
# Albert Einstein



The Special and the General Theory



A Popular Exposition by ALBERT EINSTEIN



Authorised Translation by ROBERT W. LAWSON

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
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#### PREFACE

HE present book is intended, as far as possible, to give an exact insight into the theory of Relativity to those readers who, from a general scientific and philosophical point of view, are interested in the theory, but who are not conversant with the mathematical apparatus of theoretical physics. The work presumes a standard of education corresponding to that of a university matriculation examination, and, despite the shortness of the book, a fair amount of patience and force of will on the part of the reader. The author has spared himself no pains in his endeavour to present the main ideas in the simplest and most intelligible form, and on the whole, in the sequence and connection in which they actually originated. In the interest of clearness, it appeared to me inevitable that I should repeat myself frequently, without paying the slightest attention to the elegance of the presentation. I adhered scrupulously to the precept of that brilliant theoretical physicist L. Boltzmann, according to whom matters of elegance ought to be left to the tailor and to the cobbler. I make no pretence of having withheld

from the reader difficulties which are inherent to the subject. On the other hand, I have purposely treated the empitical physical foundations of the theory in a "step-motherly" fashion, so that readers unfamiliar with physics may not feel like the wanderer who was unable to see the forest for trees. May the book bring some one a few happy hours of suggestive thought!

December, 1916


A. EINSTEIN

# NOTE TO THE FIFTEENTH EDITION

In this edition I have added, as a fifth appendix, a presentation of my views on the problem of space in general and on the gradual modifications of our ideas on space resulting from the influence of the relativistic view-point. I wished to show that space-time is not necessarily something to which one can ascribe a separate existence, independently of the actual objects of physical reality. Physical objects are not in space, but these objects are spatially extended. In this way the concept "empty space" loses its meaning.

June 9th, 1952

A. EINSTEIN



Drawn by Hermann Struck

# THE SPECIAL AND THE GENERAL THEORY

#### CONTENTS

#### PART I

#### THE SPECIAL THEORY OF RELATIVITY

		PAGE
I. Physical Meaning of Geometrical Propositions	s.	1
II. The System of Co-ordinates		5
III. Space and Time in Classical Mechanics .		9
IV. The Galileian System of Co-ordinates .		11
V. The Principle of Relativity (in the Restrict Sense)	cted.	12
VI. The Theorem of the Addition of Velocities ployed in Classical Mechanics .	em-	16
VII. The Apparent Incompatibility of the Law Propagation of Light with the Principle Relativity		17
VIII. On the Idea of Time in Physics		21
IX. The Relativity of Simultaneity		25
X. On the Relativity of the Conception of Dista	nce	28
$XI. \ The \ Lorentz \ Transformation$		30
XII. The Behaviour of Measuring-Rods and Clo	ocks	
in Motion		35

#### CONTENTS

	PAGE
XIII. Theorem of the Addition of Velocities. The Experiment of Fizeau	38
XIV. The Heuristic Value of the Theory of Relativity	42
XV. General Results of the Theory	44
XVI. Experience and the Special Theory of Relativity	49
XVII. Minkowski's Four-dimensional Space	55
PART II	
THE GENERAL THEORY OF RELATIVITY	
XVIII. Special and General Principle of Relativity .	59
XIX. The Gravitational Field	63
XX. The Equality of Inertial and Gravitational Mass as an Argument for the General Postulate of Relativity	66
XXI. In what Respects are the Foundations of Classical Mechanics and of the Special Theory of Relativity unsatisfactory?	71
XXII. A Few Inferences from the General Principle of	•
Relativity	74
XXIII. Behaviour of Clocks and Measuring-Rods on a Rotating Body of Reference	79
XXIV. Euclidean and non-Euclidean Continuum .	83
XXV. Gaussian Co-ordinates	87
The state of the s	-,
XXVI. The Space-time Continuum of the Special Theory of Relativity considered as a	
Euclidean Continuum	91

	CON	TEN	TS			i	x
		_			_	PAC	GE
•	of R			of the ot a E		ın	
Contin		•	•		•		3
XXVIII. Exact Form		n of th	e Gen	eral Pri •	nciple .		7
XXIX. The Solution the B	asis of			Gravit		on of . 10	00
	PA	RT I	II				
CONSIDERA		ON T		UNIVE	RSE		
XXX. Cosmologica	al Diffi	culties	of N	ewton's	Theor	у 10	5
XXXI. The Possib bounder				and ye	et "Ui	n- . 10	8
XXXII. The Struc Genera					to th	ne . 11	3
							•
	APPE	NDI	CES				
I. Simple Derivation	of the	Lorent	tz Trai	isforma	tion	. 11	5
II. Minkowski's Four					rld'')		
[Supplemen	tary to	Section	on XV	[[.]		. 12	I
III. The Experimental		nation	of the	General	l Theor	•	
of Relativit	-				•	. 12	-
(a) Motion of (b) Deflection				-		. 12	•
(c) Displacement	_						O
Red		·				. 12	9
IV. The Structure of	Space	[Supp	lement	ary to	Sectio	n	
XXXII]		•		•		. 13	3
V. Relativity and the	Proble	m of S	pace	•		. 13	5
BIBLIOGRAPHY .						. 15	9
INDEX						. 16	I

#### PARTI

#### THE SPECIAL THEORY OF RELATIVITY

Ι

## PHYSICAL MEANING OF GEOMETRICAL PROPOSITIONS

In your schooldays most of you who read this book made acquaintance with the noble building of Euclid's geometry, and you remember—perhaps with more respect than love—the magnificent structure, on the lofty staircase of which you were chased about for uncounted hours by conscientious teachers. By reason of your past experience, you would certainly regard everyone with disdain who should pronounce even the most out-of-the-way proposition of this science to be untrue. But perhaps this feeling of proud certainty would leave you immediately if some one were to ask you: "What, then, do you mean by the assertion that these propositions are true?" Let us proceed to give this question a little consideration.

Geometry sets out from certain conceptions such as "plane," "point," and "straight line," with which

#### 2 SPECIAL THEORY OF RELATIVITY

we are able to associate more or less definite ideas, and from certain simple propositions (axioms) which, in virtue of these ideas, we are inclined to accept as "true." Then, on the basis of a logical process, the justification of which we feel ourselves compelled to admit, all remaining propositions are shown to follow from those axioms, i.e. they are proven. A proposition is then correct (" true ") when it has been derived in the recognised manner from the axioms. The question of the "truth" of the individual geometrical propositions is thus reduced to one of the "truth" of the axioms. Now it has long been known that the last question is not only unanswerable by the methods of geometry, but that it is in itself entirely without meaning. We cannot ask whether it is true that only one straight line goes through two points. We can only say that Euclidean geometry deals with things called "straight lines," to each of which is ascribed the property of being uniquely determined by two points situated on it. The concept "true" does not tally with the assertions of pure geometry, because by the word "true" we are eventually in the habit of designating always the correspondence with a "real" object: geometry, however, is not concerned with the relation of the ideas involved in it to objects of experience, but only with the logical connection of these ideas among themselves.

It is not difficult to understand why, in spite of this, we feel constrained to call the propositions of geometry "true." Geometrical ideas correspond to more or less exact objects in nature, and these last are undoubtedly the exclusive cause of the genesis of those ideas. Geometry ought to refrain from such a course, in order to

give to its structure the largest possible logical unity. The practice, for example, of seeing in a "distance" two marked positions on a practically rigid body is something which is lodged deeply in our habit of thought. We are accustomed further to regard three points as being situated on a straight line, if their apparent positions can be made to coincide for observation with one eye, under suitable choice of our place of observation.

If, in pursuance of our habit of thought, we now supplement the propositions of Euclidean geometry by the single proposition that two points on a practically rigid body always correspond to the same distance (line-interval), independently of any changes in position to which we may subject the body, the propositions of Euclidean geometry then resolve themselves into propositions on the possible relative position of practically rigid bodies.1 Geometry which has been supplemented in this way is then to be treated as a branch of physics. We can now legitimately ask as to the "truth" of geometrical propositions interpreted in this way, since we are justified in asking whether these propositions are satisfied for those real things we have associated with the geometrical ideas. In less exact terms we can express this by saying that by the "truth" of a geometrical proposition in this sense we understand its validity for a construction with ruler and compasses.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> It follows that a natural object is associated also with a straight line. Three points A, B and C on a rigid body thus lie in a straight line when, the points A and C being given, B is chosen such that the sum of the distances AB and BC is as short as possible. This incomplete suggestion will suffice for our present purpose.

#### 4 SPECIAL THEORY OF RELATIVITY

Of course the conviction of the "truth" of geometrical propositions in this sense is founded exclusively on rather incomplete experience. For the present we shall assume the "truth" of the geometrical propositions, then at a later stage (in the general theory of relativity) we shall see that this "truth" is limited, and we shall consider the extent of its limitation.

#### THE SYSTEM OF CO-ORDINATES

N the basis of the physical interpretation of distance which has been indicated, we are also in a position to establish the distance between two points on a rigid body by means of measurements. For this purpose we require a "distance" (rod S) which is to be used once and for all, and which we employ as a standard measure. If, now, A and B are two points on a rigid body, we can construct the line joining them according to the rules of geometry; then, starting from A, we can mark off the distance S time after time until we reach B. The number of these operations required is the numerical measure of the distance AB. This is the basis of all measurement of length.

Every description of the scene of an event or of the position of an object in space is based on the specification of the point on a rigid body (body of reference) with which that event or object coincides. This applies not only to scientific description, but also to everyday life. If I analyse the place specification "Trafalgar

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Here we have assumed that there is nothing left over, i.s. that the measurement gives a whole number. This difficulty is got over by the use of divided measuring-rods, the introduction of which does not demand any fundamentally new method.