

*The History  
of the  
Filipino  
People*

# TADHANA

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## PREFACE

This book, Part Two of Volume Two, covers the years from 1663 to 1765 and examines the reactions which gave this period its peculiar character. Prior to this period, of course, in the years of the "Encounter" which was the subject of Part One, Filipinos had reacted in a variety of ways to the Spanish presence, notably by means of our early revolts. In this present period, however, the reactions have become more pronounced and complex; they now also take place on firmer ground. Native resistance has grown to regional level; and revolts on this broader scale begin to be consciously harmonized by their leaders. A segment of the *principalía* becomes increasingly involved, giving resistance the benefit of sound conception and direction. Uprising, however, is not the only form of reaction. Even more significant at this time is the process of acculturation, the blending of ways as Spanish, native and Chinese mingle and compete.

"Reaction" takes place on a scene upon which are laid out the effects of other historical forces. The withdrawal of Spanish troops from Zamboanga and other points in 1663 has revealed the uncertain condition of the colonial state, itself the result of Spain's imperial decline. By now, the Philippines is the only Spanish base in all of Asia, since the imperial will can no longer match the vigor evident in the rise of the Manchus in China and the Tokugawa dynasty in Japan. On the other hand, the religious in the Philippines now demonstrate a hefty verve and a resolute will to superintend the life of the colony. The friar's presence is felt more than the soldier's, or even the bureaucrat's. In Manila, the religious are active, even eminent, in the galleon trade and the *obras pías*. In the rural areas, they wield political power, dominating even the *alcalde*, and through the *haciendas* also control the economy. The archipelago in this period is an *almacén de la fé*, a warehouse which holds a vast treasure of faith and commodities, both for the sustenance of the land and its colonizers.

Native and Spaniard alike react to all this, each in his own way.

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## Introduction

# THE PHILIPPINES IN A CENTURY OF ABSOLUTISM

**I**N HER PROUD century of power and fame, her *siglo de oro* inaugurated by Isabela and Columbus, lands and people fell before the wild conquering spirit of Spain. Less than a hundred years more afterwards, greatness would slip out of Spain's life to take its place in the memory of a fast changing world.

But pride and the sense of grandeur would linger.

In Spain itself, the memory of power and fame spawned generations of men enveloped in a mist of *hidalguía*, "grandeess" true and false who treasured pomp and scorned work. Their fantasies about an opulent life filled with comfort and ceremony would usher in, as successor to Spain's glorious sixteenth, a century of stagnation and decay.

In the colonies, Spaniards retrieved their lost glory by accentuating the gap between their race and the insignificant *Indio*.

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Defeated in the battlefields of Europe, challenged by younger rivals in power and commerce, Spaniards in their colonies walked among the natives with stern and superior bearing and dealt cruelly with their pleas and grievances.

Largely, it was a period characterized by the fall of excellence.

The martial will and imperial spirit were gone. The vessels that crossed the oceans from the ports of the monarchy no longer transported fierce and noble soldiers in search of war and conquest. In their places came mendicants and criminals, refugees from the poverty and inflation of an unproductive country, who metamorphosed under the spell of delusion into fine Castilians. Even the spoor of missionaries in quest of souls to save had been obliterated by the heavy tread of common adventurers; now seminarians from "the lower classes" beat a new trail to the colonies in search of their own salvation from a harsh and unpromising economy in the motherland.

A peasant quality crept into the public affairs of the dwindling empire, perhaps inevitably, for peasants in swelling processions dragged themselves from the countryside, recoiling from undignified and humiliating labor, to populate the cities in search of rank, title and opportunity. But while this exodus of common men diluted the substance of imperial administration, in the church it failed to coarsen the spirit and vision which had through decades permeated the missionary life. Able to reconcile faith and ambition, evangelists combined the interests of conversion and colonization in their labors. Thus the task of conversion developed a momentum and a breadth of its own, in time more prominently than the state could apply itself to the tasks of sovereignty. Indeed, in Spain and Portugal alike, the possibilities for imperial expansion could no longer match the still growing vision of the unceasingly militant Church.

By the middle of the seventeenth century both Iberian powers had ceased to rule the waves. Now past their prime, only able now to reminisce over their vanished glory, Spain and Portugal began to lose out to stronger and more resolute competitors in the contest for colonies and trade. When Spain withdrew from the Moluccas, once a Portuguese colony, she would never again gather the will to return there in force. For almost instantly after her troops turned their back on their Ternatan garrison, the



*Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* moved in to take possession gradually of what the Hollanders for so long would call their "Dutch East Indies," the lands of the present Indonesian Republic.

It was from Ternate that Francisco Serrano had written his former companion-in-arms in Malacca, Ferdinand Magellan, to join him in the Spice Islands, "a new world, richer and greater than that of Vasco de Gama." And Magellan, determined to rejoin his friend in Ternate "if not by Portugal, by another way," was in fact rushing there through the Spanish route across the Pacific when Lapulapu stopped him short in the island of Mactan. Each national history, it would seem, responds indeed to a rhythm of its own. For, despite the combined will of the sister Iberian empires and its previous prehispanic contacts with Filipino kingdoms in the Visayas and Mindanao, Ternate quite clearly followed the beat of Indonesian history, particularly now as this accelerated in contact with the challenge of Dutch mercantile expansion.

The withdrawal from Ternate, in a sense, also ended the age of epic explorers that Magellan had brought to its apogee with his circumnavigation of the globe. The world now belonged to great rulers, all autocrats in the category of Spain's Philip II. But Europe's prime autocrat was now the "sun-king" Louis XIV, the state himself, whose rays were cast upon an entire continent where his fellow autocrats were only too eager to apply his divine-right precepts for the better management of their subjects. No less an absolute monarch, Peter the Great of Russia was probably the first of the "enlightened despots" to force his nation into the mould of a modern state, an empire with dominions not across the seas, but within the continent itself. Although he created a Russian navy from almost nothing in emulation of the West, his country was as yet no more a maritime power than its perennial rival Austria, whose Emperor Leopold I had likewise begun to recast into his *Gesamtstaat* all the non-German nationalities in his dominion. In this sense, both autocrats were akin to their contemporaries Aurangzeb of India and the K'ang Hsi emperor of China, who were, however, at the head of foreign conquerors whose ethnic personalities would not long survive cultural absorption by the very peoples they had subdued.

The Manchus and Mughals, like the Ottomans, whose sway over parts of Europe was even then in the process of receding



as a result of combined pressures from Austria, Hungary and Russia, were within the pattern of Asian continental history, since they differed from the ruling élites of Russia and Austria, whose power was focused on their own homelands. Yet all were absolute rulers over land empires, at a time when the moving forces of history lay in the seas.

Only one absolutist monarchy in fact contested world power with Spain and Portugal. This was France, for both England and Holland were evolving state systems which allowed increasing power to a middle class of merchants and gentry. Holland, the smallest both in area and population was, however, the most dynamic in the drive to destroy Iberian trade in Asia as well as in Africa and America. Nonetheless, the French and the English pursued the same goal with equal ardor, first as "pious pirates" and eventually as true merchants.

England's naval power under the great Elizabeth had in fact been the achievement of sea dogs like Sir Francis Drake, Sir Thomas Cavendish, and Sir Martin Frobisher—to the extent that the destruction of the Great Armada, which ushered in the decline of Philip II's empire, has often been attributed to their valor. This was not exactly true, of course, for bad weather, insufficient Spanish preparation and incompetent admirals were as much to blame for the catastrophe. In any case, the British had persisted in their pious political piracy, finding it irresistible to wage their subsequent trade war against Spain in the same buccaneering fashion. The most famous buccaneer in the seventeenth century, Sir Henry Morgan, had for instance the legal sanction of his home government when between 1668 and 1671, he raided Portobello, Maracaibo, and Panama.

Of similar disposition, the French would even license the Caribbean buccaneers in the 1640's. From their base on Tortuga off the north coast of Hispaniola, these pampered pirates were the scourge of the Spanish West Indies. The English likewise tolerated them in Jamaica, because their annoying piracies diverted Spain from any possible interest in the area. In the 1680's buccaneers struck terror beyond the isthmus of Panama. In 1680, John Coxon with 300 marauders caused depredations in the Bay of Panama. From 1683 on, the prudent Edward Davis harried the defenseless coasts of the Pacific and combined later with

Captain Swan and William Dampier in a cruise which brought disaster to the Manila galleons. From 1689, however, the English and French buccaneers would break their long-standing bond of unity in support of their respective nations in the War of the League of Augsburg.

By the eighteenth century, the European states would withdraw all condonation of the buccaneers, who would then become outright pirates. Among these was Edward Teach or Thatch (died 1718), better known as Blackbeard, who nonetheless captured a French merchant vessel and patriotically renamed it *Queen Anne's Revenge*. Blackbeard's contemporary, Captain Woodes Rogers was, however, just a privateer for the Bristol merchants and preyed upon the Manila galleons across the Pacific.

With skills more profound than piracy, the French and the English also challenged Spanish-Portuguese dominance in the New World, where over the years they succeeded in establishing non-Iberian colonies—the start of the French and English colonial empires which, focused by the middle of the eighteenth century on America and India, would bring about the Seven Years' War (1756-1763) that brought the British to the Philippines from India.

In the meantime, both France and England would devote the last half of the seventeenth century to commercial-colonial rivalry with Holland, which had by then supplanted both Portugal and Spain in the competition for trade and empire. The protectionist shipping laws and aggressive naval policy of England since Cromwell must be viewed in this light, no less than Louis XIV's efforts through his finance minister Colbert to discriminate against Dutch commerce while building a powerful navy. As Holland sank into decline and monarchy in the eighteenth century, England and France would be left to measure each other's imperial ambitions—not in Europe alone but in the East Indies and the Americas as well, where the best prospects of expansion lay.

Whatever their rivalries and changing fortunes, however, the European powers constituted one single civilization in the process of an accelerated change which would soon unleash a dynamic force, the Industrial Revolution. But even before this could take place, most of the world was already conscious, some nations an-

xiously so, of Europe's steady expansion. For the rise of Europe expanded the limits of the known world, the area of interaction among human communities.

Within the continent of Europe itself, the expansive quality of Western civilization would affect even Russia, then an original civilization independent of the West. Now, in response, Russia would begin to define in sharper lines her identity with respect to the West. The career of Peter the Great was, in this context, a specifically pro-Western response to the challenge of Western Europe, even though his real intent might have been to save and unify the tremendous cultural mass of Russia, which three centuries earlier picked itself up from the wreckage left by the Mongol hurricane. Russia was not Europe; the Russian essence could therefore be better protected and enhanced by acquiring, rapidly if possible, Western technology and ways. This was anyhow one reason Peter built his city on the marshes of the Neva delta; he wished to open a "window to Europe" while he perfectly understood that the heart of Mother Russia lay, beyond historic Kiev, in Holy Moscow—the Third Rome. It was one way of emphasizing that Russia's salvation lay in the secularization of her culture, the shedding of religion.

Aside from the cultural encounter between Russia and the West, Western expansion would also bring forth an interaction, equally complex, between Europe and Africa. Before the East could be reached for its spices and fabled wealth, Africa had first to be touched, however peripherally. And when the European plantations in America were finally integrated into the evolving international trade, Africa would again be touched, this time more deeply, by means of the slave trade and its pain of spiritual and cultural alienation. Certainly no subjection could be more complete than what may be called "trans-cultural slavery," which subdues and demolishes man thoroughly, allowing him perhaps only physical survival. Although they carried their bodies intact, with perhaps just a few dozen marks of the lash, the slaves of the period were uprooted from their soil and culture with absolute finality. The Jews could be flung into any number of *diasporas* and may be expected to keep their identity, as they have. But the Africans who survived the slave trade were in contrast, in their lifetime and in that of their descendants, not allowed the chance or the means to reconstruct their ancient cultural identity.

Culture has of course a certain resiliency, as may be perceived in the case of the present *candomblés* of Brazil, in whose society the old gods of Africa have been resurrected, the ancient ways revived.

No matter what has happened before or since, however, the old dichotomy of East and West subsists, at least for our part of the world. The fundamental dialogue in the history of the world is likewise that in which the Eastern and the Western peoples have been engaged. In the period 1663-1765, however, this dialogue would have specific characteristics. In the first place, the core of Asia—more properly the inner core of East Asia—would to some extent cease to participate in that dialogue and withdraw into itself, in an act of purification and self-affirmation which would enable it to protect its soul from Europe. In China, this was the time when the empire was being revitalized under the Manchus. During the long reign of the K'ang Hsi emperor (1644-1722), the Europeans were contained in the south through the highly ritualized trade of Canton, while the Russian infiltration into the Amur Valley was arrested with the treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689. Among the Christian missionaries the Jesuits were tolerated, principally because they showed some intellectual gifts. Still, despite his appreciation of Western methods and techniques, the K'ang Hsi emperor held the missionaries in no excessive esteem: "After all, they know only a fraction of what I know and none of the Westerners is really conversant with Chinese literature." Any exercise of influence, therefore, was upon the West, which as a consequence now knew the delights of *chinoiseries* and tea gardens and the more general art form of the Rococo. Leibniz himself, and with him the encyclopedists at the source of the Enlightenment, owed much to the dictionary published by the Ch'ing Imperial Academy in 1716.

For a hundred years or so, Manchu China was not only strong but prosperous, with its population rising from 100 million in 1680 to 276 million in 1780, compared to the increase in Europe (including Russia) from 90 million in 1600 to 118 million in 1715 and 200 million in 1815. Chinese culture likewise received careful protection from revitalized Confucianism, which was raised with Jesuit help to the status of a state ideology. Never in fact since the Yuan dynasty (1279-1368) was China so extensive, with its internal order so well maintained for such a

long stretch of time. There was therefore, really no way for pre-industrial Europe to impress itself upon the Middle Kingdom, which till the nineteenth century would retain its ability to hold at arm's length the "barbarians come from the South."

Japan was no less impermeable. The revolt of the Christians of Shimabara in 1637-1638 moved the military government (*bakufu*) at Yedo to close Japan to foreigners, not so much because it feared Christianity or foreign conquest as because unreliable elements in the feudal aristocracy—actually the *tozama daimyo*, lords relegated to the outer fringes of central Japan, and the *ronin*, warriors left without overlords in the reallocation of fiefs after Ieyasu's victory at Sekigahara—might seek juncture with foreigners for arms and intrigue. The Portuguese, suspected of complicity in the revolt, soon found out how determined the Japanese were when in 1640 all but thirteen of a deputation from Macao were executed, with the reminder to the survivors that the Portuguese could "do the same to us if they find occasion to do so" and that the Japanese would "consent to it without demur." The foreigners should therefore, they suggested, "think no more of us; just as if we were no longer in the world." As for the Japanese themselves, death was decreed for those who sought to leave or, once in exile, to return. The only door left open to the world was Deshima, off Nagasaki harbor, where only the Dutch and some Chinese were allowed to trade. Only in 1716 was this isolation relaxed, and then only slightly, when the *eighth shogun* Yoshimune allowed the importation and study of books in Dutch, particularly on medicine and military science. The *Bakufu* nonetheless continued to maintain Japan in peace, in happy innocence unsullied by contact with the outside world. In this enterprise, the Ming scholars who came to take refuge from Manchu rule helped by giving added impetus to Confucian studies.

The inner core of East Asia was thus impervious to Western intrusion. Farther west, however, in Muslim lands in close contact with Europe, Asia had weakened somewhat, although the Turks still had the impulse to take the measure of Venice, Austria, Poland and resurgent Russia. As grand viziers, the *Koprul* had since 1656 infused the Ottoman Empire with new vigor. In 1683, Vienna itself was besieged and saved only by German and Polish relief forces under Charles of Lorraine and John Sobieski. The new upsurge of Turkish energy was accorded reli-

gious meaning by the Pope, who sponsored a Holy League joined by Venice, Austria and Poland, with Orthodox Russia watching intently in the background. A series of indecisive battles ensued, with Hungary and the Balkans at stake. In 1696, however, it was evident from the treaty of Karlowitz that the tide had changed for Islam in Eastern Europe. Practically all of Hungary was lost to the Austrians, even as Poland obtained Podolia.

Asia was clearly receding in that sector, although the full impact of European pressure would not be felt until 1768, when the Great Catherine began the wars which would bring Russia to the Balkans and the coasts of the Black Sea. In the meantime, however, a considerable portion of Europe still lay under Ottoman dominance and would so remain until way into the 19th century. In that area at least, therefore, a stalemate had developed between East and West. It was equally evident, however, that it was only a matter of time before this western part of the East would succumb to the batterings of Europe, which was in the process of acquiring sufficient primacy in technology, particularly in the technology of war.

To the north of the two extremes of West and East Asia, the area east of the Urals was crumbling to pieces, if indeed it had cohered to begin with. This was the area that saw or engendered the incursions of the East towards Europe. Before the Mongols, there certainly was an ethnic continuum in the steppes, provided by horse-riding nomads whose languages have been grouped together under the so-called Uralo-altaic family, with its Turco-Mongol and Finno-Ugrian sub-groups. The life of these steppe peoples depended not on the soil but on livestock and the solidarity of family, clan and horde, with only Heaven limiting their vision and its "four corners" their movement. All this ethnic variety had of course acquired some consistency under the Mongols; but, as in all the previous coalitions of peoples across the steppes, it was the consistency of empire, which may endure or crumble according to the vicissitudes of the empire. The Mongols gave North Eurasia its unity; its break-up could only follow the disintegration of their empire. And then came Russia in her wild rush across the steppes to the Pacific.

Russia might not be European, as Dostoyevsky consistently maintained; but her expansion towards the Pacific and beyond to

Alaska parallels the thrust of the West since Columbus across the Atlantic to the New World and beyond. Moreover, Russia's expansion to the East may also be viewed as its response to the Mongol incursion into its heartland, although at least one historian has attributed the phenomenon to "the inevitable logic of geography which lies at the basis of all history." The same logic could of course apply to all the nomad invasions from Asia to Europe. In any case, Russia had to dispose of khanate after khanate before she could reach Siberia. In 1483, three years after Ivan III renounced his allegiance to the Khan of the Golden Horde in Kazan on the Volga, the Muscovites crossed the Urals; and in 1552, Kazan itself was captured. Six years later Astrakhan fell, followed by the Khanate of Sibir. By 1587, the middle reaches of the Ob river had been attained. Some years earlier, the Stroganov family had been established east of the Urals and cossacks under Yermak had begun the conquest of Siberia. In 1647, the Russians built a stockade in Okhotsk, on the Pacific, after travelling from the Upper Lena and then down the Amur. The Bering Strait itself was reached by Deshnev (1647-8), a century before the Danish explorer whose name it bears. Thereafter, the business of colonization began, and it remained only for the Russian state to sanction the enterprise. North Asia would then have acquired a new master and China a more powerful barbarian neighbor.

Down south, the East was likewise crumbling—more specifically, the entire area south of the Himalayas, including South-east Asia. Practically all of the region, India included, would begin to be fully affected by the impact of Western dominance or machination. Aurangzeb (1659-1707) could have stayed Mughal decline, if his political sense had been greater than his religious zeal. But his intolerance produced the first religious persecutions since Akbar consolidated the empire. The result could only be rebellion, and one that not the Hindus alone would mount. The Sikhs, now militant and ever theocratic, gave Aurangzeb no less trouble than the Jats and even the Afghan tribes in the north. Bahadur Shah (1707-1712) was able to contain the disorders and broke the strength of the Sikh menace in the Deccan. But the break-up of the empire was inevitable. Soon, the Mughal emperor would have not much more than his capital of Delhi, for real power had come to repose upon his governors in the



northern and southern provinces, even as the Hindu Marathas acquired central India.

It was at this point that the English and the French pushed themselves into the scene. In the wake of the Portuguese eclipse, English power had been rising after the acquisition of Bombay in 1661. The French *Compagnies des Indes Orientales*, founded in 1664, had likewise facilitated the growth of French enterprise. Numerous settlements were established, among them Pondichéry (1674). In the early 18th century, both France and England expanded their domains through judicious interference in the disputes of the Indian rulers, both petty and great. By the middle of the century, they were thus set on a collision course, not only because of their rivalry in India but also because of the European balance of power and their respective interests in North America. In any case, both powers were now so well ensconced in India that they could afford to quarrel on a world scale.

Southeast Asia was no more immune to European intrigue, if not outright intrusion. In Burma, the efforts of the Dutch and the English to obtain a commercial foothold were not particularly successful. But the English East India Company, applying lessons learned in India, supported Alaungpaya against the party sustained by the French. Alaungpaya won and in 1758 reunited Burma, which thereupon revived its ancient feud with Siam, managing to destroy Ayudhya in 1767. In Siam, the French were equally at work, this time against the Dutch, whose monopoly of Siamese trade (obtained in 1664) was broken, but for deeper reasons the Dutch traders could never fully understand. Beyond their political-commercial interests, the French were also intent on furthering their brand of Christianity. The French court and the Jesuits therefore tried to work through a Greek adventurer, Phaulkon. They failed, with the result that a popular revolt broke out in 1688 which plunged the land into a long and bloody civil war. The French likewise penetrated Annam and Tonkin during the seventeenth century only to be aptly recompensed with hostile rejection from the Annamites in the eighteenth century.

In the Insulinde, the capture of Malacca in 1641 had given the Dutch control of the Malacca and the Sunda Straits. With Batavia as focus of their commercial empire, they now consolidated their hold on Java and the Moluccas, particularly against the Spanish and the English. A wedge was driven between Mata-

ram, whose overlordship encompassed West Java as far as Cheribon, and Bantam, whose overseas trade threatened the V.O.C.'s quasi-monopoly. As a result of their intervention in a rebellion against the Susuhunan of Mataram, the Dutch obtained in 1679 the extension of their territory across the common borders of Bantam and Mataram. In 1682, they supported the sultan's son against his father and were rewarded with the monopoly of the pepper trade and the expulsion of the English, at first from Mataram and then from all of Java. With the Spanish withdrawal from the Moluccas in 1663, they were likewise left alone in East Indonesia, where they preferred to rule by indirect methods, except in Ternate which lost its freedom in 1683 after a brief but heroic challenge to Dutch presence in the area. In any case, up to the last decade of the seventeenth century, the V.O.C. entertained little territorial ambitions. By the eighteenth century, however, it moved in to occupy whole areas. The development of commercial crops like coffee and indigo required direct supervision and exploitation of the natives, if only through stronger hold of their rulers. Forced deliveries (*leveringen*) of coffee, pepper or cotton were thus instituted and the colonization of Indonesia began in earnest.

Such was the result of what may be called the slow but insidious "infiltration" of Indonesia by the Dutch through trade, a method no less popular among the English, who thus differed from the Spaniards and the Portuguese, among whom religion was the favored instrument of penetration into a country. In our century, states similarly aiming to expand their powers or spheres of influence now do so less through trade or religion than through "exported war," or through "fifth columns" or sophisticated intelligence agencies organized for the systematic infiltration of other nations.

In the century after 1663, Southeast Asia was being integrated more rapidly than before, by trade or religion, into the world network of European colonies. And within this vast historical movement, then as in the preceding century, the most consistent and relentless colonial challenge hurled upon any Asian culture occurred in the area between the Babuyanes and Sulu.

Of course, that same area had before the Spanish advent likewise witnessed the activities, mainly commercial ones, of other civilizations in its Asian environment. Starting shortly after the