difficulty of finding terms which more scientifically describe the conceptions involved.

There are very obvious difficulties and handicaps in the writing of such a book amid the tempo of modern affairs. To keep pace perfectly with events, and to avoid being out of date even before publication, is a superhuman labour worthy of Sisyphus. To devote equal attention to the background of peacemaking in Great Britain, the United States, Soviet Russia, and all the other members of the United Nations would lead to a book of intolerable bulk : therefore the spotlight has been focused more

on Great Britain than on any other. The authors dare not hope to have succeeded in every detail. But it is hoped that the approach has been broad enough, the method objective enough, to make the book not entirely worthless after that time-lag between writing and publication which is now inevitable for even the kindest and most efficient of publishers. A postscript does something to alleviate this difficulty.

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PATTERNS OF PEACEMAKING

INTRODUCTION

GETTING WHAT WE WANT

The victory of the United Nations over the forces of tyranny in Europe and Asia brings to all believers in the ideas and ideals of democracy the opportunity and the duty of restating those ideals in terms most appropriate to our own times. There is everywhere the determination to give them new and more effective expression than after the last world war. Two tremendous questions loom ahead. What sort of New Order do we want? And how should we set about getting it?

Much has been said and written about the first of these questions. Less has been heard of the second. But behind public discussion of both there lies, in the heart of the ordinary citizen, the haunting, cynical suspicion that he heard once before about a "war to end war", the building of "homes fit for heroes", and the creation of a "brave new world". The high hopes of 1918 turned to ashes within twenty years, and from these ashes sprang the blazing, gesticulating Phoenix of the second world war. There lurks in the minds of our people the suspicion that the Phoenix is not such a *rara avis* after all: that from the rubble of London, Rotterdam and Warsaw, from the ashes of Stalingrad, Naples and Aachen, there may arise another Phoenix which is again not of their choosing. The disillusionment of the 1930's has not been forgotten. But if it be not dispelled, it may itself frustrate our present aspirations and paralyse our most strenuous efforts to make lasting peace.

This fear and suspicion find rational expression in the argument that one war leads to another. There is, indeed, a real sense in which the causes of wars are previous wars. There is a strand of direct cause and effect between Bismarck's wars which reached their climax in 1870 and the war of 1914: a strand which carries through to the war of 1939. The determination of Frenchmen to reverse the results of 1870 and to recover the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine was matched by the resolve of Bismarck and his successors to keep France isolated in Europe.

The interaction of these two policies produced the system of Great Alliances. The tensions and terrors induced by the Alliance system led to feverish competition in armaments, which bred still further fear and still more frantic friendships. The conviction that no nation could afford to lose its friends tied the more reluctant nations to the chariots of the more aggressive. When the edge of the precipice was reached in 1914, all were dragged down together into the first world war.

The victorious Powers imposed on Europe the pattern of peace calculated to be most favourable to themselves. Territorially it was a pattern in which a range of buffer-states was raised in the eastern marchlands of Europe against the new and mysterious menace of Bolshevism; devised so as to serve the double purpose of encircling Germany, too, in the south-east, and linking up with France as the chief counter-weight to Germany in the west. This pattern was imposed with all the idealism generated by President Wilson's conception of the sacred national right of self-determination, and with all the realism derived from Clemenceau's resolve to guarantee France against resurgence of the Power from which he had just wrested Alsace and Lorraine. The mingled elements of idealism and realism were carried over into the policies of the various Powers towards the new-born League of Nations. To some it was the universal application of democratic principles: to others, a convenient means of preserving the fruits of victory: to others again, it was the symbol of national humiliation or neglected claims. From this medley of motives arose that broad division of Powers into "revisionist" and "anti-revisionist" States—called somewhat inaccurately the "Have-nots" and the "Haves". From this division was born the present conflict.

These undeniable elements of continuity have led many to speak of this war as the continuation of the last. Field-Marshal Smuts has described the years since 1914 as a "Thirty Years' War", and it has become common to speak of the inter-war years as the "twenty years' truce". Yet it would be wrong to regard this chain of cause and effect as in any way inevitable. There are such strands in the rope of connection and causation, but they are not the only strands. There were points between the two wars, as there had been many points in 1919, when the links of cause and effect could have been broken, and the whole trend of events given a quite different twist. It is arguable that even as late as 1936, when Hitler laid the necessary basis for all

his later aggressions by occupying and remilitarizing the Rhineland in violation of the Treaty of Versailles, the power of Nazism could have been broken if France and Britain had acted together with decision and vigour. Certainly before 1936 greater wisdom and clear-sightedness might at many moments have altered the whole course of history. Mr. Churchill owed his immense prestige in 1940 to popular recognition that he had consistently urged a wiser policy at many of these moments. American readiness to break one of the strongest conventions of their Constitution and to re-elect President Roosevelt for a third term came largely from realization that he, too, had foreseen the menace, and had laboured to forewarn and forearm his country against it. Even basic imperfections in the machinery of the League did not determine its failure. As Mr. Robert Dell, one of the severest critics of the League, has remarked :

If all the States members of the League, and in particular the Great Powers, had been willing to fulfil their obligations under the Covenant as it stands, the League would have been quite able to check aggression or stop it when it occurred.¹

Unless the possibilities of a different development are fully appreciated and generally understood by public opinion ; unless men recover belief in their chance to choose and faith in their capacity to guide their own destiny in these things ; unless all feelings of fatalism and helplessness are destroyed, there lies ahead nothing but drift into another series of wars, which even the most wise and equitable of peace-settlements can do little to prevent.

What has been shaken is not popular confidence in the possibility of brilliant statesmanship or skilful improvisation—there have been plenty of examples of both. Nor is it faith in the values and virtues of democratic forms of government, nor the vision of what is most to be desired from the return of peace. The ideals set forth in the Atlantic Charter and in the speeches of leading statesmen from all the United Nations have won a large measure of agreement. The choice of means by which these ends must be sought naturally remain more in dispute : though already, in instruments such as the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942, the Lend-Lease arrangements, and the Moscow Agreements of November, 1943, there are signs of very substantial agreement even here. What has been shaken most fundamentally is the optimistic nineteenth-century assumption that the develop-

¹ Robert Dell : *The Geneva Racket, 1920-1939* (1941), p. 318.

ment of scientific knowledge—in the social no less than in the natural sciences—enables men by the light of their own reason and ingenuity to dictate to fate. We have learned, to our cost, that our ability to create a Frankenstein is vastly greater than our capacity to control it. The fatality of the last peace breeds fatalism about the next.

Although we of the twentieth century are adults in the art of producing wealth and of waging war, we are still as children in the art of utilizing wealth and of making peace. We have shown immense energy, resourcefulness and enterprise in developing the technique of production and warfare. By the use of advanced scientific research-methods, of subtle economic inventiveness, skilled administration and management, and new forms of social and political organization, we have evolved entirely new means for generating, accumulating and concentrating power. In warfare the forces of freedom and democracy have fortunately shown themselves superior to the forces of tyranny and dictatorship in the adoption and adaptation of these methods for the defence and promotion of their own ideals. The possibility of peace depends upon the triumph of these forces of freedom. But it depends, too, upon the capacity of democrats for showing the same resourcefulness, ingenuity and resolve in tackling the problems not only of warfare, but of welfare: not only of imposing our will on the enemy, but also of imposing our will on events.

Our most urgent need, in short, is to study the technique of peacemaking. Before that can even be started, we must examine with what justification there lurks the suspicion that it is almost impossible for us to "get what we want" out of a peace-settlement. If that remains in doubt, then all else is in vain. Nor can the doubt be easily dispelled. Recent experience casts too dark a shadow. Professor H. N. Fieldhouse has put the facts in a nutshell:

Our one agreed aim in 1914 was to break German militarism. It was no part of our original intention to break up the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, to create Czechoslovakia or resurrect Poland, to make a Russian revolution, to treble the size of Serbia and double that of Roumania, to create Iraq and Estonia and Lithuania and a Jewish National Home, or to give the keys of the Brenner and the Adriatic to Italy. Yet, in the outcome, all these things—and much else—sprang from the war . . . while the one thing which we promised ourselves, the destruction of German militarism, we failed to achieve.¹

¹ H. N. Fieldhouse: *Fortnightly*, June, 1940, pp. 580-1.

Decline of faith in the power of reason and resolve to mould the future takes diverse and even conflicting forms. The German crowds, bemused by the nightmare experience of dark, impersonal forces at work during the currency-crash of the 1920's and intoxicated by the hysteria of the Nazi mass-meeting, were enticed into surrendering control over their own lives into the hands of the medicine-men of dictatorship. They are one example of this tendency. The disciples of Lord Vansittart, panic-stricken with the fear of again "losing the peace" to German militarism, seek to exorcise their fears by driving out the whole German people as a scapegoat into the wilderness. They offer another example of the same tendency. For they simply invert the racial theories and superstitions of the Nazis, substituting Germans for Jews as the peculiarly perverted people who are to blame for everything. They, too, abandon hope in rational control and ignore the objective experience of earlier ages. There is nothing so much like a bump as a hollow : and both retard progress.

The nineteenth century is usually taken as the age of over-optimistic rationalism. But there is a curious time-lag between the advanced ideas of theorists and the immanent political assumptions of their own day. The idealist dialectic of Hegel and the materialist dialectic of Marx both tended to an argument of inevitability and fatalism. The writings of Darwin suggested an impersonal process at work which pre-conditioned man's life. The investigations of Freud and Jung explored the hitherto dark recesses of the subconscious and further depreciated rationality. The power of mass-suggestion and emotional propaganda made possible by inventions such as the cheap newspaper, the electrical amplifier and the radio, have let loose the irrational impulses of the mob and placed them at the disposal of the modern demagogues, who easily become demi-gods. But it has taken time for these changes to permeate habits of thought. The so-called optimistic rationalism of the nineteenth century derived in fact, by a process of delayed action, from the advanced thought of the eighteenth century. So has the pessimistic fatalism of the twentieth century derived from the advanced thought and the practical developments of the nineteenth century. Only during the last twenty-five years have the full effects of it become apparent in political behaviour. In 1918 the prevailing climate of opinion was still the doctrinaire, rationalistic liberalism of the mid-nineteenth century.

The change in the climate of opinion between 1918 and 1939 will inevitably affect the form and dynamic of a new world settlement. It is to be hoped that the most recent discoveries and methods in the natural sciences—especially in the realms of physical science and engineering—will modify the habits, methods and conceptions of the social sciences without this old, disastrous delayed action. This book starts with the belief that something at least can be done to achieve this result at the next peace settlement, and that more scientific control over men's social and political environment can be achieved.

The framework of this control can already be traced in the plans for scientific medical relief and food distribution at the end of the war. The theory of such control has already been developed by a variety of writers and thinkers who have cast overboard derelict mental apparatus and tried to think again on new lines.¹ By analysing the operative forces in society and the ideals men hold, and trying to assess their strength, they claim that "laws of social dynamics" can be stated: and that they can be stated accurately enough to give a real measure of control over transition. In short, we really can get what we want. We do not merely have to wait for "what is coming to us".

Getting what we want demands a fusion of power and purpose. It has been well said that if "purpose without power is a dream, power without purpose is a nightmare". In the building of Hitler's New Order the pursuit of power for its own sake has conditioned the social, economic, political and ideological structures of this alleged "New Order", moulding them and changing them to meet new situations. The quest for power culminated in the mastery of the continent by Nazi bands, and Hitler's world Utopia meant the wielding of power by an *élite*:

There will be a Herren-class . . . , there will be a great hierarchy of party members. There will be a new middle class. And there will be the great mass of the anonymous, the serving collective, the eternally disfranchised, no matter whether they are members of the old bourgeoisie, the big land-owning class, the working class or the artisans. . . . But beneath them there will still be the class of subject alien races. . . . In my *Ordensburgen* a youth will grow up before which the world will shrink back. A violently active, dominating, intrepid, brutal youth.²

¹ See especially, R. Niebuhr: *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (1932); E. H. Carr: *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (1939) and *Conditions of Peace* (1942); K. Mannheim: *Ideology and Utopia* (1936), *Man and Society* (1940). Cf. pp. 150 and 180, below, and Chapter V, *passim*.

² H. Rauschning: *Hitler Speaks* (1939), pp. 50, 247, etc.

Such an "ideal" is the garish, tawdry nightmare of "power without purpose" in which the citizens of occupied Europe have lived and worked during the war. And though a British, or an American, or a Russian use of "pure power" would be different in form,¹ peace based on such barren premises would hold little promise for the future, and would be a betrayal of all the individual sacrifices war has entailed.

But similarly a sense of purpose alone has proved inadequate to meet the demands of successful peacemaking.

The idealists were inclined to believe that power is immoral in itself, and that in any case history was in the process of gradually eliminating all power from politics. We were to look forward to the day when social organization of every kind would be a purely rational achievement—a result of the meeting of mind with mind. We admitted that power still had to be used, under circumstances, but we regarded its use as a temporary expedient.²

The attack on "power politics" before 1914, the campaign against secret treaties, the hatred of the holocaust between 1914 and 1918, the high hopes of world peace, did not in themselves produce a world where, to quote Mr. Day Lewis,

... Humankind stands forth
A mightier presence,
Flooded by dawn's pale courage, rapt in eve's
Rich acquiescence.³

Instead they merely left power in the hands of the unscrupulous, and allowed purpose to wither and die in face of strong men armed.

The jungle code and the hypocrite gesture?
A poppy wreath for the slain
And a cut-throat world for the living.⁴

The difficult fusion of power and purpose will be one of the central problems of the next peace: creative vision must have ordered power as its basis, if it is to be transformed into effective achievement.

* * *

Such a fusion of power and purpose can be achieved only

¹ Bertrand Russell has analysed the various forms of power, which he regards as "the fundamental concept in social science, in the same sense in which Energy is the fundamental concept in physics". See his *Power: A New Social Analysis* (1938).

² R. Niebuhr: *Power as the Instrument of Justice*: broadcast talk printed in *The Listener*, 24th June, 1943.

³ C. Day Lewis; *Word Over All* (1943). ⁴ *Ibid.*, "Will it be so again?"

against an historical setting. The pattern of peacemaking for the future must partly, at least, grow out of past patterns, if only because they have themselves done so much to mould present conditions and present conceptions. The most impressive feature of peacemaking in the past has been the enormous disparity between what the makers of peace settlements have set out to achieve and what in fact resulted from their work. The road to the present is strewn with unfulfilled intentions. But the authors have tried to show that it would be a fallacy to draw from this fact over-pessimistic conclusions about the fate of the next peace settlement. Any settlement must be the product of a particular set of historical circumstances, and the problem is how these circumstances can most perfectly be influenced and controlled so as to favour the establishment of a lasting order.

It must be constantly recognized that the final settlement which emerges from the present war will inevitably be the result of a give-and-take compromise between the most powerful forces involved—the product of several complex parallelograms of forces among which the power of governments, the pledged purpose of national leaders, the existing conditions of the world at the time of the settlement, the desires of peoples and the activities of organized pressure-groups whether religious, political or economic in character, will probably be the most decisive. Because this is recognized, the main purpose of this book is to analyse these forces, to estimate their relative strength and probable tendencies, and to suggest forms of preparation, organization and procedure which will enable these forces in combination to produce a settlement with a good chance of enduring.

The authors have been more concerned to analyse and to make suggestions than to pronounce final judgements. It is not their main purpose to trace yet another blue-print for a new world-order, nor to decide what should be the particular forms of territorial, political or economic organization to be adopted by the peacemakers. If that were already known or generally accepted, there would be little need for a peace-conference: certainly there would be no need for this book. But those existing blue-prints of most desirable patterns of peacemaking which have behind them the support of influential forces or groups will themselves be one important factor conditioning the final settlement. They therefore have to be taken into account. Accordingly, a special section of the book (Chapter V) has been devoted to analysis of the main proposals which have emerged from

contemporary discussion. It is, of course, quite unlikely that any one of these schemes will find practical expression in its entirety. But, as has been shown, they are not always incompatible with one another; and the very existence of so many schemes suggests that the final issue may be a compound of ingredients from more than one of them.

In the final interaction between historical developments pointing to certain features in the next pattern of peace, and strongly backed remedies prescribed by contemporary theory, the decisive factor will normally be yet a third force—the concrete situation in the world at the time of the peace-settlement. The whole set of circumstances prevailing during the peace-making—involving material conditions such as food-supply and transport facilities, and spiritual factors such as war-weariness, hatreds and idealistic visions, no less than the balance of political power-blocs—will act, so to speak, as the selective and sifting mesh through which more long-range tendencies and war-time aspirations must pass before they play a decisive rôle in the new pattern. Therefore these, too, have been estimated and described with as much regard for probability as present knowledge allows: and Chapter VI has been devoted to this task. The “growing pattern” of peacemaking machinery which has been evolved step by step during war is the vital link between war and peace: it is described in Chapter VII. The four main typical patterns which seem most likely to emerge from this complex and only partially calculable process have been defined in Chapter VIII. Of the four, the pattern of a revised League of Nations has emerged during the last phases of the war as the most generally favoured solution, although it will no doubt be supplemented by various forms of functional machinery. It is evident, too, that the four patterns described are distinct only in logical content and not in practical application. Perhaps the most durable settlement would be compounded of a judicious selection of certain ingredients from all four.

Although the broad division is between the “technique” and the “substance” of peacemaking, it is a central thesis of the whole argument that ends and means are vitally interconnected. Technique and method of procedure are as important for peacemakers as a clear vision of probable and desirable ends: and most important of all is the relation between ends and means. On the one hand the substance of the settlement must be largely conditioned and determined by the method of arriving at the