

# WAR AND DIPLOMACY IN THE FRENCH REPUBLIC

*An Inquiry into Political Motivations and the  
Control of Foreign Policy*

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WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY DUNCAN WRIGHT

*"Les hommes ne baptisent la guerre que le  
jour où ils l'ont commencée" — PROUDHON*

WHITTLESEY HOUSE  
McGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY, INC.  
NEW YORK AND LONDON  
1931

## PREFACE

ACCORDING to well-established traditions in academic circles, a preface to a work of this kind, should consist of three parts: a statement of the origins and purposes of the study, an apology for its weaknesses and limitations as testimony to the modesty of the author, and a word of acknowledgment to those whose assistance has contributed to whatever value the work may have. All prefaces, moreover, should be brief, unless written by Bernard Shaw or Walter Lippman. Bearing these precepts in mind, the writer offers the following preliminary observations for the perusal of the prospective reader.

The investigation which has culminated in the publication of this study of the conduct of French foreign relations was originally undertaken as a segment of a project of cooperative research into the causes of war which was begun in 1927 by various members of the social science departments at the University of Chicago. The present study was initiated in 1928 in consultation with the Causes of War Committee, presided over by Professor Quincy Wright. It was pursued in Chicago and in Paris during 1929 and 1930 and was brought to substantial completion in the early summer of the present year, just prior to the Hoover debt moratorium proposal of June 21, which initiated the protracted negotiations still in progress at the time of publication. These negotiations and their aftermath have perhaps revealed more clearly to the English-speaking world than any other single series of events since the occupation of the Ruhr the diplomatic interests and objectives of the French Republic in present-day Europe. These interests and objectives comprise the substance of that remarkably successful political and financial hegemony over the continent which France has established since the Armistice. If they are misinterpreted and made the targets of unreasoning attack by critics in other States, the reason is largely to be found in a lack of understanding of the stakes of diplomacy and of the sources from which foreign policy springs in the State System in which France has always played such an important rôle. It is the author's expectation that this volume will aid in revealing the controlling factors in international relations generally and in French foreign affairs particularly, and thereby contribute to a better understanding of diplomatic events, past, present, and to come.

From a broader point of view, the study is also intended to throw light upon the general problem of war and peace in the Western State System. That problem may be approached from various angles and the succeeding units of the series, of which this is the first volume to be published, will employ a variety of orientations and techniques in analyzing the situations

out of which modern wars arise. The present approach seeks to analyze constitutional and administrative structures and the dynamic political forces which underlie the formulation of foreign policy. This analysis should prove to be of interest not merely to students of French politics and diplomacy, but to all who are concerned with the control of foreign policy everywhere. The analysis has inevitably involved a consideration of the patterns of international relations as a whole. Such conclusions and suggestions as are offered are pertinent to the whole problem created by the periodical use of armed violence in the contacts between sovereign States. If the writer's efforts to maintain an attitude of scientific detachment toward his subject matter has been successful, the result should prove useful not merely to academic social scientists and students, but to all who are interested in the currents of contemporary world politics.

No one is in a better position than the author to appreciate the limitations of a study of this kind. The foreigner who attempts to observe any phase of a national culture which is essentially alien to him is almost certain to fall into errors of fact and interpretation which no amount of careful scholarship can entirely remove. To employ a phrase which Clemenceau applied, unjustly no doubt, to Poincaré, his garnering of facts may leave him in a position where he knows everything, but understands nothing. On the other hand he brings to his task an objectivity and a perspective which few natives possess in studying their fellow-citizens. Lord Bryce's classic study of *The American Commonwealth* and Lowell's equally classic work on *The Government of England* testify to the ability of foreign observers to see more of the realities of foreign government and politics than those who are too close to them. The Anglo-Saxon observer of Latin European institutions is, of course, faced with peculiar difficulties of language and national psychology not present to the same degree in the ventures which have been mentioned. These difficulties have been apparent to me throughout the present study. I can only hope that my analysis has gained through the virtue of detachment whatever it has lost through lack of life-long familiarity with French life and customs.

As for content and method, it should perhaps be emphasized that the work is not intended in any sense as a complete diplomatic history of the Third French Republic. The diplomatic episodes and events which are described in the second part of the book are merely a few selected cases out of many which might have been chosen for the purpose of illustrating concretely the functioning of the constitutional and political machinery for the handling of French foreign affairs. Others might well have made a different selection from the vast mass of available material. It is my conviction, however, that the generalizations drawn from the assembled data are valid for all phases of French foreign policy and would be substantiated rather than vitiated by an extension of the same method to other possible cases.

The historical evidence itself is adduced, wherever possible, from original documentary sources. The fact that at the time of writing only a small

beginning has been made toward the publication of the French pre-war diplomatic correspondence means, obviously, that an indeterminate amount of relevant evidence is still unavailable to the diplomatic historian. I feel, however, that the material at hand in the various *Livres Jaunes*, in the *Journal Officiel*, in the published diplomatic correspondence of other governments, and in secondary sources has been fairly adequate for the purposes of the present study. The vexed question of "war guilt" is not discussed in traditional terms in the following pages for reasons set forth in the text. But the two chapters on 1914 set forth as clearly and accurately as the available evidence permits the rôle of the French Government in the initiation of the Great War. Other chapters reveal the goals and methods of French diplomacy since the Peace Conference. The book is not an indictment and still less an apologia, but rather, in intention at least, a behavioristic account of those patterns of social action which underly French foreign policy and which have their exact counterparts in the foreign policies of all other Great Powers. Documentary sources at present unavailable will throw further light upon many aspects of the narrative. But in all probability they will not modify substantially the major conclusions reached either as to the content of French foreign policy or as to the methods through which it is carried out.

My first acknowledgments of indebtedness must go to the Social Science Research Council, which enabled me, through the grant of a fellowship, to spend the autumn and winter of 1929-1930 in Paris, and to the Social Science Research Committee of the University of Chicago, which extended financial assistance in the earlier phases of the study. As for my friends in France, my thanks are due to innumerable unnamed officials in libraries, government offices, and elsewhere whose courtesy, patience, and helpfulness were of invaluable assistance in enabling me to secure the materials needed for the study. I take pleasure in making personal acknowledgments to Professor Joseph Barthélemy, pioneer scholar and outstanding authority on the conduct of French foreign relations, for granting me the benefit of his aid and counsel; to M. Georges Cahen-Salvador, Secretary-General of the National Economic Council, for giving me a clearer conception of the work of the organization which he serves; to M. Pengeaud, *Directeur des Archives* at the Quai d'Orsay, for granting me access to the library of the Ministry and assisting me in locating relevant material; to M. Jacques Kayser, Secretary-General of the Radical Socialist Party, for advice and assistance; to Professor Maurice Caudel, MM. Henri and Florian Chardon, MM. Alexandre and Aubert Lefas, Professor Louis Lefur, and M. Jules Priou for their kindness, hospitality, and sundry services too numerous to mention; and last, but far from least, to my good friend, Madame Simon of 3 rue Berthollet, without whose cordial and unfailing solicitude for the comfort of her American *pensionnaires* my sojourn in Paris would have been less pleasant and less profitable.

Among my American friends who have assisted me in various ways, my warmest thanks are due to Professor Quincy Wright, who originally inspired the study and who later read the entire manuscript and offered many valuable suggestions in the course of its preparation. His kindness in writing the Introduction to the work is also greatly appreciated. Most of the chapters in the second section were read by Professor Bernadotte E. Schmitt, and the two concluding chapters by Professor Harold D. Lasswell and Dr. S. McKee Rosen, all of the University of Chicago. I am grateful to all of these gentlemen for their useful criticisms and suggestions. I am likewise indebted to Professor Walter R. Sharp, formerly Fellowship Secretary of the Social Science Research Council, for putting me into contact with various people in Paris, for reading and commenting upon the third chapter, and for permitting me to read in manuscript his own excellent study of *The French Civil Service* and to use from it his chart of the personnel of the foreign service. I am also grateful to Professor J. Gilbert Heinberg of the University of Missouri for his kindness in permitting me to use the material which he gathered on the personnel of French Cabinets. Among my own students who have rendered first aid at critical moments I am grateful to Miss Helene Kitzinger for doing some of the spade work for Chapter XI, and to Miss Dorothy Blumenstock for clerical aid in putting the manuscript in final form. Mr. Sol Spector and Miss Brita Berglund are particularly deserving of my thanks for assisting in the preparation of the index. Justice also requires a word of thanks to Mr. George Sorel, from whom I cheerfully acknowledge the theft of the title of the concluding chapter, and again last, but not least, to my wife for her encouragement and good humor in the face of my absorption in the labor of composition.

A time-honored formula obliges me to say that while all of these people have added to any merit the work may possess, none of them is answerable for any of its defects, for which I assume full responsibility. I close in the hope that this work may contribute slightly to international understanding and to a more adequate comprehension of the scourge of war and its cure.

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO,  
September, 1931.

## INTRODUCTION

THE present volume represents an effort to apply the methodology of the social sciences to the investigation of a problem which is universally recognized to be of decisive significance for the future of western civilization. Major wars have been followed by periods of general interest in the problem of war and peace. But in the period since the World War this interest has been more intense, more organized, and more effective upon the utterances and actions of the statesmen than hitherto. There has been a mass of writing on the subject, historical, analytical, polemical, philosophical, and literary, but the appearance of this volume indicates a conviction that there is room for more.

Dr. Schuman's study of war and diplomacy in the French Republic is designed neither to recapitulate historical data nor to offer a panacea, but to investigate as objectively as possible certain aspects of the situations from which recent wars have arisen. It is hoped that a gradual accumulation of studies which like this utilize the points of view and the methods of the contemporary social sciences may eventually prove useful both in theory and in practice.

It has been with this thought that the Social Science Research Committee at the University of Chicago has supported since 1927 a cooperative investigation of the Causes of War. Numerous studies have proceeded in connection with this investigation and, while it is anticipated that summaries of the results of the investigation will from time to time be published, it is thought desirable to publish special studies which have an independent interest as they are completed.

The project began with no theory of the causes of war but with a series of approaches suggested in several meetings of members of the departments of political science, economics, history, sociology, anthropology, geography, and psychology at the University of Chicago in the spring of 1926. Certain of these suggestions were selected for detailed study by research assistants working under the direction of members of the university staff or, as in the present instance, by members of the staff themselves. Thus, such unity as the project may eventually acquire will be a result of final synthesis rather than of initial analysis.

It is clear that governments of states are immediately responsible for the initiation of most modern wars. Governments differ from each other according to the type of men in positions of power and according to the constitutional structures which more or less determine the classes or sections of the population which shall exert influence and the degree of deliberation and breadth of participation which shall precede important decisions. One

might expect to find that the frequency of war in the foreign relations of a given state is related to the type of governing personality and constitutional structure which prevail in the state, but before such an expectation can be tested detailed descriptive accounts on a somewhat common model of these personalities and constitutional structures operating in a number of states in the same international milieu must be available.

Dr. Schuman's study is an effort to present such a model. He has attempted to analyze the factors entering into the formulation of French foreign policy by combining the methods of the diplomatic historian with those of the political scientist. France was chosen because no comprehensive study of its personnel and structure for conducting foreign relations is available, because it is a country of importance in all major international transactions, and because its history abounds with wars of various kinds.

The study in successive parts describes the constitutional structure of France with enough of its history to indicate the spirit of its institutions; sets forth the operation of this structure in a selected list of international transactions with due attention to the personalities of the officers as well as the powers of the offices; and finally synthesizes this material according to types of activity involved which are classified as treaty making, war making, and the formulation of foreign policy.

While comparative studies are necessary before final conclusions can be reached, Dr. Schuman's investigation hardly encourages the idea that constitutional forms determine the character of foreign policy. Rather he suggests that foreign policy springs from independent roots, from the conception of the personality of the state and the interest of the entire population in the prestige of this personality in relations with other states. Thus, the policy of a particular state results from the manifestations of this general interest as well as many lesser interests of groups, parties and individuals in the peculiar international environment of the state, while the form of its constitutional structure and the personality of its leaders are, in the main, an adaptation to the necessities of this policy. Instead of structure determining policy, Dr. Schuman sees policy, in the main, determining structure. He recognizes, it is true, that "the constitution does impose certain restraints and limits upon the action that may be taken by a particular government," but these restraints generally bow before serious exigencies. It follows that Dr. Schuman would search for a solution of the problem of war and peace not within the state but in the relations of states, not in the constitution but in international organization and in modification of the basic popular interests which present world culture inculcates. So long as these remain constant, democratic control of foreign policy within the state or other reforms of constitutional structure can have but a limited effect.

QUINCY WRIGHT.

## ABBREVIATIONS

- J.O.Cb. or Sén.*: *Journal Officiel de la République Française—Annales de la Chambre des Députés or Annales du Sénat: Débats parlementaires*, Imprimerie du Journal Officiel, Paris. (Unless otherwise indicated, all references are to that portion of the *Journal Officiel* containing the parliamentary debates, always dated as of the day following the session reported.)
- Rap. Budget, Ch. or Sén.*: *Rapports fait au nom de la commission des finances chargée d'examiner le projet de loi portant fixation du Budget Général de l'Exercice*, 18- or 19- (Ministère des Affaires Étrangères) *Chambre des Députés or Sénat*; Imprimerie de la Chambre des Députés or du Sénat, Paris.
- L.J.T.*: (*Livre Jaune*, Tunis) Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Documents diplomatiques, affaires de Tunisie*, 1870-1881, Imprimerie Nationale, Paris, 1881.
- L.J.T.Supp.*: (*Livre Jaune*, Tunis, supplement) Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Documents diplomatiques, affaires de Tunisie—supplément, avril-mai*, 1881, Imprimerie Nationale, Paris, 1881.
- L.J.Tonkin*: (*Livre Jaune*, Tonkin) Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Documents diplomatiques, affaires du Tonkin, convention de Tien-Tsin du 11 mai 1884, incident de Lang-Son*, Imprimerie Nationale, Paris, 1884.
- L.J.C. et T.*: (*Livre Jaune*, China and Tonkin) Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Documents diplomatiques, affaires de Chine et du Tonkin, 1884-1885*, Imprimerie Nationale, Paris, 1885.
- L.J.Siam*: (*Livre Jaune*, Siam) Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Documents diplomatiques, affaires de Siam*, 1893-1902, Imprimerie Nationale, Paris, 1902.
- L.J.Haut-Mekong*: (*Livre Jaune*, Upper Mekong) Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Documents diplomatiques, affaires du Haut-Mekong*, Imprimerie Nationale, Paris, 1893.
- L.J.Siam et Haut-Mekong*: (*Livre Jaune*, Siam and Upper Mekong) Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Documents diplomatiques, Affaires du Siam et du Haut-Mekong*, Imprimerie Nationale, Paris, 1896.
- L.J.Mad.*: (*Livre Jaune*, Madagascar, series of five, indicated by dates) Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Documents diplomatiques, affaires de Madagascar*, 1881-1883; 1882-1883; 1884-1886; 1885-1895; 1896; Imprimerie Nationale, Paris, respectively, 1883, 1884, 1886, 1895, and 1896.
- L.J.L'A.F.R.*: (*Livre Jaune*, Franco-Russian Alliance) Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Documents diplomatiques, L'Alliance Franco-Russe*, Imprimerie Nationale, Paris, 1918.
- L.J.Maroc*: (*Livre Jaune*, Morocco) Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Documents diplomatiques, affaires de Maroc*, 1901-1905, Imprimerie Nationale, Paris, 1905.
- F.Y.B.*: (French Yellow Book) Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *La Guerre Européenne*, 1914, Imprimerie Nationale, Paris, 1914.
- L.N.*: (*Livre Noir*, Black Book) *Un Livre Noir*, 2 vols., Librairie du Travail, Paris, 1922.
- D.D.F.*: (French diplomatic documents) Commission de publication des documents relatifs aux origines de la guerre de 1914, *Documents diplomatiques française, 1871-1914*, Imprimerie Nationale, Paris, 1929-.
- B.D.*: (British Documents) *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, Vol. XI: Foreign Office Documents, June 28-August 4, 1914, London, 1926.
- G.P.*: (Grosse Politik) *Die grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914*, Sammlung der Akten des Deutschen Auswärtigen Amtes, 40 vols., Berlin, 1922-1927.



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## PART I

### THE STRUCTURE OF THE MACHINE



## CHAPTER I

### THE THIRD FRENCH REPUBLIC

#### 1. LA GRANDE NATION

THE conduct of foreign relations may be approached from a variety of angles and for a variety of purposes. The increasing attention which has been paid to the subject since 1919 has been motivated largely by a desire on the part of students to further the democratization of foreign policy, apparently on the assumption that a democratically controlled foreign policy is likely to be a pacific one.<sup>1</sup> Studies have also been undertaken from the point of view of constitutional law,<sup>2</sup> of administrative organization, of personnel management,<sup>3</sup> and the like, with the relatively limited and specific objectives implied in the approach of public law and administration. The traditional approach of the diplomatic historian, whose objective is to present an accurate factual account of the chronological development of international contacts, has tended to center in recent years about the question of relative responsibility for the initiation of the Great War.

In view of this diversity of objectives and methods of approach, it seems appropriate at the outset to indicate briefly the general point of view from which the present study of the foreign affairs of France is undertaken. The present work aims at an analysis and interpretation of the machinery for the conduct of foreign relations in the Third French Republic in the light of the basic behavior patterns of States in the Western State System. These behavior patterns may be regarded, for the most part, as manifestations of that complex of attitudes, ideals, sentiments, and policies described by the somewhat vague term of "nationalism." It is submitted, not as an *a priori* assumption, but as a helpful hypothesis upon which to proceed, that the behavior of States toward one another is conditioned by their position in the State System of which they are an inseparable part, much as the behavior of individuals is conditioned by the social *milieu* in which they are born and have their being; that the "self" of a nation, like that of a single personality, is a product of the interaction of inherent characteristics and the social environment; that this process of conditioning as it has gone on between the

<sup>1</sup> J. Barthélemy, *Démocratie et politique étrangère*, Paris, 1917; F. R. Flournoy, *Parliament and War*, London, 1927.

<sup>2</sup> Quincy Wright, *The Control of American Foreign Relations*, New York, 1922.

<sup>3</sup> J. M. Mathews, *American Foreign Relations*, New York, 1928; H. K. Norton, "Foreign Office Organization" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CXLIII, Philadelphia, May, 1929.

States comprising Western European civilization during the past five centuries has led to the growth, spread, and intensification, within each State, of the emotions and ideology of national patriotism; that the attitudes so generated have been the major factors controlling the behavior of these States toward one another; and that, more specifically, the functioning of the machine for the conduct of foreign affairs in France is intelligible only when viewed as an expression of French nationalism. The control of French foreign relations will be dealt with here primarily as an aspect of French nationalism, with such attention to constitutional and legal phases as is necessary to understand the machinery of its operation.

Social consciousness of common nationality, with its attendant mass emotions of national pride, ethnocentric patriotism, and antipathy toward the alien beyond the frontier, was a phenomenon which appeared relatively early in France. Local loyalties and feudal allegiances were merged into a broader nationalism here earlier than in any other modern State with the possible exception of England. The genesis of French nationalism may indeed be traced to the long series of conflicts between the Valois kings and "perfidious Albion" comprising the Hundred Years' War. Out of the humiliation of Crecy, Poitiers, and Agincourt, out of the suffering and bitterness of a protracted and apparently hopeless struggle against the invader, emerged the desperate politico-religious enthusiasm which made Jeanne d'Arc the first national political leader of modern France. Not only was final victory gained in the conflict, but loyalty to the monarch was gradually transformed into patriotism for the nation. Like the other nationalisms of Western Europe, French nationalism was born of war and was, at its conception, an extension of allegiance from king to country.

Throughout the whole formative period of French nationalism, the king was the symbol of the nation. His glory and prowess on the field of battle, as well as in the less exciting works of peace, were associated with the grandeur of France. This association helps to explain the royalist leanings of many extreme French patriots and the undoubted patriotism of all French royalists. If modern France was not created by her kings, she was at least created in the name of her kings, and to the popular mind the two things are not very different.

More significant perhaps, from the point of view of the traditional content of French nationalism, was the international position which France occupied from the beginning of so-called "modern times" to the middle of the nineteenth century. France was ever the first State of Europe—first in national unity, first in population and wealth, first in diplomatic prestige and military power. Her neighbors, with the exception of the House of Hapsburg and distant Russia, were small States, like the Netherlands; weak States, like Spain; or mere conglomerations of petty principalities. Germany, like Italy, was but a "geographical expression." England alone was the enemy to be feared, not because she approached France in power, but because of her

insular immunity from invasion and her formidable sea forces. And, in the interest of security, prestige, and the balance of power, England, after 1689, was usually to be found aligned with the weak continental States which felt themselves menaced by the might of France. This coalition, in its various forms, was always sufficiently powerful to prevent any permanent establishment of French control over the continent. Not only did British diplomacy achieve this goal, but it succeeded in 1763 in wresting from France her colonial empire in America and India and, in 1813 to 1815, in checkmating the most nearly triumphant French attempt at the conquest of Europe.

Retrospection usually softens the sting of defeat and enhances the pride of victory. The Parisian of to-day has about him constant reminders of Rivoli, Austerlitz, and Jena, while Blenheim, Trafalgar, and Waterloo are forgotten—unless he goes to London, which is seldom. The French patriot boasts a purple past for his nation, such as no other State can claim. His heritage shines with the names of Francis I, Richelieu, Louis XIV, and Napoleon. He is accustomed to think of his country as the arbiter of the destinies of Europe and as the foremost military power of the world. The traditional ideology of French nationalism is thus almost inseparable from the legacy of glory in arms.<sup>1</sup> This is perhaps no more true of French nationalism than of others. But the Frenchman can point to a longer, brighter record of victory in diplomacy and war than any of his neighbors. This fact inevitably conditions all his basic attitudes toward foreign affairs. Nowhere else has national patriotism struck deeper roots and flowered so luxuriantly. Nowhere else can the diplomat whose policies seem to serve "national interests" count upon such unanimous and enthusiastic support from the mass of the citizenry.

## 2. L'ANNÉE TERRIBLE

The tragic events of 1870 and 1871 furnish the point of departure for any consideration of the political institutions of contemporary France. They also shape the entire course of French diplomacy throughout the period of the present study, constituting, as they did, a diplomatic revolution which left *la Grande Nation* prostrate before a powerful and united Germany. More than the dignity and prestige of Louis Napoleon perished at Sedan. More than the Napoleonic tradition and the fabric of the Second Empire were dragged in the dust at the fall of Paris to the Prussians. The whole international position of France in the European State System was demolished under the blows of Bismarck. The hegemony over the continent which France had exercised for three centuries and which even the fall of the first Bonaparte had not destroyed now passed into other hands. Henceforth France, defeated and truncated, was to occupy a position of dimmed prestige and uneasy insecurity, in painful contrast to the glory of mastery and the pride of power of the past.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Appendices of C. H. Hayes, *France—A Nation of Patriots*, New York, 1930.



The origins of the Franco-Prussian War are sufficiently well known to obviate the necessity of any extended treatment of them here.<sup>1</sup> From the halcyon days of the victory over Russia in the Crimea and the humbling of Austria in Italy in 1859, the Second Empire had sunk to a level from which the most desperate diplomatic expedients of Napoleon III were unable to raise it. While French troops lingered in Rome, Algeria, and Mexico, the "blood and iron" methods of the great Prussian Chancellor eliminated Austria from German affairs in the Seven Weeks' War of 1866 and at a single stroke achieved the creation of the North German Confederation. Napoleon's pitiable efforts to secure territorial "compensations" in the Rhenish Palatinate, Belgium, or Luxembourg were uniformly unsuccessful in the face of Bismarck's firmness. His attempts to secure diplomatic sympathy and support abroad fell on deaf ears. France was isolated as a result of Napoleon's blunders and his ambitions of territorial aggrandizement. Nevertheless, the Emperor felt that the arms of France might still achieve what diplomacy had failed to win. He counted upon war to prevent complete German unification and to restore for himself and his dynasty the waning loyalty of his subjects. Bismarck shrewdly analyzed the situation, decided that war was "inevitable," and determined to utilize the efficient military machine which he had at hand to overthrow France and incorporate the South German States into the Union.

The eagerness with which the Government of the Second Empire snatched at the bait which Bismarck held out was indicative of an optimistic but ill-founded confidence in the outcome of the impending struggle. Not content with Prince Leopold's relinquishment of the Hohenzollern candidacy to the Spanish throne, Napoleon III demanded that the renunciation be repeated and be made in perpetuity. William I's refusal to comply with this demand, as presented by Ambassador Benedetti, was reported curtly by Bismarck in the famous "Ems Dispatch," which he knew would be "a red flag to the Gallic bull." On July 14, 1871, the Chambers, at the Emperor's suggestion and with the apparent support of public opinion, declared war on Prussia in a great manifestation of belligerent, patriotic enthusiasm. Victory seemed certain. But France was diplomatically isolated because of the feeling abroad that she was playing the rôle of the aggressor. The South German States joined Prussia. Bismarck's war machine, with Von Moltke at the throttle, overwhelmed the Imperial armies. On September 3, the Emperor, with the last important French field army, was captured at Sedan and the road to Paris lay open to the invaders.

In the agony of defeat the Third French Republic had its birth. On September 4, a group of self-appointed Republicans under the leadership of Léon Gambetta proclaimed the deposition of the Bonaparte dynasty and the establishment of the Republic in the Hôtel de Ville of Paris. The Empress Eugénie fled to England and a provisional "Government of National De-

<sup>1</sup> For a brief account, see E. Bourgeois, *History of Modern France*, pp. 161-173, Cambridge, 1919.