A New History of Educational Philosophy

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Preface

The first preface for this book was written some ten years ago while I was at the University of Hawaii on sabbatical leave. After my work in Hawaii it was impossible for me to believe that educational philosophy was connected to philosophy through some simple line of intellectual descent—the way the story is usually recounted. Between 1983 and 1986 I spent my time trying to disassemble my understandings about the origins of philosophy of education acquired in graduate school and trying to formulate a more useful and interesting construct with which to replace them. I found it a great deal easier to lose my faith than to find something to replace it with.

The impulse to write a different and new history of educational philosophy came from Stephen Toulmin's *Human understanding* (1972) and Harold Silver's *Education as history* (1983). Toulmin's idea of intellectual professions and their embodiment in various organizations—"The Professional Embodiment of Science"—was immediately suggestive. I began to investigate the possibility that the origins of educational philosophy were better attached to the organizations of its embodiment than to their annotated bibliographies. Further, Silver's work called my attention to the connection between the 1890s social reform movement, social science, and education—and therein educational philosophy. It was apparent that the origins of educational philosophy were tied not only to the professional organization of its embodiment but also to the social reform movement and social science as well. The work of Toulmin and Silver convinced me that educational philosophy had a much broader intellectual parentage than was commonly acknowledged. What followed from those two insights is this book, which is an intellectual history of the type Richard Rorty claims as his own. He writes, "In my

sense intellectual history consists of descriptions of what the intellectuals were up to at a given time, and their interaction with the rest of society—descriptions which, for the most part, bracket the questions of what activities which intellectuals were conducting" (1984, 68). It is also a history of educational philosophy. It is doxography, an attempt to settle the question of who is a philosopher of education, what works deserve the honorific title of educational philosophy, and so on. In this version of the discipline the central issues are these: What intellectual activities have educational philosophers concerned themselves with? What strands of common interest unite the discipline? Is such and such stance correct? All of these concerns are central to this book.

This book is also an anthropology of the discipline. In this sense,

> What we want to be told is whether that tribe has anything interesting to tell us—interesting by *our* lights, answering to *our* concerns, informative about what *we* know to exist. Any anthropologist who rejected this assignment on the grounds that filtering and paraphrase would distort and betray the integrity of the tribe's culture would no longer be an anthropologist, but a sort of cultist. He is, after all, working for *us*, not for *them*. (Rorty, Schneewind, and Skinner, 1984, 6-7)

As both anthropologist and cultist in one guise I hope no more than for the book to be "interesting by *our* lights, answering to *our* concerns, informative about what *we* know to exist" (Rorty, Schneewind, and Skinner, 1984, 6-7). In the guise of a cultist I hope it can suggest a version of educational philosophy that is less self-referential and less constrained by its history and its intellectual present. In this genre the book is more educational philosophy than educational history.

Several people have helped both directly and indirectly in the writing of this book and I would like to acknowledge their assistance. First and foremost I would like to acknowledge the technical assistance of Bonnie Ann Rasmussen who edited draft after draft of this manuscript—over the entire ten years of its writing. The other large debt that I must acknowledge is to Professor Alan Cumming an eminent department chair who supported this work during its early years when the project was very new and very fragile. I should also thank Tony Welch and other colleagues at the Department of Social and Cultural Studies in Education, University of New England in Australia, who provided intellectual support during those early days, and thank my colleagues in the Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia who thoughtfully discussed and offered constructive criticisms of several papers that foreshadowed various sections of this book.

In Britain I would like to thank Professor Paul Hirst, who granted me a sabbatical place at the University of Cambridge, Department of Education, where I concluded researching various aspects of philosophy

of education in Britain. T. H. McLaughlin offered his personable assistance while I was at Cambridge and provided me with an opportunity to test my ideas at a meeting of the Cambridge Branch of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain. After I returned to the United States, McLaughlin, acting as secretary of the British society, provided important archival records, for which I am very grateful. I would also like to note the assistance of John and Pat White at the Institute of Education, University of London. Pat was particularly instrumental in assisting me to gain access to an unpublished autobiography of L. A. Reid. I would also like to thank Nicholas Reid and Dr. F. M. Reid, Professor Reid's widow, for providing access to the autobiography.

In the United States I would like to acknowledge the support of my colleagues in the Southeast Philosophy of Education Society. The support of Robert Sherman at the University of Florida, C. J. B. (Jim) Macmillan at Florida State University, and Joe L. Green, at Louisiana State University in Shreveport was both timely and effective. They all offered professional and intellectual support in the last days of the project—at a time when it was sorely needed.

At this point it is also important to note the support of my colleagues in the Philosophy of Education Society in the United States. Denis Phillips at Stanford University assisted me in obtaining a sabbatical place at Stanford where I concluded research on the United States section of this book. Denis was as always the generous scholar and gentleman; I remember his assistance well. I would also like to thank Gerald Reagan and Richard Pratte at Ohio State University, who offered their general comments and support for this project over the years. I would also like to note the important counterpoint Harvey Siegel at the University of Miami provided for my work. My inability to convince Harvey of the central thesis of this work and his continued cheerful willingness to listen to my argument as the project evolved was a constructive element in this intellectual endeavor.

I would like to thank Edward Beauchamp at the University of Hawaii who suggested a publisher for this book. Finally I need to acknowledge my colleagues at Auburn University whose generous support and encouragement allowed me to concentrate on this work.

At this point I must also acknowledge my indebtedness to the editors of *Educational Philosophy and Theory, Educational Studies, Harvard Educational Review,* and the *Journal of Education* for allowing me to republish materials from those journals. The articles were these: James S. Kaminsky. 1986. "The first 600 months of philosophy of education—1935–1985: A deconstructionist account." *Educational Philosophy and Theory* (18) 2; 1988. "The first 600 months . . . revisited: A response to

Harris." *Educational Philosophy and Theory* (20) 1; 1988. "Philosophy of education in Australasia: A definition and a history." *Educational Philosophy and Theory* (21) 1; 1991. "Some antecedents of educational philosophy in Britain with particular reference to social science." *Educational Studies* (17) 3; 1992. "A pre-history of educational philosophy in the United States: 1861 to 1914." *Harvard Educational Review.* (62) 2; and 1992. (*in press*) "A new history of philosophy of education in the United States: A prologue." *Journal of Education.*

Introduction

What is offered here is a new history of philosophy of education.[1] It is a history from the bottom up (see Stearns, 1988, 3-6). It is an international history.[2] While this is not a people's history of educational philosophy, it is at least a social history. Philosophy of education did not reach its mature form and standing in the premier research universities of America upon the shoulders of any one individual. This new international history maintains that the dialogues of educational philosophy can be best understood by reference to the broader intellectual, social, and political movements that were related to the practice of the discipline and to the individuals who were a part of or contributed to those movements than by reference to the arguments of its extended bibliographies alone. This study calls attention to the importance of the profession's "external" structures while remembering the significance of its "internal" logics. It acknowledges the profession's "inner circle," but it is also interested in the actors who were not part of the inner circle and in the relevant literature that did not flow from the inner circle. In an even more heretical tone, it claims a centrality for a literature that can only tacitly be called philosophical.

What is intellectually deceptive in contemporary and influential accounts of the discipline's prologue is the intimation that its antecedents are to be found in the internal logic of philosophy (e.g. Price, 1967, 230-243). While it must be conceded that certain comments on education share a certain literary style (turgid, prolix, and self-referential), intellectual genealogies (Greek and Roman), and doxologies (metaphysical and epistemological), upon close inspection it must also be granted that the concerns and reservoir of questions that

constitute the discipline's first forms are as closely tied to the idea and possibility of social reform (the elimination of poverty, hunger, disease, drunkenness, ignorance, crime, and corruption) and the invention of social science (amelioration versus theory production) as they are to the intellectual history of philosophy.

The present rehearsal of educational philosophy's genesis is concerned with the manner in which social, cultural, and historical pressures affected and, in some sense, created the educational discipline that we know as philosophy of education, more than it is with the internal logic of its natural history and annotated bibliographies (cf. Passmore, 1967b). Educational philosophy is a complex discipline that has many points of contact with the intellectual and social movements of its period of genesis. There are several elements in its prologue: (1) the intellectual work of Herbert Spencer; (2) Victorianism; (3) the social reform movement of the 1890s; (4) social science; (5) the new class; (6) philosophy; and perhaps most important, (7) the institutions (professional societies) of its establishment.

NONTRADITIONAL PERSPECTIVE

There are real advantages in thinking about philosophy of education from a nontraditional perspective. First (at the risk of belaboring the point), this approach separates the history of philosophy of education from the history of philosophy and calls attention to why it is useful to distinguish between the work of the two. Second, by focusing upon mechanism (the societies that are constitutive of educational philosophy's invisible college), the discipline's history can be extracted from its schizophrenic relationship with philosophy while still retaining a constructive link with philosophy, social science, and the schools. Third, this approach argues for reshaping the reservoir of questions that is constitutive of educational philosophy's program of research and, in most instances, for allotting the questions of philosophy to departments of philosophy. It also calls attention to a natural audience—professional educators. Last, it points the way toward a more productive relationship with the schools and professional educators.

A history of educational philosophy cannot be told without reference to philosophy, but more important, it cannot be retold without reference to its own history, the history of social science, and the intellectual matrix in which that history occurred. The natural history of philosophy of education does not exhibit a seamless link with philosophy. Various philosophical tracts partially pertaining to

matters of education can be traced at least back to Plato in the Western intellectual tradition (see Ulich, [1947] 1982) but its intellectual pedigree cannot be traced with reference only to philosophy.

PROTO-PHILOSOPHY

It is best to consider timeworn philosophical tracts concerned with education as a proto-philosophy of education. They share a certain literary style and language with educational philosophy, but they do not share the industrial context or the concern with social and political reform of industrial capitalism. In other words, philosophy is part of a different pool of questions that only overlaps the questions of educational philosophy. For some purposes it makes perfect sense to attribute educational philosophy to philosophy in general, if not to academic philosophy, given their common literary and linguistic styles. But this narrow view only can be maintained, however, by neglecting educational philosophy's important connections with social science, social reform, and political action. The social reform movement of the 1890s and social science provided a focused intellectual arena for the moral, social, and philosophical issues of schooling.

The questions raised in classical literature of philosophy were about a different set of questions and answers. For example, Plato's *Republic* and Aristotle's *Politics* essentially addressed education in aristocratic, agricultural, city–states. Although these texts had a certain metaphorical or analogical usefulness for Victorian social and educational concerns, they did not fit the reservoir of questions produced by industrial society: the questions of political economy generated by the acute poverty of its slums or the questions of social organization generated by urbanization.

UNITED STATES

The economic and demographic origins of American educational philosophy are found in the period following the Civil War. The industrial revolution, urbanization, and the concentration of wealth that followed the Civil War dissolved the agricultural society that had been at the core of America's social order.

The intellectual origins of modern educational philosophy can be traced first to Herbert Spencer and collaterally to Charles Darwin and Alfred Russell Wallace, cofounder with Darwin of evolutionary theory. They fundamentally changed traditional concepts of the world.

Spencer wrote compelling descriptions of the Victorian social order and its educational system and legitimized them with the technical power of Darwin's and Wallace's work. Spencer fundamentally affirmed evolutionary explanations of the social order and challenged classical concepts of an education. At the turn of the century America's middle class discovered Herbert Spencer's evolutionary theory. Just as the universe was moved by evolution—a process containing so many variables as to be unpredictable—so was human destiny. Moreover, just as the ultimate end of the universe was unknowable, so was the ultimate end of humanity. To Spencer's mind intervening in the evolutionary processes was either futile or mischievous. Social intervention merely interfered with the general process of evolution. Intervention in society created social turbulence just as intervention in the physical world created unforeseeable and in many instances harmful side effects; that is, intervention created costs (problems) without the possibility of anything more than the most transient benefit. Thus, the good intentions of social reforms and those dedicated to humanitarian reform were, despite their surface appearance, socially and morally pointless, if not harmful to the social order. In Spencer's fundamental scheme of things order was placed prior to welfare.

The fatalism of Spencer's work, its indifference to the situation of many Americans who found themselves the objects if not the victims of the nation's social and economic reorganization, as well as his vastly appealing (anticlassical) educational thought were the intellectual predicates of educational philosophy in America. Spencer made education a philosophical issue in the United States. Insofar as educational philosophy and pragmatism had a consistent and focused intellectual predicate, its predicate was mortgaged to the thought of Spencer, whose writings, particularly *Social statics* ([1851] 1969), *Education* ([1861] 1897), and *Principles of sociology* (1876–1896) were the wellspring of educational philosophy.

Educational philosophy's political economy—the manner in which formal, cultural, and social politics and economics interact so as to affect ideology or social orientation—reflected a social reform politics. Its political economy was the social democratic politics of Populism and Progressivism, just as it was a reaction against Spencer's social Darwinism. Thus, a certain solidarity was established between educational philosophy and those who did not possess social and economic privilege. The discipline's political economy was a justification for a rational educational solvent of the social and economic differences that existed between America's "haves" and "have-nots." It was a stance that was warranted by "the conviction [of

Populists and Progressives] that they were thus assuring social unity and progress" (Glenn, [1987] 1988, 9). The political economy of American educational philosophy can be traced to the complex interaction of industrialism and urbanization. Wrenching social and technological dislocations followed the Civil War and brought about unprecedented material distinctions that threatened to create a permanent under-class and a class of permanent advantage—a new aristocracy of wealth. At the same time in the United States, social dislocations generated a new intellectual class with its own technical and intellectual agendas.

America's new intellectual class was also part of the history of educational philosophy. The new class allied their interests with those of the common people and consolidated, among other things, a program for universal education, that is, the common school movement (see Glenn, [1987] 1988, 9). In part, educational philosophy became the intellectual and politically articulate voice of the movement during the period between the turn of the century and 1940. Educational philosophers hoped to secure social progress and order without the kind of apocalyptic confrontations that they had witnessed during the American Civil War. Educational philosophy became the voice of rational social reform and social construction within the university and the institution of schooling.

Industrialism and urbanization brought an inordinate educational commitment to the nineteenth century; what it lacked was an educational system to match the commitment evident in the rhetoric of the period. The idea of the common school can be traced at least back to the seminal work of Horace Mann (Glenn, [1987] 1988). But it was the Progressives who would bring the common school to life in modern form. Mann was committed to the establishment of a common school that would foster American patriotism outside of the divisive sentiments of the church and the social distinctions of European society. The Progressives were committed to taming industrial modernism and the social injustices that threatened the peace of the social fabric. The Progressives' version of the common school was committed to the creation of a just and fair democratic society. It would provide a place where individuals could find their place in the world on the basis of merit, not station. *Education became their general theory of action* (cf. Mills, 1964, 331, 391-423, 447).[3] Philosophy of education began in the belief that there should be public schools for everyone.

In the period before the Civil War American philosophy of education explicitly referred to Enlightenment contract theorists such as John Locke, Jeremy Bentham, and James and John Stuart Mill, just as it had reference to great republican revolutionaries such as Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, James Madison (Karier, [1967] 1986, 21-

42), and a group of less well-known American churchmen (Chambliss, 1968). Between the Civil War and World War I it referred to Herbert Spencer. After World War I—in its professionalized form—educational philosophy referred, normally, to the pragmatists: Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey.

Outside of academic circles influential educators such as William Torrey Harris—organizer of the St. Louis Philosophical Society and the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, superintendent of the St. Louis Schools, and most important, United States Commissioner of Education to Presidents Cleveland, McKinley, and Roosevelt—had reference to Hegel and explored his thought in his own journal and the *Journal of Social Science*. But in a very important sense Harris's Hegelianism was merely something to be transcended.

Progressives heard the call to arms in the work of "muckraking" novelists like Sinclair Lewis, Upton Sinclair, and Theodore Dreiser, the philosophy of the socialist Left. Muckraking novelists like Sinclair Lewis, Upton Sinclair, and Theodore Dreiser are all part of the discipline's early history. Thorstein Veblen's trenchant critique of business domination of the universities, *The higher learning in America* (1918), and Upton Sinclair's two polemics, *The goose-step* (1922) and *The goslings* (1924), are all part of a matrix that generated philosophy of education. They made fundamental education questions a public issue.

Philosophy also made its contribution to the discipline. American philosophy in general, and Peirce, James, and Dewey in particular, became increasingly disappointed with classicism and Hegelian idealism. By the same token they were increasingly at odds with Herbert Spencer's evolutionary metaphysics. Although they were initially fascinated by its materialism and naturalism and its unified theory of science, its implicit social fatalism and seeming indifference to the human condition alienated them from Spencer's work. Spencer marginalized mind, discounting it to the naturalistic functions of evolutionary forces. The pragmatists could not accept a philosophy that had no place for a vigorous voluntarism and abandoned the human condition to the "ghost in the machine."

At the turn of the century, both Charles Sanders Peirce and William James struggled to construct a more active and independent version of mind, and John Dewey integrated a radical (at least in comparison to existing academic conventions) democratic politics and a social conscience into the constitutive elements of pragmatism. Dewey argued for the school as a device for social reform, a device of social action. In the same manner as the radical utilitarians, Peirce, James, and Dewey all believed in the power of rationality and philosophy. But Dewey's

faith seemed particularly strong ([1920] 1950). He instrumentalized that faith in his investigations of education (e.g. Dewey, [1899] 1959; 1902b; [1916] 1966; 1938). His stance was consistent with the best socialist, utilitarian, Fabian, and utopian tracts. The work of Peirce, James, and Dewey was a new beginning—or at least a strong set of new brackets—that abandoned Spencer's conservative social perspective just as it abandoned Hegelian idealism.

The twentieth century in America witnessed the fruition of the common school movement. It also marked the emergence of the belief that education could be investigated as a "laboratory science" as well as a new awareness that schooling was intimately involved in the nation's social order. These events as a part and function of the social reform movement of the 1890s "brought the talents of John Dewey and a group of less publicly known scholars and teachers that formed the backbone of the progressive movement in education" (Eaton, 1975, 73) into the public arena.

In the hands of Dewey and his colleagues at Chicago and Columbia, educational philosophy became the device for the realization of the fact and promise of the common school. As Glenn ([1987] 1988, 4-5) reminds us, on one level the common school agenda was a matter of providing free, secular, and universal education—public schools for all the children of a community, not schools of churches, religious foundations, and private enterprise. On another level it had to do with producing the common attitudes, loyalties, and values necessary for forging a new nation. And on still another level it had to do with the establishment of the schools as a public institution for transcending the unprecedented material distinctions brought about by the generation and concentration of vast wealth during the Civil War, wealth that threatened to create a permanent underclass in American society and that appeared to threaten the egalitarian and democratic focus of America's social order. In a sense then, the history of educational philosophy is part of a reconstructionist politics of community and social and economic opportunity.

In the period between the turn of the century and World War II reference must be made to the Great Depression. It was the catalyst that drove the discipline in the 1930s and explains its tryst with social radicalism of all varieties, just its unsuccessful tryst points the way toward its obsession with metaphysics, epistemology and analysis.

Further, the discipline's modern development cannot be rehearsed without reference to the sixties and its counterculture, writers and musicians, civil rights activists, and antiwar protesters. Included in this group are Richard Nixon's "Silent Majority"; writers and poets such as Tom Wolfe and Bob Dylan; activists such as Martin Luther

King, Jr., Malcolm X, Todd Gitlin, Abbie Hoffman, Angela Davis, and Herbert Marcuse, who authored the popular American statement of the ideology of the academic American New Left; Arlo Guthrie's gentle cinematographic icon of the "folk years," *Alice's restaurant, M.A.S.H.* (the movie), the rockopera *Hair,* and its less profane counterpart *Jesus Christ superstar* consolidated the zeitgeist of the sixties. During the sixties both America and educational philosophy changed fundamentally.

GREAT BRITAIN

Educational philosophy's evolution in Great Britain is not simple or straightforward. It does not boast a solitary intellectual accomplishment that foreshadowed the discipline's mature form. But it does have a discrete starting point: its professional organization in the mid-1960s. (cf. Larson, 1977, 208). Its antecedents can be traced back to the Enlightenment, but its modern configuration was largely an event of the social and intellectual politics of the period following World War II.

During the reign of Queen Victoria, toward the end of the nineteenth century, the schools and education were beginning to find their way into social and intellectual discourse. The topic was part of a general social concern about the apparently desperate and intractable social and economic conditions being generated by industrialism. It was part of a more general discussion of political economy and social reform. But for the most part it was about finding tangible political solutions for the amelioration of the suffering and smoldering anger generated by the industrial world.

Educational philosophy's history in Britain has a complex and amorphous prologue. Social, cultural, intellectual, and historical pressures created a concern for social reform, and therein education. The conservative reaction to Victorian liberalism and radicalism, that is the Victorian response to the issues of social reform, established the reservoir of educational questions with which moral philosophy and political economy would contend during this period. The reaction also separated social science (and education) from philosophy. In other words, it created the possibility of education as a separate discipline just as it created the possibility of educational philosophy as an academic enterprise outside of moral philosophy and political economy. Conversely, questions of social, economic, and political reform provided whatever reference philosophy retained with education.

The study of social science (in the singular) and therein the study of education found collective public representation in the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, an umbrella organization dedicated to social welfare founded in 1856. Its membership list extended to peers, MPs, fellows of the Royal Society, various baronets, knights, ministers of the Church of England, statisticians, administrators, reformers, politicians, and moral philosophers.[4] It was the association that was responsible for initiating a systematic study of society and its institutions—education among them.[5] Education's central role in this organization quite probably helped delay its establishment within the university until well after World War II.

In the time between the close of the Victorian period and the end of World War II government and the university establishment were the only sources of patronage capable of sustaining the academic study of education or its collateral superstructure, social science. Neither was interested in supporting the systematic study of education. The poverty-stricken teachers colleges were barely capable of supporting themselves let alone sponsoring an intellectual and professional initiative such as educational philosophy (cf. McNair, 1944, 13; Stewart, 1989, 69). Since neither sinecure was available to educational philosophy, insofar as the discipline took shape at all, it did so around an endless list of government reports and royal commissions and did so through the lives of a handful of highly charismatic individuals: James and John Stuart Mill and elitist liberals such as Beatrice and Sidney Webb, John Ruskin, H. G. Wells, George Bernard Shaw, Bertrand Russell, and the great intellectual families of Britain.

Prior to the 1960s educational philosophy was a "discipline in waiting." It could not emerge while educational philosophy's tasks were dispersed among diverse elements of the social reform movement, Britain's intellectual elite, and the civil service establishment. World War II provided the predicate for a systematic reappraisal of education's fundamental assumptions in Britain; the war brought a social environment in which the easy Victorian answers to social problems were less compelling and also brought a lower class that was unwilling to return to a time "before the war." Politically enfranchised and active in a way that they had never been before, the lower classes found patent political responses less plausible than they had seemed previously. This matrix of events suggested a reorganization of British society just as it suggested an intellectual reorganization of the ancient universities and the system in which they were the keystone (Marwick, 1982, 94-155; Stewart, 1989). The ancient universities were

compelled to find a place for social science and a collateral—if not internal—place for the study of education and the training of teachers.

The discipline's prologue is important because it explains how the condition of Britain's wider social and intellectual order conditioned the fund of questions that would define the educational philosophy that R. S. Peters and Paul Hirst wrote and the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain developed (cf. Toulmin, 1969, 26). Although the social reform movement of the 1890s and the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science generated the same fund of questions that helped inspire philosophy of education in the United States, this reservoir of questions and answers germane to social reform did not find a "susceptible" environment in Britain. Although the educational philosophy was "ripe," the absence of a university environment that was, for all intents and purposes, supportive of education delayed the university study of the discipline. In a sense the discipline's prologue is an account of opportunities that were not taken up and an account of a conservative response to a quantity of fundamental research questions appropriated by the social reform movement and therein social science. Essentially, the discipline's history is a display of establishment solidarity and resistance.

Educational philosophy's modern British form was foreshadowed by a complex interaction of biography, enduring intellectual acts, and social movements. As in the United States, it is a discipline of mixed parentage. But British philosophy of education evolved out of a stronger link with academic philosophy than did its American counterpart. Under the guidance of R. S. Peters it was methodologically radical and intellectually conservative. It was more at home with a classical version of education than it was with the social reform versions of education evolving out of Wilson's Labour politics. The discipline in the United States had strong and immediate links with the social reform movement and therein social science. The discipline in Britain did not adopt similar linkages but maintained a strong allegiance to philosophy. British educational philosophy was a reaction to the attempt of social science to appropriate the language and thereby the study of education to itself. Of course, the establishment of educational philosophy in Britain was at least partially an attempt to attach the status and academic standards of philosophy onto teacher education.

The evolution of the discipline was erratic. But it would be wrong to claim that this was an effect of inadequate intellectual resources. Individuals of great intellectual capacity and accomplishment were deeply concerned with problems of education and, collaterally, social problems at every level of generality.[6] The critical difficulty was