

PETER
CALVOCORESSI

WORLD
POLITICS
SINCE 1945

SIXTH EDITION

‘Lucid narrative, coherent structure and an
enlightened liberal viewpoint’

THE OBSERVER

‘The book compels admiration for its
thoroughness, its scope, the masterly ordering
of its immense material’

THE SUNDAY TIMES

WORLD POLITICS SINCE 1945

SIXTH EDITION

PETER CALVOCORESSI



LONGMAN
LONDON AND NEW YORK

Longman Group UK Limited

Longman House, Burnt Mill, Harlow,
Essex CM20 2JE, England
and Associated Companies throughout the world.

*Published in the United States of America
by Longman Inc., New York*

© Peter Calvocoressi 1968, 1971, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1991

All rights reserved; no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without either the prior written permission of the Publishers or a licence permitting restricted copying in the United Kingdom issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency Ltd, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 9HE.

First published 1968
Second edition 1971
Third edition 1977
Fourth edition 1982
Fifth edition 1987
Sixth edition 1991
Second impression 1992

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Calvocoressi, Peter
World politics since 1945. — 6th ed.
I. Title
327.09

ISBN 0-582-07379-0

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
applied for

Set in 10 on 12pt Bembo Roman

Produced by Longman Singapore Publishers (Pte) Ltd.
Printed in Singapore

By the same author

Nuremberg: the facts, the law and the consequences

Survey of International Affairs 1947–48

Survey of International Affairs 1949–50

Survey of International Affairs 1951

Survey of International Affairs 1952

Survey of International Affairs 1953

Middle East Crisis (with Guy Wint)

South Africa and World Opinion

World Order and New States

Suez: ten years after (with Anthony Moncrieff)

Total War: Causes and courses of the Second World War (with Guy Wint and John Pritchard)

The British Experience 1945–75

Freedom to Publish (with Ann Bristow)

Top Secret Ultra

Independent Africa and the World

From Byzantium to Eton: a memoir of a millennium

A Time for Peace

Who's Who in the Bible

Resilient Europe: a study of the years 1870–2000

FOREWORD TO THE THIRD EDITION

This book now covers a period of thirty years since the end of the Second World War. Much of the international map has changed little in these years. The USA and the USSR remain in conflict, mainly because they are still powers of a different order from every other. The essence of this conflict is the clash of power, although its nature and course have been affected by ideology, particularly on the American side, for whereas the USSR has used its power – in Europe and thereafter in the Middle East and at sea – in ways and for purposes which have been standard European power practice for centuries, the USA's major display of strength – in Vietnam – owed a great deal to the view that Russian and Chinese power must be checked because they are communist. Europe remained divided. Despite periodic reminders of the hazards of the new European order, for example in Czechoslovakia in 1968, this division acquired a certain normality and even the continuing and confirmed division of Germany itself (which would not have surprised Henry the Fowler) has been absorbed into the larger division around it. The longevity of Tito has kept Yugoslavia where it is, but the mortality of Franco began the shift of Spain out of its straitjacket and the neighbouring dictatorship was cracked by Portugal's impossible policies in Africa. Middle Eastern affairs have been persistently dominated throughout these thirty years by the Arab-Israeli fight for Palestine, the increasing appetite of the rest of the world for oil, and the uneasy and unsure manoeuvrings of the superpowers in an area which has continued to hypnotize everybody. The British empire has all but completely vanished away, leaving Britain with major problems of readjustment and vast areas of Asia and Africa (where the French, Belgian, Dutch, Portuguese and Spanish empires also dissolved) with responsibility for their own problems relieved only by the meagre help which they could wring from the rich either directly or through such bodies as the UN, the World Bank or the EEC – the last a phenomenon which seemed at first to mark a major change in the world's pattern but by 1975 faced the question whether the change was major or minor. Latin America has remained a byword for instability and inequality. There has been a lot of fighting and killing in the world but none of it nuclear. It has become accepted that the major

concern of superpowers is to seek to control the nuclear arms race and this is perhaps the most significant feature of the world political map, even though the hideous complexity of the matter has prevented this mood from being transformed into more than very partial agreements. The third superpower, China, recognized as such by Roosevelt before 1945 if by few others, has displayed a reticence which should probably be attributed to greatness of a different kind, namely its great size which has enormously complicated the business of organizing the country after a major revolution which itself came at the end of a century of wars and decay. Next to the threat of nuclear catastrophe, and for most of the human race, a more present threat has been poverty, squalor and starvation aggravated for many by the helpless beholding of plenty not far away and corruption even nearer. The jarring injustices of racial discrimination have been reduced by decolonization and by changes in mood but not yet eliminated from a world in which so elementary an evil as slavery still persists.

For this edition I have brought all sections of the book up to date while trying to make it not too much longer. The principal changes are these. In Part One I have added a new chapter on post-war Japan and have carried the story of arms control forward to the end of SALT 1 and into the incomplete SALT 2 negotiations. In Part Two I have essayed an appreciation of the cohesion of the two halves of Europe, the eastern after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in the light of economic stringencies and choices among the members of Comecon, the western in terms of the addition of three new members to the EEC and proposals to make it yet larger. The principal additions to Part Three concern the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 and the destruction of Lebanon. The end of American intervention in Vietnam and the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan provide most of the new material in Part Four and the end of Portuguese empire and its consequences do the same for Part Five. Finally, to Part Six I have made few additions but have appended an overall view of Latin America in terms which have emerged from further thought about its problems. The arrival of man on the moon falls outside the scope of this book.

The main purpose of a book of this kind is to order a mass of factual detail and in that way offer explanations of what has happened: the danger is that it will ignore the general currents which are difficult to discern in a period so short as thirty years and so recent. Nevertheless some currents in which later historians may discern lasting significance may tentatively be indicated.

While war has never been absent from the annals of man (except, I believe, among Eskimos) there have been periods which in retrospect appear remarkably pacific and others which appear remarkably sanguinary. Unquestionably war has in the twentieth century been

enormously discussed as well as diastrously waged, and its causes sedulously dissected by academic and other writers while the horrible facts of war have been witnessed directly or through photography by vaster audiences than ever before. Whether warmaking has been commensurately diminished by this specialist enquiry or general impact is another matter, over which it is worth pausing briefly.

When the Second World War ended there was, first of all, an attempt to prevent its repetition by constitutional means – through the Charter of the United Nations and the obligations and institutions thereby created. Yet – and partly because the UN was not so much a new venture as a second attempt – the aspirations invested in the UN were muted from the start and the organs of the UN soon became little more than functional additions to the established machinery of international relations. More or less contemporaneously a second view about the prevention of war emerged. This was to the effect that war had become so destructive and uncontrollable that major powers, remembering the fable of the sorcerer's apprentice, would eschew it on a calculation of expediency, let alone human revulsion: that war had ruled itself out. This was the balance of terror argument which meant that no superpower could expect to defeat another without itself being laid in ruins. But this argument, which still prevails, had a serious flaw. It rested on the presumed nature of nuclear war and applied therefore to nuclear powers only. In order to broaden the argument it was necessary to add a new factor: that non-nuclear wars too would be interdicted because the nuclear powers, fearing that a non-nuclear war might develop into a war involving themselves and their nuclear armouries, would prevent lesser states from making wars or at worst stop them almost as soon as they started (thus in effect transferring to lesser power the blitzkrieg reasoning of the twenties and thirties). The spread of nuclear weapons and, more important, of nuclear technology and capacity has eroded the credibility of this theory which in any case presumed an overriding common purpose and joint action by the superpowers. It required in effect a new kind of international police function – the policing of international disputes not by the UN or by a single world power such as Britain had been but by a combination of two, perhaps later more, powers who must in the nature of things be distrustful of one another, understand one another less than perfectly and communicate with one another with all manner of hampering reservations.

There were therefore no solid grounds for supposing the elimination or significant reduction of war as a regulator of international conflict. New constitutional apparatus, however useful, was an adjunct of an international system which included war as part of the system; this apparatus was not the instrument of a new and more pacific system. In nuclear powers *raison d'état* would, in their relations with one another,

take account of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons, but for the great majority of non-nuclear states the conduct of international relations remained much as it had been since the emergence of the nation-state system. In addition groups or movements which lacked the trappings of a duly constituted state were claiming, where they could, some of the prerogatives of the state, notably diplomatic recognition and the right to make war and kill people just like states do (including the age-old practice of resorting to war without a declaration of war).

But what about the impact of war on human sensibilities? This is shaky ground. Since however it is observable that the ravages of war have been unevenly spread over the centuries, it is legitimate to try to discern why this should have been so and why in particular mankind has experienced a relative immunity from war at certain times. One such period in Europe was the age which succeeded the wars of religion, an age which certainly did not see the abolition of war but did see the exercise of more control over its initiation and conduct. One explanation which has been offered for this more benign state of affairs is that the excesses of the wars of religion, culminating in the appalling devastation of the Thirty Years War, so sickened observers and survivors that for a time war became rarer and milder. If there is anything in this argument, then there are grounds for hoping that the concluding decades of the twentieth century may follow this example, since the recent past has provided devastation enough. The peoples of the USSR suffered in the forties death and destruction on an appalling scale; the Japanese suffered the unprecedented shock of two nuclear bombs; China had lived through a century of mounting upheavals; and finally the United States, hitherto immune from the worst horrors of wars even though taking part in them, became involved in and responsible for the slaughter and wasting of Vietnam with retributive – and perhaps not wholly transient – humiliation and demoralization. Were these experiences of the world's leading states enough to put them off war and make them use their skills and strengths to stop other people's wars too?

There is, finally, another strand in the history of these thirty years which deserves an oblique glance. This is the feminist movement which, in various parts of the world, was marked by the advent of women to positions of power and a more general increase in the influence of women at many levels of public affairs. There are precedents for this phenomenon. In the later Middle Ages in Europe – particularly in France, England and Naples – queens became more than the consorts of kings and women have been credited with the softening of manners which changed a warrior world of straw-littered castle halls full of roistering illiterates into a gentler, more decent, more private, more considerate society prepared to give a higher place to the practice of the arts and the play of the mind. But whether women are nicer than

men in these respects only when subject to men and without the temptations of power is a question which, so far as I know, remains unanswered.

Peter Calvocoressi
September 1976

PREFACE TO THE SIXTH EDITION

The first function of successive editions of this book is to bring it up to date. The second is to take the opportunity to review past topics and to address some of them from a new angle. Thus I added in the fourth edition a survey of Russian – and to a lesser extent Chinese – activities in Africa since the end of the Second World War and I also consolidated in a new chapter various hitherto scattered aspects of the development, or plight, of the Third World and the emergence of a Fourth. For the fifth edition I gave special thought and space to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and its consequences, and to the contorted affairs of Central America.

These and other themes are pursued in this sixth edition, but in the five years now covered for the first time (1986–90) all else is overshadowed by the helter-skelter collapse of communist rule in central and eastern Europe and the travails of the USSR itself as, like all empires before it but more precipitately, it loses imperial status and becomes something different. Since convulsions habitually attract a maybe undue share of attention, China and South Africa figure dramatically in this quinquennium, the one balefully, the other with hope. So too does the spasm produced by Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait. By contrast with these stirring events I have included an extended review of the progress of the European Community which may, in the eyes of history, turn out as significant as more turbulent contemporary chronicles.

The more often I prepare a new edition of this book the more do I feel a need to warn readers to be on the look-out for matters which, because they are too speculative for a work of this kind, do not figure in it. Of these the most puzzling is the role in world affairs of nuclear weapons which, although utterly destructive and so unprecedented, are also unusable for military or political purposes. It appears that the aggression hitherto inseparable from states and their intercourse has to find means of expression other than war. This is a notion not easily assimilated.

Peter Calvocoressi
January 1991

CONTENTS

<i>List of maps</i>	viii
<i>Foreword to the third edition</i>	ix
<i>Foreword to the sixth edition</i>	xiv

PART ONE WORLD POWERS

1	The superpowers	3
	The Cold War	3
	The arms race	33
	The depreciation of the Superpowers	57
2	Japan	71
3	China	83
	The triumph of Mao	83
	China and the Superpowers	94
	Modernization	112
4	World order	121
5	A Third World – and a Fourth	139
	Notes A Very small states	164
	B Antarctica	168

PART TWO EUROPE

6	Western Europe	173
	Recovery	173
	The European Community	193
	The southern flank	213
7	Communist Europe	229
	Stalin's empire	229
	After Stalin	241
	Annus mirabilis 1989	257
	Yugoslavia after Tito	266

Notes	A	Northern Ireland	271
	B	The Basques	275
	C	Cyprus	275

PART THREE THE MIDDLE EAST

8	The Arabs and Israel to the Suez War	287
9	From Suez to the death of Nasser	310
10	Focus on Lebanon	325
11	Gulf wars	347
12	The Arabian peninsula	371
	Notes A The Kurds	385
	B The Shi'ites	387
	C The Muslim Brotherhood and sectarian violence	387

PART FOUR ASIA

13	The Indian sub-continent	391
14	Afghanistan	423
15	Sri Lanka	429
16	Burma	433
17	Indo-China	437
18	South-east Asia	456
	Notes A Korea	471
	B Timor	472

PART FIVE AFRICA

19	North Africa	475
	The Maghrib	475
	Libya and Chad	489
20	West Africa	493
21	From Congo to Zaïre	518
22	East Africa	533
	The Sudan	533
	The Horn	539
	Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya	544

23	Africa's deep south		556
	The legacy of Cecil Rhodes	556	
	South Africa	574	
24	Russians, Cubans, Chinese		610
	Notes		
	A	Rwanda and Burundi	629
	B	The Malagasy Republic and the Indian Ocean	629
	C	Botswana, Lesotho, Ngwane	631
	D	The Homelands or Bantustans	633

PART SIX AMERICA

25	Canada	637
26	South America	641
27	Mexico and Central America	677
28	Cuba and the Caribbean	690
	Note Guyana	704

INDEX	706
--------------	-----

LIST OF MAPS

1.1	The Cold War division of Europe	6-7
1.2	The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	8
1.3	Cuba and its relationship to the United States and Jamaica	31
2.1	Japan and its neighbours	72
3.1	China and neighbouring countries	86-7
3.2	Korea showing division between North and South	97
4.1	Scenes of United Nations Interventions since 1945	128-9
5.1	The world's major oil producers	158-9
5.2	The South Pacific	166-7
5.3	Antarctica	169
6.1	Growth of the European Community	195
7.1	Eastern Europe	230
7.2	Yugoslavia and its republics	267
8.1	The Middle East	289
8.2	Israel and its neighbours	290
11.1	Major oil pipelines of the Gulf	348
12.1	The Islamic world	372-3
13.1	Pakistan, northern India and Bangladesh	394-5
14.1	Afghanistan	425
15.1	Southern India and Sri Lanka	430
16.1	Burma (Myanmar)	434
17.1	Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos	438
18.1	South-east Asia	457
18.2	Indonesia	463
20.1	North-West Africa (with inset of Nigeria at the time of the Biafra War)	494-5
22.1	The Horn and East Africa	534
23.1	Equatorial and southern Africa	557
23.2	South Africa and the Homelands	576
25.1	North America	639
26.1	South America	642
27.1	Central America	679
28.1	The Caribbean	691

PART ONE

WORLD POWERS

1 THE SUPERPOWERS

THE COLD WAR

The Cold War of the two postwar superpowers was not an episode like other wars which have beginnings and ends, winners and losers. The term 'cold war' was invented to describe a state of affairs. The principal ingredient in this state of affairs was the mutual hostility and fears of the protagonists. These emotions were rooted in their several historical and political differences and were powerfully stimulated by myths which at times turned hostility into hatred. The Cold War dominated world affairs for a generation and more.

In American eyes the USSR was dedicated to the conquest of Europe and the world for itself and for communism and was capable of achieving, or at least initiating, this destructive and evil course by armed force abetted by subversion. Seen from Moscow the western world (which included half of Europe as well as the United States) was inspired by capitalist values which demanded the destruction of the USSR and the extirpation of communism by any means available but above all by force or the threat of irresistible force. Both these appreciations were absurd. When the Second World War ended the USSR was incapable of further military exertion, while the communist parties beyond its immediate sphere were unable to achieve anything of significance. The western powers, while profoundly mistrustful of the USSR and hostile to its system and beliefs, had no intention of attacking it and were not even prepared to disturb the dominance of central and eastern Europe secured by its armies in the last year of the war. Each side armed itself to win a war which it expected the other to begin but for which it had no stomach and no plans.

The focus of the Cold War was Germany where confrontation over Berlin in 1948-49 came close to armed conflict but ended in victory for the western side without a military engagement. This controlled trial of strength stabilized Europe which became the world's most stable area for several decades, but hostilities were almost simultaneously carried into Asia, beginning with the triumph of communism in China and