

JUNG'S

SEMINAR ON NIETZSCHE'S ZARATHUSTRA



ABRIDGED EDITION

Edited and abridged by
James L. Jarrett

BOLLINGEN SERIES XCIX

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FOREWORD

"Seminar": from the Latin for a seed plot or nursery, where plants are started, afterwards to be transplanted in the hope that they will flourish. German nineteenth-century universities appropriated the word for a selected group of advanced students engaged in special study and research under the guidance of a professor. Likewise at Alemannic Swiss universities—and thus at the University of Basel, which in 1900 graduated an aspiring physician, Carl Gustav Jung.

Embarking on his chosen career in psychiatry, Jung had not proposed to teach, but he discovered that his patients, eventually his analysands, wanted to learn. He began to use the seminar, the "seed plot," as a teaching method as early as 1912, and he continued to employ it as late as 1941. In the summer of 1912, Jung was giving lectures on psychoanalysis at the University of Zurich. One analysand who attended was an American woman, Fanny Bowditch, who because of a "nervous disorder" had been referred to Jung by a family friend, James Jackson Putnam, M.D., who had come to psychoanalysis early on. Fanny's notebook for the lectures carried the title "Seminar"; another notebook shows that the seminars continued in 1916 at least. During the following years of the Great War, Jung was on army duty as a medical officer and not often in Zurich, and the seminars paused.

After the war, Jung was able to travel abroad, and he accepted invitations to lecture in England, where his school of depth psychology was gaining a following. In 1920, a group of disciples arranged for Jung to lead a seminar at Sennen Cove, on the tip of Cornwall. The subject was the contents of an obscure little book about the dreams of an Englishman, one Peter Blobbs. There is no record of what Jung said. Another Cornwall seminar, on "Human Relationships in Relation to the Process of Individuation," took place in the summer of 1923 at Polzeath. Two analysts from New York, Kristine Mann and Esther Harding, took longhand notes, and an unpublished typescript survives. In 1925 the British Jungians organized another summer seminar, on "Dreams and Symbolism," at Swanage, in southern England. It began on July 25th, the day before Jung's fiftieth birthday. Again, a typescript of longhand notes survives, still unpublished.

Immediately preceding the Swanage seminar, Jung had given the first of his "formal" English seminars, in Zurich, from March 23 to July 6th. Known merely by the title *Analytical Psychology*,* it surveys the de-

velopment of Jung's thought from 1896 to the break with Freud, in 1912, expounds the precepts of his system, and analyzes the symbolism in Rider Haggard's *She* and other novels.

In 1928, Jung embarked on the two-year *Dream Analysis** seminar, beginning an almost unbroken series of his "nurseries" or "seed plots." Next, from 1930 to 1934, was *Interpretation of Visions**, based on "active imagination" paintings by an American woman patient; that seminar was put on hold in spring 1932 for a brief seminar on *The Kundalini Yoga*.* From 1934 to 1939, the subject was Nietzsche's "*Zarathustra*,"* which was several times interrupted by lecture trips to England, the United States, and India.

As a general rule, each seminar met on Wednesday morning in the Zurich Psychological Club. No fee was paid, other than a small assessment for tea, served during a break. Jung's permission to attend was requisite, and members had to be, or to have been, in analysis with Jung or another Jungian analyst (a rule sometimes waived). A shorthand record of Jung's remarks and those of members was taken down, at first by members of the seminar and later by a stenographer employed by Mary Foote, a silent participant, who became editor and private publisher of the mimeographed transcripts. These could be read, and purchased, only by those qualified by analysis and an analyst's approval. Jung was not expected to contribute; he got free copies. When reprints were required, pupils and friends of Jung, including Mary and Paul Mellon, helped with expenses.

To reach a larger (and Swiss) audience, in 1933 Jung opened public lectures in German in an auditorium at the Federal Technical Institute (the "ETH"), in Zurich, on the theme "Modern Psychology." These were transcribed in shorthand and eventually issued in German and English editions for qualified readers, in the same way as the seminars. The topics, off and on until 1941, were Eastern texts, the process of individuation, St. Ignatius of Loyola's thought, alchemy, and psychological types; also, in a separate sequence, children's dreams.*

The readership of the seminars and ETH lectures, according to a warning included in each, was restricted to "private use," and the text could not be "quoted for publication without Professor Jung's written permission." In 1956, however, in response to the advice of the editors of the *Collected Works* and other Jungian scholars, he agreed to the publication of the Seminar Notes as an appendix to the *Works*. Not until well after Jung's death (1961) was the editing and publication undertaken, apart from the *Works*, edited and annotated in accordance with his wishes. The first volume to appear, in 1984, was *Dream Analysis*. The titles marked above with an asterisk have been or will be published.

FOREWORD

The *Visions* and *Zarathustra* seminars run each to some forty sessions and nearly 1,500 book pages. Accordingly, an abridgement of the latter has been made by its editor, James L. Jarrett, a scholar of Nietzsche and of analytical psychology.

William McGuire

INTRODUCTION

In the Spring of 1934, Dr. C. G. Jung brought to a conclusion a seminar at the Zürich Psychological Club which had been running since October 1930. The subject matter with which Jung and his students—practicing analysts, those training to be analysts, and selected analysts—had engaged themselves was visions, more especially the remarkable painted visions of an American woman, Christiana Morgan. As this final term drew to a close, the question arose as to what the next seminar should center upon, for by now the importance—almost the necessity—of such a lecture/discussion series was well established. Before Visions, there had been the Dreams Seminar, and so on back to 1923—perhaps even earlier—when Jung started this kind of teaching for a very particular audience. In 1934 the group apparently had little hesitation in deciding upon Nietzsche as their new topic, and more particularly Nietzsche's strange and wonderful *Thus Spake Zarathustra*. And so it was that when the group, some of whom had dropped out and been replaced by others, convened in May, it was to hear their mentor's warning that they all had an uphill and rocky path before them, for not only was Nietzsche's mind highly convoluted and devious, but his *Zarathustra* particularly so, with a style invented for this very purpose—whatever *that* was! But nothing daunted, they set to, and as in previous seminars, the excitement grew as their leader (who loved mountains) began to ready them for a journey that was destined to end before its natural culmination, drowned out by the alarms of war as the fateful summer of 1939 approached.

By this time another feature of the seminars was also familiar: the recording of the lectures and discussions. A professional secretary had been engaged to take notes, which in turn were edited by Mary Foote with the help of various members of the group, virtually all of whom were taking their own notes. Bound multigraphed copies of these notes were then made available to the participants, and to others associated with Analytical Psychology, but each "volume" bore a warning that the report was intended for the exclusive use of "members of the Seminar with the understanding that it is not to be loaned and that no part of it is to be copied or quoted for publication without Prof. Jung's written permission."

An important reason for this restriction was undoubtedly Jung's not having edited the notes, at least not beyond giving a quick run-through

and answers to questions Miss Foote had, perhaps about a proper name not caught by the secretary. But for all the explicit prohibition, copies *were* made, and the multigraphed copies began to appear in cities all over the world, especially where C. G. Jung Institutes were established, for the word got out that here was something special—indeed, unique. For those who had never been present at a lecture, these typescripts afforded an opportunity to get acquainted with *Professor Jung*, speaking extemporaneously and with considerable informality, fielding questions and observations (by persons who were in most instances themselves highly intelligent and knowledgeable students of human nature), not worrying if the discussion meandered some distance from the main path, offering suggestions for further reading, alluding to contemporary political and economic happenings, telling jokes. In 1957 Jung gave permission for “going public,” and the appearance in 1984 of *Dream Analysis*, edited by William McGuire, inaugurated a project to publish most of Jung’s seminar notes.¹

Jung’s recommendation to the Seminar of the Nietzsche text would have been no surprise to those who knew him well. Already in his early works, Jung had discussed Nietzsche, and most of his associates must have heard him attest to the importance this German philosopher-poet-psychologist had had for his own intellectual coming-of-age. In the chapter “Student Days” of his autobiography, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, we read Jung’s account of how in medical school, he’d had to curtail his philosophical readings:

The clinical semesters that followed kept me so busy that scarcely any time remained for my forays into outlying fields. I was able to study Kant only on Sundays. I also read Eduard von Hartmann [famous then for his *Philosophy of the Unconscious*] assiduously. Nietzsche had been on my program for some time, but I hesitated to begin reading him because I felt I was insufficiently prepared.² At that time he was much discussed, mostly in adverse terms, by the allegedly competent philosophy students, from which I was able to deduce the hostility he aroused in the higher echelons. The supreme authority, of course, was Jakob Burckhardt, whose various critical comments on Nietzsche were bandied about. Moreover, there were some persons at the university who had known

¹ For a fuller account of the history of the seminars, see Mr. McGuire’s Introduction in *Dream Sem.*

² Presumably Jung means *studying* instead of *reading*, for by the summer of 1898 (when he turned 23) he was quoting Nietzsche extensively in a lecture to his medical fraternity. See *The Zofingia Lectures* (Princeton, B.S. XX: A, 1938).

Nietzsche personally and were able to retail all sorts of unflattering tidbits about him. (p. 101/105)

All of this whetted Jung's appetite, and yet he "was held back by a secret fear that I might perhaps be like him" (p. 102/105). Still, curiosity got the better of him and he plunged with enthusiasm into the early collection of essays called *Thoughts Out of Season* (or *Untimely Meditations*) and then on to *Zarathustra*, which "like Goethe's *Faust*, was a tremendous experience for me." Yet there remained the feeling that this was very dangerous territory, from which he retreated to the safer ground of empirical studies.

Medical school completed, he had gone to Zürich's Burghölzli Hospital as resident psychiatrist. Then came the historic meeting with Freud. Jung must have been surprised at this well-read man's admission that he had never read Nietzsche. Indeed this seems to have planted in the younger man's mind the seed of suspicion, one that grew into a later conviction, that Freud's heavy emphasis upon eros and his neglect of the power drive could be better stated as "Freud versus Nietzsche" than as "Freud versus Adler" (*MDR*, p. 153/150).

After the break with Freud in 1913 and during the enforced isolation of the war years, Jung began a closer reading of *Beyond Good and Evil*, *The Gay Science*, *Genealogy of Morals*, and of course *Zarathustra*. Now he was even more strongly impressed with how powerfully Nietzsche's case illustrated his own growing understanding that one's most basic beliefs have their roots in personality and in turn one can discover much about an author's own personality from his writings. In *Psychological Types* (1921) he recognized Nietzsche as a highly introverted intuitive, with a strongly developed thinking function, but with serious weaknesses in sensation and feeling. In contrast to the intellectualistic Bergson, Jung wrote,

Nietzsche made far greater use of the intuitive source and in so doing freed himself from the body of the intellect in shaping his philosophical ideas. . . . If one can speak of an intuitive method at all, *Zarathustra* is in my view the best example of it, and at the same time a vivid illustration of how the problem can be grasped in a non-intellectual and yet philosophical way. (CW 6, par. 540)

Schopenhauer and Kant, the other two great philosophical influences on Jung, were both thinking types—a function that comes out strongly in Nietzsche too in his more aphoristic writings—but here at last was a philosopher whose interests were more psychological than metaphysical, and who was constantly in search of a world-view that

would guide and enrich life and not, as in Schopenhauer's case, simply intone the inevitability of frustration. And yet, Jung came to think, nobody illustrates better than Nietzsche the necessity not to take at face value what a philosopher or psychologist says and writes, but to examine the words in the context of the quality of his life as lived.

We must look very critically at the life of one who taught such a yea-saying, in order to examine the effects of this teaching on the teacher's own life. When we scrutinize his life with this aim in view we are bound to admit that Nietzsche lived beyond instinct, in the lofty heights of heroic sublimity—heights that he could maintain only with the help of the most meticulous diet, a carefully selected climate, and many aids to sleep—until the tension shattered his brain. He talked of yea-saying and lived the nay. His loathing for man, for the human animal that lived by instinct, was too great. Despite everything, he could not swallow the toad he so often dreamed of and which he feared had to be swallowed. The roaring of the Zarathustrian lion drove back into the cavern of the unconscious all the "higher" men who were clamouring to live. Hence his life does not convince us of his teaching. For the "higher man" wants to be able to sleep without chloral, to live in Naumburg and Basel despite the "fogs and shadows." He desires wife and offspring, standing and esteem among the herd, innumerable commonplace realities, and not least those of the Philistine. Nietzsche failed to live this instinct, the animal urge to life. For all his greatness and importance, Nietzsche's was a pathological personality. (CW 7, par. 37)

As will be apparent from the lectures below, Jung believed that Nietzsche's psychosis announced itself long before the break in 1889, and the neurosis, he was sure, was there all along. About a mental illness, Jung had no romantic illusions. A creative person is not creative, or more creative, because of neurosis—quite the contrary. Against Freud, he maintained with firmness that "art is not a morbidity." At the same time, Jung recognized that "a person must pay dearly for the divine gift of creative fire" (CW 15, par. 158). This is especially true of the kind of artist he called "visionary," those with startling prescience, like Goethe and Joyce—and certainly this strange, lonely, ailing, productive genius that was Nietzsche.

Jung saw in Nietzsche one who had greatly assisted in the nineteenth-century discovery of the unconscious, thus constituting an exception to Freud's complaint that philosophers pay attention only to the purely mental side of life. But Freud was unwilling to read

Zarathustra, even though he sensed the ways in which Nietzsche had anticipated some of his own ideas, for fear that he be unduly influenced by ideas that were merely speculative rather than grounded in empirical practice. Jung on the other hand was always delighted to discover anticipators of any sort: they seemed somehow to contribute an advance confirmation of his own expression of what he took to be archetypally grounded ideas.

This present volume appears at a time when Nietzsche's reputation has reached a new height. In his own short lifetime—he had a little over fifteen years of mature, creative work before his breakdown in 1889—he was one more gossiped about or ignored than taken seriously. Many of his writings he had to publish out of his own slender resources. Only right at the last was he beginning to be recognized by a few important people outside the narrow circle of his acquaintances: August Strindberg, Georg Brandes, Hippolyte Taine. Yet his mental collapse made it all too easy to dismiss his ideas as brilliant but—mad. Even as late as 1925, a popular history of philosophy textbook in America made no mention of Nietzsche in the march of nineteenth-century ideas; yet without always being acknowledged, Nietzsche had a notable effect on twentieth-century writers: Thomas Mann, Shaw, Lawrence, Remy de Gourmont, Heidegger, Jaspers—the list could go on and on. A hundred years after his birth, Nietzsche was to be recognized as a major thinker—and, more generally, writer.

The brilliance of his mind must have been apparent from early along. Once he found his academic specialization, classical philology, at Bonn and then Leipzig, he was recognized by his teachers and fellow students to be destined for high achievement, as is evident by his appointment to the University of Basel at the age of 24 with promotion to a full professorship a year later. Yet his first sizable work, the original *The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music*, was a disappointment to those who expected him to follow the lines of conventional scholarship. Here it was that Nietzsche established his identity with Dionysos, even though he balanced this god of music and darkness with Apollo, the patron of Greek sculpture, form, light. As a young man he was the faithful follower of Schopenhauer, and when he met Wagner, he found, as he thought, a living exemplar of the philosopher who taught that in music and the contemplation of the Eternal Ideas lay the only escape from the wheel of will to which we are all so miserably strapped. Both of these heroes were celebrated in his *Untimely Essays*, but it was not long before his idols began to tarnish. Schopenhauer, he came to think, was right in the importance that he attached to Will, but

wrong in not celebrating it in the form of Will to Power—by which Nietzsche meant especially the power of creative genius, grounded in the severest discipline. (“All creators are hard” was one way he put it.) Wagner he counted one of the greatest exemplars of artistic creativity, but unfortunately (Nietzsche came to think), there was in him a streak of decadence, a softness, a romantic weakness, even a sentimental nostalgia for Christianity: consider *Parsifal*.

Jung was to see in Nietzsche’s radical shifts of judgment what he called (taking the word from Heraclitus) *enantiodromia*, a pendulum swing from one judgment or belief to its opposite. He even cites as an example Nietzsche’s “deification and subsequent hatred of Wagner” (CW 6, par. 709). Nietzsche showed himself to be a fine teacher at Basel, but in only a few years the teaching duties proved too onerous for his delicately balanced organism. He had to take a leave, and not long after, to petition for a remarkably early retirement. The rest of his life he lived on a modest pension, enough to supply him board and room, pen and ink, and train tickets to carry him from Basel to Turin to Genoa to Nice to Venice, continually on the move in search of the right climate, which with a new diet, was ever his hope for relief from his miseries—blinding headache, indigestion, failing eyes, dizzy spells, insomnia, etc.—which were to be his lifelong lot. Worst of all was the loneliness. But as he became more and more the yea-sayer, he saw his loneliness and even his sickness as essential to the creative tasks he had set for himself; as he wrote, late in his conscious life, to Georg Brandes, “My illness has been my greatest boon: it unblocked me, it gave me the courage to be myself.” And *Zarathustra*, he called “a dithyramb to solitude.”

Although he was to go on to write the works reckoned by philosophers as his masterpieces—*The Genealogy of Morals*, *Beyond Good and Evil*, *Twilight of the Idols*, *The Anti-Christ*, *The Gay Science*—he always reckoned *Zarathustra* his greatest achievement, and it remains the favorite of most people who read Nietzsche at all. Composed, as he liked to say, six thousand feet beyond good and evil, if ever there was a work written out of inspiration, this is it. Each of the first three parts (which is as far as Jung’s seminar ever got) was written in about ten days, and for all of the work’s poetic style, it is quintessential Nietzsche.³ Here is the emergence of the self-announced immoralist, here is the will to power, here the eternal recurrence of the same, the death of god, and the overman.

³ The first two parts of *Zarathustra* appeared in 1883, the third in 1884, and the fourth, which gave Nietzsche more trouble, appeared in a privately printed edition of a mere forty copies in 1885.

INTRODUCTION

In the semi-legendary Persian prophet Zarathustra, he found his spokesman for the necessity of a complete reversal of mankind's attitudes, beliefs, and aspirations.⁴ Everything that has been revered—especially by Christians—was to be denounced and abandoned, and that which had been reviled was to be embraced and practiced. In what he called the “transvaluation of all values,” he celebrated not amoralism but what the western tradition has called immoralism and immorality. In renouncing the antithesis of good and evil, he embraced the opposition of good and bad.

What is good? Everything that heightens the feeling of power in man, the will to power, power itself. What is bad? Everything that is born of weakness.

This particular formulation came later, but the sentiment, the idea, is already in *Zarathustra*.

Although he prided himself on having “unlearned self-pity,” it would have required an overman (which Nietzsche made no claim to be) not to be devastated by the silence that greeted what he knew to be a major work. (In 1876 he reported that each part had sold sixty or seventy copies!) To compensate for the neglect of others, he found it necessary, it seems, to make ever stronger claims for himself: “the foremost mind of the century” was the way he put it four months before his collapse. But also, “With this Z[arathustra] I have brought the German language to a state of perfection.” Not Nietzsche at his most endearing, but the number who today find the boasts *not* ill-founded is impressive. Yet he had to settle for a self-assurance that his time would come: “Some people are born posthumously.” And no doubt that would mean interpreters. Here was another source of anxiety: almost better—maybe even really better—to be ignored than misunderstood. “If you should ever come around to writing about me,” he wrote to his friend Carl Fuchs (who was indeed tempted to do so),

... be sensible enough—as nobody has been till now—to characterize me, to “describe”—but not to “evaluate.” . . . I have never been characterized, either as a *psychologist* or as a *writer* (including *poet*), or as the inventor of a new kind of pessimism (a Dionysian pessimism born of strength, which takes pleasure in seizing the problem of existence by the horns), or as an *Immoralist* (the highest form, till now, of “intellectual rectitude,” which is permitted to

⁴ Nietzsche was later to say to a friend that perhaps his title should have been *The Temptation of Zarathustra*, very possibly thinking of Jesus' temptation in the wilderness.

treat morality as illusion, having itself become *instinct* and *inevitability*).

Many have indeed characterized and described Nietzsche, but few have minded his plea not to evaluate. Certainly Jung's whole bent as a psychotherapist was to look beyond the words by which men and women pronounce their truths and exalt their ideals to other signs of the quality of life being led.

When Jung began his *Zarathustra* seminar, Nietzsche, dead a third of a century, was becoming famous. Many biographies had been written, including one by Nietzsche's own sister. His philosophical acumen was being increasingly recognized, interpreted, and taught. His mastery of the German language was receiving ever greater recognition. Even his own claims to being a psychologist (than which he could imagine no greater calling) were receiving grudging recognition, at least by those in the traditions of Depth Psychology. But there was also the alarming spectacle of Nietzsche's being trumpeted as a prophet for National Socialism. Jung knew this claim to be based on a complete misunderstanding: consider Nietzsche's contempt for nearly everything German, his hatred of anti-Semitism, his exposure of "the neurosis called Nationalism." Or this:

As soon as war breaks out anywhere, there also breaks out precisely among the noblest people a pleasure that, to be sure, is kept secret . . . ; war offers them a detour to suicide, but a detour with a good conscience.

All the same, there were bound to be those who would jump to the conclusion that lectures on Nietzsche were a kind of attempt to give the Nazis an intellectual justification. Perhaps even more dangerous were those Nazi sympathizers in Switzerland and elsewhere who might claim as allies any student of Nietzsche.

It is perhaps not easy for those distanced from the intensity of political and economic feelings in the thirties, to understand that even this little seminar, devoted to psychological analysis, was not exempt—who was?—from the growing sense of the inevitability of a dreadful war, with the outcome uncertain—for perhaps it *was* to be Deutschland (in its new guise) "Über Alles." These seminar notes evidence over and again an uneasy awareness even in this protected environment of the violence abroad in Europe. Certainly Jung was intensely conscious of the importance of *Zarathustra* as a foreshadowing of the cataclysm about to overtake Europe and the world. Late in the seminar he said, "Perhaps I am the only one who takes the trouble to go so much into

the detail of *Zarathustra*—far too much, some people may think. So nobody actually realizes to what extent he was connected with the unconscious and therefore with the fate of Europe in general.”

For all the tension of the times, Jung was busy as ever. In addition to this seminar, he was conducting another in German on children's dreams. He was traveling: to London to deliver the Tavistock Lectures; to Yale University to deliver the Terry Lectures, *The Psychology of Religion*; and to India, where he was awarded three honorary doctorates. And he was writing, of course: “A Review of the Complex Theory,” “Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious,” “Individual Dream Symbolism in Relation to Alchemy,” “What is Psychotherapy?” “The Practical Use of Dream Analysis,” “The Development of Personality,” “Yoga and the West”—to mention only some of his publications dating from this time. He had a large clinical practice. There was his annual Swiss military duty to perform. He was *paterfamilias* to a large household. Besides a running correspondence with many friends, he was generous in answering queries and prayers for advice from strangers who wrote him from all parts of the world. Yet year after year Jung continued as a teacher, particularly in this format that had established itself over the years: the group of twenty-five or thirty carefully selected persons, with a strong central core of veterans, who would hear the lectures and participate in the discussion on those magical Wednesday mornings. Yet in these troubled times, there were those who would raise a question about whether to continue the *Zarathustra* seminar: wouldn't it be better and not so distressingly charged to move to a quieter subject, say Goethe's *Fairy Tales*? But a vote came out in favor of continuing with *Zarathustra*, and so Jung went on to wrestle and dance with the immensely complex psyche of Nietzsche.

The written confrontation of giants in intellectual history is always fascinating and often exceedingly illuminating: Plato and Socrates, Aristotle and Plato, Aquinas and Aristotle, and so on down to more recent times: Hegel and Marx, Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, Jung and Freud. Interestingly, Nietzsche seems to have had a particularly magnetic quality for some of the finest intellects of the twentieth century: thus both Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger wrote voluminously on this most provocative of thinkers. And then—now—Jung and Nietzsche.

Always in these confrontations of peers there are affinities—otherwise, why bother? Listen to Aristotle say, “We Platonists.” And for a time, Jung said, “We Freudians.” Jung could *not* have said, “We Nietzscheans,” yet he shared much with Nietzsche. Both were haunted by Christianity. Alike, they were elitists—not on trivial grounds of

wealth, family, class, race, but with respect to intelligence, understanding, and consciousness. For Nietzsche, who self-consciously addressed his works to "the very few," the great distinction was between the slave morality of accommodation, appeasement, mercy, forgiveness, turning the other cheek, *and* the morality of the masters, the overmen. Jung, too, often said that in terms of their conscious development, most people have not got beyond the Middle Ages and thus, perhaps, should be left slumbering in their family parlors and church pews. For both Jung and Nietzsche, the road to individuation—to use Jung's term—is lonely and rough, especially if there is a widespread lack of understanding of, even of belligerence toward, the mission. Thus, at times, each had a sense of being, as Nietzsche put it, posthumous.

Alike they were contemptuous of hedonism, the philosophy of comfort, pleasure, satisfaction. Both—though neither would have put it this way—were in the existentialist tradition of belief that without conflict and suffering, consciousness is doomed to stagnation and regression. Both sought, instead, for a philosophy and psychology (if they would admit a difference between the two) whose test is simply but richly this: does it conduce to a life rich in fulfilment, attainment, even transcendence to a realm of integration beyond what is reachable from the comfortable couches of everydayness. Theirs, alike, was a philosophy of darkness, no less than light, a celebration of the Dionysian spirit wherein is found the scariness of the unconscious with its alarming dreams which are yet the great source of human creativity. Both deplored and regretted—yet acknowledged the prevalence of—what Nietzsche called "the diminished personality" with its cautiously expurgated conception of what is real and important. They agreed that no one's intellectual or artistic achievement can be understood or fairly assessed without regard for the whole self of the creator. Thus, listen to Jung's applause for Nietzsche's claim: "I have always written my works with my whole body and life"—this in contesting any such thing as a merely intellectual problem. Both were, in Jung's terms, highly developed in intuition and thinking; both were introverts. Both acknowledged their debt to Heraclitus, Goethe, Schopenhauer, and Dostoevsky. Jung would have rejoiced in Nietzsche's equating greatness in a man with his "comprehensiveness, and multiplicity, his wholeness in manifoldness—how much and how many things a person could bear and take upon himself, how far a person could extend his responsibility." Nietzsche anticipated Jung as to the part of the psyche that is an *it* (Freud's *id*), something that dreams, anticipates, thinks, but is below the level of the subject-ego. And what must have been the astonishment on the part of the inventor of Archetypal Psychology when he

encountered Nietzsche's praise of Siegfried: "A marvelously accurate, archetypal youth." Or better yet, of the *Ring*: "A tremendous system of thought without the conceptual forms of thought"—an extraordinary description of the archetype. Their important differences will come out, as never before, in the long commentary that lies ahead in this book, but two important disagreements between these thinkers may be mentioned here. The first is that for the one, the aesthetic dimension of life was of primary importance, for the other, the religious. It is no accident that the one overwhelmingly important friendship in Nietzsche's life was with a musician—indeed a musician whose great ambition was to make his operas (or as he preferred to say, "music dramas") transcend the trivialities of public entertainment, to become grand syntheses of music, literature, visual design, dance, mythology, and philosophy. Nietzsche wholly agreed with the aspiration, and if he became disillusioned with the all-too-human Wagner, it was because Wagner finally also wanted to include religion—worst of all, Christianity. Like Nietzsche, Jung was a pastor's son and both can be easily seen as in revolt against the pieties of their early households. Still Jung, unlike Nietzsche, saw in the various religions of the world an inescapable and often profound attempt to symbolize man's eternal quest for meaning. Against Nietzsche (and Freud) Jung believed that the great world religions represent brave attempts to grasp the nature of the soul and the possibilities—albeit dreadfully remote—of salvation. Thus, to neglect the profound questions of the origins and destinies of human consciousness is as self-defeating as neglecting dream and myth.

If Aeschylus and Shakespeare and Goethe are no less worth our time and energy than are the prophets and gurus, it is because they share the latter's concern with the ultimate questions, not because of a highly developed aesthetic capability or a mastery of the grand style. We can imagine Jung smiling in agreement with Nietzsche's little poem that says, "I am naught but a word maker," yet would Nietzsche have smiled in return, "Is it not written, 'In the beginning was the word' "? Certain it is that Nietzsche's career-long effort—almost desperate in its intensity—to achieve, for each of his multifarious purposes, the right style, the ultimate way of integrating form and content, was an *idée fixe*, one Jung could hardly share or condone.

Another great parting of the ways for these men comes out clearly in an early criticism by Jung: agreeing as to the necessity of not losing touch with the instincts (for instance, through excessive intellectualization or other forms of spirituality), they differed as to the best path toward a higher level. Nietzsche undoubtedly