THE GLOBAL AGENDA



ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES

THIRD EDITION

CHARLES W. KEGLEY, JR.
EUGENE R. WITTKOPF

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PREFACE

There is no scientific antidote [to the atomic bomb], only education. You've got to change the way people think. I am not interested in disarmament talks between nations. . . . What I want to do is to disarm the mind. After that, everything else will automatically follow. The ultimate weapon for such mental disarmament is international education.

—Albert Einstein

Change and constancy seem to describe most accurately the nature of contemporary international politics. Dramatic new developments during recent years have combined with less rapidly unfolding but no less important trends to produce new issues, cleavages, and a new international climate. Simultaneously, traditional controversies continue to color relations among nations. Hence the study of contemporary international politics must give attention to the factors that produce change and also to those that promote changelessness in relations among political actors on the global stage.

Because change is endemic to international politics, it is understandable that the new issues that now crowd the global agenda challenge the analytical perspectives long used by scholars and policymakers to understand world politics, as recorded in the first and second editions of this book. Thus our purpose in preparing a third edition is to bring the coverage up to date by presenting current, informed commentary on the dominant issues in contemporary international politics and the analytical perspectives that have been devised to understand them. But the overarching goals that motivated the first two editions remain: to make available to students what we, as editors, believe to be the best introductions to the contemporary issues that animate contemporary world politics and, also, to introduce the major analytical perspectives and organizing concepts that have been fashioned to make these issues comprehensible.

The Global Agenda: Issues and Perspectives categorizes readings into four "baskets" that build on the distinction between "high politics" (peace and security issues) and "low politics" (nonsecurity welfare issues). The criteria that guided the selection of particular articles within each part and the rationale that underlies the organization of the book are made explicit in our introductions to

each part, which are designed to help students connect individual readings to common themes.

The organization of the book is intended to capture the diversity of global issues and patterns of interaction that presently dominate the attention of world political actors and precipitate policy responses. Its thematic organization allows treatment of the breadth of global issues and of the analytical perspectives that give them meaning, ranging from classic theoretical formulations to the newer analytic focuses and concepts that have arisen to account for recent developments in world affairs. In preparing the volume in this manner, we have proceeded from the assumption that there is need for educational materials treating description and theoretical exposition in a balanced manner and exposing a variety of normative interpretations without advocating any particular one. It seems to us that, to a greater or lesser degree, coverage of these important elements comprising both the theory and evidence of international politics as a social science is missing in most standard texts (by design and necessity) and that a supplementary anthology is the logical place for them.

Several people have contributed to the development of this book as it has gone through various iterations. We chose not to list them individually at the risk of slighting someone, but our gratitude to all remains, especially to Bert Lummus and Fred Burns at McGraw-Hill for their continuing enthusiasm for this project.

Charles W. Kegley, Jr.

Eugene R. Wittkopf

CONTENTS

PART ONE

ARMS AND INFLUENCE

The contemporary international political system began to acquire its present shape and definition more than three centuries ago with the emergence of a state system in Europe following the highly destructive Thirty Years War. As the Westphalian treaties brought that war to an end and political, economic, and social intercourse grew among the states of Europe, new legal norms were embraced in an effort to regulate interstate behavior. The doctrine of state sovereignty, according to which no legal authority is higher than the state, emerged supreme. Thus the emergent international system was based on the right of states to control without interference from others their internal affairs, and to manage their relations with other states, with which they collaborated or competed as they saw fit. Foremost in this system was the belief, reinforced by law, that the state possessed the right, indeed, the obligation, to take whatever measures it deemed necessary to ensure its preservation.

Although the international system and patterns of interaction among its political actors have changed profoundly since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia gave birth to the state system, contemporary world politics remains significantly colored by its legacy. World politics continues to be conducted in an atmosphere of anarchy. As in the past, the system remains fragmented and decentralized, with no higher authority above nation-states, which, as the principal actors in world politics, remain free to behave toward one another largely as they choose.

This is not meant to imply either that states exercise their freedoms with abandon or that they are unconstrained in the choices they make. The political,

legal, moral, and circumstantial constraints on states' freedom of choice are formidable. Moreover, states' national interests are served best when they act in a manner that does not threaten the stability of their relations with others or of the global system that protects their autonomy. Hence, the international system, as the British political scientist Hedley Bull reminds us, may be an anarchical society, but it is one of "ordered anarchy" nonetheless.

The world has grown increasingly complex and interdependent as contact, communication, and exchange have increased among the actors in the state system and as the number of nation-states and other nonstate international actors has grown since the conclusion of World War II in 1945. Expanded interaction among countless international and transnational actors reflects the enlarged range of possible mutually beneficial exchanges between and among states. But just as opportunities for cooperation have expanded, so have the possible sources of disagreement. That we live in an age of conflict is a cliché that contains elements of truth, for differences of opinion and efforts to resolve disputes to one's advantage, often at the expense of others, are part of any long-term relationship. Thus, as the world has grown smaller, the mutual dependence of transnational political actors on one another has grown and the number of potential rivalries, antagonisms, and disagreements has increased correspondingly. Friction and tension therefore appear to be endemic to the relations of nations; the image of world politics conveyed in newspaper headlines does not suggest that a shrinking world has become a more peaceful one. Instead, even as the Cold War wanes, competition and conflict persist, as demonstrated by Iraq's brutal invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and the international community's subsequent military response to it.

Given the persistent characteristics of contemporary world politics, the number of *issues* that at any one time are in dispute among nation-states and other global actors appears to have increased greatly. The multitude of contentions renders the *global agenda* —the list of issues that force their way into consideration and command that they be addressed, peacefully or not—more crowded and complex. Because the responses that are made to the issues on the global agenda shape our lives both today and into the future, it is appropriate that we direct attention to those matters that animate world politics and stimulate the attention and activities of national decision makers. At the same time, as different state and nonstate actors view global political issues from often widely varying vantage points, it is appropriate that we remain sensitive to the various perceptual lenses through which the items on the global agenda are viewed. Accordingly, *The Global Agenda: Issues and Perspectives* seeks to focus on the range of issues that dominates world politics and also on the multitude of analytical and interpretive perspectives from which those issues are viewed.

The issues and perspectives discussed in *The Global Agenda* are grouped into four broad, somewhat overlapping, but analytically distinct issue areas: (1) arms and influence, (2) discord and collaboration, (3) politics and markets, and

(4) ecology and politics. Broadly speaking, the first two issue areas deal with states' security interests, often referred to as matters of *high politics.* The latter two, again broadly speaking, deal with the nonsecurity issues, often referred to as matters of *low politics,* that increasingly have come to occupy, if not dominate, the attention of actors on the world stage. In all four issue areas, we seek to convey not only the range of issues now facing those responsible for political choices but also the many vantage points from which they are typically viewed.

We begin in Part One with consideration of a series of issues appropriately subsumed under the collective rubric *Arms and Influence.* As the term "high politics" suggests, the issues and perspectives treated here focus on the prospects for peace and security in a world of competitive nation-states armed with increasingly lethal weapons with which to inflict violence and destruction.

ARMS AND INFLUENCE

It is often argued that states strive for power, security, and domination in a global environment punctuated by the threat of violence and death. This viewpoint flows naturally from the characteristics of the international political system, which continues to be marked by the absence of central institutions empowered to manage and resolve conflict. Hence, preoccupation with preparations for defense to promote national security becomes understandable, for the fear persists that one adversary might use force against another to realize its goals or to vent its frustrations. In such an environment, arms are widely perceived useful not only to enhance security but also as a means to realize and extend one's influence. Hence, nations frequently see their interests best served by a search for power, by whatever means. Understandably, therefore, *power* and *influence* remain perhaps the core concepts in the study of world politics.

Appropriately, our first essay, "Power, Capability, and Influence in International Politics," by K. J. Holsti, provides a thoughtful discussion of the meaning of power, capability, and influence as these concepts relate to the foreign policy behavior of states in contemporary world politics. The essay provides insights important not only for evaluating the subsequent essays in this book but also for evaluating the use to which these necessary but ambiguous terms are often put in other interpretations of global issues. For almost invariably such discussions make reference, implicitly or explicitly, to the interrelationships among power, capability, and influence.

If the purpose of statecraft is the pursuit of political power, then a critical question is: What are the most appropriate means through which states might rise to a position of prominence in the international hierarchy? In "Force or Trade: The Costs and Benefits of Two Paths to Global Influence," Richard Rosecrance outlines rival approaches to the realization of that goal. The first encompasses the conventional path: the acquisition of military might as a way to position and power. The United States and the Soviet Union exhibited steadfast

dedication to this tradition throughout the Cold War, as did other participants in the post–World War II struggle for arms and influence. In contrast, other states—in Europe, Latin America, and Asia—have chosen a second path by emulating the Japanese model; this approach emphasizes the search for global power through trade expansion instead of territorial control and force. Rosecrance concludes that global leadership is destined to pass to what he calls "the new trading states"; he contends that those who remain wedded to the pursuit of power through territorial control and military spending are destined to experience an erosion of their power and influence. States have a clear choice and must weigh the trade-off between economic and military power, Rosecrance argues, for prosperity through economic power cannot be achieved simultaneously with excessive military spending. His conclusion, that trade instead of arms provides the most viable path to both prosperity and peace, finds a prominent place on the global agenda because it poses a dilemma no policymaker can ignore, especially now that the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union has receded and the economic battleground arguably has become the primary locus in the struggle for power and influence. At issue is how security is to be realized and welfare assured.

Rosecrance's thesis is, of course, open to theoretical and empirical challenge. In our third selection, "The Future of Military Power: The Continuing Utility of Force," Eliot A. Cohen takes exception to the view that military force no longer plays a decisive role in world politics now that the Cold War has thawed and liberal democratic institutions have begun to spread to Eastern Europe and elsewhere. Contrary to Rosecrance's argument, Cohen maintains that the usability and usefulness of military force have not diminished and that, even in the era of thermonuclear weapons and the abrupt (but reversible?) end of superpower animosity, the threat and actual use of military force retain many of their traditional functions and advantages. Cohen argues that whereas preparation for war is costly and the use of force risky, they are often necessary nonetheless; accordingly, he questions the view that "methods of commerce are displacing military methods." Moreover, he questions the validity of three popular theories of the use of force: that "the horrific quality of modern military technology, the spread of democracy, and the rise of transnational issues and actors" giving rise to conditions of interdependence will inhibit recourse to war and give birth to a new age of lasting peace. Cohen maintains that none of these arguments is persuasive, and that the trends and conditions that make them plausible are unlikely to endure. None warrants the conclusion that military power is obsolete. Instead, "war, and potential war, will remain a feature of international politics." Hence, Cohen concludes that the ends of military power remain many and that military force continues to occupy a central place in international politics.

Cohen's thesis is compelling. However, the picture and prescriptions it presents must be weighed against the long-term implications of one of the most profound achievements in post–World War II international politics: in the period

since World War II the great powers have experienced the longest period of uninterrupted peace since the advent of the territorial state system in 1648. The face of war and international politics *have* been transformed. Whether weapons produced this outcome—or whether this long postwar peace occurred despite these weapons—thus deserves consideration.

In "The Obsolescence of Major War," John Mueller explores the policy and moral implications of this accomplishment, in which war has passed from a noble institution to one in which it is now widely regarded as illegal, immoral, and counterproductive. The steps to this global awakening are traced in an account that sees the contribution of nuclear weapons as essentially irrelevant to the preservation of the long postwar peace. While recognizing that "war in the developed world . . . has not become impossible" and war in the Third World remains frequent and increasingly lethal, Mueller nonetheless sees hope for the future in the fact that "peoples and leaders in the developed world—where war was once endemic—have increasingly found war to be disgusting, ridiculous, and unwise." The charter of UNESCO insists that "war begins in the minds of men." If that is the case, Mueller responds, then "it can end there." Such an outcome would indeed alter the way the world has conventionally thought about arms, influence, and peace. In such a world (Professor Cohen's assessment notwithstanding), the utility of force would certainly command far less respect than in the past.

The applicability of military force to the resolution of political problems is challenged most provocatively by the destructiveness of modern weapons, of which nuclear weapons are doubtless the most lethal. For that reason, the prevention of a nuclear World War III is an issue of explosive global interest. *The Fate of the Earth,* as Jonathan Schell's popular book published in 1982 on the subject is titled, is at stake.

Since the atomic age began in 1945, considerable effort has been devoted to devising ways of avoiding resort to nuclear weapons. *Deterrence*—preventing a potential adversary from doing something it might otherwise do, such as launching a military attack—has dominated strategic thinking about nuclear weapons since their creation. The failure of deterrence, particularly in a war between the United States and the Soviet Union, could, of course, ignite a global conflagration culminating in the destruction of human civilization, which means that the entire world has a stake in the operation of a successful deterrent strategy.

Many people place great faith in nuclear weapons as instruments able to keep peace. Indeed, the most popular theory of the general war avoidance since 1945 is the claim that nuclear weapons have made system-wide war obsolete. But others endorse John Mueller's thesis that nuclear weapons are "essentially irrelevant" in the prevention of major war. As Mueller argues at length in his well-known book *Retreat from Doomsday,* the growing aversion to war in general, in conjunction with the inhibiting fear of another major *conventional* war, in particular, explain the obsolescence of war among the advanced industrial societies of

the developed world. As noted, however, others disagree with this argument; they offer an opposing interpretation that treats nuclear weapons as categorically different from conventional weapons and far more potent in deterring another worldwide war.

Kenneth N. Waltz, a neo-realist, is one of them. In "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," Waltz argues that nuclear weapons have had a pacifying impact on the course of world affairs since World War II, and that in the absence of nuclear weapons the post–World War II world might have been far less stable. Thus Waltz responds to Mueller by reminding us that, because nuclear weapons threaten all parties to a conflict with enormous and rapid destruction, their political effects are qualitatively different from conventional weapons, with the result that the stability of the postwar world cannot be attributed to conventional deterrence. Waltz warns, however, that scholars and policymakers have not understood the true strategic implications of nuclear weapons and the reasons why they dominate strategy, with the result that the advantages of nuclear weapons have not been properly appreciated. Thus Waltz advances the controversial conclusion that nuclear weapons have been "a tremendous force for peace" which "afford nations who possess them the possibility of security at reasonable cost."

The debate about the role of weapons in keeping peace (and making war) illustrates the importance of the theoretical perspective the observer takes toward these controversies. Because arms both threaten and protect, there exists a congeries of rival hypotheses about the causes of armed conflict and of peace in the nuclear age. In "The Causes of War: Contending Theories," Jack S. Levy summarizes many of the leading ideas. He notes that the outbreak of war derives from factors internal to individual states and many external to them, both of which combine to influence its occurrence. His primary focus, however, is on "systemic" factors, that is, attributes of the international system writ large. Levy examines three major "structural" explanations for the continuing outbreak of war: (1) international anarchy and the security dilemma it creates, (2) theories of international equilibrium such as the balance of power and the questionable operation of a successful balance under the emerging conditions of multipolarity, and (3) "power transition" theories and their most important variant, "long cycle" theories. His review suggests that, because war clearly has multiple potential causes, its control is difficult and depends on a varied combination of tangible and intangible factors. Arms, therefore, may be necessary instruments of modern warfare, but the reasons for the call to arms—and the means to their control—must be located elsewhere, since arming and engaging in violence typically derive from many deep-seated underlying factors.

The problems of international security and the inadequacy of control measures are compounded further by the strong probability that the number of states possessing nuclear weapons will soon increase beyond the small club that presently possesses them. Controlling *nuclear proliferation* is a major arms con-

trol issue. But, as Lewis A. Dunn warns in "Four Decades of Nuclear Nonproliferation: Lessons for the 1990s," the proliferation issue is complex. Many states have powerful incentives to join the nuclear club and are actively pursuing development of nuclear capabilities. Dunn inventories the problems and prospects confronting the world community on this global issue and finds the obstacles to the further expansion of the number of nuclear states insufficient. Surveying initiatives to contain the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities over four decades, he finds a "mixed" record of "wins," "losses," and "draws." Whereas important steps have been taken to reduce the incentives that could lead to the acquisition of nuclear weapons and to increase the technological and institutional obstacles to acquisition, proliferation continues. Paradoxically, the process of proliferation is accelerated by the major powers who, while protesting it, either inadvertently or clandestinely contribute to the problem and its dangers. Thus nuclear proliferation remains a prominent issue on the global agenda.

National leaders have dreamed since the dawn of the nuclear age of a solution to the nuclear dilemma and the threat it poses. Fortunately, the superpowers have managed to avoid the nuclear precipice. Their ability to prevent nuclear war has required the successful management of the many crises that have punctuated their relationships during the past several decades. Many of these crises have involved Third World countries that have themselves frequently faced crises. Indeed, crisis has become so prevalent a feature of world politics that some theorists see it as a substitute for war, which is why, perhaps, ours is often characterized as an "age of crisis."

What paths and policies most facilitate the successful management of crisis is not entirely clear, however. Richard Ned Lebow examines the nature of international crises and their resolution in "Is Crisis Management Always Possible?" Tying his definition of a crisis to the incipience of war, Lebow provides an insightful discussion of the causes, evolution, and outcomes of crises, and exposes the risks associated with the reassuring but unwarranted belief that crisis management can resolve conflicts on the brink of war in future international crises.

A dramatic increase in the capacity to destroy is among the inevitable consequences of nations' efforts to enhance their influence through the purchase or production of increasingly sophisticated armaments. Many political analysts see the prospects for peace dramatically reduced by these efforts. Michael T. Klare is among them. In "The Arms Trade with the Third World: Changing Patterns in the 1990s," he reaches the pessimistic prediction that the prevailing policies and practices of both suppliers and purchasers militate against imposition of meaningful controls. In fact, he warns that the arms trade is likely to expand rather than decline now that the Cold War has ended. Why? Because "in an ironic twist of fate, the forthcoming Soviet and American arms reductions in Europe will produce massive supplies of surplus weapons which are likely to be funneled into the arms inventories of emerging Third World powers." This sobering con-

clusion derives from Klare's analysis of the shifting patterns of suppliers and buyers. These trends suggest that nations' appetite for arms has not been satisfied, and that the instruments of war will be readily available to Third World powers ("regional hegemons") in the 1990s.

As noted, many observers contend that the use of force has declined as a viable instrument of foreign policy because of the increasing destructiveness of modern weapons, whose use would be so devastating as to threaten the interests and security of both the attacker and the attacked. The proponents of this thesis point to the rise of new forms of violence—often referred to as "low-intensity conflict"—as evidence supporting this interpretation; they allege that such conflict waged without large inventories of weapons permits the continued exercise of power through force by the weak on the world stage. Their argument has proved persuasive to many, who focus their attention on perhaps the most conspicuous and threatening form of "low-intensity conflict": international terrorism. In "Reflections on Terrorism," Walter Laqueur offers a timely and illuminating discussion of the nature of international terrorism and the prospects for its control. Because different actors view the issue of international terrorism differently, and, in fact, bring contending perspectives to its definition, Laqueur is pessimistic about the possibility of bringing this terrifying force under control. But he contends that efforts to grapple with it must begin with a sober account of its meanings and purposes and, in destroying much of the myth and cant that surround the emotional discussion of international terrorism, he provides a basis for making this phenomenon understandable.

Finally, we conclude Part One of *The Global Agenda* with an assessment of the changing nature of power and influence in light of the turbulent transformations in world politics that have occurred in recent years. In "The Changing Nature of World Power," Joseph S. Nye, Jr. provides us with the tools with which to assess how the relationships among arms, influence, and world leadership are likely to change as the last decade of the twentieth century unfolds. He provides a broad survey as well as critique of current thinking and theorizing about the changing sources of power, the balance of power, and hegemony in modern history. By comparing rival models (for example, realist interpretations of hegemonic transitions, the neo-Marxist view of hegemony, and the long cycle theory of world leadership), he also provides a theoretical foundation with which to predict the future of American power and evaluate the risks of world war as we approach the twenty-first century.

The issues discussed in the eleven essays in Part One inevitably focus attention on only some of the many issues relating to the role of arms and influence in a world of interdependent and often competitive states, but they do offer insight into the complexities of the issues of high politics with which national decision makers must grapple. Part Two, in which we shift attention to the nature of discord and collaboration in world politics, adds further insight into the politics of peace and security.