


THE SELECTED  
POLITICAL WRITINGS  
OF  
JOHN LOCKE



EDITED BY PAUL E. SIGMUND

A NORTON CRITICAL EDITION

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# THE SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE



TEXTS  
BACKGROUND SELECTIONS  
SOURCES  
INTERPRETATIONS

*Edited by*

PAUL E. SIGMUND

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

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# Introduction

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John Locke is one of the most important theorists in the history of political thought. His writings inspired and helped justify the American Revolution; the basic assumptions of his thought underlie many of the fundamental political ideas of American liberal constitutional democracy; and his arguments in favor of human rights, religious and economic freedom, political equality, government by consent, and the right of revolution are widely accepted—in theory, if not always in practice—around the world.

This has not always been the case, nor is it true everywhere today. At the time Locke wrote, his principles were accepted in theory by a few and in practice by none. Divine right monarchy was the norm, and democracy based on majority rule, nonexistent. Religious uniformity was enforced with coercive sanctions, and arguments for toleration were rare. Mercantilist state policies and government monopolies limited trade and commerce. Society functioned on the basis of “great chain of being” hierarchies and deference to one’s betters. Groups had rights, based in tradition, law, or religion; but the idea of individual rights was only beginning to develop. Armed conflict and rebellions were frequent, but revolution—in the sense of a fundamental restructuring of society—was advocated only by extreme groups such as millenarian religious sects.

Today Locke’s principles are more generally accepted, but they are not uncontested. On the right, the claims of order, tradition, national security, and the need for social or religious cohesion or economic growth are often cited to justify departures from the Lockean ideals of freedom and democracy. On the left, the demands of social justice are seen by some as requiring the sacrifice of political and/or economic freedoms. Postmodern, structuralist, and antifoundationalist critics deny the possibility of a philosophical defense of freedom and democracy on the basis of universal values. Locke’s ideas are viewed as historically and culturally conditioned or as an ideological justification for Western domination.

Even within the Lockean framework there is a continuing argument over the meaning and application of his ideas. The values for which he argued are not always consistent with one another. What

is the relation of political equality and economic freedom, of government by consent and the right of revolution, of majority rule and minority rights, of freedom of religion and freedom from religion? Those debates have often focused on the acceptance, rejection, or interpretation of the thought of John Locke, the founding father of modern liberalism.

The continuing, even increasing, importance of Locke and the controversies about his ideas are the reasons for this collection of his political and related writings, the sources on which he drew, and the conflicting interpretations of his thought. The debate about Locke has intensified during the fifty years in which I have taught his political thought in ways that reflect both the continuing philosophical disagreements about his ideas and our considerably enlarged knowledge of his thinking because of newly published sources that were not available to earlier commentators. In the same period, the ideals of equality, political democracy, and human rights that he espoused have led to the lessening of racial, religious, gender, and national barriers in ways that would have been inconceivable to him.

This collection is published with two goals in mind. The first is to enable students to benefit from the vast scholarly output on Locke to achieve a more accurate understanding of the meaning of what he wrote, in terms both of his original intention and of later interpretations of his work. The second goal is to stimulate thought and debate about the implications of the principles he defended for the contemporary world.

The literature on Locke, most of it published during the last fifty years, is enormous. The Princeton University library lists more than 950 books written by or about him, 171 of them since 1990. It is a rich literature, which examines not only his political thinking but also his ideas on religion, economics, ethics, epistemology, and more recently race and gender. Relevant excerpts from and commentaries on his writings on these related subjects are included in this book. Locke wrote in a time of transition, from tradition to modernity, from religious conformity to religious pluralism, from feudal aristocracy to bourgeois democracy, from group domination to individualism, and from social norms based on ascription to those based on achievement. He believed that his ideas were founded on the political inheritance of the classical and Christian tradition in which he was educated, but he combined and applied them in a different way—with significant implications for the modern world.

John Locke was born in 1632 in Wrington, near Bristol in the west of England. He was ten years old when the struggle between

the Stuart monarchy and the Puritan-dominated parliament led to the outbreak of the English Civil War (1642–48). He was sixteen when Charles I was executed and a commonwealth was established under Oliver Cromwell. Locke's father was an attorney, small landowner, and friend of Alexander Popham, a wealthy magistrate. The elder Locke fought along with Popham in the early years of the Civil War; and in 1647, after the Puritan-dominated Long Parliament took control of the most important of the English public (i.e., private) schools, Westminster School, in London, Popham nominated John Locke, then fifteen, to a place at the school. There he received an intensive education in the classics and was exposed to a different set of religious and political views from his earlier Calvinism. The headmaster of Westminster was strongly pro-royalist and kept the boys in school for public prayers in January 1649, as Charles I was beheaded outside the nearby palace of Whitehall (Cranston 1957:20).

In 1652 Locke was chosen as one of six Westminster recipients of scholarships to Christ Church at Oxford. There he studied classics, logic, rhetoric, and geometry, receiving his B.A. in 1656 and his M.A. in 1658. An Oxford education was still in many ways medieval. The lectures and disputations were in Latin, students arose at 5 A.M., and daily chapel was compulsory. Aristotle and Cicero dominated the curriculum (Bill 1988:195 ff.), and Locke found the required scholastic disputations unsatisfying, spending much of his undergraduate years reading romances (Bourne 1876:I:54), although attendance at lectures was required. While Locke was still an undergraduate, an Oxford and Westminster friend introduced him to the study of medicine, which became a lifelong interest.

After receiving his master's degree, Locke received a studentship (fellowship) at Christ College and was appointed a tutor in classics, lecturer in Greek, and in 1663 censor in moral philosophy. During this period he seems to have given lectures and conducted disputations on the subject of natural law, and his essays on the subject—unpublished until the 1950s (Locke 1954)—reflect both his acquaintance with the classical tradition and the beginnings of the empiricism that was to characterize his later *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. His notebooks on his readings (which still survive) demonstrate that he read more books on medicine and science than on any other subject. He became acquainted with Robert Boyle, who is sometimes regarded as the father of modern chemistry, and he carried out chemical experiments on his own. In this same period he wrote English and Latin tracts in support of the “absolute and arbitrary power” of the magistrate to regulate “things indifferent” in the area of religion, a view that sharply differs from those expressed in his later political writings (Locke

1967). Maurice Cranston (1957:62), his biographer, also detects the influence of Hobbes in Locke's description of the unpleasantness of life without government and the need to surrender "primitive liberty" to the magistrate.

In 1665 he left Oxford to participate in an English diplomatic mission to the elector of Brandenburg in Cleves (Kleve), in north-west Germany, where he was impressed with the mutual good relations and toleration for one another's religion among Calvinists, Lutherans, and Catholics. When he returned to Oxford in 1666 he decided against becoming a clergyman, the career of most holders of studentships (fellowships), and he continued to pursue his medical studies. His petition to be granted a doctorate in medicine without attending lectures was denied, although he later received the degree of bachelor of medicine.

In connection with his medical interests, he met and favorably impressed Anthony Ashley Cooper, Lord Ashley, later the first Earl of Shaftesbury and founder of the Whig Party. In the following year Ashley invited him to join his London household, and Locke became his part-time physician, secretary, and speech writer. In 1667 under Ashley's influence, and in sharp contrast to his earlier writings, he wrote an essay on religious toleration, described by one writer as "a founding document of liberalism" (Locke 1993:38), that anticipated much of the argument of his later *Letter Concerning Toleration* (1685). It argued for toleration because the magistrate's duty was "the preservation and peace of men in society," and "hath nothing to do with the good of men's souls and concerns in another life." Like the later *Letter Concerning Toleration*, it denied toleration to Catholics on political grounds, because their loyalty was to Rome. In 1668 Locke also wrote a draft of a treatise opposing the legal regulation of the interest rate, a later version of which he published in 1692. In the following year, as secretary to the lord proprietors of the colony of Carolina, he supervised the preparation of a draft constitution for the colony. He continued to be interested in Carolina, and the colony provided many of the American examples that he cited in the *Second Treatise* (Armitage 2004). The constitution differed, however, from his later political writings in its support for a hereditary aristocracy as well as African—but not Indian—slavery.

In 1671 Locke and a group of friends began to discuss "the issue of human understanding" of "the principles of morality and religion," and Locke wrote two preliminary drafts of what was to become the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, published at the end of 1689. When Ashley became Lord Chancellor and Earl of Shaftesbury in 1672, Locke was appointed secretary for presentations of income-producing positions ("livings") in the Anglican



church. The following year he became secretary of the Council on Trade and Plantations, which brought him into further contact with the English colonies, where he had already invested some of the income from his inheritance from his father, including investments in the slave trade (see James Farr, p. 374 herein). In 1675 he returned to Oxford and received a medical studentship and the degree of bachelor of medicine.

He did not remain in Oxford but left for France in November 1675, where he spent the next three and a half years. His journals indicate that he met leading Huguenots, the outlawing of whose religion in 1685 led him to write the *Letter Concerning Toleration* (Lough 1953). During his time in France, his mentor, the earl of Shaftesbury, was imprisoned for a time in the Tower of London for, among other reasons, advocating annual elections of Parliament. By the time Locke returned, Shaftesbury had become the chief prosecutor against the supposed participants in a "Popish Plot" to kill King Charles II and to place his Catholic brother, the duke of York and future James II, on the throne. In February 1680 Locke purchased a copy of the recently published political writings of Sir Robert Filmer. In November 1680 the House of Commons passed the Exclusion Bill, blocking the Catholic duke of York from succeeding to the throne. The House of Lords rejected the bill, and the king, hoping to find a less hostile atmosphere outside of London, called a meeting of parliament in Oxford in March 1681. When it became clear that Commons would insist on the exclusion of James, the king dissolved the Parliament with no indication that he would convene it again. In July Shaftesbury was arrested and charged with high treason, but a pro-Whig jury acquitted him in November. In the summer of 1682 he and other Whigs began to plan a rebellion to prevent James, the duke of York, from succeeding to the throne. In November when the revolt failed to materialize, Shaftesbury fled to Holland, where he died in January 1683.

This was the period, we now know, when the *Two Treatises of Government*, published in 1689, were written. References, subsequently corrected, in the 1689 edition to "King James" rather than James I, indicating composition before the accession to the throne of James II in 1685; the fact that Locke mentions in the preface the loss of "the papers that should have filled up the middle, and were more than all the rest"; and other evidence from a collection of Locke's papers that Oxford acquired in the mid-twentieth century (Locke 1988:45 ff.) have forced a revision of the earlier view that the *Two Treatises* were written by Locke after the Glorious Revolution of 1688, that replaced James II with William, prince of Orange, and Mary, James's Protestant daughter.

There is consensus among Locke scholars that the first draft of

the *First Treatise* was written in 1680, after Locke bought the *Patriarcha* and other writings of Filmer that had been published in connection with the contemporary debate about the relation of the king to Parliament. There is less agreement about the exact date of composition of the *Second Treatise*; but most of the conflicting accounts, using among other evidence his recorded purchases of books used in the *Second Treatise*, place it in 1681 and 1682, and all agree that some updating took place at the time of publication (Milton 1995:380). The earlier date of composition makes Locke's theory more radical, in terms of the context in which it is written, than if it had appeared as an *ex post facto* defense of the 1688 Glorious Revolution (see the section "Locke as Revolutionary?" p. 353 herein).

The *First Treatise* is a refutation of Filmer's patriarchalism—that is, his defense of the divine right of kings as based on the descent of their right to rule from God's original grant of authority to Adam. It contains important theoretical discussions, but it is much less known and read than the *Second Treatise* because much of it is devoted to the exegesis of the meaning of the passages from the first book of Genesis cited by Filmer. It was relatively easy for Locke to refute Filmer's interpretations of his principal biblical texts. He answers Filmer's argument that the first book of Genesis subjects "every living thing that moveth upon the earth" (v. 28) to Adam by demonstrating that the passage refers to animals rather than to men. The text and context of the passage cited by Filmer in which Eve is made subject to Adam after the Fall (Genesis 2:16) clearly indicate, Locke argues, that this was God's punishment of Eve after the Fall for her disobedience and not a general grant of political authority over all mankind. Filmer's third reference to the divine commandment to "Honor thy father" is answered by quoting the rest of the sentence: "and thy mother" (Exodus 20:12; Deuteronomy 5:16).

Yet the *First Treatise* goes well beyond biblical hermeneutics. Locke argues against divine right by an appeal to natural freedom and consent, describing absolute government as a form of slavery. To deny that the king has absolute property rights, he makes an important argument on the duty of charity, which gives a starving man title to enough of the surplus goods of others to enable him to preserve himself (*First Treatise* 42). Our duty to God to preserve his creation becomes the basis of a defense of property rights and of the inheritance rights of children. In this connection, Locke also criticizes primogeniture as a violation of the rights of the other offspring to inherit enough for their "comfortable preservation" (*ibid.* 87). The section on Eve's subjection to Adam includes a broader discussion of conjugal authority that both admits there is a "foun-

dation in nature" for male dominance and that "condition or contract" may alter that relationship (ibid. 47). There are also discussions that are similar to passages in the *Essays on the Law of Nature* and the *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, on the way reason and the senses can give us knowledge of the natural law as well as on the degradation that history demonstrates is the result of departure from reason, "our only star and compass" (ibid. 58, 86).

The *Second Treatise* does not argue from biblical texts as the *First Treatise* does, although biblical examples are cited, principally from the Old Testament. Except for a few references, it also does not argue from the history or constitution of England, which were central to most of the contemporary debate. It is a philosophical treatise that attempts to develop a systematic theory of legitimacy, obligation, limited government, political equality, and natural rights, including the right to revolution. It begins with individuals in the state of nature, a condition of life without government or organized political life. In that state, Locke argues all "men" (*Second Treatise* 95, but see 96 "individuals") are free, equal, and rational. Their reason tells them that, as God's "workmanship," he wishes them to preserve themselves and "the rest of mankind" (*Second Treatise* 6). Because of the duty of self-preservation humans cannot surrender their lives and liberty, either by enslavement (except through criminal actions that forfeit their humanity) or by subjecting themselves to an absolute monarch. They have voluntarily contracted with each other to form families and to bring up children to whom they owe nurture and education. They provide for their preservation through a system of private property, which is created by mixing their labor with the goods of the earth that God has intended for that purpose. Only then does humankind perceive the need to establish law and government because, although the state of nature is initially a state of peace being made up of men who can know their moral obligations to each other, it is marred by conflicts. These conflicts are the result of disagreements over the application of the natural law, which arise because of the lack of a written law and a common judge on its implementation and because of the actions of "degenerate men" who violate the natural law. Because of these "inconveniences," individuals in the state of nature surrender their right to enforce the natural law and agree to act by majority rule to establish governments that will defend their rights to life, liberty, and property through a system of common laws and judges. The laws should be adopted by legislatures that represent those who choose them and enforced by an executive that is, at least in part; separate from the legislature and that has wide discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs ("the federative power"). If the government violates the purposes for which it was established, the people

(i.e., the majority), or even—since “every man is judge for himself” (ibid. 241)—“any single man” (ibid., 168), can “appeal to heaven” through resort to revolution. This will happen, however, only after “a long train” of abuses (ibid., 225), and the individual will be successful only if he persuades the majority that the violation of his rights will threaten theirs (ibid., 208).

What is new about Locke’s theory is its emphasis on the grant and possible withdrawal of *individual* consent, even though it is diluted by admitting the possibility of tacit consent and by allowing a majority, to which he has consented, or its representatives to act for the individual. Beginning with individual consent, Locke makes a systematic argument for the rule of law, responsible and limited government, and individual rights in a way that makes the *Second Treatise* the classic expression of liberal constitutionalism, which has as its foundational principles individual judgment and political equality.

The association of the *Second Treatise* with advocacy of armed revolution meant that Locke was in some personal danger at a time when those who opposed the king were being imprisoned or executed. What he had written became all the more dangerous in 1683 when the Rye House Plot to murder the king and his brother was discovered and Algernon Sidney (later revered as a martyr by the American revolutionaries), who had also written a work opposing Filmer and supporting resistance to the king, was arrested, tried, and executed. Although he was not directly implicated in the plotting, Locke knew many of the plotters and government spies were reporting on him. In early September 1683, after arranging for the safekeeping of his papers, Locke went into exile in Holland.

During his exile years (1683–89) he continued to work on the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* and wrote his famous *Letter Concerning Toleration*. He was spied on by agents of the English monarchy; at one point he adopted a pseudonym; and he wrote a friend about a work he had entrusted to his keeping, *De Morbo Gallico* (On the French Disease), which has been interpreted by some scholars as a reference to his treatises against monarchical absolutism. *The Letter Concerning Toleration* was written in Latin for a European audience, in response to King Louis XIV’s October 1685 revocation of the Edict of Nantes, which had granted religious toleration to the Huguenots. Locke’s letter argued that religious belief should not be subject to government coercion because faith, especially the Christian faith, is a matter of free rather than coerced acceptance (“A church, I take to be, a voluntary society of men, joining themselves together . . . for the public worshipping of God”) and because it exceeds the competence of the magistrate and the purposes of government, which are “life, liberty, health, and in-

dolency [freedom from pain] of body." It denied religious toleration to advocates of "moral rules which . . . manifestly undermine the foundations of society" as well as to Catholics and atheists, the former because of their subjection to a foreign power, and the latter because they could not be trusted to keep their oaths since they lacked fear of God's punishment after death. The *Letter* was influenced by theological discussions with dissident Calvinists in Holland (Remonstrants) with whom Locke developed close friendships in exile. It was published in England without attribution in 1689 and immediately translated into English by William Popple, an adherent of Socinianism, which because it denied the Trinity was beginning to be called Unitarianism. Popple took some liberties with Locke's Latin text and introduced the work by calling for "absolute [religious] liberty," which was not what Locke advocated in the *Letter*.

The *Letter Concerning Toleration* and the *Two Treatises of Government* were published anonymously after Locke's return from Holland with Princess—soon to be Queen—Mary in February 1689. Locke may not have wished to acknowledge authorship of the *Letter Concerning Toleration* (indeed, in his will he denied involvement in the preparation of the translation, although in fact he did see it before it was published [Ashcraft 1986:498–99]). The 1689 Toleration Act extended religious freedom only to Protestant Trinitarian Christians, so that his reticence may have been related to the fact that Popple was the author of *A Rationalist Catechism* and was associated with Unitarianism (Robbins 1967). The subversive character of the *Two Treatises* at the time they were originally written may also explain Locke's reluctance to be named as their author. He seems to have made a few changes in the *Second Treatise* (to chapters 1, 9, and 15 and substantial revisions and updating of chapter 19) before its publication, and he also added a preface that argued that the title of "our great restorer, our present King William" was based on "the consent of the people" (Locke 1988).

At the end of the year, with a date of 1690, he also published, under his own name, the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, a work that made his reputation as a philosopher. The *Essay*'s denial of innate ideas, the criticisms that it made of traditional philosophic categories, and its association of morality with pleasure and pain led to attacks on it by religious conservatives. In response Locke added to later editions the explanation that the divine law, discussed in the first edition, should be understood to include both revelation and the law of reason. He also referred in his correspondence (Cranston 1957:134) to his insistence in the *Essay* (1.3.13) that, while he denied innate ideas, he continued to believe in the law of nature as "something that we being ignorant of may attain

the knowledge of, by the use and due application of our natural faculties." Both the *Essay* and the earlier *Essays on the Law of Nature* make it clear that he always believed that human beings are capable of arriving at certainty about basic moral truths on the basis of sense-experience and rational analysis.

Immediately after his return Locke was offered the post of British ambassador to the Elector of Brandenburg. He declined for reasons of health and because as "the soberest man" in England he could not match the "warm drinking" of the Germans (Cranston 1957:312). In 1690, to avoid the polluted air of London that aggravated his asthma, he moved to an estate belonging to the husband of a longtime friend, Lady Masham. In December 1691, with a date of 1692, he published his essay opposing the legal regulation of the interest rate. In 1692 he was urged by a friend to write a treatise on morality that would show, as he had claimed several times in the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, that morality was as demonstrable as mathematics. He responded that he was considering it, but "while I thought I saw that morality might be demonstratively made out, yet whether I am able to make it out is another question. . . . I shall not decline the first leisure I get to employ some thoughts that way" (Locke, 1976–1989: IV:524, no. 1538). Some critics (Bluhm et al. 1980; Coby 1987) have argued that Locke said this because he realized there was a contradiction between the supposed hedonism of the *Essay* and his earlier commitment to natural law. However, already in the *Essays on the Law of Nature* Locke described how we leave the natural law from sense-experience (p. 175) while insisting that "utility is not the basis of the law or the ground of obligation, but the consequence of obedience to it (p. 184). When the same friend pressed him once more on the subject in 1696, Locke replied that he was gathering some materials for such a work but that, in any case, "the Gospel contains such a perfect body of Ethicks, that reason may be excused from that enquiry" (Locke 1976–1989: VI:595, no. 2059). In the *Second Vindication* and in *The Conduct of Understanding*, both written in the late 1690s, Locke continued to assert the possibility, indeed the duty, of studying the natural law, along with the truths of revelation (Marshall 1994:441–47).

In 1693 Locke published *Some Thoughts on Education*, based on letters that he (a bachelor) had written from Holland to an English friend concerning the education of children. Locke recommended developing self-control, restraint of desire ("the true foundation of ability and happiness" is "to resist the importunity of pleasure and pain for the sake of what reason tells him is fit to be done"; no. 45), and regularity of habits (including bowel movements) in the child. He advised the study of French and Latin, but not Greek, empha-

sizing conversational and practical approaches rather than rote memorization and rules of grammar. Rather than logic and rhetoric, he recommended geography, astronomy, anatomy, history, and the principles of English law as well as ethics, based principally on the Bible but also on works by Cicero, Pufendorf, and Grotius (see sources herein for selections by Pufendorf, p. 251, and Grotius, p. 233; on the influence of Cicero on Locke, see Sigmund 1997).

In 1695, Locke published, again anonymously, *The Reasonableness of Christianity*. It argued for a minimal Christian creed of repentance for sin and belief in Jesus as the Messiah, whose resurrection gives the promise of immortality. *The Reasonableness* maintained that the Bible provided the best source of morality ("the law of nature knowable by reason") for those who did not have the time or ability to study and learn its precepts. Some have taken Locke's doubts about human capacities to know natural law to be in tension with his belief in majority rule. However, his pessimism about whether one can know the natural law "all entire as law" was also expressed in the early *Essays on the Law of Nature* (see herein Essays III, p. 175, and V, p. 177) and thus does not contradict the possibility that basic principles of equality, liberty, and property can be sufficiently known to establish society and government.

*The Reasonableness* provoked further attacks, because of both its denial of the inherited guilt of original sin as a consequence of Adam's Fall and its lack of a clear statement that belief in the Trinity is a central doctrine of Christianity. In lengthy replies Locke denied that he was a "Socinian" (i.e., Unitarian), declaring that his works contained "not one word of Socinianism." His comments on the opening passages of the Gospel of John as well as other similar passages demonstrate a certain evasiveness about the divinity of Christ, although he believed that Jesus had a special relationship to God from all eternity (Locke 1987: I:38, 58). At the very least he did not think that the Trinity was part of the minimal doctrinal commitment required for all Christians (Marshall 1996, 2000). Nevertheless he was a devout Christian who believed that the Bible was God's revelation and that Jesus was the Messiah, although the purpose of His coming was not to atone for the sin of Adam but to show us the way to eternal life.

In 1696 Locke was appointed to the newly established Board of Trade and Plantations. This was a well-paid position, but it meant that he had to spend considerable time in London. The board dealt with such topics as piracy; the development of the colonies, including those in America; and issues of unemployment and poverty. In 1697 Locke submitted to the board a proposal for reform of the government of Virginia that reflected the thinking of the *Second Treatise* in its proposals for judicial independence and the powers of the leg-

islature (Ashcraft 1969b) He also submitted a proposal (never adopted) on government policy toward the poor. It called for Draconian regulation of begging and poor relief, making sure that the able-bodied poor were compelled to work and requiring that the children of the poor be placed in work-schools at the age of three, fed bread provided by the parish along with (in winter) "water-gruel," and "taught spinning or knitting" (see Locke 1993: 446–61). Locke's biographer, Maurice Cranston, calls the proposal "an appalling document" but balances its ferocity with a quotation from Lady Masham attesting to the fact that "he was naturally compassionate and exceedingly charitable to those in want" while adding that "his charity was directed to encourage working, labourious, industrious people, and not to relieve idle beggars to whom he never gave anything. . . . People who had been industrious, but through age and infirmity passed labour, he was very bountiful to" (Cranston 1957:426). He also notes that Locke's will provided for a simple burial for himself, with the money saved going to the poor of the parish (ibid.: 480).

Also in 1697 Locke began work on *The Conduct of Understanding*, published posthumously, in which he recommended the study of theology as "one science . . . incomparably above the rest . . . that noble study which is every man's duty and everyone that can be called a rational creature is capable of" (Locke 1996: no. 23). In his last years Locke composed a paraphrase of, and notes on, the Epistles of St. Paul in which he seems to have interpreted Paul's assertion that "the wages of sin is death" as indicating that those who died unrepentant would be annihilated at the Last Judgment rather than subjected to eternal torment (Locke 1987: I:53) Shortly before his death he received the Sacrament from the local minister, after which he said, "I am in perfect charity with all men and in sincere communion with the whole church of Christ, by whatever names Christ's followers call themselves" (Bourne 1876: II:557). He died on October 28, 1704, while the Psalms were being read to him by Lady Masham. In his will he bequeathed copies of his books to the Bodleian Library at Oxford (admitting in a codicil, that he had written *The Two Treatises* and *The Letter Concerning Toleration*). He left his manuscripts and half his library of five thousand books to his young cousin Peter King; this later became the Lovelace Collection, acquired by Oxford in the mid-twentieth century. His Latin epitaph speaks of his contentment with his "modest lot" (the translation by his nineteenth-century biographer of *mediocritate*) and his devotion to truth. He cites the Gospel as an example of morality and his grave as proof of the certainty of death (ibid. II: 560–61).

The *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* was widely known, both in England and on the Continent, and the *Letter Concerning*



*Toleration* was the subject of debate in England, although the Toleration Act of 1689 did not go as far as it recommended since the act retained religious tests for public office and extended toleration only to Protestants who believed in the Trinity. The *Two Treatises* were less well known; but the *Second Treatise* was cited, and arguments drawn from it were used in defending the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the settlement that followed. More often, however, the defenders of the 1689 settlement cited the “ancient constitution” of England and the historical role of Parliament in consenting to legislation and taxation (absent from Locke) rather than the more philosophical arguments used by Locke. As the six-volume collection of early writings on Locke, edited by Mark Goldie (1999), demonstrates, Locke was sometimes interpreted in a more radical direction (“If all men are born free, how is it that all women are born slaves?”; Mary Astell, “Some Reflections Upon Marriage,” 1706, cited in Goldie 1999:II:116), and his theories of natural freedom and equality were attacked by Tory conservatives such as Bolingbroke. His argument for the social contract and his defense of property were widely known, both through reprints of his works and through the many editions of the English translation of Samuel Pufendorf’s *On the Law of Nature and Nations*, with commentaries by Jean Barbeyrac, who used Locke to correct what he felt were inadequacies of Pufendorf (Hutchinson 1991:chap. 2). Leading Enlightenment figures referred to Locke’s work, principally the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*; and Voltaire’s library included, besides English and French editions of the *Essay*, two editions of the *Reasonableness of Christianity* in French translation as well as a translation of the *Two Treatises of Government* (ibid.: 206).

Locke’s theories were sometimes used by antiroyalist republican theorists who also drew on the history of the Roman republic to argue for constitutional government and revolution. An example of such literature that was particularly influential in the American colonies was Thomas Gordon and John Trenchard, *Cato’s Letters* (1720–23), which combined arguments based on the Roman republic, for civic virtue and against the corruption of the English monarchy with appeals to natural rights and original freedom in the state of nature (Goldie 1999:II:229 ff.; full text in Trenchard and Gordon 1995). Twentieth-century scholars have attempted to oppose the republican tradition to that of Locke; but as discussed below, there is now persuasive documentary evidence that the colonists were *both* republicans and Lockean (see Dworetz p. 388 herein).

Although some scholars (Dunn 1969b; Wills 1976) have tried to downplay their influence, Locke’s political ideas were widely diffused in the American colonies, both directly and through the use of his theories in Sunday sermons (Lutz 1988; Huyler 1994). In