

JAPAN'S AGGRESSION
AND
PUBLIC OPINION

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FOREWORD

THIS publication is not Chinese propaganda, nor is it a reproduction of arguments and opinions for or against a doubtful issue. It is a collection of a certain number of articles on the present Sino-Japanese conflict, written by disinterested parties whose integrity and judgment are unassailable and whose considered opinion always constitutes the weight of authority on the subject they deal with. These articles are devoted to a situation which, to the whole civilized world, is susceptible of but one interpretation: it is aggression pure and simple by one member against another member of the Family of Nations; it is might *versus* right, the strong and vicious attempting to annihilate the weak and virtuous. Reprinted here in their original form, these articles are only a small part of the voluminous literature which has appeared in every country since the beginning of Japan's armed invasion of China, wholly uninspired and unsolicited, but out of a common conviction of what is right and what is wrong. They also reflect the trend of current thought of countless men and women in the world, which has found expression in the spontaneous voicing of their sympathetic sentiments towards China, but which has not been transformed into print. This volume may therefore be rightly considered to contain the verdict pronounced by the bar of public opinion on the bloody conflict now raging in East Asia.

It is hoped that future historians will make use of the material here presented in recording the events that have been taking place in this part of the world. A perusal of the following pages shows unmistakably how the conflict arose; how nobly and tenaciously China has defended herself against the invader; what pledges have been broken and what treaties have been trampled underfoot by Japan; what atrocities committed by Japan's soldiery have left an indelible blot on the civilization of humanity; and why China is destined to win the final victory and why Japan is bound to collapse when the day of reckoning arrives. The reading matter of to-day for the enlightenment of the contemporary public will be the main source from which springs true knowledge for the education of posterity.

Hsu Mo,

Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs.

PREFACE

THE present collection of fifty-seven articles selected from leading British and American periodicals, and also from a few of the most important ones published in China and elsewhere, embody intelligent and unbiased interpretations of the Sino-Japanese conflict by some of the most outstanding authorities on the Far East. Fully to indicate the trend of public opinion abroad, articles by Chinese writers have purposely been excluded. In making our selection, hundreds of magazine articles have been carefully perused, and the present collection will, we believe, give the reader the alpha and omega on all phases of the Sino-Japanese struggle.

Readers of these articles will invariably be impressed by the precarious situation into which Japan has plunged herself through the intrepid undertaking of her own warlords on the one hand, and the consolidated and growing strength of Chinese resistance on the other. The Japanese people are disillusioned and the army is baffled by the stubbornness and courage of the Chinese soldiers in the act of defending their national honour and existence.

The economic resources of Japan are more and more exhausted as the war is prolonged. A year of relentless campaign against a comparatively weak but determined country finds the Island Empire, inspired by an insatiable lust for more territory and manacled by military terrorism, not only still remote from her goal, but also sinking deeper and deeper into the morass from which it is extremely hard to extricate herself.

In China there is an increasing conviction that right will finally overcome might and, as the war of attrition is protracted, there has been manifested in the whole nation an indomitable will and power of resistance to the bitter end, in spite of China's immense sacrifice which is the greatest she has ever experienced in the course of her long history. In the midst of unparalleled tribulations, the Chinese people are fighting with courage and persistence to free themselves from Japanese aggression and to stand before the world as defender of democracy and human decency.

To the sympathetic onlookers, between a united China and a desperate and frustrated aggressor, the future course of events is not hard to foretell; but our readers may form their own conclusions

regarding the outcome of the Far Eastern situation. Having observed the first anniversary of the commencement of our war of resistance, we cannot but hope that effective measures will eventually be adopted by democratic powers to stop and end this inhuman war of aggression in order that international peace and justice may be restored.

In the formation of this volume, hearty thanks are due to various publishers who have given special permission for the reproduction of these articles. Credit should be given to the staff of the Library of the National Southwest Associated University in the work of selection and compilation.

T. L. YUAN.

KUNMING, CHINA,

JULY 7, 1938.

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PART I

BACKGROUND OF
JAPANESE AGGRESSION
AND
IMPERIALISM

CONFLICT IN THE EAST AND IN THE WEST

By HARRY PAXTON HOWARD

THE present Sino-Japanese War (not officially declared as yet) is closely linked with developments in the Western world, and indeed may be regarded as part of a world conflict, with a real World War looming as a possibility. This latter eventuality is by no means certain. None of the dictatorial states with world ambitions have a policy so fixed, with relation to other states, that it may not undergo radical modifications if these seem advantageous. Each dictator or ruling group aims at the extension of its own power, and alliances are formed and campaigns launched as opportunities present themselves or can be created.

In the present war in the Far East the Japanese military have their own aims; they are certainly not undertaking the present costly adventure on behalf of any universal ideal. The Chinese Government likewise has its own aims, feeling the urgent necessity of resisting an invasion which threatens China with complete subjection by a foreign power. Neither Japan nor China, however, stands alone. Each looks to and draws strength from one or another quarter in the West. Neither Japan nor China, indeed, would dare enter upon such a struggle as the present one if isolated.

This situation is not wholly new. But in recent decades the world has been ever more closely linked together—by economic interests and by finance, by ever more rapid communication facilities, by the growing universalization of various political and social ideas as well as of cultures,—so that the bonds between East and West are stronger than ever before. East and West, indeed, are ceasing to exist as distinct entities. The twain have met. The East has obtained Western armaments and adopted Western militarization, and has lost its inferiority and erstwhile subjection to the West in these respects.

At the same time, however, it has been brought into the orbit of an increasingly organized and ever dwindling world, in which many states are slowly yielding their former sovereignty to international bodies and international agreements. In the words of Gilbert Murray :

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"The sovereign state is dying. . . . But it may take an unconscionable time in doing so: and a dying monster as it kicks and struggles in its agony may be a worse danger to all around it than when it was in full health."

And so at this time, with the nations of the world more dependent upon one another than at any previous stage in history, we find the most bitter and sanguinary wars which the world has ever known. But for the waging of these wars, some countries must depend to-day upon other countries. In some way, both Japan and China are more dependent upon Western countries than ever before. And Western developments are of greater moment here than they could have been at any previous period in history.

EARLIER CONFLICTS

Conflicts in the West, indeed, have long had repercussions in the Far East. The very first Western arrivals in China, the Portuguese, so worked up the distrust of the Ming Imperial officials against the British that the latter had finally to fight their way up to Canton. English and Dutch "warnings" against the Portuguese, and the opposition of rival sects to the Jesuits, were important factors in the closing of Japan to the West three hundred years ago. The struggle between the Jesuits of Portugal, on the one hand, and other Christian rulers and sects, on the other, for control of mission work in China, finally resulted in the general proscription of missionary activity in this country also—a century after Japan—breaking an important cultural link between China and the West. British attacks upon American ships in Chinese waters early in the nineteenth century embarrassed and involved the Chinese Government, as did also Britain's seizure of Macao from the Portuguese at that period; these incidents were important factors in preventing diplomatic relations between London and Peking until after actual conflict.

Western influences were of increasing importance to the East, and Western conflicts had increasingly serious repercussions here. The rivalry between British and French-American influence in Japan seventy years ago, when the leaning of the Shogun's Government towards the United States and France resulted in the whole weight of British influence being thrown on the side of the anti-Shogunate elements, was a serious factor in the Restoration, from which "modern Japan" dates. Subsequent endeavors by American diplomatic and consular officials to ingratiate themselves with Japanese military leaders led to their encouraging the Formosan expedition, almost leading to war between China and Japan, American and other Western diplomats

were also influential in preventing closer rapprochement between Japan and China at the time, which they feared might operate for the ending of Western privilege and the expulsion of Western influence from the Far East.

For a while the Western Powers, which had obtained extra-territorial privileges, control of Customs tariffs, concessions and settlements, etc., both in China and Japan, formed and maintained something of a common front towards the Far East, whatever the disputes dividing them in the West. Anglo-Russian rivalry, however, was of intermittent and increasing importance. At the time of the Sino-Japanese war in 1894, both England and Russia moved to check this new development with its uncertain consequences, but neither trusted the other, and America (approached by England) refused to intervene at all on behalf of Korea. There was, as a result, no united intervention by the Powers at the time. The Japanese, in fact, utilized the situation to obtain, by shrewd diplomacy, Britain's agreement to abandon extraterritorial privileges in Japan,—opening the way for such action by other Powers as well.

The terms of the Sino-Japanese treaty ending the war provided not only for the opening of some new ports, but also the right to establish industrial enterprises in China—a right of very little importance to the Japanese at the time, but of considerable importance to the British, who soon took advantage of it.

Subsequently, France and Germany joined Russia in the intervention which obliged Japan to retrocede to China the territory of southern Fengtien, which the Japanese had seized. Since that time the Japanese have made no important move without first securing their international position. They recognized the power of the West, and the situation there became of even greater importance to the East.

European intervention against the Japanese included the secret Russo-Chinese Alliance of 1896. New Russian privileges and concessions in China increased British suspicion and hostility, and towards the end of 1897 actual war threatened over whether Britain or Russia would make the next loan to China to pay her indemnity to Japan. The Japanese, missing no opportunity, supported the British, and though an amicable understanding was reached among the three at the expense of China, the Anglo-Japanese rapprochement continued and in 1920 became a formal alliance. The United States under President Theodore Roosevelt became an informal but influential member of this alliance, and when the Japanese finally considered the time ripe to drive into Manchuria and supplant the Russians there, they had both British and American diplomatic as well as financial support, Russia

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being all but isolated by the Anglo-French rapprochement and by Roosevelt's warning to European states not to intervene. American and British financial and diplomatic support assisted the Japanese to establish themselves in South Manchuria. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was supplemented in 1907 Japan's Entente with France, and subsequently by a friendly understanding which grew into a military alliance of Imperial Japan with Czarist Russia, furnishing firm support to the Japanese in their subsequent moves in China.

The General War of twenty years ago had momentous effects upon China and the East. The Foreign Powers in China had exercised a kind of hegemony through the old Diplomatic Corps—which in some ways appeared to be almost a "super-Government" over China securing from the abdicating Empire control of Customs funds and from Yuan Shih-kai control of Salt funds, financing Yuan against the Republic, etc.,—but the acerbities of the General War changed this. The Western Powers carried their conflict into China, splitting the Diplomatic Corps. The Allies obtained the support of Chinese militarists for a declaration of war against Germany,—a move which brought the forcible dissolution of the Chinese Parliament owing to its refusal to endorse such a declaration, thus ending all vestiges either of representative government or political unity in China. War being finally declared, Germans and other "enemy" nationals were deprived of all special privileges, concessions, etc., in China, and many were deported.

The Diplomatic Corps and foreign hegemony was further split and weakened by the Russian Revolution, with the conflict between Soviet Russia and the interventionist Powers. Soviet Russia not only renounced all special privileges of Russians in China, but strongly encouraged the Chinese to take such privileges away from the Western states against whose political and social systems the Bolshevists were at war. Some there were who saw in the Russian attempt to strike at Britain through China the revival of the old Anglo-Russian antagonism in a new form, and it was indeed notable that during the period of greatest Russian influence in China, from 1925 to the middle of 1927, the "anti-Imperialist movement" was almost wholly directed against Great Britain.

These struggles in the West, breaking up the foreign hegemony over China, resulted in considerable gains for Chinese sovereignty despite China's own political disunity at the time. There were, however, still other disputes in the West working out advantageously to China. The opposition of the British Dominions to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance—supplemented by America's strong disapproval of the pact—obliged the British Foreign Office to abandon it in 1922. Owing to

Western developments and conflicts Japan lost her most powerful allies—Czarist Russia in 1917 and Great Britain in 1922—and was compelled to retrocede Kiaochow and agree to Nine Power Treaty.

JAPAN AND EUROPE, 1931-1936

With the West at peace, Japan made no further important moves in China until 1931. At that time, however, the severe economic crisis in the West encouraged action, with the feeling that no Western Power would be sufficiently interested to intervene at such a time, and with the added assurance which came with the end of the Labor Government and the re-establishment of Conservatism in Britain in August 1931. Neither France, a close diplomatic ally with whom the 1907 Entente was still in force, nor Conservative Britain, would take any action to interfere through the League of Nations, whose Secretariat these two Powers dominated. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States was a member of the League, and these two Powers did not even possess diplomatic relations with one another; China itself did not possess diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The situation in the West was wholly favorable to Japan, and every advantage was taken of it.

The economic crisis had momentous political effects in the West, however, and since 1931 there have been serious changes in the European situation. It is the new situation there which has given the Japanese encouragement for their new drive, and also given the Chinese encouragement and unity for their new resistance. Previously the Japanese centered on Manchuria, where their interests have always been greater than those of any Western state (excepting Russia). But the Japanese drive is now into territory in which the reverse is the case, but where the Japanese do not hesitate to threaten the interests of puissant Western Powers. It is the present conflicts in the West, and Japan's alliances there, which give the Japanese confidence in their moves against Powers far stronger than themselves. The struggle in the East is more closely linked with that in the West than ever before, and the situation in Europe and the West generally is of the most vital importance to both China and Japan.

The establishment of Hitler's dictatorship in Germany in 1933 was the beginning of a chain of events leading to the present situation. The rise of the Nazis to power, however, was itself the result of international conditions. The Versailles Treaty of 1919 had not ended the war of 1914/18; it was a treaty of senseless revenge, effective only so long as the erstwhile victors held together and maintained their joint dominance. In some ways, it had restored pre-modern conditions which faced increasing difficulties, notably a nineteenth-century

nationalism. Instead of a more united Europe being created, the victors at Versailles turned the clock backward by "reviving" ancient states (such as Poland and Lithuania) and creating new ones (such as Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia), each able to block trade, to manœuvre diplomatically, and to intrigue politically. The Prussian and Austro-Hungarian Empires, instead of being democratized and linked with other European states in a United States of Europe, were actually broken up; the organization achieved by these Empires was undone, and Central Europe "Balkanized," France establishing a series of military alliances which would secure her hegemony over as much of the continent as possible, and at the same time weaken and crush the German people,—called upon despite their utter economic exhaustion from the War to pay heavy indemnities to the conquerors.

In this situation, the world economic crisis made itself felt in Central Europe with special intensity and with special effects. When American loans were cut off, the German Government was forced to make a desperate effort to pay "reparations" out of its own resources, despite a growing army of unemployed due to "rationalization," and intense depression on the home market caused by the lowered purchasing power of the people. Semi-starvation measures enforced by stern Government control, more than a decade after the "end" of war, stirred up fierce resentment and despair. Hitlerism and Communism, with their vehement opposition to "reparations" and to the democratic regime, rapidly gained converts, at times joining forces against the middle and finally making impossible the working of the "bourgeois democracy" which both fought against. As was inevitable, when the impasse came the conservative elements relinquished power to the Nazis, not to the Communists. First the Communists, then the Social-Democrats, were outlawed; Hitler and his Party, hand in hand with military leaders, became absolute rulers of Germany. From release from "reparations" and similar disabilities, the Nazi program expanded into one for rearmament as a Great Power, and a resumption of the old march towards hegemony in Central Europe and the regaining of colonies overseas. For propaganda purposes, the Nazis adopted a fiercely "anti-Communist" attitude; their violent denunciations of Bolshevism and of Soviet Russia gained them much sympathy among conservative and militarist elements elsewhere.

This vehement "anti-Communism" was an important factor in gaining the support of British Conservatives for German rearmament. Mussolini also, seeing new alliances and new fields of endeavor opening, similarly favored this rearmament. The armaments denied the German Republic, therefore, were permitted the Nazis. Indemnities ("reparations") had already been cancelled; the rearmed Germans

under the Nazis were permitted to re-enter the Rhineland; all German economic life, already impoverished and difficult, was devoted to the building up of German armaments and the establishment of German power in Europe and wherever else it seemed practicable. The Nazis' denunciation of Bolshevism gained them friends not only in the West but in the East—including many gullible Chinese. The more sophisticated, however, noted that the Rapallo Treaty with Soviet Russia linked Berlin with Moscow both by geographic and economic agreement, and was never denounced. The real German aims, in fact, lay elsewhere, in more vulnerable objectives than Soviet Russia.

Hitlerism, however, in view of the uncertain situation on Russia's eastern front, created considerable apprehension in Moscow. Japan's ambitions, and expansion westward into an almost non-resistant China, roused the fear of isolation when German friendship, under the Nazis, became a quite uncertain quantity, and Germany itself rearmed as a Great Power. The Soviet Government early endeavored to secure itself, by a series of non-aggression pacts, with states to the west and south—as well as the conclusion of conventions precisely defining aggression,—particularly in 1933. Further, the renaissance of militarist Germany with British approval drew France—far more vulnerable than Soviet Russia—closer to Moscow in opposition to Berlin, and Soviet ties with both Poland and the Little Entente were strengthened. The Soviet Government, indeed, became the strongest supporter of the *status quo*, even pledging non-assistance to revolutionary attempts in the states with which it bound itself. Both France and Russia drew closer to Italy; Moscow, which had long maintained most friendly relations with Mussolini, now concluded a non-aggression pact with his government. In the East, the situation at Geneva brought the resumption of diplomatic relations between Nanking and Moscow; the situation on the Far East also resulted in the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Soviet Russia—a link likewise approved by France.

The attempts made to isolate Nazi Germany, however, were nullified by the concessions made by France to Mussolini, with the fatuous idea that he could be kept on the French side by gifts. The rise of the Nazis in Germany threatened Austria, itself predominantly German in population but with power divided between Catholics and Social-Democrats—the former having a margin through their control of most of the rural population. Austria, indeed, had been economically dependent since the War, lacking complete sovereignty and being aided by the League of Nations. The League Powers in 1933, however, instead of insuring against the Nazi threat by guaranteeing Austria's independence and neutrality, and the continued democratic rights of