


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Series Introduction

This nine-volume set is a collection of writings by experts in ancient Greek literature. On display here is their thinking, that is, their readings of ancient writings. Most, though not all, of these experts would call themselves philologists. For that reason, it is relevant to cite the definition of “philology” offered by Friedrich Nietzsche. In the preface to *Daybreak*, he says that philology is the art of reading slowly:

Philology is that venerable art which demands of its votaries one thing above all: to go aside, to take time, to become still, to become slow—it is a goldsmith’s art and connoisseurship of the word which has nothing but delicate cautious work to do and achieves nothing if it does not achieve it *lento*. But for precisely this reason it is more necessary than ever today; by precisely this means does it entice and enchant us the most, in the midst of an age of “work,” that is to say, of hurry, of indecent and perspiring haste, which wants to “get everything done” at once, including every old or new book:— this art does not easily get anything done, it teaches to read well, that is to say, to read slowly, deeply, looking cautiously before and aft, with reservations, with doors left open, with delicate fingers and eyes.

(This translation is adapted, with only slight changes, from R. J. Hollingdale, Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, *Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality* [Cambridge, 1982].)

Nietzsche’s original wording deserves to be quoted in full, since its power cannot be matched even by the best of translations:

Philologie nämlich ist jene ehrwürdige Kunst, welche von ihrem Verehrer vor Allem Eins heischt, bei Seite gehn, sich Zeit lassen, still werden, langsam werden—, als eine Goldschmiedekunst und -kennerschaft des Wortes, die lauter feine vorsichtige Arbeit abzuthun hat und Nichts erreicht, wenn sie es nicht *lento* erreicht. Gerade damit aber ist sie heute nöthiger als je, gerade dadurch zieht sie und bezaubert sie uns am stärksten, mitten in einem Zeitalter der “Arbeit,” will sagen: der Hast, der unanständigen und schwitzenden Eilfertigkeit, das mit Allem gleich “fertig werden” will, auch mit jedem alten und neuen Buche:— sie selbst wird nicht so leicht irgend womit fertig, sie lehrt gut lesen, das heisst langsam,

tief, rück- und vorsichtig, mit Hintergedanken, mit offen gelassenen Thüen, mit zarten Fingern und Augen lesen...
(Friedrich Nietzsche, *Morgenröthe. Nachgelassene Fragmente, Anfang 1880 bis Frühjahr 1881. Nietzsche Werke* V.1, ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari [Berlin, 1971], 9.)

This is not to say that the selections in these nine volumes must be ideal exemplifications of philology as Nietzsche defined it. Faced with the challenge of describing their own approaches to Greek literature, most authors of these studies would surely prefer a definition of “philology” that is less demanding. Perhaps most congenial to most would be the formulation of Rudolf Pfeiffer (*History of Classical Scholarship* I [Oxford, 1968]): “Philology is the art of understanding, explaining and reconstructing literary tradition.”

This collection may be viewed as an attempt to demonstrate such an art, in all its complexity and multiplicity. Such a demonstration, of course, cannot be completely successful, because perfection is far beyond reach: the subject is vast; the space is limited, and the learning required is ever incomplete.

Finally, it is important to keep in mind that disagreements persist in the ongoing study of ancient Greek literature, and thus the articles in these nine volumes necessarily reflect a diversity of opinions. There is ample room for disagreement even about the merits of representative articles, let alone the choices of the articles themselves. It is therefore reasonable for each reader to ask, after reading an article, whether it has indeed been true to the art of philology. The editor, a philologist by training, has his own opinions about the relative success or failure of each of the studies here selected. These opinions, however, must be subordinated to the single most practical purpose of the collection, which is to offer a representative set of modern studies that seek the best possible readings of the ancient writings.

Volume Introduction

The thinker Empedocles, who flourished in the fifth century B.C.E., is not a “poet” (*poiêtês*) but a “naturalist” (*phusiologos*), says Aristotle in the fourth century (*Poetics* 1447b). As far as Aristotle was concerned, the only thing that a poet like Homer and a philosopher like Empedocles have in common is that they both say what they say in the meter of epic, dactylic hexameter. As far as Empedocles was concerned, however, the relationship between his philosophy and Homeric poetry was organic: as the studies of Jean Bollack have shown (1965–1969), Empedocles so internalized the language of Homer that he *thought* in the language of Homer and therefore *spoke* in the language of Homer. Such a continuum between philosophy and poetry is evident in the thinking of the so-called Presocratics (see also Nussbaum 1972, article 1). From the standpoint of the ancient world in general, such a continuum seemed conventional (Hardie 1995 and Segal 1962, articles 2 and 3).

From the standpoint of Aristotle’s teacher, Plato, on the other hand, there must be an inherent discontinuity between philosophy and poetry. Mimesis, as a characteristic of poetry, detracts from the project of philosophy (Nehamas 1982, article 4). This is not to say that Plato does not appreciate poetry or lacks poetic skills: on the contrary, he reveals his connoisseurship and displays his mastery of these skills at every opportunity (Nightingale 1993 and Demos 1997, articles 5 and 6). It is only that Plato’s poetic and rhetorical agenda must be subordinated to his philosophical agenda (Clay 1975 and North 1991, articles 7 and 8). Plato’s poetic effects may rival those of actual poets in their communicative appeal (Derrida 1972 and Compton 1990, articles 9 and 10), but the agenda must remain philosophical.

There are other thinkers in the age of Plato, however, who continue to integrate poetry and philosophy, such as Isocrates (Race 1987, article 11). Even Aristotle, Plato’s pupil, treats poetry and poetics as worthy subjects of study within the realm of philosophical discourse (Croix 1975, article 12). Finally, Aristotle’s *Poetics*, as a philosophical discourse, can even be read as if it were a literary artifact (Carson 1990, article 13).

Philosophical criteria are usefully applied by modern literary critics to ancient Greek literature (see, for example, Held 1991, article 14, on applications of the definition of man as a *politikon zôion*, “organism of the city-state,” according to Aristotle’s *Politics*, book I). In fact, sustained philosophical argumentation can be successfully combined with sustained literary criticism of ancient Greek texts (Silk 1995 and Habinek 1998, articles 15 and 16; see also Schur 1998).

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ΨΥΧΗ in Heraclitus, I

MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM

In the fragments of Heraclitus*, frequent mention is made of ψυχή; to understand what Heraclitus means by ψυχή would seem to be central to any attempt to discuss his ideas about human life and death. In order to understand Heraclitus' own usage, however, we must first attempt to review the meaning of the word ψυχή as traditionally used, and particularly as used in the poems of Homer, of whose ideas and influence Heraclitus is harshly critical.¹ It will also be useful to sketch the pre-Heraclitean history of the word λόγος, since its history parallels, in certain important respects, that of ψυχή, and since the two notions will be seen to be vitally related in Heraclitus' ψυχή fragments. The first section of this paper will deal briefly with the history of these words, and go on to investigate the role which, for Heraclitus, ψυχή plays in the living man, and the way in which this role may be seen as dependent upon Heraclitus' ideas about language.

The ψυχή in Homer² is that which leaves a man at death to continue existence as a shade in Hades. Without ψυχή, a man cannot live; it is the single factor the presence or absence of which differentiates the living man from the corpse. But it is mentioned as present only insofar as it may potentially depart, and is thus the characteristic sign of human vulnerability and mortality. It becomes plain, upon examining the passages in which it is used, that the term ψυχή, alone, implies the presence of none of those faculties which we would regard as characteristic of human life. Ψυχή is a necessary condition for human life, for consciousness, thought and emotion; but it is not a sufficient condition. In speaking of his faculties, the Homeric man distinguishes a number of "organs" with separate functions and locations: θυμός, κῆρ, ἦτορ, φρένες, νόος, etc. He does not refer explicitly to anything which connects them, or in virtue of which he is a single being.³

* For modern works referred to in this article, please see *Bibliography* on p. 15.

¹ Explicitly in DK 22 A 22, B 42, B 56; implicitly, as I hope to show, in many other fragments.

² See the thorough discussion in Snell, *Discovery*, ch. I, esp. pp. 8-12. Also Snell, *Gnomon* 77 ff. and Böhme *passim*.

³ See Snell, *Discovery*, p. 8.

The ψυχή is, vaguely, a principle of breath; we know this from its etymology, and from the fact that when it leaves a man it is breathed out, flies away, or departs through a wound. But its function in the living man remains undefined, and it is mentioned only in connection with death. When one's life's breath leaves, it is called ψυχή. But when a hero wishes to say "as long as the breath of life remains in me", he says: εἰς ὃ κ' ἄυτμῆ / ἐν στήθεσσι μένη (K 89-90). A hero may fight *περὶ ψυχῆς* (X 161) or risk his ψυχή in battle (I 321) or discourse about the irrecoverability of the ψυχή once it is lost (I 408). But he is never aware of doing anything by means of it in life; only once is it mentioned as being present in a living man at all. And the sole point of mentioning its presence there is to declare the man mortal and vulnerable. Agenor, attempting to persuade his θυμός not to fear Achilles, says (Φ 569):

καὶ γὰρ θῆν τούτῳ τρωτὸς χρώς ὀξεί χαλκῶ,
ἐν δὲ ἴα ψυχή, θνητὸν δὲ ἔφασ' ἀνθρώποι
ἐμμεναι.

Each mortal man has within him a single ψυχή, and it is this which characterizes him as mortal. The gods are not credited, either in Homer or in subsequent literature, with the possession of ψυχή.⁴

⁴ This seems to hold true even after the word ψυχή has acquired a wider usage and can, on occasion, be substituted for θυμός, or even for νόος. In the non-philosophic literature of the fifth century, ψυχή is ascribed in only four cases to a god. Aristophanes, *Frogs*, 1468 – αἰρήσομαι γὰρ ὄνπερ ἡ ψυχή θέλει – seems for metrical and contextual reasons to be a quotation from tragedy, and the fact that it is Dionysus, a god, who quotes it may be yet a further dimension to the joke. In line 1472, Euripides addresses Dionysus as ὁ μαιρώτατ' ἀνθρώπων. The Oceanids (Aesch. *Prom.* 693) are characterized throughout more as females than as immortals, and the poet's desire to juxtapose ψυχή with ψύχειν may have allowed him to admit this irregularity. A more startling exception is at Pindar, *Pyth.* 3.41, where Apollo speaks of enduring in his ψυχή. This must be understood, I think, as connected with Pindar's ideas concerning the fundamental similarity of gods and men (*Nem.* 6.1 ff.) and the divinity of ψυχή (frs. 116, 127). The fourth exception is Euripides, fr. 431 (following the attribution by Clement, though Stobaeus attributes it to Sophocles):

ἔρωσ γὰρ ἄνδρας οὐ μόνους ἐπέρχεται
οὐδ' αὖ γυναῖκας, ἀλλὰ καὶ θεῶν ἄνω
ψυχὰς ταρασσει, κἀπὶ πόντων ἔρχεται.

For several reasons I believe the fragment to be Euripidean. Stobaeus mentions a *Phaedra* play of Sophocles. Could it instead be the first *Phaedra* of Euripides, which so shocked contemporary sensibilities? And could this not be one of its more shocking lines? In any case, though absence of context prevents sure interpretation, it seems worth noting that this humanization of the gods takes place in connection with ἔρωσ, which, for Heraclitus too, is, next to death, the prime disturber of the ψυχή (see our Part II, later in this volume). To be vulnerable to

Two elements in this Homeric picture will be of importance to our discussion of Heraclitus: the tendency to mention ψυχή only in “negative contexts” (i.e. its functioning is noticed only when it goes wrong), and the absence of any sense of a central faculty connecting the disparate faculties of the living man. Snell has shown that the same is true of the Homeric notion of body: it is spoken of as a collection of parts, and there is no word to describe its unity.⁵ We shall now observe that the Homeric picture of language presents similar features: ἔπεα, frequently mentioned, are a series of unordered units.⁶ Λόγος, implying order or connection, is employed, as is ψυχή, primarily in “negative contexts.” And there is no sense of a central faculty by virtue of which one learns to use language properly.⁷

Guthrie, discussing the meaning of λόγος in Heraclitus, outlines “the ways in which the word was currently used in and around the time of Heraclitus.”⁸ Now it is true, accepting Guthrie’s own dating, that most of the meanings he lists are current within a generation or two after Heraclitus’ death. Several examples he cites – those from early works of Pindar – even fall, probably, within his lifetime, although it is unlikely that he ever became acquainted with Pindar’s work or with the social milieu in which he worked. What is interesting, however, is that if we examine the works of those writers known to have been read by Heraclitus (Homer, Hesiod, Archilochus, Xenophanes), as well as those of other poets distinctly prior in date (Solon, Theognis, etc.), we find, instead of an impressive diversity of usage, a singular unanimity. Λόγος in early writers is not used frequently. When it is used, it always means a story, or some sort of connected account told by a specific person. And, in the vast majority of cases, this account is a falsehood, a beguiling tale, one which is intended to deceive the hearer or to make him forget something of importance.⁹ Common formulae with λόγος

ἔρωσ is almost to be vulnerable to death. Elsewhere the notion of mortality remains central to the notion of ψυχή. Cf. also Plato, *Phaedrus*, 246 c 7 ff.

⁵ Snell, *Discovery*, pp. 5-8.

⁶ Cf. Fournier, pp. 211-12: “Dans Homère ἔπος était un vase vide de pensée: il présentait les paroles prononcées comme un fait, un objet, ou un instrument... Il peut être complément de βαλεῖν. Il est utilisé comme arme... C’est quelque chose de passif et d’inerte”.

⁷ On the history of λόγος, see also Hoffmann; Verdenius, pp. 81-82; Boeder, p. 85; Fournier, pp. 53 ff., 217-219.

⁸ Guthrie, pp. 420-424; also Kirk, HCF, p. 38.

⁹ Cf. Boeder, p. 20: “Jedesmal eignet diesen λόγοι etwas Berückendes und sie gelten daher als mittel der Bezauberung und Ablenkung und Irreführung. Sie

are: ψεύδεά θ' αἰμυλίου τε λόγους (Hes. *Op.* 78, 788) and αἰμυλοῖσι λόγοισι (α 56, *H. Herm.* 317, Hes. *Th.* 890, Theognis 704; cf. also O 393; Theognis 254, 981, 1221). Less frequently, λόγος designates simply a tale or story, without regard to content; a legendary nature, however, is often suggested (Hes. *Op.* 106, Tyrtaeus 9.1, Theognis 1055, Xenoph. B 1, 14; B 7, 1). Λόγοι are personified in the *Theogony*: hateful Eris gives birth to Νείκεά τε ψευδέας τε Λόγους Αμφιλογίας τε (229). And the only mention of an explicitly true λόγος in the works of the authors mentioned is in Archilochus 35, at line 12: Λόγω[ι ν]υ τ[ῶιδ' ἀλη]θείη πάρα. We are reminded that the word for truth itself in Greek is a privative term, designating the absence of concealment, or “uncoveredness”.¹⁰

Λόγος by itself does not mean only falsehood, any more than ψυχή means merely the shade of the dead man. But men's notions of language at this time appear to have been simple. As a man speaks of his life in terms of separate faculties, but fails to notice their unity until this unity is destroyed, so he speaks of his words as separate units, and usually refers to connected statement only when the connecting has been done improperly, so as to produce a falsehood. When the impressive effect of Odysseus' speaking is described, his words (ἔπεα) are compared to wintry snowflakes (Γ 222) – apparently an early case of semantic atomism. And Υ 248 ff., a section of Aeneas' speech to Achilles, gives us an even clearer idea of the Homeric man's lack of awareness both of syntax and of the mental processes by which language is learned and understood:

στρεπτή δὲ γλῶσσο' ἐστὶ βροτῶν, πολέες δ' ἐνὶ μῦθοι
παντοῖοι, ἐπέων δὲ πολὺς νομὸς ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα,
ὄπποῖόν κ' εἴπησθα ἔπος, τοῖόν κ' ἔπακούσασαι.

The tongue, herding the single words here and there like sheep, is the only acknowledged linguistic organ, both here and elsewhere. And the general effect of Aeneas' succeeding arguments is to demonstrate the heroes' contempt for speeches.¹¹ Speaking requires little skill; one

verschleiern, was im Blick bleiben sollte, schieben anderes vor und stellen es in ein günstiges Licht.”

¹⁰ Krischer, pp. 163-4, and Boeder, who reminds us that the false λόγοι of the *Theogony* are sisters of Lethe.

¹¹ Benardete (p. 2) has observed that this contempt for speeches is evident in the hero's description of speeches as the work of ἄνθρωποι (Υ 204, etc.) and of deeds as the work of ἄνδρες (I 189, etc.). “The hero's contempt for speeches is but part of his contempt for ἄνθρωποι.”

simply says the sort of words one hears, and anyone, even a woman, can do this (Υ 252). Fighting, not speaking, is a genuine test of skill, and proves the hero's worth.¹² There is no recognition here that the learning of language involves anything more than the ear and the tongue. And the Homeric man has no term at all for any faculty of connected reasoning; even νόος, generally considered a "rational" faculty, has been shown by von Fritz to stand, in Homer, for a non-discursive, a-logical faculty of insight, more nearly similar to the sense of sight than to what we think of as "reason".¹³

In general, then, Homeric man fails to recognize explicitly that in virtue of which he is a single individual. His use of the first person shows that he is conscious of the self, and that he is somehow aware that his limbs and faculties form a unity. But he cannot explain what connects his separate faculties; and though he implicitly acknowledges the centrality of ψυχή as a necessary condition for consciousness, he has not yet acquired a notion of its activities and its role. His understanding of language reveals similar limitations: he is aware of words rather than of syntax, of the ear and the tongue rather than of the discursive reasoning and connection-making necessary for the proper learning of language. Heraclitus sees deficiencies in this view, and attempts to formulate a more complex picture of human life and language, conceiving the rôle of ψυχή as that of a central faculty connecting all the others, and ascribing to it the power of connected reasoning and language-learning for which his predecessors have no explanation.

¹² This passage, and others like it, seem to indicate that Kirk (*HCF*, p. 32) insists too emphatically upon the parallelism of word and action in early Greek thought when he denies the existence of a "sharp distinction between the two, at any rate until the development by the sophists and rhetoricians of the λόγος-ἔργον contrast . . ." His analysis assimilates Heraclitus to his predecessors, and ignores certain definite distinctions between the Homeric and the Heraclitean views of language and its relationship with action. Cf. also Verdenius' remarks (p. 97) on early examples of the λόγος-ἔργον contrast.

¹³ Von Fritz, "NOOS in Homer," pp. 79-93. Also von Fritz, "NOOS in Pre-Socratics," 225ff., where he says: "There is absolutely no passage in Homer in which this process of reasoning is so much as hinted at, when the terms νόος and νοεῖν are used. On the contrary, the realization of the truth comes always as a sudden intuition: the truth is suddenly 'seen.'" D. G. Frame's thesis, *The Origins of Greek NOOS*, contains an excellent study of the etymology and semantics of νόος which, while supporting von Fritz's general conclusions, provides a much more likely etymology and a far more precise and thorough study of contexts and associations in the early epic tradition.

The prominence which Heraclitus gives to $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ among the faculties of the living man can clearly be seen in those fragments in which $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ takes the place of fire, the central element of the cosmic $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$, in the $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ of human existence (36, 77), and in many other fragments as well. Fragment 67a is not indispensable for an understanding of Heraclitus' $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ doctrine; and if one denies its authenticity, one must still, I think, admit that it is in no way inconsistent with what we learn from other fragments. But I believe, with Pohlenz, Diels, Kranz, Kirk, and others, and against Marcovich,¹⁴ that it is genuine; and since it presents with greater clarity than any other single fragment the central role of $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ in the living man, it seems appropriate to discuss it briefly before moving on to a consideration of specific aspects of this central role as they can be seen in other fragments.

Fragment 67a is cited by an early twelfth-century scholiast, Hisdosus, in his commentary on Chalcidius' translation of the *Timaeus* (Codex Parisinus Latinus 8624), with regard to 34b, the discussion of the world-soul's position in the center of the cosmos. The scholiast remarks that there are others who believe the sun to be the center; just as the *anima*, with its seat in the heart, diffuses energy throughout the limbs, so the heat proceeding from the sun gives life to all living things:

cui sententiae Heraclitus adquiescens optimam similitudinem dat de aranea ad animam, de tela aranae ad corpus. sic(ut) aranea, ait, stans in medio telae sentit, quam cito musca aliquem filum suum corrumpit itaque illuc celeriter currit quasi de fili perfectione¹⁵ dolens, sic hominis anima aliqua parte corporis laesa illuc festine meat quasi impatiens laesionis corporis, cui firme et proportionaliter iuncta est.

I believe that the general content of this simile can be attributed to Heraclitus, although I would not agree with Kranz that every particular is likely to be genuine. Kranz' arguments for *verbatim* acceptance are largely based on the dubious analogy with Tertullian, *de anima*, 14,

¹⁴ Pohlenz, p. 972; DK I *ad. loc.*; Kranz, pp. 111-113; Kirk, *Archiv*, p. 76; Marcovich, pp. 576-9.

¹⁵ I have retained the *de fili perfectione* of the manuscript rather than accepting Diels' *persectione*. *Persectio* seems to occur nowhere else; and the usage *de aliquo dolere* with the meaning "to mourn for" or "to grieve over something which is no longer" is perfectly good Latin (e.g. Cic. *Att.* 6, 6, 2; Hor. *Ep.* 1, 14, 7), and is an easy and natural extension of the ordinary meaning, "to grieve over." Thus I would translate, "grieving over the wholeness of its thread (which is no longer, whole, being broken)."

an analogy which Marcovich uses to prove just the opposite point, and one which, as I will show, is confusing rather than enlightening. In addition to the arguments cited by Pohlenz in favor of the ascription of this simile to Heraclitus (the absence of such a reference in Chalcidius, the scholiast's general awareness of ancient literature), I would point also to the consistency of the fragment's general import with that of other Heraclitean fragments, and to the interesting suggestion Hisdosus gives in *cui sententiae . . . adquiescens* that his Heraclitean source contains some sort of a further analogy between solar energy and ψυχή. That Heraclitus draws an analogy between cosmic fire and the ψυχή, the "fiery" element in man, is certainly an accurate observation, and is one of the only points about Heraclitus' theory of ψυχή on which there is general agreement. Such an observation would not have been possible, I think, for a man who knew Heraclitus' work only through the pneumatic theory of the Sceptics. And yet this, Marcovich alleges, is the case with Hisdosus, although he gives us no concrete reason for rejecting Pohlenz' assessment of the scholiast's knowledge of the ancients.

Indeed, the arguments used by Marcovich to deny the fragment's authenticity are based on highly dubious analogies with later doctrine. The fragments of Straton of Lampsacus (110-111), which he considers an indispensable basis for the spider analogy, give us an extremely passive notion of ψυχή as the seat of perceptual πάθη, *drawn to* that ἀφ' οὗ πέπονθε. If Hisdosus were familiar with these fragments, and were constructing his "Heraclitean" simile on the basis of this familiarity, it is difficult to see how it could have occurred to him to mention the simile in a passage of commentary relating views concerning the energizing and active properties of ψυχή. Moreover, Straton gives no account of ψυχή as microcosm, which Hisdosus' source apparently does.

Nor does Marcovich argue convincingly when he declares that Hisdosus became familiar with Heraclitus through the Sceptics and their pneumatic-diffusion theory of ψυχή. As an example of this theory, he cites Tertullian's *de anima* 14,5, which Diels and Kranz cite in support of the fragment's authenticity. This passage, which attributes to "Straton, Aenesidemus, and Heraclitus" an analogy between ψυχή and Archimedes' water-organ, obscures the issue here more than it clarifies it. Tertullian is rarely reliable when he paraphrases; and his ascription of doctrines to a group of people of widely divergent dates and views is a confusing and inaccurate polemical expedient. This pneumatic doctrine bears even less resemblance to fr. 67a than do the

fragments of Straton. Hisdosus does not describe the Heraclitean ψυχή as generally diffused, a breath rushing through the body; the implication of the whole passage is, rather, that ψυχή is analogous to the sun, a central, definitely locatable, possibly fiery, source of energy. If Hisdosus used the sources Marcovich describes, it is amazing that he should have produced a picture of ψυχή which is so much closer in its general import to other known fragments of Heraclitus that it is to the alleged sources themselves.

It is also worth remembering that Hisdosus claims to quote directly from Heraclitus, and seems to have no polemical point in view, as does Tertullian, which might cause him willfully to present a false picture. Even Tertullian, however, quotes correctly in the single reference to Heraclitus where he actually *claims* to quote (*de an* 2: fr. 45).

We can, I think, conclude that Hisdosus' source was one which did not assimilate Heraclitus to the Sceptics, and which was generally more faithful to his words than those "sources" upon which Marcovich claims the fragment is based. We may accept as Heraclitean the comparison between spider and ψυχή, though not necessarily in all its detail, and the suggestion of a further analogy between ψυχή and cosmic fire.

What, then, can we learn from the spider-simile itself about Heraclitus' notions of ψυχή's role in life? First, that it is the central life-faculty, upon which the others depend, and through which they operate. A man is not, as in Homer, a loosely-joined collection of limbs; he does not react to one sort of stimulus in his θυμός, and to another in his φρένες. All stimuli are referred to ψυχή, which holds the body and its faculties together. It is an active faculty, and not merely the seat of the πάθη. It responds to stimuli, but these stimuli remain external to it. It is locatable, and not generally diffused, but its location is not fixed, as it is in the very similar analogy of Chrysippus (II 879 A). Unlike Tertullian's *flatus in calamo*, it is apparently self-moving, and capable of directing its movement. And there is the further implication that, since it is the essential animating force in the body, nothing done merely to the body will be sufficient to produce death. If the simile is accurate, we will expect to see death explained as something which happens specifically to ψυχή, and neither merely to the body, nor to the creature as a whole. And, indeed, this prediction is borne out by the evidence of fragments 36 and 77, as we shall see.

It would not be wise to push the details of the analogy further. The interesting suggestion, embodied in *firme et proportionaliter*, about the