The Politics of PEACE-MAINTENANCE

edited by
JARAT CHOPRA

with a foreword by Chester A. Crocker

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THE POLITICS OF PEACE-MAINTENANCE

To C.

In memoriam

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Foreword



Chester A. Crocker

his volume raises the quality of the debate about humanitarian intervention and military operations other than war. It does so by incorporating trenchant lessons learned from the cases of the 1990s and by insisting on the overarching importance of strategic concepts that spell the difference between effective international action and failures or lost opportunities. In the process, the chapters that follow lay to rest some of the early half-truths and politically convenient judgments that emerged from our experience in such places as Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia. The historical record of multilateral intervention is set in a context that clearly documents the entire range of actions of which the international community has already demonstrated it is capable. The authors thereby illustrate the possibility of an evolution toward "best practices," and they enrich our conceptual tools for understanding what we are already doing (or not doing).

Editor Jarat Chopra sparked a lively debate with the introduction in 1995 of the term *peace-maintenance*, coined to distinguish the concept from both the largely diplomatic *peacekeeping* function between states and the largely military notions of *peace-enforcement* in situations of civil strife. Peace-maintenance, as developed further here, is proposed as a comprehensive political strategy for pulling together all forms of intervention and assistance that may be required when state institutions fail (or risk failing) and the "warlord syndrome" emerges.

Not everyone will be persuaded that such holistic strategic planning for intervention by leading actors in the international community is feasible or even desirable. Some will view these proposals as a call for unrestrained internationalism delinked from considerations of national interest and finite power resources. Others will point out the sweeping authority and responsibility that outsiders are expected to exercise in the affairs of people who have temporarily become victim to the breakdown or fragility of their own institutions. The sovereignty-supranationalism (not to mention "assertive multilateralism") debates are seldom absent from these discussions.

Still others will point out that while peace-maintenance might be possible in an ideal world, there are many alternative priorities to consume

our energy and attention, resource constraints at a time of shrinking militaries and disaster fatigue, and an uncertain stock of political will without which creative strategic action is doomed. Some may even wonder if the peace-maintenance terminology helps advance the frontiers of conceptual clarity when many sweeping phrases linked to peace have been given a bad name by the recent performance of what we choose to call the international community.

But this book contains practical guidance as well as bold strategic proposals. The authors accept as givens the hard lessons we face about (1) the impossibility of politically "neutral" humanitarian intervention; (2) the likelihood of perverse and unintended consequences when humanitarian action occurs in a political-military vacuum; (3) the demonstrated short-comings of many recent experiments in multilateral intervention management by the UN and other agencies; (4) the predictable failures that flow from action that is motivated by the need to be seen to be "doing something" and by time-defined exit strategies; and (5) the lively prospect of failure when external action is divorced from local political alliances and does not generate internal political legitimacy—a likelihood enhanced by a narrow focus on holding elections in polities that are both polarized and militarized.

It is on the basis of this knowledge that the book develops its case for peace-maintenance, encompassing scenarios ranging from *governorship* to less intrusive forms of political action such as selective *control*, *partnership* with local authority, and *assistance* to government offices. The chapters discuss the full gamut of functional tasks (establishing transitional political authority, conducting civil administration, maintaining law and order with justice, delivering humanitarian assistance, providing military security, and linking external decisionmakers with the local politics of legitimacy). At the same time, they encompass most of the modern cases of operations other than war in all the regions where civil chaos occurs.

To this observer, the most compelling argument here is about the necessity for comprehensive thinking and coherence (or unity) of action. For too long, it has been trendy to assert that specialists in different disciplines need to be relatively unburdened by each other's baggage and subjected only to the loosest forms of coordination in national capitals or the field. Similarly, the bureaucratic fudge factories of the UN system and the dilemmas of military-humanitarian (to say nothing of military-to-military) coordination are often cited as reasons for accepting that interventionism must be disorderly. In turn, this "fact" is used to justify scaling back the global response to civil chaos.

But these arguments are cop-outs. It is not written on stone tablets that we cannot learn from mistakes, that complex operations must fail, or that inept or inappropriate personnel will always be placed in charge of interventions. For all their inadequacies, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe have demonstrated in Bosnia that incremental learning is possible. The United States and UN in Haiti have also shown a capacity for learning. The critical lessons from these and other places, such as Mozambique and Namibia, include: the importance of political commitment and staying power; the need for a comprehensive framework of action linked to an operational center of gravity and a critical mass of resources; the demand for clearly defined goals about the "end state" (or definition of success); and the imperative of unity of field level operational authority and military command.

None of the concepts and suggestions in the book will be properly implemented without broader public debate and understanding. It is unreasonable to expect political leaders simply to impose on their mediadrenched electorates a full-blown vision of these recommendations for improved management of their national and global security. At the same time, these pages offer some basis for believing that political courage may have its reward.

Note

Chester A. Crocker is research professor in the practice of diplomacy at Georgetown University and chairman of the board, U.S. Institute of Peace. He was formerly U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs.

Contents



	Foreword Chester A. Crocker	ix
1	Introducing Peace-Maintenance Jarat Chopra	1
2	Establishing Political Authority in Peace-Maintenance W. Andy Knight	19
3	Organizing Civil Administration in Peace-Maintenance Sally Morphet	41
4	Reestablishing Law and Order in Peace-Maintenance Mark Plunkett	61
5	Asserting Humanitarianism in Peace-Maintenance Antonio Donini	81
6	Providing Military Security in Peace-Maintenance Richard P. Cousens	97
7	Accepting External Authority in Peace-Maintenance Clement E. Adibe	107
8	Critiquing Peace-Maintenance Duane Bratt	123
	Acronyms	135
	Index	137
	About the Book	145

1

Introducing Peace-Maintenance

Iarat Chopra

eek ye first the political kingdom and all other things shall be added unto you." So proclaimed Ghanaian leader Kwame Nkrumah in the 1950s regarding the critical ingredient of African independence. Despite the perils of promises, the same may be said today of an international community contending with unprecedented social transformations. The dramatic, painful, and often violent pulses of change, inevitably, have not fitted within the boundaries of states or strictures of sovereignty. Neither lengthy evolutions nor quick revolutions can be managed by polite, long-distance diplomacy or military force alone, or without vision and controlled direction. The ability to steer events rests in the political realm. However, UN member states have sought first to offer development or deliver humanitarian assistance. Consequently, food and aid have been consumed more by competing factions than by victim populations, and converted into a simple but devastating kind of weaponry in Somalia, Rwanda, and Zaire.

We have been at war. We now understand this to have been true, statistically. The five years between 1990 and 1995 proved to be twice as lethal as any half decade since the end of World War II. According to avowedly conservative estimates, there were ninety-three wars involving seventy countries. Of the 22 million people who perished in armed conflict since 1945, 5.5 million of them, some one quarter, died in the early 1990s. Furthermore, war has ceased to be primarily a profession of arms: if at the beginning of the twentieth century 85–90 percent of war deaths were soldiers, by the end, on average, 75 percent are civilians—and the figure is considerably higher in some estimates.² The current character of interstate relations, conditioned by the grand diplomacy of the Cold War, could not avert the internecine killing by peoples redefining themselves and their positions globally.

It is as if the organizational pattern established by the political competition of the last great war fifty years ago is now being challenged, perhaps almost unconsciously—more as the natural result of social imperatives not accommodated by that pattern than by virtue of some new and compelling ideology. And even the limited response of the Security Council is no less profound. The year 1992 may turn out to have been revolutionary—a kind

of 1917 or 1789—for the UN. Member states conducted perhaps the greatest experiments in international organization since the drafting and signing of the UN Charter. That is, the largest and most complex operations in UN history were deployed that year simultaneously to Cambodia, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia, to stop wars and to secure a degree of well-being for local populations.

While significant, the diplomatic and military limitations of these and other vast efforts in internal conflicts indicated that social competition necessitated political management. Already, the static diplomatic character of traditional, inter-state peacekeeping had burst its bounds in a hot peace after a cold war, and the use of military force was called on to fill the gap in what became the so-called second generation of UN peace operations.³ This period witnessed the reemergence of the term *peace-enforcement*. In the years immediately before and after the signing of the UN Charter, peace-enforcement was virtually synonymous with the idea of collective security, in which military force was authorized jointly and employed by powerful states to prevent and halt acts of aggression. It referred to what has come to be known simply as "enforcement," of the kind envisioned in Article 42 of Chapter VII of the charter.

However, after four decades of "peacekeeping"—a word that neither appears in the charter nor was uttered during the period of its formulation—other "peace" terms gained currency that fitted more in the context of distinguishing lower level operational categories and doctrine than referred explicitly to the existing model of international organization. So "peace-enforcement" was used by then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in *An Agenda for Peace* to describe what had been already identified as a middle ground in the use of force, between defensive peacekeeping and high-intensity enforcement. This "third option" was not synonymous with the kinds of total war that might be necessitated in the suppression of aggression.

In the juridical history of Article 1(1) of the UN Charter, which refers to collective measures for the maintenance of international peace and security, the term *peace-maintenance* is referred to intermittently between the Atlantic Charter in 1942 and the drafters conference in San Francisco three years later. The principal planners, including particularly Franklin D. Roosevelt,⁴ attempted to express the scope and purpose of a novel form of permanent organization in the postwar world. It was not the passive preservation of a diplomatic status quo but the active determination of law and order internationally, in the manner of a domestic political community. Peace was not to be elusive and only occasionally kept, but convincingly and perpetually "maintained." The extent of earlier proposals was narrowed first by the wartime agreements of the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union; second, by the opinions of smaller powers; and finally, by great-power geopolitical competition. But the remaining politi-

cal kernel defined the "collective" character and separate legal personality of the UN, and distinguished it from the merely "cooperative" nature of the League of Nations.

Now, after the Cold War, in the midst of new conflagrations, and after conditioning by decades of peacekeeping and years of second-generation experiments with the use of force, the term peace-maintenance is reborn as a "unified concept" for peace missions. This chapter—which introduces a book first published as a special issue of the journal Global Governance distinguishes diplomatic peacekeeping and military peace-enforcement from political peace-maintenance. It also provides a context for the succeeding chapters, each of which explores a separate component of peace-maintenance. W. Andy Knight discusses how such operations establish political authority. In her analysis, Sally Morphet focuses on the organization of civil administration. Mark Plunkett examines the reestablishment of law and order. Antonio Donini outlines the challenges of asserting humanitarianism. while Richard P. Cousens reviews those of providing military security. Clement E. Adibe describes the conditions under which local populations may accept external authority. And finally, Duane Bratt's conclusion critiques the preceding chapters and considers the future of politics of peacemaintenance. Together, the authors recognize the need for a globally effective political capability, and their arguments reflect that the evolution of peace operations doctrine has entered a third and, perhaps, final phase.

Diplomatic Peacekeeping and Military Peace-Enforcement

The first phase of peace operations doctrine, the era of traditional "peace-keeping," lasted from 1948 to 1989, during which some fifteen operations were deployed.⁵ This Cold War period was characterized by diplomatic frameworks, the result of what conventional UN parlance referred to as "peace-making." As a consequence of diplomacy, limited military forces and civilian personnel were deployed symbolically to guarantee negotiated settlements, invariably between two sovereign states. This practice developed certain basic assumptions:⁶

- 1. A force had to operate with the full confidence and backing of the Security Council.
- 2. A force operated only with the full consent and cooperation of the parties in conflict.
- Command and control of the force would be vested in the secretary-general and the force commander, under the authority of the Security Council.

- 4. The composition of the force would represent a wide geographic spectrum, although conventionally excluding the permanent members of the Security Council, and contingents would be supplied voluntarily by member states upon the secretary-general's request.
- 5. Armed force would be used only in self-defense, although self-defense included defense of the mandate as well as the peacekeeper.
- 6. The force would operate with complete impartiality.

Observers in blue berets or peacekeepers in blue helmets supervised clear lines separating belligerents in places as diverse as the Golan Heights between Israel and Syria; Kashmir between India and Pakistan; and Nicosia between Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus. The UN's mission to Lebanon in 1978—the last peacekeeping operation for nearly a decade—was deployed in the midst of factional militia manipulated by neighboring governments in Syria and Israel, and foreshadowed the future landscape of UN catastrophes. A turning point occurred in 1989 when a decolonization mission arrived in Namibia, mandated with a wider range of tasks than were authorized for previous verification observers or interposition forces.⁷

Traditional peacekeeping principles were necessarily challenged. In particular, consent of the parties in conflict was not always forthcoming or was sometimes withdrawn once given. In response, UN operations would have to consider using force. This would require sufficient assets to do so and the inclusion in operations of armed forces from Security Council permanent members. In turn, the issue of command and control of assets would become more acute. Impartiality would be defined as the objectivity with which the mandate was executed rather than the degree of submission to the will of the parties in conflict. This would give the Security Council an even more crucial role in developing clear instructions, continually supporting the force in the field with the solidarity of its will, and expanding mandates as changes in ground conditions required. These new requirements reflected that a second generation of operations had come into being, beyond symbolic peacekeeping but short of Gulf War–style enforcement.

In this next phase, specifically between 1989 and 1994, some eighteen operations were deployed, more than had been dispatched in the UN's first forty-five years. The challenging environment of internal conflicts necessitated the development of a concept for the limited and gradually escalating use of armed force for multinational missions. UN military operations could be divided into nine categories, arranged in three levels of varying degrees of force. At one extreme were level one operations: the familiar tasks of observer missions and peacekeeping forces. At the other end of the spectrum were the level three tasks of sanctions and high-intensity operations, which are characteristic of Articles 41 and 42, respectively, of the

UN Charter. The five level two tasks in between represented the latest doctrinal developments, as follows:8

- 1. Preventive deployment: A UN force may be deployed to an area where tension is rising between two parties, to avoid the outbreak of hostilities or the maturing of an existing conflict. This area may be between two states or between two factions within a state. Examples include the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia and the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), a trigger mechanism between Gulf War adversaries.
- Internal conflict resolution measures: A UN force may be required
 to underwrite a multiparty cease-fire within a state. It may have to
 demobilize and canton warring factions, secure their weapons, and
 stabilize the theater of conflict. UN operations in Cambodia and
 Mozambique illustrated this type of activity.
- 3. Assistance to interim civil authorities: A UN force may be required to underwrite a transition process and transfer of power in a country reestablishing its civil society from the ashes of conflict. It may have to provide security during (a) the repatriation of refugees, (b) the organization and conduct of elections, and (c) the early stages of infrastructure rehabilitation. This series of tasks was essential in transition operations in Namibia, Cambodia, and El Salvador.
- 4. Protection of humanitarian relief operations: A UN force may be deployed to establish a mounting base, a delivery site, and a corridor between the two to protect the provision and distribution of humanitarian relief by UN and nongovernmental civilian agencies. This activity met with varying degrees of success in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and northern Iraq.
- 5. Guarantee and denial of movement: A UN force may be called on to secure the rights of passage in international waterways and airspace, or across national territory. A force may also be required to restrict movement of parties designated as delinquent by the international community. Examples include the efforts in Bosnia and in northern and southern Iraq.

In reference to this middle ground in the use of force, Boutros-Ghali included the term *peace-enforcement* in *An Agenda for Peace*. However, after the UN was militarily routed in places such as Somalia,⁹ he reverted to the black-and-white options of defensive peacekeeping and high-intensity enforcement, relegating peace-enforcement back to the latter and equating it again with action of the type outlined in Article 42.¹⁰ This reaction was impractical to sustain, and at a press conference only two days after issuing the "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace," the secretary-general had to distinguish between peace-enforcement and "huge peace

enforcement operations."¹¹ Meanwhile, in national departments and ministries of defense, such as in the U.K., the term *peace support* has been used to refer to the variety of military tasks undertaken in multifunctional missions. While the underlying doctrine indicates support of a framework, it does not identify the nature of that framework.

Also, a misnomer emerged, "second generation peacekeeping." ¹² It confused the narrowly defined practice of peacekeeping, on the one hand, and, on the other, second-generation operations that were not exclusively reliant on consent of belligerents and that did not restrict the use of force to self-defense alone. Precisely the application of a diplomatic peacekeeping approach in challenging environments proved fatal in Cambodia, Angola, and the former Yugoslavia, and in most other operations as well.

Furthermore, the artificiality of a "third generation" of peace operations has exacerbated the confusion. When Boutros-Ghali first acknowledged the emergence of a second generation, he also suggested the existence—simultaneously, and rather illogically, therefore—of a third generation, defined by institutional "peace-building." These concepts have since become more distorted by a reversal of their meanings: second-generation operations have been defined as consensual peace-building, and third-generation operations as peace-enforcement equated with high-intensity enforcement.

The complex, multifunctional operations of the second phase, designed to supervise transitions from conditions of social conflict to minimal political order, had limited impact because of excessive reliance on either diplomatic peacekeeping or military peace-enforcement. Consequently, transitional arrangements required but did not achieve better coordination between military forces, humanitarian assistance, and civilian components organizing elections, protecting human rights, or conducting administrative and executive tasks of government. In *An Agenda for Peace*, "post-conflict peace-building" referred to longer-term development, strengthening institutions, and fostering conditions that could vitiate violence as a means of political competition. But this kind of "assistance" is incapable of either ensuring accountability of an oppressive regime or reconstituting fragmented authority. Another concept has been needed.

Political Peace-Maintenance

On the ground, the UN has had to contend with the contradictory phenomena of too much order and authority by a powerful government, such as in El Salvador or Namibia, and of varying degrees of anarchy, as in Cambodia and Somalia. In the incoherent malaise of factionalism, a kind of "warlord syndrome" emerged in which the appetites of power could mobilize religion in Lebanon, ethnicity in the former Yugoslavia, and relatively homogeneous clan lineages in Somalia. Unchecked by either a weakened

population below or the diluted resolve of the international community above, factional leaders proliferated and inherited the places where UN deployments proved ineffective. Interstate diplomacy conducted by institution-reliant bureaucrats between factional leaders in internal conflicts served to further fragment conditions of anarchy. Use of military force without sufficiently clear political objectives led inevitably to confrontation. Commanders reacted to the imperatives of combat, including defeat of an enemy, rather than creating conditions that could be supported and sustained in the long term.

The current third phase of peace operations doctrine needs to elaborate functional dimensions of a political framework. Despite the danger of adding yet another debased "peace" term to a prevalent kind of "bluespeak"—and not as the result of the desire to coin a new phrase, but as a natural reconsideration of the essential basis of the UN Charter—the goal of "peace-maintenance" can be associated with this third phase. The term peace-maintenance must be used in its intended sense. 15 Specifically, it refers to the overall political framework, as part of which the objectives of diplomatic activities, humanitarian assistance, military forces, and civilian components are not only coordinated but harmonized. The concept provides a link between the strategic and operational levels of command and control, and constitutes the exercise by the international community as a whole of political authority within nations.

The UN tends to confuse the terms *diplomatic* and *political*. In Clausewitzian fashion, former U.S. secretary of state James Baker argued that "diplomacy *is* the continuation of politics." This would imply that the two are related but not synonymous. Yet the UN refers to the "political process" as the attempt to reach a degree of reconciliation between factions or states. The process is considered "political" not just because it addresses the conclusion of a long-term settlement between states or the establishment of a unified executive authority internally. But calling it "political" also distinguishes it from other components of an operation—military security, humanitarian assistance, or electoral organization, for instance. However, in such "political processes," the UN behaves as a diplomat and interlocutor, a representative of an authority far away, but fails to exercise executive powers itself.

Diplomacy may be a logical practice to pursue when separating two states, since each one has a government with political authority. In the noman's-land in between, the UN need not come to terms with its jurisdiction over an area, or with its relationship to territory, the local population, or executive authority. It need be concerned only with the limited locations of its deployments and the placement of troops and armaments of the belligerents, since the government of each state is still juridically responsible for a portion of the buffer zone up to the international boundary, even if the exact position of that boundary is in dispute.

Within a state, however, reliance on diplomacy is not tenable. The UN cannot remain aloof of its relationship to territory or to the local population over which it may have claimed jurisdiction, and therefore must recognize its role in the exercise of executive political authority. It may have to fulfill this role independently in anarchical conditions, or jointly with an existing regime. Even in the latter case, if the UN is to effectively ensure accountability, it needs an independent political decisionmaking capability, as well as law and order institutions available at its disposal. In both cases, the UN would be defeating its own efforts if it were at the same time to depend on local authority structures (whether coherent and oppressive or fragmented and negligible) and attempt to reconstitute a new authority.

In fact, doing so draws the mission into the existing conditions of local authority, as the UN gravitates toward what it is permitted to do by a regime or warlords. The mission either becomes beholden to the will of a powerful government or is undermined by factionalism in anarchical conditions. In Western Sahara and El Salvador, the UN strengthened the hand of the stronger: of Morocco and the government in San Salvador, respectively. In Cambodia, it joined the Cambodians' competition for control of Phnom Penh, which for centuries never implied control of the rest of the country. In Somalia, its loosely arranged coalition fragmented due to the irresistible forces of anarchy when UN commanders proved incapable of replacing U.S. leadership.

To avoid being undermined, the UN must deploy decisively and establish a center of gravity around which local individuals and institutions can coalesce until a new authority structure is established and transferred to a legitimately determined, indigenous leadership. In the interim period, the UN needs to counterbalance or even displace the oppressor or warlords. This implies that the UN claims jurisdiction over the entire territory and ought to deploy throughout if it can. It establishes a direct relationship with the local people who will eventually participate in the reconstitution of authority and inherit the newly established institutions.

This is the meaning of a political framework, an overall blue umbrella, under which law and order are maintained once a UN center and periphery are delineated. It is distinct from the notion of intervention as part of interstate relations, in which entry into an area is only partial and territory is incidental to limited objectives. Authority cannot be exercised based on a perceptual axis of inside, outside, and between, as is the essence of diplomacy. A political framework is all-pervasive and connected to the total social process locally. It links that domestic population with an international mandate as the basis of authority, in defiance of malevolent institutions of belligerents. Like the purpose of a rule of law, peace-maintenance must be a means of transforming the position of the weak as against the strong; it is an outside guarantor of a kind of internal self-determination.