CRITICAL MASSES AND CRITICAL CHOICES

EVOLVING PUBLIC OPINION ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS, TERRORISM, AND SECURITY

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For Carol Silva, the love of my life and the center of my universe.
—Hank C. Jenkins-Smith

With love and appreciation to Marilyn, Kristina, and Kimber, the women in my life.
—Kerry G. Herron

PREFACE

When we set out to write this book in early 2001, our chief interest was to understand how members of the American public were adjusting their perspectives on international nuclear threats and security policies in the context of monumental changes wrought by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The terrorist strikes on September 11, 2001, changed the world again, leading us to extend our investigations for another two and a half years to assess how these new shocks would affect public opinion on security issues. The result is an assessment of the expressed opinions of Americans about security issues spanning a full decade—a decade that saw the unfolding of some of the most remarkable and wrenching changes in American history. Throughout that period, however, our focus remained consistent: how are Americans' beliefs and preferences regarding the appropriate means to manage security threats abroad and at home evolving in a rapidly changing world?

Our approaches to the multidimensional issue of security, and to our study of the ways in which ordinary citizens apprehend and respond to security concerns, were shaped by the positions from which we conducted our research. For the bulk of the period in which we engaged in this analysis, we worked in an academic institution that focused on the conduct of policy-oriented survey research. Our academic colleagues, at our home institutions and across the country, provided the kind of feisty and intellectually demanding critiques that prevented us from becoming too complaisant or comfortable with our developing analyses. (We include the anonymous reviewers of our papers, who were often kind and supportive but almost as often pointedly critical in their evaluations.) This experience was greatly enriched by extensive opportunities to engage and argue with an array of extraordinary experts and officials who work in various positions in the field of security, ranging

from the national laboratories to executive agencies, and from local emergency responders to senior policy officials. The effect of this contact was, in part, to keep us aware of the very difficult strategic and operational issues that face policymakers in this complex issue domain. We trust that these interactions served as effective antidotes to facile assumptions and too-easy conclusions about the characterizations, trade-offs, and implications of the security dilemmas that face the United States. But it was a third aspect of our research environment—a deep and long-term engagement with a diverse cross section of the American public—that most fundamentally affected our work. This engagement grew in part from our personal involvement in conceptualizing and implementing opinion survey research. Both of us designed and alternately led twenty-one focus groups in which we sought to stimulate discussions about security among Americans from ten cities and suburbs ranging from San Diego to Boston, and from New Orleans to Chicago. This proved to be an amazingly easy task. In most instances, the discussions would be moving at full throttle when the allotted time was up. In the design of our initial surveys, we personally interviewed citizens on the telephone. And—most importantly—we analyzed the responses to over 13,500 interviews with members of the general public on nuclear postures, international threats, domestic considerations of security policies, terrorism, and political beliefs conducted in the years spanning 1993 to 2003. (Although not reported in this book, we also interviewed more than 4,200 technical and policy elites during the same ten-year period, asking many of the identical questions posed to participants from the general public.) The substance and structure of those interviews are described in the chapters that follow, but all this engagement fundamentally influenced our understanding of public opinion. Traditional elite characterizations of extremely limited public capacities and tendencies toward volatility do not explain the kinds of stable patterns and common sense we measured. The longer we investigate public opinion, the more we respect and value it. We appreciate the generosity of our respondents who took time from their busy lives to answer our lengthy surveys. We deeply value their considerable efforts freely given, their contributions of rich personal experience and analogy, and the deliberate management of uncertainty that shaped and informed their answers to our questions. We also directly observed occasions in which respondents appeared to be ill informed, glib, or thoughtless in their answers, but these were the exceptions and may be among the irreducible ingredients of public opinion. Overall, we are deeply impressed with ordinary citizens' capacities and willingness to engage in relatively complex and extended discussions about pressing national issues. Their lives are touched by the policy concerns in question; they *have* thought about them, and they are willing (and sometimes eager) to provide their views. From all this we conclude that it is

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well worth listening carefully to what these people have to say about public policy—especially on complex and urgent issues such as security.

Our extended evaluation of public opinion on security has not led us to advocate particular security policy positions. We have our own policy preferences, of course, though we differ from each other almost as often as we agree. But that is not the point of this book. What we do advocate is that policymakers, opinion leaders, and scholars take a hard and informed look at expressed public values concerning terrorism, security, and US strategies involving nuclear weapons. Public opinion needs to be understood, not because it is right or wrong—indeed, that is the "wrong" question—but because policy must be informed by how it is understood and evaluated by the public. Deep and resilient policy beliefs and preferences among the American people provide the parameters within which stable security policies can be constructed. They warn when policy is on unsure ground, subject to sustained and broad dissent of the sort that may undermine or delegitimize security efforts. Without such input, security policies, whether focused outside or inside the United States, are much less likely to provide and protect the very security that is their objective. Responsible decision makers in a representative republic like the United States are obliged to attend to the nature of public support for security policies. That does not mean policy should be based primarily on polling or developed by referenda. It only means that public opinion, even about the most complex security issues, should be a valued input to policy processes.

In taking on a project of this magnitude, we have enjoyed the generosity and support of many people and institutions. (Because of the span of time over which we have worked on this project, some individuals who supported this research changed institutional affiliations or retired during the course of the project. In this section we acknowledge contributions based on the primary institution with which the named individuals were affiliated at the time of their involvement.) Primary funding and institutional support was generously provided by Sandia National Laboratories, the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, and the Institute for Public Policy at the University of New Mexico. As we note below, other organizations also were involved in important ways.

At Sandia National Laboratories we are indebted to senior leaders who made the necessary financial and institutional support possible. They include the current president and director, Dr. Thomas O. Hunter; former president and director, Dr. C. Paul Robinson; Dr. Joan B. Woodard, executive vice president and deputy laboratories director for nuclear weapons; and Dr. Alton D. Romig Jr., senior vice president and deputy laboratories director for integrated technologies and systems. We especially want to acknowledge the sustained contributions of Dr. Roger L. Hagengruber, senior vice president, emeritus,

whose institutional support, professional expertise, and personal interest, advice, and encouragement were essential to all of the research efforts and findings reported in this volume. This project would not have been possible without his personal participation. Richard Schwoebel and David McVey helped conceive and initiate the project. Stan Fraley, Laura Gilliom, Clyde Layne, and John Taylor were key partners and administrators of associated contracts. Others who made important contributions include Arlin Cooper, David Cunnington, Aida Garcia, Victor Johnson, Jerry Langheim, Dennis Miyoshi, William Nickell, David Nokes, Arian Pregenzer, Dick Smith, and Stan Spray. Among the many compliments that we could pay the people at the Sandia National Laboratories, we most appreciate that they took the risk of giving us the latitude to design and implement this project without once seeking to interfere with the nature of the questions asked or the content of the analyses conducted.

We have received the kind of intellectual and financial support from Texas A&M University of which most researchers can only dream. The faculty at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service has been an unstinting source of constructive criticism and encouragement. Professor Carol Silva is a research partner who has participated in all of the surveys reported in this book. She contributed importantly to theoretical development, survey design, and data collection efforts. Her intellectual and methodological contributions have been of immense value and are matched only by her charm, wit, and ability to win any argument about the deteriorating effects of age on senior male academics. Professor Guy Whitten (from the Texas A&M Department of Political Science) is another research partner who contributed importantly. We especially value his international expertise and his participation in surveys conducted in Europe. Professors Larry Lynn, Warren Eller, Mike Desch, Kishore "The Enforcer" Gawande, Jeffrey Engels, James Lewis, and the infamous GBS Brown Bag group have all provided important critiques, suggestions, and support. Others who provided valuable support include Matthew Henderson, Laura Templeton and Joe Dillard. Crucial financial support was provided by the endowment of Joe R. and Teresa Lozano Long, who are heroes to us because of their unstinting support of education and research. And we wish to warmly acknowledge the unflinching support (even when we behaved like pesky academics) of the dean of the George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Lieutenant General (Retired) Richard A. (Dick) Chilcoat.

From the University of New Mexico we continued to receive the crucial support of Dr. Roger Hagengruber, who after retiring from senior leadership positions at Sandia National Laboratories assumed directorship of the UNM Institute for Public Policy and established the Office for Policy, Security and Technology. His support and participation through his roles at UNM remain

vital to our research. We also want to especially acknowledge the contributions of Amy Goodin and Amelia Rouse, who contributed importantly to survey designs and directed data collections. Professor Neil Mitchell (who left New Mexico in 2005 for the University of Aberdeen in Scotland) made significant conceptual inputs to research design and analysis of results from surveys in Europe. Gilbert St. Clair participated in the design and implementation of our first survey in this series. Scott Hughes contributed importantly to interviewing and analysis. Others at UNM who provided valuable administrative support include Carol Brown, Rudy Gallegos, Adam Pool, and Eric Whitmore. We also want to acknowledge the hard work and energetic support we received from the many graduate and undergraduate students who served as survey interviewers at the UNM Institute for Public Policy Survey Research Center.

We also wish to thank Robert O'Connor, Director of the Decision, Risk and Management Sciences Division of the National Science Foundation (NSF). NSF grant number 0234119 provided the resources needed to collect the panel data analyzed in chapter 5 of this book.

We deeply appreciate the participation and continuing friendship of Professor Richard Barke at the Georgia Institute of Technology, who helped develop the first survey in this series. We acknowledge the support of Karl Braithwaite, Scott Duncan, and Janet Langone, all at Los Alamos National Laboratory. We appreciate the support of John Hirsh at Pacific Northwest Laboratory. Klaus Berkner, at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, provided assistance. We are indebted to Stan Neeley, at the Battelle Seattle Research Center. Bob Bland, at the Union of Concerned Scientists, was very helpful. Among many others at various institutions in the United States and abroad, we gratefully acknowledge the contributions of Ayaz Akhtar, Kathleen Bailey, Dinah Bisdee, Alessia Damato, Simon Glanville, Dennis Gormley, Marilyn Herron, Thomas Mahnken, Antoline Monteils, Uwe Gerd Oberlack, Cyrille Pinson, and Laura Turino.

While all these people, and many others, contributed importantly to the work reported in this book, they bear no responsibility for any errors, misinterpretations, or omissions. We have only ourselves to acknowledge for any such failures.

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OBJECTIVES, CONCEPTS, AND THEORIES

THE CENTRAL ORGANIZING principle of international security in the twentieth century was a struggle among the competing ideologies of fascism, democracy, and communism. The massive destruction of two world wars was succeeded by a cold war between the open markets and societies of the West and the closed societies and centralized economies of the Soviet bloc. Today that conflict has been replaced by an emerging struggle between the forces of modernity and societies seeking to preserve religious and cultural traditions threatened by globalizing social, political, economic, and technological trends. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their potential uses by some states and transnational terrorist groups trying to stem the tide of modernity has become the contemporary dynamic around which international security is reorganizing.

The huge nuclear arsenals that evolved during the Cold War are being reconsidered in the absence of superpower confrontation and in light of the difficulties of deterring amorphous terrorist groups. At the same time, maintaining and safeguarding existing nuclear weapons and materials continue to require substantial resources. The number of states possessing nuclear weapons increased by one-third when India and Pakistan fielded operational nuclear weapons systems.[1] In February 2005, North Korea officially declared that it possesses nuclear weapons, and Iran is thought to be vigorously pursuing nuclear capabilities. Growing threats of mass-casualty terrorism are demanding large investments in defensive preparedness against nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. The prospects of further horizontal nuclear

proliferation to other states and to terrorist organizations, combined with vertical proliferation in nuclear capacities and sophistication among those who possess or acquire nuclear weapons, constitute persistent threats to US interests. Coupled with these developments, the reemergence of previously subdued ethnic conflicts is producing civil wars that demand international intervention, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict persists, a global war on terrorism is underway, and the long-range outcome of the war in Iraq may be problematic. In this volatile security environment, the United States is reducing its nuclear arsenal, fielding an embryonic system of national ballistic missile defenses, restructuring its military, and reorganizing its government to fight terrorism. The implications of these trends for future nuclear deterrence, security investments, and military postures are continuously evolving, and they raise critical questions about associated policy processes and outcomes.

One of the most important considerations relates to the role of the public. American citizens are key stakeholders in the future of US security, and because of the requirement for public support, security issues have critical implications for domestic politics, elections, and the boundaries within which sustainable security policy can evolve. To what degree can policymakers expect or desire the US public to participate directly or indirectly in dynamic foreign and strategic policy processes? Do the rapid changes and associated complexities of the security situation exceed the capacities of most Americans to understand and contribute to the shaping of new security designs? How are American views of nuclear security evolving in such a dynamic environment? How does the general public perceive the efficacy of nuclear deterrence in the face of new and different post–Cold War threats? Do Americans support the elimination of nuclear weapons? If not, do they support further development and testing of new and more tailored nuclear weapons capabilities? How is the growing threat of mass-casualty terrorism affecting public views of security? How are initial US efforts in the ongoing war on terrorism being assessed by the American public? What are public views of trade-offs in personal security and personal freedoms? What are acceptable conditions for the use of US military force in the struggle against terrorism? These are but a few questions illustrating the kinds of twenty-first-century security issues facing the American people and the international community. What should we expect of the abilities of ordinary citizens to usefully grapple with these issues?

Rationale and Objectives

We have two modest objectives in this book. One is to examine empirically the views of the US general public about post–Cold War security, with special emphasis on the nuclear dimensions of security and the growing challenges to

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security posed by terrorism. Another objective is to contribute to the continuing debate about the capacities of publics to help guide policies in complex domains. Nuclear security and terrorism are particularly well suited for both objectives, for they constitute the central elements of strategic planning in the post–Cold War era and provide challenging tests of competing theories of public capacities. We pursue our objectives by analyzing extensive data about nuclear security and terrorism obtained in a series of six national surveys measuring the views of almost 10,000 members of the American public conducted biennially between 1993 and 2003. We analyze responses from core questions asked in each of the six surveys that provide a unique view of the changing nature of security from a period beginning eighteen months after the collapse of the Soviet Union and extending through the next decade of the post–Cold War era, encompassing the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001 (9/11), the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and ongoing global efforts in the war on terrorism.

Our examination of public views on nuclear security includes a wide spectrum of measures ranging from broad impressions of the changing security environment to quite specific beliefs and policy preferences. Included are conceptual questions about the viability of nuclear deterrence, beliefs about the risks and benefits associated with nuclear weapons, and assessments of specific nuclear security issues such as the appropriate size of the US nuclear arsenal. We track more specific preferences concerning investments in nuclear weapons capabilities and views about strategic arms control. Our analyses include data collected before the attacks of 9/11, immediately following 9/11, and two years later. These data permit us to investigate public assessments of terrorist threats, preferences for response options, and views of progress in the continuing struggle against terrorism.

Strong Test Cases

Nuclear security is a challenging policy area for public participation for several reasons. First, the design, testing, maintenance, transportation, safeguarding, and employment of nuclear weapons all have highly technical aspects that require specialized expertise. For example, whether US nuclear weapons can be reliably maintained for the foreseeable future without operational nuclear testing is a debatable technical issue. How the stewards of nuclear weapons will safeguard them and their associated nuclear materials for thousands of years is a continuing technical question with implications that exceed human experience. Certainly nuclear security poses very difficult technical hurdles for many ordinary citizens, and the factual knowledge gap between elites and members of the mass public is especially high in this policy area.

Second, nuclear security has a long-standing tradition of limited public

access. US development of the world's first nuclear weapons was conducted without public knowledge under strict secrecy. After World War II, nuclear espionage was a real and threatening attribute of the Cold War, and nuclear advantage remains a competitive objective of some states in the post–Cold War era. The potential for transnational networks of terrorists to acquire and use nuclear devices as the ultimate terror weapons adds even greater requirements for secrecy and protection. Nuclear security policy options often are debated by officials and technical experts in arenas not accessible to the media and the vast majority of American citizens. In relative terms, public access and participation is highest in domestic policy processes, more restricted in general foreign and security policy processes, and even more restricted in matters of nuclear security.

Third, most citizens have no personal experience with nuclear technologies and related policy choices. This stands in contrast to public experience with many other complex policy domains. For example, health care, education, and social security all are complex policy areas, and each has technical dimensions requiring specialized expertise, but the vast majority of adult citizens have some degree of personal or family experience in dealing with associated issues. That level of personal experience is not present in the case of nuclear security. All these aspects of nuclear weapons policy make it more difficult for citizens to be informed of alternative choices and significantly restrict public participation in nuclear security policy processes. The challenges in the way of coherent—let alone rational—public beliefs and preferences on nuclear security issues would thus seem to be nearly insurmountable.

Because of the threat of nuclear and other forms of mass-casualty attacks, transnational terrorism also provides a tough case for policy participation. Terrorism is different conceptually, because it is highly resistant to deterrence. To be effective, deterrence (nuclear or otherwise) has two prerequisites: accountability and retribution. The source of attacks must be identifiable to a high degree of certainty, and retribution must be unavoidable and unacceptable to the attacker. Because of the nature of transnational terrorism, both requirements are problematic. Terrorist networks are amorphous, ill defined, borderless, and make attribution much more difficult than state-level threats. The facts that transnational terrorist groups may have members from multiple countries, may receive support from multiple sources, and may train and prepare in multiple locations also make retribution more complex and less certain. Together, the problematic nature of attribution and retribution make deterring terrorism particularly challenging.

Terrorism provides the nexus for the dangerous confluence of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ideological and cultural conflict, and the challenges of securing an increasingly globalized economy and transpor-

tation network. This means that no one state, or even an alliance of several states, is likely to successfully combat transnational terrorism. The requirement for international cooperation in the struggle against terrorism exceeds that required in most state-level conflicts and makes public participation in policy processes for combating terrorism much more complex.

Early Post–Cold War Optimism

The liberation of Eastern Europe, capped by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1990 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, set the stage for optimistic expectations about a post–Cold War world. Nuclear policy trends during the last decade of the twentieth century included the following promising developments: reductions in the numbers of US and allied nuclear weapons as well as prospects for a smaller Russian nuclear arsenal; safe removal of Soviet-era nuclear weapons from the newly independent states of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus to the possession and operational control of Russia; a moratorium on US nuclear weapons testing and debate about a comprehensive nuclear test ban; efforts to develop a treaty limiting the production of fissile materials; the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty; destruction of previously undeclared nuclear weapons by South Africa; and optimistic domestic debate about a "peace dividend." Even the Persian Gulf War of 1990–1991 did not long dampen the strategic outlook for a more peaceful future following the half-century of nuclear brinksmanship between the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective allies.

We began research early in this period of optimism partly to measure what we anticipated would be a devaluation of US nuclear weapons capabilities after the Cold War. We expected to document public assessments of the diminishing relevance of nuclear weapons and to track the rates at which nuclear devaluation occurred over time. We began designing the first survey little more than a year after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and though we could not reference a baseline survey employing the same core set of questions during the Cold War, we sought to establish reference points early in the new security environment against which subsequent measures could be compared as we progressed further into the post–Cold War era.

Analytical Framework

Before writing the first survey question, we developed the analytical framework in figure 1.1, within which we hypothesize key relationships expected to influence opinions and preferences about nuclear issues. From this framework, we constructed baseline questions designed to meet our twin objectives of measuring and documenting public views on nuclear weapons as well as



Figure 1.1. Analytical framework

gaining insights into the larger theoretical questions about public capacities to hold and express coherent views on complex policy issues.

Our framework suggests that public attitudes about nuclear security partially are functions of interactive beliefs about risks and benefits associated with nuclear weapons. These beliefs are held within the context of a number of factors specific to each individual. Among them are three key sets of variables: (1) demographic factors such as age, gender, education, income, training, experience, and place of residence; (2) social and political lenses shaped by political culture and ideology, subject knowledge, and belief systems; and (3) preferences about related public policy issues such as the environment, the role of science and technology in society, economic considerations, and trust in public institutions and policy processes. This framework is central to our analysis of trends in public views, because it suggests issues and relationships for which questions can be designed, and it provides a map for testing hypotheses about the capacities of publics to employ policy-relevant structured beliefs. During the design stages of our various surveys between 1993 and 2003, we explored issues and relationships suggested by our model in discussions among twenty-one focus groups in ten different cities. Results helped us hone and refine survey questions.[2]

After designing the initial survey instrument, our objectives for subse-

quent surveys included retaining and improving the core set of questions intended to elaborate our analytical framework as well as incorporating additional related topical issues. For example, in addition to the nuclear security and terrorism issues discussed in this book, we also surveyed opinions about a range of other topics including nuclear energy, philosophical approaches to science and research, relationships among American technical communities, US national science policies, cooperation among American and Russian nuclear scientists, and personal security issues. Though the issue content varies among our surveys, the set of comparative questions about nuclear security forms the leading core of most surveys, followed by other issues and lines of investigation. In subsequent chapters, we summarize policy-relevant findings about mass views on nuclear security and terrorism, but before examining those data, it is necessary to establish the larger theoretical questions about public capacities that we address.

Theoretical Questions

The nature and role of public opinion in democratic theory has long been debated. Though separate concepts of "public" and "opinion" can be traced to ancient times, Jean-Jacques Rousseau is credited with using the combined term "*l'opinion publique*" (public opinion) around 1744 (Noelle-Neumann 1984).[3] How to differentiate "public opinion" from among the mass of conflicting views present in the body politic was a central dilemma of liberal philosophy (Price 1992). The concept and role of public opinion was discussed by the US Founding Fathers, debated in the Federalist Papers (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay [1788] 1961), and critiqued by de Tocqueville ([1835, 1840] 1945) in his essays on American democracy. One of the central issues in the philosophic struggles between republicanism and federalism was the argument between James Madison and Alexander Hamilton about the role of public opinion. As Sheehan (2004) notes:

> For Madison, republicanism meant the recognition of the sovereignty of public opinion and the commitment to participatory politics. Hamilton advocated a more submissive role for the citizenry and a more independent status for the political elite. While Madison did not deny to political leaders and enlightened men a critical place in the formation of public opinion, he fought against Hamilton's thin version of public opinion as "confidence" in government. . . . Hamilton recognized that Madison's opposition to him and the Federalists was propelled by a fundamental philosophic disagreement over the nature and role of public opinion in a republic. (405–6)

Throughout the eighteenth century, the concept of public opinion most often referred to general social behavior, but by the nineteenth century, theo-

rists such as Bentham ([1838–1843] 1962) and Mill ([1863] 1992) evolved a more utilitarian political role for public opinion in government (Price 1992). Ultimately, the Bentham/Mill utilitarian perspective provided the foundation for the most broadly accepted construct of public opinion in the twentieth century and the rationale for the evolution of systematic attempts to measure it through opinion polling (Minar 1960). In this evolution, concepts from the Enlightenment period in which public opinion was conceived as an expression of the general will gave way to utilitarian notions of contemporary public opinion comprising the most commonly held ideas (Price 1992).

Traditional Expectations of Public Capacities

Modern concepts of public opinion and its proper role in US policy processes evolved to an elitist perspective characterized by three interacting components: (1) a philosophy of minimal capacities of mass publics to understand and contribute to complex policy domains—especially foreign and security policies; (2) empirical evidence suggesting that the belief systems of ordinary citizens are insufficiently structured to inform and constrain policy choices in areas where individuals lack specialized knowledge or experience; and (3) criticism of means for systematically measuring and understanding public views. This perspective gained wide acceptance among political sophisticates, theorists, and academics, and became the "traditional" view that informed much of the common wisdom about what elites should expect from the general public in terms of policy participation and influence.

Modern philosophical underpinnings of this traditional perspective are featured most prominently in the writings of Walter Lippmann (1922, 1925, 1955). Lippmann's deep reservations about the capacities of publics to usefully contribute to policy processes is apparent throughout much of his work, but three of Lippmann's books most directly address the limitations of publics and their opinions. In the aptly titled *Public Opinion* (1922), Lippmann expresses his doubts about the abilities of common citizens to understand the complexities of public policy while emphasizing the role of elites:

> I argue that representative government, either in what is ordinarily called politics, or in industry, cannot be worked successfully, no matter what the basis of election, unless there is an independent, expert organization for making the unseen facts intelligible to those who have to make the decisions. (31)
>
> In the absence of institutions and education by which the environment is so successfully reported that the realities of public life stand out sharply against self-centered opinion, the common interests very largely elude public opinion entirely, and can be managed only by a specialized class whose personal interests reach beyond the locality. (310)

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