DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

PLANNING DEVELOPMENT WITH WOMEN

Making a World of Difference

Kate Young

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Introduction

This book is a rather idiosyncratic account of the appearance and growth of concern with women and development over the past three decades. Many of the chapters are based on materials that were prepared for use in the courses on gender and development I ran at the Institute for Development Studies, University of Sussex. As a personal account, certain things have been given emphasis which others working in the field may not feel are as important as other aspects. But this book is in no way intended as a definitive, 'correct' account. Over the next few years it is probable that a great many other books will be written which go over much the same ground but from a number of different perspectives.

The book is intended for use by students in any of the social sciences who are considering working in some aspect of development. It has been assumed that many readers will be students enrolled in universities in countries where libraries may have little of the development literature, either because of foreign exchange constraints or the difficulty of acquiring books and journals. I have therefore tried to refer only to standard texts, and not to refer to a vast number of them. However, I have referred to much of the literature on women and development. This may cause particular difficulties, given that librarians with a small budget may not give this literature priority. In an attempt to overcome the problems this may cause, two lists of books are given in the bibliography. One includes details of books and journals referred to in the text; the other gives details of alternative materials. In this way I hope that readers may get a chance to read some of the relevant literature, however haphazard their university library's collection may be.

The layout

Chapters 1, 2 and 3 give an overview of the terms and evolution of the main debates in development during the three UN Development Decades (1960–69, 1970–79, 1980–89). These were roughly from economic growth and modernisation of the 1950s and 1960s, through (re)distribution and basic needs, to the return to an emphasis on economic growth and the exaltation of the market mechanism of the 1980s. How women fit into these debates is outlined, as are shifts in the perception of the problematic of 'the woman question' and its solution.

In the First UN Development Decade women were viewed largely from the perspective of family welfare and were virtually invisible in development planning. In the Second Development Decade, the Women in Development (WID) movement expanded rapidly: women, not relations between women and men, were the main focus of analysis. The recognition of women's economic contribution, particularly in the poorest sectors of society, and their needs as economic actors came to the forefront in the basic needs approach. The accusation that women are invisible to development planners resulted in much activity designed to generate disaggregated statistical data. The 1980s saw the further consolidation of WID. Funding emphasis shifted from poverty and meeting basic needs to efficiency – to utilising women more effectively, by improving their productive capacity within the framework of the market system. The first three chapters lead to the conclusion that throughout the whole period, perceptions and solutions to the women in development question have, in the main, gone with the grain of mainstream development thinking.

Chapters 4, 5 and 6 look at specific sectors of the economy in which women are engaged: agriculture, industry and the informal sector. Chapter 4 draws on materials about Africa, both because of the preponderance of women farmers in agriculture and the wealth of literature available. In Chapter 5 industrial development is examined in the context of Asian development because of the heavy use of female labour in manufacturing for export. Chapter 6 covers the informal sector; Latin American case material is used because of the wealth of research carried out in the region on the informal sector and casualised labour, and because of the predominance of women in the sector throughout the region.

Two of these chapters review changes in development strategies over the last three development decades, touching on the impact of policies and strategies on women. All three make suggestions as to how development planning could be adapted to support and enhance women's participation and empowerment. The chapters establish the case for a close examination of social and economic relations between men and women.

Chapter 7 turns to the question of statistical data and discusses the problem of the conceptual schema which guide the collection of census data. Two aspects of this complex issue are examined: women's economic activity and the household as a unit of analysis. The need for statisticians, planners and economists to re-examine their theoretical frameworks is argued, and for basic concepts like productive and reproductive work to be re-evaluated.

Chapter 8 contrasts the two main perspectives – Women in Development and Gender and Development – and looks at their strengths and weaknesses from the policy and implementation point of view. Chapter 9 examines some of the issues involved in planning development with women and, as an outcome of this, raises the question of empowerment and political action. Its underlying argument is that sustainable change in women's material conditions will never come about without tackling the underlying structures which produce the imbalance between the genders. But these structures are also deeply embedded in the current models of development; conventional socialist and capitalist development models are productivist in bias and emphasise rapid economic growth rather than sustainable growth. For the latter, far greater attention needs to be paid to the conditions which will allow growth over generations. One condition is the dismantling of the pervasive structures of inequality between men and women. Another, and which follows from the first, is the questioning of the relationship between humanity and nature itself, and of the ability of the planet earth to sustain and maintain humankind as well as its other living beings.

'We do not own the earth, we hold it in guardianship for our children.'

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This book is based on many of the materials used in the series of short study courses on Women, Men and Development at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex. It also makes use of materials produced for the MA in Gender and Development and for the EEC/IDS 'Training for Trainers' project (published as *Gender and Third World Development*) – in particular the modules on agriculture, and on statistics, written by Ann Whitehead and Alison Evans respectively.

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The book also owes much to all those who collaborated on the Women, Men and Development study course and contributed to its success. For each study course an international team of people with different specialisms was put together. The members of the course team usually came to the Institute several weeks before the start of the course. We then worked through the course content, each person making suggestions as to how they could contribute to its improvement. Particular thanks are due to Pat Mohammed, the first co-director of the course. Her input into the original format was invaluable, and her Trinidadian warmness, humour and good counsel were key factors in its success, as was the hard work that Alison Evans put into the preparations for this and two further courses. Many warm thanks are due too to Shireen Huq (Bangladesh), Marge Hinawaeola (Papua New Guinea), Neera Desai (India), Agnes Morell (France), Faustina Ward Osborne (Guyana), Emelina Quintillan (Philippines), Helen Dalton (Kenya), Jean Stubbs (Cuba and UK), Theresa Kaijage (Tanzania), Jacinthe Kumarswamy (India), and Liliana Cetrangulo (Argentina). I am also endebted to colleagues, past and present at IDS for their support, in particular Gordon White, Christine White, Mick Moore, Mike Faber, Robin Murray, Emmanuel de Kadt, Manfred Bienefeld, Reg Green, and Robert Chambers. To Jill McCabe, Alison Tesfachew and Ann Watson warm thanks are also due.

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My last great debt of gratitude is to those people around the world who were incredibly supportive of, and enthusiastic about the work we were doing at IDS, from the early days of the Subordination of Women Workshop, right through to the Short Courses and the first MA in Gender and Development in the UK. From them I learned a very great deal, both in terms of theory and practice, and of taking a principled stand on what can broadly be called feminist issues in very hostile environments.

This book is dedicated to them and to all those who are struggling for the creation of a more equitable and just future society in which men and women will be true partners and helpmeets, and in which the enormous disparities of wealth and power between the industrialised countries and those of the south will have disappeared, and in which all people can live lives unshadowed by want and deprivation.

London, June 1991

> The present moment, then, is not a culmination but a point of choice. The purpose of analysis is to understand better the structure of the choice and the collective projects that are feasible responses to it.
>
> R. W. Connell, *Gender and Power*

Contents

1 From growth to basic needs and back to growth

Between 1945 and 1965 over 50 countries in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean became independent nations. Many of them were deeply impoverished; their colonial inheritance left them with distorted or fragmented economies, poor or virtually non-existent systems of education, health, land and water management, communication and transport. Levels of literacy and education were low – in most parts of Africa and many Asian countries 80 per cent illiteracy was normal and 50 per cent primary school enrolment figures were considered an achievement. Provision of health care was lacking in all but the largest urban centres and even these services were often rudimentary. Many of these newly-independent ex-colonies also had very fragile political institutions and social integration was impeded by sharp ethnic and cultural divisions. Arbitrary or disputed boundaries imposed by the colonial powers were a source of potential and actual conflict.

Most of these new nations aimed to become economically as well as politically independent, yet the times were not particularly propitious. Tension between two opposed economic and political systems, capitalism and socialism, meant pressures to become aligned. Many nationalist leaders who had hopes of taking their countries along a 'third way' and to avoid being drawn into the hemispheric contest, found these hopes to be unfulfillable. The absence of alternative models to a market or a planned economy presented politicians and planners with serious difficulties.

Even those who were relatively convinced of the adequacy of the market economy had little actual experience of how to bring about economic growth, nor the social, political and other changes needed to ensure the majority of the population would benefit. William Rostow in 1960 brought together much of the thinking on how the ex-colonies were to 'modernise' in his *The Stages of Economic Growth* (Rostow, 1960). Today the approach seems rather naive. It assumes that all countries will go through a number of definable stages, similar to those already experienced by the 'advanced' countries, but each at their own pace. The various stages involve the move from traditional subsistence economy to the spread of money-based exchange, take off into market relations, the move into international trade and eventually the development of a mass consumption economy. The development of the market plays a key role in the process.[1] This economic stages theory mirrored a sociological theory of modernisation which posits that people would move from a traditional way of life based on ascribed positions and an acceptance of collective values, to a modern way of life based on positions gained by merit, and an open and questioning attitude with a more individualistic set of values. Modern education was to play a key role in the transition.

As economists, politicians and policymakers tried to tackle the problems of mass poverty of the ex-colonies and other developing countries, a specific brand of economic theory began to be developed. Informed by many of the ideas of the British economist, John Maynard Keynes, development economics largely held sway until the mid to late-1970s. Not all developing countries had the same problems – in fact they were very heterogeneous, nor of course did all development economists hold identical views, but most did focus on the structure of the economy, promoted macro-economic planning and a considerable degree of government intervention in the economy.

Going for growth

Initially common obstacles to rapid economic growth were identified, the most crucial of which were the lack of capital and/or means of capital formation (i.e. people with money to invest or enterprises which created profits which could be invested in expanded capacity); lack of skilled labour and management expertise; lack of infrastructure and technology; and lastly lack of foreign exchange. Given these constraints, the proposed solutions were: the stimulation of the rate of savings and investment (capital accumulation); the pulling of surplus labour away from the low return, low productivity 'traditional' rural sector into a new 'modern' urban, manufacturing sector (i.e. to pull labour from agriculture into industry and from unskilled manual work to skilled non-manual work); the hiring of non-national 'experts' until local ones could be trained; and the importation of modern technology (Roxborough, 1979; Colman and Nixson, 1986).

Manufacturing

Developing manufacturing capacity was given particular emphasis. The idea was that LDCs (Less Developed Countries) would first shift from producing agricultural and primary products for export to manufacturing mass consumer goods for the domestic market (and later the international market) using largely unskilled labour. With the knowledge acquired from this stage they would be able to move to production of more sophisticated intermediate and luxury consumption goods, and then, in a third stage, to producing capital goods themselves. By this time new entrants to the labour force would be better educated and skilled. Planners worked with a very simplified two-sector model of the economy: a modern, industrial and urban sector pulling the economy into the twentieth century, and a traditional, agricultural sector providing the labour and the consumption needs of those in the modern sector.

One aim of developing industrial capacity was to enable developing countries to sell goods on the world market and thereby gain scarce foreign exchange. Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage was adduced to suggest that developing countries would benefit from specialising in the production of certain goods (including raw materials) for trade.[2]

Many development advisers believed that direct investment and bilateral and multilateral aid would both help a country to acquire needed capital goods and technology and to become rapidly integrated into the global economic system. Foreign companies were therefore encouraged to set up branches or new enterprises; large sums were borrowed from international or bilateral donors to create new enterprises and invest in crucial infrastructure (roads, railways, hospitals, schools, etc.).

Investment alone was not sufficient to facilitate, dynamise and direct the economy. Development economists therefore, following Keynes, argued for state intervention to create the conditions for economic take-off. The intervention would involve firstly, fiscal and monetary measures to encourage foreign investment – preferential tariffs, tax exemptions, repatriation of profits, etc.; secondly, measures to control labour militancy; and thirdly, playing the role of entrepreneur itself (managing enterprises such as mines, factories and trading/marketing boards).

By the late-1960s in fact a number of countries had built up quite a large production capacity, but this was often achieved by allowing what became known as world market factories to be based in their countries. Free Trade Zones were set up where foreign manufacturers enjoyed special conditions (tax exemption, repatriation of profits, prohibition on labour militancy, etc.), and could produce goods for their home markets at much lower costs and higher profits. Typical world market factories produced clothing, pharmaceuticals, textiles and electrical and electronic goods.

Agriculture

At first, little thought was given to the need to modernise domestic agriculture (i.e. the production of food crops rather than cash crops) in developing countries but by the mid-1960s it had become clear that for many countries, particularly those in Asia, inability to produce sufficient food for the growing urban masses was a major constraint to the development process (Myrdal, 1968).

In many countries (for example in much of Latin America) land reform was an urgent need if land was to be more productively used. Land reform is, however, politically difficult to implement. As a result, the development of high yielding varieties (HYVs) of grains (mainly maize, wheat and rice) and their associated technical packages (the Green Revolution) were welcomed as a means to increase aggregate food output without political difficulties. Introduced into areas (for example Mexico, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Philippines) where farmers had the means to adopt the new but more costly (capital intensive) production processes, the Green Revolution brought a shift from production for subsistence or own use to production for the (domestic) market, and certainly allowed many Asian countries to produce enough for domestic consumption and even export as well.

In other areas, for example in Africa, although HYVs were introduced (particularly maize), considerable efforts were made to encourage smallholding peasant producers to shift from subsistence to cash crop production largely for the export market, so as to bring in foreign exchange much needed by the state. The farmers themselves, it was assumed, could procure their own subsistence needs through the market. But little attention was paid to ensuring the development and integration of local and regional marketing networks. Crops all too often were chanelled directly to the nearest urban areas to meet the needs of the rapidly expanding cities, leaving the rural areas poorly supplied. To meet the town dwellers ever growing demand for food, major infrastructural projects, notably in West Africa, involving the introduction of irrigation or control of river basin water flows, were put in place to increase production of marketable foods, particularly rice.

Impact of going for growth strategies

The strategies based on these ideas were initially apparently highly successful. Many countries returned growth rates of 5 per cent and above per year. For example, on average, during the First UN Development Decade (1960 – 69), the growth rate of Kenya was 7.1 per cent, of Brazil 8 per cent, of South Korea 8.5 per cent (World Bank, 1978). The low-income countries as a whole (as defined by the World Bank) had growth rates of 3.6 per cent during this period, while the middle-income countries averaged out at 5.7 per cent. Many of these countries were growing and industrialising faster than the IMEs (Industrial Market Economies) had in the nineteenth century.

What these growth rates also reflected was an overall boom in the world economy, which came to an end with the two oil price rises of 1973 and 1979. And, as critics have since pointed out, the focus on LDC growth rates disguised the growing disparity between the already industrialised north and the industrialising south. During the 1960s the global gross international product increased by one trillion dollars. But this was very unevenly distributed, with

80 per cent going to rich industrialised nations and only 6 per cent to the poorest (those with per capita annual incomes of less than $200).

The growth figures for the 1960s also indicate the beginnings of a trend which was consolidated in the 1970s: certain 'developing' countries were moving ahead swiftly, while others stagnated. This foreshadowed the emergence of the Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) of Latin America and South-East Asia and the falling behind of many of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa now categorised as Least Developed Countries (LLDCs).[3]

National growth rates measured as changes in GDP/GNP (Gross Domestic Product/Gross National Product) year-on-year also concealed the pattern of growth. Scholars who looked at the quality of life of the bulk of the population found much less reason for optimism. Gunnar Myrdal, for example, found that the assumed benefits of development were not reaching the majority of ordinary people, particularly the poorest (Mydral 1968). In his study Myrdal uses various indicators of standard of living such as food, clothing and energy consumption, and levels of literacy. While the theory predicted that through the trickle-down effect all social strata would benefit from economic growth fostered by modernisation and industrialisation, in reality the development-as-growth paradigm was accompanied by the economic and social marginalisation of large sectors of the population. Increasing income disparities, underemployment – both urban and rural – chronic food shortages and the impoverishment of a large proportion of the rural population, indicated that all was not well. The trickle-down effect, which should have spread the benefits of increasing wealth to the mass of the population through job creation, increased demand for local products and increased demand for a wide range of services, had not materialised.

Assessing the impact of the Green Revolution in Asia Keith Griffin notes: 'The Green Revolution represents an attempt to substitute technical change for institutional change, to use scientific progress as an alternative to social progress' (1989, p. 144). Despite the enormous increases in production that these technical solutions to food shortage brought, they involved a limited number of crops. Most were durable and marketable staples (maize, rice, wheat) rather than the basic staples of the bulk of the rural poor – pulses, root crops such as cassava and yams, and grains such as millet or quinoa. In many areas these subsistence crops already were or became the province of women; but they were offered few of the incentives to increase production that their male counterparts were given. Studies, such as that by Kathleen Staudt (1985), showed that agricultural extension workers rarely gave women subsistence crop farmers the same degree of attention and care as male cash crop farmers. In addition to producing food for their families, the women also had to accommodate their husbands' need for more labour on their cash crop fields. Women producers became overburdened rather than more productive, and looked to ways to lessen their work burden. In some cases this led to substitution of lower nutritional value crops for higher value but higher labour intensity crops.

Food crop production was also affected by the fact that land with better soils was taken for cash crop production. Rural poverty worsened because the increased cost of production of the HYVs and cash and export crops led to many small farmers and tenants having to sell land or losing rights in land; cash crop producers were also beggared by the instability of commodity prices.

Not only were these negative economic and social indicators worrying but the political situation in many countries had also deteriorated. Both Nigeria and Pakistan suffered civil wars – in the latter case ending with the secession of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), Malaysia experienced violent race riots and Iran the overthrow of the Shah bent on modernising the economy at the cost of considerable repression. In Latin America and Africa authoritarian and often military governments became common in the 1970s, and almost everywhere there were growing levels of militarisation. The worrying question was to what extent economic growth was being promoted at the cost of popular discontent and subsequent repression.

Growth in question

The paradox of apparent growing wealth and greater poverty led both to the questioning of the dominant model of economic development and a search for explanations of its failure. Some observers argued that the model failed to address squarely issues of distribution; others that the model had too benevolent a notion of the benefits of trade. Many development economists responded by arguing that the main reason for failure was unanticipated population growth rates. With the success of their health programmes, infant and child mortality had decreased rapidly, but this was not matched by declining birth rates. We will briefly look at the critiques of the model and then at the population issue.

Insufficient attention to distribution

Growing evidence of gross poverty and new forms of poverty led to criticism of the conventional philosophy of grow first and distribute later and to questioning of the trickle-down assumption. An influential study published in 1974, entitled *Redistribution With Growth*, by Hollis Chenery and others, encapsulated the new thinking. It stressed the benefits to be gained from the inclusion of distributional factors in development planning, and showed that the mass of the population did not benefit from growth of the industrial and modern sectors and the increasing wealth of the urban entrepreneurial class through the trickle-down effect because the majority of the population – both rural and urban – were only minimally incorporated into the market. Research showed that the majority of the poor do not derive their livelihood from regular employment but rather from casual labouring and sale of goods and services, and other forms of what is called informal sector activity.

Given this, the authors of *Redistribution With Growth* (RWG) advocated a poverty-oriented approach; that is targeting the poor (the lowest 40 per cent of the population), and giving them assets or access to productive resources so they can have a permanent source of income. By raising the purchasing power of the bulk of the population, a demand for basic goods (manufactures and agricultural products) and services would be created, and in turn this would lead to more employment. Logically, the authors note that agriculture and manufacturing must be reoriented toward production of labour-intensive, mass consumption goods, and that price distortions which favour urban goods over rural ones must be eliminated. The authors do not discuss how governments will be able to reorient distribution towards the poor and away from the literate and articulate urban beneficiaries of growth without redistribution.

The redistribution approach made several valid points: the need to recognise the heterogeneity of social groups and the particular constraints that specific categories of the population face in their attempts to wrest a livelihood in a rather hostile economic environment. It also alerted development planners to the fact that, for reasons which the book does not explore, women formed a large proportion of the poorest: an observation which became the basis for much subsequent research and policy demands.

Employment issues had also been the concern of the ILO (International Labour Organisation) researchers in the 1960s. Focusing on the incapacity of industrial and modern sectors to absorb labour, ILO studies showed that large sectors of LDC populations were impoverished, not because they did not work, but because the types of economic activities they engaged in were low productivity, low return and unstable. They used the term 'informal sector' to describe the myriad activities of the working poor.

They noted that most governments are hostile to informal sector workers in part because they usually work on the streets, live in self-built shacks and huts in the interstices of the urban environment, and represent in many areas a real health hazard. As a result, city or municipal authorities frequently tried to rid themselves of the living evidence of the economy's failure by attacking the street workers and dwellers, burning down their houses and destroying their minimalist means of production. The ILO researchers, in contrast, argued that the survival strategies of the poor should be built upon and supported, and that this would help the economy in general.

To meet the needs of the 40 to 60 per cent of the population living on the margins of survival, the ILO proposed a new development strategy: the basic needs approach (BNA) (ILO, 1976). The BNA focused more sharply than RWG on the problem of how most people actually take part in development processes. Its main objective was to create the conditions which would, by the year 2000, give gainful employment to those who needed it, and meet most people's essential needs. These needs were identified as being of two types: those which could be met through individual effort – food, shelter, clothing – and those which should be met through public provision – health, sanitation, potable water, transport, education.

The focus on basic needs initiated a gradual reconsideration of women's contribution to development. The question of who provides most of the family's basic needs (food, water, clothing, health, heat) in most societies elicited the answer: women. Yet the conditions under which women were expected to provide for their families were appalling; little development concern had been directed to ameliorating these conditions. The implications of the fact that these time-consuming, arduous but essential tasks are given little or no value either by families or development planners was not addressed.

The strategies for achieving the BNA objectives were both economic and political, and included investment in labour-intensive production of basic goods and services, the use wherever possible of indigenous rather than external resources and of appropriate technologies. A crucial component of the strategy (like that of RWG) was the easing of poor people's means of access to socially valued resources, such as land, capital, education, employment opportunities, public services. Planning and other political institutions had to be reformed so as to encourage the greater participation of the poor in decision-making processes. The international monetary system and system of trade also needed reform so that national action on basic needs provision would not be blocked.

The BNA, like the RWG approach, relies heavily on the state to re-orientate the economy. The state must play a prescriptive role in devising policies to meet society's basic needs. In guiding the course of development it must ensure that the inadequacies of a poorly-developed market system are compensated for or eliminated. In fact, a government's ability to pursue such strategies is dependent not only on the political will of those in power, but on its political capacity in terms of institutional structures. Yet in many countries both will and capacity were lacking. Strangely, despite all the recommendations for state action, analysis of the different forms of the state in developing countries was neglected, as was the study of the extent and composition of civil society.

The harsher economic climate of the late-1970s and early-1980s made BNA a deadletter almost as soon as it was put forward, at least as far as macro-economic planning was concerned. Criticised for being overly idealistic and welfarist, for ignoring economic realities, the BNA did, none the less, add another dimension to development thinking. By raising the issues of autonomy and decision-making, cultural hegemony and indigenous knowledge, a much more overtly political dimension to the debate was opened up.

Although never implemented as a development policy, BNA was incorporated quite successfully into development practice: it has proved effective in individual project planning and drawing up local and regional plans, in getting planners to identify the basic needs of (and with) their target groups. Those who advocate the needs of particular groups – women, the poorest, the landless – have used it to get the concerns of their constituents integrated into the planning process. The problem, of course, is that such plans have to be implemented within the parameters set by macro-economic plans and national development strategies. And it is here that the needs of those without voice or political power get aggregated into invisibility.

Inequalities of trade

As we have noted, many policymakers considered production for the international market a prime means for development. This view was attacked by economists working with the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) (see e.g. Celso Furtado, 1964; Osvaldo Sunkel, 1969). They were particularly critical of the benevolent role assigned to foreign capital and aid, and to international trade in the development process. Believing the classical theory of comparative advantage to be seriously flawed, they argued that on the contrary, the world economic system is characterised by the unequal distribution of gains from trade. The industrialised Western nations (the 'core'), because of their economic power, benefit at the expense of the less developed and largely agricultural or primary product producing countries (the 'periphery'). Trade and specialisation in the periphery does not equalise disparities in levels of development nor stimulate balanced growth as the theory of comparative advantage predicts. Rather, developing countries are merely exposed to the vagaries of levels of demand from the centre and fluctuations in commodity prices, and become ever more dependent on imports and exports rather than increasingly self-sufficient.

The ECLA economists identified restructuring the terms of trade between centre and periphery as a precondition for LDC development. This was taken up by the group of 77 developing countries who, in 1973, launched a campaign for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), with the support of UNCTAD (UN Conference on Trade and Development). Among the requirements of NIEO were the stabilisation of commodity prices, ending of tariff barriers against LDC manufactures in developed country markets, reform of the international monetary system and the system of trade and tariffs (GATT), regulation of multinational corporations (MNC) activities, and the promotion of south-south trade.

In some ways NIEO was a direct challenge to BNA. Many LDC economists and politicians feared that concentration on meeting the basic needs of the poorest would divert attention (and resources) away from industrial development and that their countries would remain forever dependent on northern manufactures. They suggested that BNA was little more than a ploy to divert attention away from structural imbalances in the world economy. However, many distributionists argued that, while NIEO would undoubtedly benefit