

THINKERS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
A Biographical, Bibliographical and Critical Dictionary

Editors

Elizabeth Devine; Michael Held; James Vinson; George Walsh

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EDITOR'S NOTE

The selection of twentieth-century thinkers included in this book is based upon the recommendations of the advisers listed on page ix.

The entry for each thinker consists of a biography, a bibliography, a listing of critical studies of the entrant, and a signed critical essay. The bibliographies list all books—with details of original publication in the U.K. and U.S.A. In the case of those entrants who published originally in a language other than English, original foreign language publication is listed as well as, where applicable, subsequent publication in English.

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aggression, responsibility and disease.

Adler summed up a lifetime of research and reflection in *What Life Should Mean to You*, which he dedicated "to the human

ADLER, Alfred. Austrian psychologist. Born in Vienna, 7 February 1870. Studied medicine at the University of Vienna, M.D. 1895. Attached to the Austrian Army during World War I. Married Raissa Einstein in 1898; 4 children. Worked in the Vienna General Hospital and Polyclinic, 1895-97, and as a General Practitioner and Nerve Specialist in Vienna, 1897-1927. Lecturer, Pedagogic Institute, Vienna, 1924-27; Lecturer, College of Physicians and Surgeons, Columbia University, New York, 1927-28; Director, Mariahilfer Ambulatorium, Vienna, 1928-32; Visiting Professor of Medical Psychology, Long Island College of Medicine, New York, 1932-37; Organized Child Guidance Centers in Vienna; founded the *Journal of Individual Psychology* in Vienna in 1914 and in New York in 1935. Died (in Aberdeen, Scotland), 28 May 1937.

self-determined through the meaning he assigns to experiences.

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Psychology In work, individuals are concerned with the fictitious personality. In work, individuals are concerned with the fictitious personality. In work, individuals are concerned with the fictitious personality.

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normalcy is marked by his or her compensating for this while

grown up as a fully participating member of society; but children can easily tend to overcompensate and thus distort the

Evanston, Illinois, Northwestern University Press, 1965.

intensified ego-consciousness which posits a simplistic final pur-

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normalcy is marked by his or her compensating for this while growing up as a fully participating member of society; but children can easily tend to overcompensate and thus distort the realities of psycho-physical existence, which results in a range of anti-social attitudes and conduct. The emerging neurotic has an intensified ego-consciousness which posits a simplistic final purpose; it can be formulated as, "I wish to be a complete man." This "masculine protest (Männlichen Protest)" is the chief fiction in neurosis and manifests itself as a will to power or domination which is inherently anti-social. Insofar as neurosis has a sexual content, it arises from the masculine protest cast in terms of an imaginary antithesis of masculine and feminine. Its appearance reveals the distance between subject and goal, which will be reflected in the psychic distance the neurotic puts between himself and others. Infantile wishes, incipient sexuality and dream life, which figure prominently in Freud's thought, were for Adler already subordinate to the all-governing goal. Sexuality itself is expropriated as a tool for domination. This urge to power may take active or aggressive forms, or it may be passive and submissive, but it is all one and reveals itself as the conspicuous inability of the psyche to adapt to society.

There is no element in the neurotic character that cannot also be found in the healthy individual. In the case of the neurotic, however, the universal need to compensate for inferiority has taken an unfortunate turn by being made to serve an imaginary goal, focussed upon heightening the fictitious personality rather than lowering ego-consciousness through social concern or a felt identity with humanity. Given the unattainability of the neurotic's goal, he may make vacillation and doubt a way of life, or he may deify the goal (and move ever closer to full psychosis), or he may pretend to change the goal so that feminine means are used to convey what is in fact masculine protest. Thus, whilst heredity provides the materials for life, the congenital differences between individuals pale into insignificance in the face of the "guiding fiction." Even while the neurotic justifies, explains or excuses his actions and passions in terms of that given material, he is really attempting to abnegate responsibility for being what he is. "Inferior organs and neurotic phenomena are symbols of formative forces which strive to realize a self-constructed life plan by means of intense efforts and expedients." When the dynamics of human nature are understood, striving for power is reduced in favour of energetic pursuit of constructive social interests.

Adler's profound concern that psychology be regarded as a practical science led him to publish *Understanding Human Nature*. It is written for any intelligent reader. In it Adler argues that the immense range of interests and experiences to be found in any life do not indicate alterations in the lines of psychic movement; the "life-plan" remains essentially fixed. All problems of life can be reduced to three broad categories—occupational, social and sexual—and neurosis can develop out of any of them. Therapeutic cures are often adjustments of means, not transformations of goals. When the goal is fictitious or unrealistic, such cures are delusive; the neurotic remains neurotic. While he may cope better with some aspects of the world, neither he nor society has benefitted. Authentic therapy occurs only when the root error, upon which the fictitious goal and deluded life-pattern is based, is fully uncovered. In this the strict determinists are right: the chain of cause and effect is inexorable. Only self-knowledge can make a decisive difference by inserting a new line of causation into the nexus of error. For Adler, parents and schools are crucial, and often negative, influences on the child. In families where the father is leader (the norm in many cultures), masculine protest, the will to power and the implied competitive aggressiveness and its inversions, are enhanced. Teachers are ill-prepared to treat their students in truly human terms, and even when they are, class size and school rules vitiate their efforts. Until parents can draw the fine line between empathy and indulgence, and men and women function on equal terms in the home, and until teachers come to know their students as well as their intellectual disciplines, these basic sources of human health will continue to contribute to the production of weakness and

aggression, irresponsibility and disease.

Adler summed up a lifetime of research and reflection in *What Life Should Mean to You*, which he dedicated "to the human family in the hope that its members may learn from these pages to understand themselves better." Pointing out that human beings live in a realm of multiple meanings, he indicated that individuals are bound by a triple tie—to the earth on which one must live, to the human species with which one must interact, and to a sex, since humans "are living in two sexes." From these ties derive the three categories of problems of life, and in their avoidance or solution is found the meaning of life. A true, as contrasted with a fictitious, meaning is sharable with others, and this is so even in regard to genius. "Life means—to contribute to the whole." One meets the problems of life successfully by discerning that the meaning of life is co-operation and sustained interest in one's fellow beings. Individuals are not mere products of their traumas, but may use them as they will. Hence each individual is self-determined through the meaning he assigns to experiences. (This implies, as Adler saw, that eugenic selection is no solution to problems arising out of inferiority.) Neurosis and unsatisfactory life-plans in general result from one's becoming too concerned with the fictitious personality. In work, this leads to tyranny or escape from responsibility; in society, it is revealed in failures of relationship; in sexuality, it is love that turns to oneself. Inferiority may manifest as fear, fatalism or auto-intoxication to the point of feeling superior. Learning to co-operate and to take an interest in the welfare of others involves a sort of self-forgetfulness that is inherently therapeutic. Like Plato, Adler advocated the early training of individuals to take their places in the division of labor, the assumption of responsibility for solving the problems of life co-operatively, and monogamous and equal partnership in love and marriage. In *Social Interest: A Challenge to Mankind*, Adler reiterated these insights with a detailed analysis of superiority in terms of overcompensation for inferiority and turned his attention to the particular problems of the pampered individual and the removal of social obstructions in childhood.

Adler's "Individual psychology" was distinguished by its respect for the givens of each individual and its refusal to treat all individuals as psychically intersubstitutable. This was the consequence of Adler's essential respect for the mystery of each human being, inherent in each one's life-plan. Fully aware of the coherence and strength of that line of life, he nevertheless held out the therapeutic possibility of change. The results of experience acquire entirely new values when the power of self-knowledge and self-criticism is still alive and remains a living motif. "The ability to know one's self becomes greater when one can determine the well-springs of his activity and the dynamics of his soul. Once he has understood this, he has become a different man and can no longer escape the inevitable consequences of his knowledge."

—R. N. Iyer

ADORNO, Theodor W (iesengrund). German philosopher, musicologist, and sociologist. Born in Frankfurt, 11 September 1903. Studied at the University of Frankfurt, Ph.D. 1924. Married Gretel Karplus in 1937. Associated with the Institut für Sozialforschung, 1928-69; in Vienna and New York, 1928-38, as Head of Music Study, Institute Office of Radio Research, Princeton, New Jersey, 1938-41, in California, 1941-49, and as Assistant Director, 1950-55, Co-Director, 1955-58, and Director, 1958-69, in Frankfurt; also, Professor of Philosophy and Sociology, University of Frankfurt, 1958-69. Recipient: Arnold Schönberg Medal, 1954; Critics' Prize for Literature, 1959; Goethe Medal, Frankfurt, 1963. Died (in Frankfurt) 6 August 1969.

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Theodor W. Adorno was a philosopher whose work extended far beyond the traditional boundaries of philosophy. He made original contributions to social psychology, aesthetics, musicology and literary criticism. He returned continually—always in a critical vein—to the works of Kant, Hegel, Marx, Freud, Husserl and Heidegger. His essays, on topics ranging from parataxis in the poetry of Hölderlin to the socio-political function of television, frequently display a subtle literary texture of their own. The

breadth of Adorno's knowledge, talents and interests poses a unique and extremely difficult problem for anyone attempting an evaluation of his complete "oeuvre."

Although his name has become closely linked to the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, Adorno's intellectual orientation and philosophical methods were formulated before he officially joined that organization in 1938. Music had played a decisive role in his cultivated, bourgeois upbringing, and throughout his career it would retain a central place in his philosophical and social scientific work, not just as a recurring subject of analysis but as a model for the organization and presentation of his thought. By the 1920's Adorno had immersed himself equally in classical German philosophy and in the theory of atonal composition in music, and cognitive and aesthetic experience had become inseparable for him. In a series of articles published in the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* in the '30's and in his *Philosophie der neuen Musik* of 1949 Adorno argued that Schoenberg's twelve-tone compositions, in their rigorous exploration of a logic internal to their own musical materials, remained exempt from complete social determination. He devoted so much energy to analyzing cultural products because he believed that under contemporary conditions they alone kept alive the utopian prospects of individual autonomy and happiness. Popular cultural forms, such as jazz and the mass media, were treated under the heading of the "culture industry" and were deemed highly regressive because of the automatic, standardized and passive satisfaction they engender in their audience. Adorno was repeatedly charged with cultural elitism for such statements as: "Popular music is objectively untrue and helps to maim the consciousness of those exposed to it, however hard the individual crippling effects may be to measure."

The most important single influence on Adorno during the '20's and '30's came from the philosophical literary critic Walter Benjamin, who was eleven years his senior. Adorno's assimilation of Marxism as a method of cultural criticism rather than a political program was inspired largely by Benjamin's study of the concept of art criticism in the romantic period (1920) and his essay on seventeenth-century German drama: *Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels* (1928). In the "Epistemological-Critical Preface" to this second work Benjamin defined philosophy as a fragmentary, representational mode of discourse given to shattering ossified historical consciousness. The way in which it does so is to cite and arrange concrete details of the phenomenal realm in such a way that a transcendent meaning breaks out from within their configuration. Adorno's Inaugural Lecture to the Philosophy Faculty at Frankfurt University in 1931, "Die Aktualität der Philosophie," eschews a-historical questions concerning reality, appearance, the formal criteria of knowledge and the structure of Being, and instead advocates the construction of verbal images that expose the irrationality of the historical present. The term Adorno takes from Benjamin for such an invention is "constellation." Although he had little if any trust in the proletariat as the bearer of revolutionary social awareness, his own writings were intended to be instrumental in dispelling collective, repressive delusions. Benjamin's theory of figure construction had a lasting effect on Adorno's conception of the emancipatory purpose of philosophy.

Adorno fled Nazism in 1934 for Oxford, England, and then went to the United States in 1938, staying first in New York and then in Los Angeles, where his neighbors included Thomas Mann, Brecht, Schoenberg and his close colleague Max Horkheimer. Adorno's volume of aphorisms from this time, *Minima Moralia*, documents an intense personal effort to analyze totalitarian barbarism. One section bears an epigraph from F.H. Bradley: "When everything is bad it must be good to know the worst." Insinuating themes of insomnia, environmental ugliness, childhood and memory, sexual intimacy, mortality, radical evil and language, Adorno unmask the presence of awful social conditions in the most private moments of daily experience. Also during this period Adorno co-authored *Dialectic of Enlightenment* with Horkheimer, director of the exiled Institute for Social

Research. This work, which has come to be regarded as a main theoretical statement of the Frankfurt "School" as a whole, traces the historical emergence of reason from myth and the transformation of reason itself into an irrational force dominating both nature and the human subject. They attempt to show that the rationalization of social life has resulted in the virtually complete negation of freedom as embodied in the structures of totalitarian social control. Progress has turned into its opposite. They conclude: "Enlightenment is totalitarian."

Adorno became involved in an empirical study of the psychosocial determinants of anti-semitism sponsored by the Berkeley Public Opinion Study, the Institute for Social Research and the American Jewish Committee. The result of this collective work was the monumental study of *The Authoritarian Personality*. Adorno brought to this project a long-standing interest in psycho-analysis—he'd written his first "Habilitationsschrift" in 1927 on the concept of the unconscious and Kant—and he assisted in devising an ingenious questionnaire (the "F scale") for isolating and quantifying the essential but latent traits of the fascist personality. The underlying assumption of this study was that Fascism was not merely a disastrous political aberration but was rooted in unconscious personality structures conditioned by advanced capitalist society as a whole.

Adorno returned to Frankfurt in 1949 and, with Horkheimer's retirement in 1958, he assumed directorship of the Institute, which had also returned to Europe. During the post-war years Adorno became the leading theoretical voice of the Frankfurt "School" and his microscopic analyses of social and cultural phenomena exerted a strong influence on leftists. He was a central figure in the public controversy known as the "positivist debate," which concerned the conflict between empirical and dialectical methods in sociology. His position was that all observations of discrete social "facts" are necessarily mediated by the social totality and that social science must therefore examine the social whole in order to make truthful investigations of any of its parts. But the polemic mobilized more than views on method. The disagreement was about the kind of knowledge each side was seeking. The "positivist" aim was a unified body of statements explaining that to which they refer, and the critical theorists' aim was a mode of self-awareness consisting of knowledge of one's own true interests.

The major philosophical works of Adorno's later years were *Negative Dialectics* and the *Aesthetische Theorie*. In the first of these Adorno exemplifies a type of discourse in which thought is not inhabited by reality in unperceived ways. This is the main point about Kant, Hegel and Heidegger, the three philosophers discussed in the work—that conceptually their texts reproduce reality in ways uncontrolled either authorially or linguistically. This is why, for Adorno, the aim of philosophy is to criticize ideology without positing yet another conceptual scheme. Adorno was working on the *Aesthetische Theorie* at the time of his death in 1969. This fragmentary and difficult work, to have been dedicated to Samuel Beckett, focuses on the way in which an instance of liberation is built into aesthetic experience precisely in its most formal, non-representational dimensions. This thesis is explored chiefly within the field of modernist art and literature.

In the 1960's German students turned against Adorno and the Institute for Social Research. Although they had found guidelines for political action in his critical theory of society, they themselves had come to be criticized for exhibiting just another form of socially manipulated behaviour. Adorno's career ended with his being held in disfavor by the only social group he ever inspired to action. His thinking had been informed by a fascination with structures of self-deception, a ruthless logicity and a sense of historical helplessness.

Alan Waters

THINKERS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

AJDUKIEWICZ, Kazimierz. Polish logician and philosopher. Born in Tarnopol, Eastern Galicia, now the U.S.S.R., 12 December 1890. Studied at the University of Lvov, Ph.D. 1912. Served in the Polish and Austrian armies during World War I. Married Maria Twardowska in 1919; 2 children. Professor of Philosophy and Logic, University of Warsaw, 1926-39; Professor of Philosophy, 1945-54, and Rector, 1948-52, University of Poznań. Professor of Logic, University of Warsaw, 1954-60. Chief Editor, *Studia Logica*. *Died* 12 April 1963.

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The Polish philosopher Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz was a child of his epoch, which was obsessed with precision, logic, semantics, language, an epoch that attempted to give a new expression to philosophy by putting it on a par with science. The ancestry of this philosophy is, on the one hand, Descartes with his quest for the right method to arrive at clear and precise results, and, on the other hand, the German mathematician and logician Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) who initiated the inquiry into the foundations of mathematics and logic. From Frege the line goes to the early work of Bertrand Russell, who was clearly working out Frege's problem: how to secure solid foundations, at least in the realm of mathematics. If mathematics cannot be shown to rest on a secure foundation, then what other branch of knowledge can? From Russell the line goes to the Polish school of logic, especially Lesniewski (1886-1939) and Lukasiewicz (1878-1956) who equally sought to work out a language so clean and precise that it (almost) alone would be able not only to solve complex problems of logic and mathematics, but also to create a universal means to put philosophy on a firm and secure footing—once and for all. The same line of assumptions is continued through other later branches and extensions of analytical philosophy: logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle in the 1930's and 40's; Oxford linguistic philosophy in the 1950's; and then through American analyti-

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cal philosophy—Quine, (Carnap during his American period), then Chomsky, then Kripke; and all others of the analytical persuasion, via the refinement of language they all attempted to arrive at lasting philosophical results.

Ajdukiewicz was a part of the same idiom. He was in sympathy with the Vienna Circle. He published his major papers in the early 1930's, which made for him an international reputation; in the official journal of the Vienna Circle called *Erkenntnis*. Yet he clearly separated himself from the one-sidedness and crudity of the Viennese philosophers. He always insisted (like Popper) on the importance of problems and not of techniques.

The main focus of Ajdukiewicz's philosophical endeavours was language and cognition: how do they determine each other; how do they determine the structure of our knowledge and indeed ultimately the structure of our world. The most far-reaching result of Ajdukiewicz's insights was the doctrine of "Radical Conventionalism," which claims that the structure of our language—our conceptual apparatus—determines uniquely the world view we hold. Different conceptual apparatus lead to different pictures of the "world." The totality of meanings attributed to the expressions of a given language Ajdukiewicz called the conceptual apparatus of this language.

Radical conventionalism was a bold doctrine which incorporated the main insights of 19th century conventionalism and carried these insights to an extreme. While Henri Poincaré (the creator of 19th century conventionalism) suggested that some elements of our system of knowledge, be it physics or geometry, can be assumed as a matter of convention, Ajdukiewicz went the whole way and insisted that our entire linguistic apparatus, with which we describe the world, is a matter of convention. The conceptual apparatus is often indistinguishable from language as such. The choice of the conceptual apparatus is not imposed on us by the external reality or our inner experience. It is to a large degree a matter of convention.

This is a fascinating doctrine which has neither been proved nor disproved by "reality." Nor can it be. For it assumes being prior to any reading of reality.

In a profound sense, Radical Conventionalism anticipates the revolution of the New Physics of the 1970's, which maintains (going actually further than Ajdukiewicz) that the notion of reality independent of our knowledge and our minds does not make any sense. We live in a *participatory* universe (J.A. Wheeler), and through our act of participation, through peculiar cognitive faculties we possess and specific concepts of knowledge we have invented, we constitute (or co-create) reality. The epistemological insights of the New Physics are in a perfect accord with Ajdukiewicz's notion of Radical Conventionalism.

Let me emphasize: Radical Conventionalism was not only a semantic or a linguistic doctrine, but also an epistemological one. What Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) attributed to the categories of the mind (shaping reality into appropriate forms), Ajdukiewicz attributed to the conceptual apparatus. Nor was Ajdukiewicz alone in this quest. Concurrently with him, and actually slightly preceding him, was Benjamin Lee Whorf (*Language, Thought and Reality*, 1956) with his Linguistic Relativity Principle, spelling out (though less rigorously) very similar ideas. A bit later came W.V. Quine with his idea of radical conventionalism (see in particular the introduction to Quine's *Methods of Logic*). Quine's conventionalism was, in my opinion, influenced by Ajdukiewicz's ideas. And later still came Chomsky with his concept of man as language animal. All of them (and many others in the 20th century) attempted to find in language the mediator and indeed determinator of the structure of our knowledge and of reality.

Ajdukiewicz's Radical Conventionalism was born out of his researches into the theory of meaning which, in the 1930's, was the professional preoccupation and obsession of analytical philosophers. To recognize language as such, Ajdukiewicz claimed, implies following the rules of its use. If we do not respect the rules of use (workings of language), we do not operate with the language in question. In a word, meaning is use. This was an

important anticipation of Oxford linguistic philosophy, as well as an anticipation of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Indeed, some of the credit that usually goes to Wittgenstein—for grasping the nature of the rules of language in use—should go to Ajdukiewicz.

Ajdukiewicz was a philosopher's philosopher, most rigorous and painstaking in his approach, with a bit of German pedantry thrown into the bargain. He wrote voluminously on all subjects with which analytical philosophers were preoccupied. They all wrote on logic and contributed textbooks to the field. So did Ajdukiewicz. So many of them wanted to salvage empiricism, which was considered a good thing. (This adulation of empiricism among analytical philosophers is to me a strange phenomenon—not justified at all.) Although Ajdukiewicz was a radical conventionalist, he entertained the strange notion of radical empiricism. It was *conceptual* empiricism (really not empiricism in the traditional sense—as language determines it all), not radical empiricism.

Ajdukiewicz studied at Göttingen—philosophy with Husserl and mathematics with Hilbert—in addition to his earlier studies with K. Twardowski in Lwow (Twardowski established the Polish analytical school, often called Lwow-Warsaw School). During the interwar years Ajdukiewicz was one of the handful of Polish philosophers with a truly Renaissance mind: completely at ease with Aristotle in the original as well as with modern formal logic. He also commanded considerable personal respect—to the point of being called, while he was Rector of Poznan University, Casimir the Magnificent. There were at least half a dozen of such individuals in Poland in the interwar period (Lukasiewicz, Kotarbinski, Ajdukiewicz, Witkiewicz, Chwistek, Ingarden): they put Polish philosophy on the map; they also created the legacy of the stubborn independence of the Polish mind not only in the realm of things intellectual but also in the realm of things ideological and political. The spirit of a nation is often determined by the quality of its philosophy.

—Henryk Skolimowski

ALEXANDER, Samuel. British philosopher. Born in Sydney, New South Wales, Australia, 6 January 1859. Educated at Wesley College, Melbourne; Balliol College, Oxford. Fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford, 1882-88; Professor of Philosophy, Owens College, later Victoria University of Manchester, 1893-1924. Gifford Lecturer, University of Glasgow, 1916-18. President, Aristotelian Society, 1908-11. Honorary doctorate: Durham University, 1923; Oxford University, 1924; University of Birmingham, 1924; University of Liverpool, 1925; Cambridge University, 1934. Honorary Fellow, Lincoln College, 1918, and Balliol College, 1925. Fellow of the British Academy, 1913. Order of Merit, 1930. *Died 13 September 1938.*

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Samuel Alexander's aim is to get a synoptic view of the evolving universe which science has depicted and to find in it the place of mind, values and religion. He seeks to "take time seriously" and, as a "naturalist," to understand something without dissolving it away. The relation of mind to body is the clue to how all levels of existence are related. The mind requires a neural basis, and mental processes can be expressed completely in neural terms. But, while the mental process is *also* neural, it is not *merely* neural. For mind to emerge, there is required a constellation of neural conditions not found in vital actions which are not mental. Nor could knowledge of the neural conditions enable us to predict that or explain why it would have a mental quality. Mind is thus something new, even though expressible in neural terms. Mental processes, though they may be reduced to the class of vital processes, are so distinct from the rest of the class that they hold a privileged position in it, just as a king is a man like his subjects but is not one of them. Also, the neural process which carries thought becomes changed into a different one when it ceases to carry thought.

The emergence of a new quality from any level of existence means that at that level there comes into being a constellation of motions belonging to that level with qualities appropriate to that level, which constellation also has a new quality distinctive of the higher complex. The constellation and its qualities are new yet expressible without residue in terms of the processes from the level of which they emerge. Mind, for example, is not merely physiological but is also psychological. The emergent qualities are to be accepted with the "natural piety" of an investigator. It admits of no explanation. The different levels are roughly: motions, physical matter, matter with "secondary qualities" (e.g., color, taste), life, and mind, with possible intermediate levels. Each level is related to the lower as the mind is to the neural processes. They are now emergents, expressible in terms of the lower, but are not merely the lower. This is Alexander's alternative to reductionism and dualism.

It is the job of the scientist to trace the history of things. The philosopher points out the general features of the advance. Philosophy, like science, uses the empirical method: reflective description and analysis of data, making hypothesis to form verifiable connections. Unlike science, its subject matter is comprehensive, the all-pervasive characters of experienced things.

Alexander's ideas about space-time are complex. Each point in space is distinguished by its instant in time and vice-versa. Thus we can speak of space-time and of point-instants. Alexander sees his notion of space-time as somewhat similar to that of Minkowski and Einstein. There is an analogy between time and mind, space and body. This suggests the intimacy of the relationship and also that something like mind was present from the beginning, helping us to see all the forms of existence as a continuous series from Space-Time upwards through matter to mind. The analogy breaks down in that mind, unlike time, is a new emergent. If the past is not to be lost, there must be some continuum to sustain the togetherness of past and present. This is space. This is time. Each plays the part of identity to the other's diversity. Alexander wishes to develop a position distinct from absolute space and from space and time as relationships between things. Space is full of memory and expectation. We always