JÜRGEN HABERMAS

Communication and the Evolution of Society

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Translator's

Introduction

Some twenty years ago Jürgen Habermas introduced his idea of a critical social theory that would be empirical and scientific without being reducible to empirical-analytic science, philosophical in the sense of critique but not of presuppositionless "first philosophy," historical without being historicist, and practical in the sense of being oriented to an emancipatory political practice but not to technological-administrative control.[1] Although these general features are still recognizable in his mature views on critical theory, the original conception has undergone considerable development. The essays translated in this volume provide an overview of the theoretical program that has emerged. Before sketching its main lines it might be well, by way of introduction, to review briefly Habermas' earlier discussions of social theory; for in these a number of important ideas that have since receded into the background or altogether disappeared from view are still clearly visible.

I

A recurring theme of Habermas' writings in the late fifties and early sixties was that critique must somehow be located "between philosophy and science."[2] In his account of the transition from

the classical doctrine of politics to modern political science,
Habermas noted a decisive shift in the conceptions of theory and
practice and their interrelation.[3] For Aristotle politics was con-
tinuous with ethics, the doctrine of the good and just life. As
such it referred to the sphere of human action, *praxis,* and was
directed to achieving and maintaining an order of virtuous con-
duct among the citizens of the *polis.* The practical intention of
politics, as well as the nature of its subject matter, determined
its cognitive status: Politics could not assume the form of a
rigorous science, of *episteme* but had to rest content with estab-
lishing rules of a more-or-less and in-most-cases character. The
capacity thereby cultivated, and the keystone of the virtuous
character, was *phronesis,* a prudent understanding of variable
situations with a view to what was to be done.

With the rise of modern science the classical conception of
politics was drastically altered. Theory came to mean the logically
integrated systems of quantitatively expressed, lawlike statements
characteristic of the most advanced sciences. Given a description
of the relevant initial conditions, such theories could be used
(within certain limits) to predict future states of a system; pro-
viding the relevant factors were manipulable, they could also be
used to produce desired states of affairs. Adopting this ideal of
knowledge for politics, Hobbes early outlined a program that
took human behavior as the material for a science of man, society,
and the state. On the basis of a correct understanding of the laws
of human nature it would be possible to establish once and for
all the conditions for a proper ordering of human life. The
classical instruction in leading a good and just life, the formation
of virtuous character, and the cultivation of practical prudence
would be replaced by the application of a scientifically grounded
social theory, by the production of the conditions that would lead
to the desired behavior according to the laws of nature. In this
way the sphere of the practical was absorbed into the sphere of
the technical; the practical problem of the virtuous life of the
citizens of the *polis* was transformed into the technical-adminis-
trative problem of regulating social intercourse so as to ensure the
order and well-being of the citizens of the state.

In Habermas' view the principal loss incurred in this transition

was the replacement of a direct access to practice with a purely technological understanding of the theory-practice relationship; the principal gain was the introduction of scientific rigor into the study of society. Accordingly, the outstanding task for a post-positivist methodology of social inquiry was somehow to combine philosophical and practical moments with the methodological rigor, which was "the irreversible achievement of modern science." [4] Of course, the type of practical philosophy Habermas himself had in mind was not the classical Greek but that which developed in the movement of German thought from Kant through Marx; and the type of combination he envisaged was summed up in the phrase: "empirical philosophy of history with a practical (political) intent."

The presence of the term *philosophy* in this characterization of critical theory did not signal a basic disagreement with Marx's dictum that the demands and results of philosophy could be preserved only through "the negation of previous philosophy, of philosophy as philosophy." Habermas was not using the term in its traditional sense as a presuppositionless mode of thought that provided its own foundations. With Marx he regarded philosophy as belonging to the world on which it reflected and as having to return to it; the ideals inherent in philosophy—truth and reason, freedom and justice—could not be realized by thought itself. The philosophy of history, in particular, was marred by a failure to realize this. Pretending to a contemplative view of the whole of history, prospective as well as retrospective, it claimed to reveal its meaning, often in terms of a necessary progress toward some metaphysically guaranteed goal ascribed to God or Nature, Reason or Spirit.

As Habermas interpreted him, the young Marx rejected this construction. For him the movement of history was not at all a matter of metaphysical necessity; it was contingent in regard to both the empirical conditions of change and the practical engagement of social agents. The meaning of history, its goal, was not a subject for metaphysical hypostatization but for practical projection; it was a meaning that men, in the knowledge of objective conditions, could seek to give it with will and consciousness. The exaggerated epistemic claims of the traditional philos-

ophy of history derived in part from ignoring the essentially
practical nature of its prospective dimension. The projected future
(which conferred meaning on the past) was not a product of
contemplation or of scientific prediction but of a situationally
engaged practical reason.

The meaning of the actual historical process is revealed to the extent
that we grasp a meaning, derived from "practical reason," of what
should be and what should be otherwise . . . and theoretically examine
the presuppositions of its practical realization . . . We must interpret
the actual course and the social forces of the present from the point
of view of the realization of that meaning.[5]

Thus Habermas already found in the young Marx many of the
necessary correctives to the excesses of traditional philosophy.
But Marx, in his desire to distinguish himself from the "merely
philosophic" critique of the left Hegelians, subsequently ascribed
to his own views the features of a strictly empirical theory of
society; and later, in the hands of his "orthodox" followers,
Marxism seemed to provide a purely theoretical guarantee of the
outcome of history; the importance of critical self-reflection and
enlightened political practice receded behind the solid, objective
necessity of inexorable laws of history. The spectacle of this
retrogression was one of the motivating factors behind the Frank-
furt School's renewal of the philosophical dimension of Marxism;
and it was behind Habermas' concern to demarcate critical social
theory from strictly empirical-analytic science as clearly as Marx
had from philosophy—to locate it "between philosophy and
science."

While the essays of the late fifties and early sixties introduced
the idea of comprehending society as a historically developing
whole for the sake of enlightening practical consciousness, build-
ing a collective political will, and rationally guiding practice,
they provided as yet no detailed articulation of the logic, method-
ology, or structure of this type of theory. The first attempts to
do so appeared in the later sixties, principally in *Zur Logik der
Sozialwissenschaften* (1967) and *Knowledge and Human Inter-
ests* (1968).[6] Although these studies were still labelled "pro-
paedeutic" by Habermas, they did contain extended discussions

of the methodological issues surrounding social inquiry in general
and critical theory in particular. One of his principal targets in
both books was the neopositivist thesis of the unity of scientific
method, the thesis, in particular, that the logic of scientific inquiry
in the human sciences is basically the same as that in the natural
sciences. In *Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften* the main line of
attack runs through a consideration of the nature and role of
Verstehen, or interpretive understanding, in social inquiry. Ex-
aming various *verstehenden* approaches to society—neo-Kantian
and Weberian, social interactionist, phenomenological and ethno-
methodological, linguistic and hermeneutic—Habermas argues
that access to a symbolically structured object domain calls for
procedures that are logically distinct from those developed in the
natural sciences, procedures designed to grasp the "meaning"
that is constitutive of social reality. Social action depends on the
agent's "definition of the situation," and this is not solely a matter
of subjective motivations. The meanings to which social action is
oriented are primarily intersubjective meanings constitutive of
the sociocultural matrix in which individuals find themselves and
act: inherited values and world views, institutionalized roles and
social norms, and so on. Any methodology that systematically
neglects the interpretive schemata through which social action is
itself mediated, that pursues the tasks of concept and theory
formation in abstraction from the prior categorical formation of
social reality, is doomed to failure. Sociological concepts are, in
Alfred Schutz's words, "second-level constructs"; the "first-level
constructs" are those through which social actors have already
prestructured the social world prior to its scientific investigation.
Understanding the latter is a necessary point of departure for
constructing the former.

While arguing this point Habermas was careful, at the same
time, to distance himself from the view that interpretive under-
standing could be the sole methodological basis of social inquiry.
In his lengthy discussion of Gadamer's philosophical hermenutics,
which he took to be the most developed form of this view, he
pointed out different aspects of social reality that called for modes
of inquiry going beyond the merely interpretive.[7] For one thing,
the reduction of social research to the explication of meaning

rests on an unwarranted sublimation of social processes entirely
into subjectively intended and/or culturally transmitted mean-
ings. If, however, these meanings are viewed in relation to the
social, political, and economic conditions of life, it becomes evi-
dent that they can conceal and distort as well as reveal and express
these conditions. Thus an adequate social methodology would
have to integrate interpretive understanding with critique of
ideology. Of course, this requires a system of reference that goes
beyond subjective intentions and cultural tradition, one that sys-
tematically takes into account the objective framework of social
action and the empirical conditions under which traditions his-
torically change. Developments in the economic and political
spheres, for example, can overturn accepted patterns of interpre-
tation. And such developments are not as a rule simply the results
of new ways of looking at things; rather they themselves bring
about a restructuring of world views. Thus an adequate social
methodology would have to integrate interpretive understanding
and critique of ideology with an historically oriented analysis of
social systems.

   To specify desiderata in this way is obviously only a first step
on the way to a fully developed critical social theory. In both
Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften and *Knowledge and Human
Interests* Habermas did go on to offer a number of suggestions
on the direction in which further steps might lead. In the latter
work, he used Freudian psychoanalysis as a "tangible example"
of critical theory in order to derive from its analysis a number of
general methodological clues.[8] Interpreting Freud's work as a
theory of systematically distorted communication, he pointed out
the ways in which it went beyond a purely *verstehenden* explica-
tion of meaning. In contrast to normal hermeneutics, psycho-
analytic interpretation deals with "texts" that both express and
conceal their "author's" self-deceptions. The "depth hermeneu-
tics" that Freud developed to deal with this "internal foreign
territory" relies on theoretical assumptions that are only partly
explicit in his own work. Their full and consistent development
would require a general theory of normal (undistorted) com-
munication, a developmental account of the acquisition of the
competence to communicate, as well as an account of the condi-

tions under which systematic distortions in communication arise
It is on this last point that Freud has most to offer; he provides
us with a general interpretation of early-childhood patterns of
interaction, coordinated with a phase-specific model of personal-
ity formation. This "general interpretation" or "interpretative
schema" has the form of a "systematically generalized history" of
psychodynamic development. Its methodological peculiarities pro-
vide clues as to what is distinctive about critical theory. For one
thing, the application of such an interpretive schema has an in-
expungible hermeneutic component. Its concepts are schematic
or type concepts that have to be translated into individuated situ-
ations; it is applied in constructing histories in which subjects
can recognize themselves and their world. In contrast to ordinary
philological hermeneutics, however, this reconstruction of individ-
ual life histories requires a peculiar combination of interpretive
understanding and causal explanation. "We cannot 'understand'
the 'what'—the semantic content of the systematically distorted
expression—without at the same time 'explaining' the 'why'—
the origin of the systematic distortion itself." [9] The explanatory
hypotheses refer not to the "causality of nature" but, so to speak,
to the "causality of fate," that is, to the workings of repressed
motives and other "symbolic contents." The postulated causal
connections do not represent an invariance of natural laws but
an invariance of life history that operates through "the symbolic
means of the mind" and can thus be analytically dissolved.

Other methodological peculiarities of Freud's general theory of
psychodynamic development concern the type of corroboration
appropriate to a systematically generalized history of this type.
The assumptions it contains—about interaction patterns between
the child and primary reference persons, about corresponding
conflicts and forms of coping with conflict, about the personality
structures that result, and so on—serve as a "narrative foil" for
the reconstruction of individual life histories. They are developed
as the result of numerous and repeated clinical experiences and
are correspondingly subject to empirical corroboration. But this
corroboration is of a distinctive sort; the physician's attempt to
combine the fragmentary information obtained in the analytic
dialogue and to offer a hypothetical reconstruction of the patient's

life history essentially anticipates the latter's own reflective ap-
propriation of this story. The corroboration of a general interpre-
tation thus ultimately relies on the successful continuation of
processes of self-formation: "only the context of the self-forma-
tive process as a whole has confirming and falsifying power." [10]

The relevance of this notion of a "systematically" or "theoret-
ically generalized history" for the critical theory of *society* was
suggested in Habermas' discussion of Parsons in *Zur Logik der
Sozialwissenschaften*.[11] Structural-functionalism interested him
as an attempt to integrate action-theoretic and systems-theoretic
perspectives. Parsons does not ignore the meaningfulness of social
action; but he does not limit its significance to what is intended
by social agents or articulated in the cultural tradition. The social
system is conceived as a functional complex of institutions within
which cultural patterns or values are made binding for action,
that is, are incorporated into binding social norms and institu-
tionalized values. In this framework it is possible to investigate
empirical connections between social norms that go beyond the
subjective intentions of those acting under the norms. The sig-
nificance of the objective connections within the system of social
roles is latent; to grasp it we must discover the functions that
specific elements fulfill for the self-maintenance of the social
system.

Habermas' criticisms of this approach centered around its sub-
ordination of the hermeneutic and critical moments of social
inquiry to the requirements of empirical-analytic science. Parsons
short-circuits the hermeneutic dimension by, for example, adopt-
ing the simplifying assumption of a universal value schema; all
value systems are constructed from the same set of basic value
orientations (pattern variables) fundamental to all social action.
But both the universality and the completeness of his table of
categories can be questioned; upon closer analysis it becomes
evident that the four pairs of alternative value orientations are
tailored to an analysis of one historical process, the transforma-
tion from traditional to modern society. There is a preunder-
standing of the historical situation incorporated into the very
formulation of these basic concepts. If the historically situated
character of functional analysis is to be taken into account, the

problems and methods of historical-hermeneutic reflection become unavoidable.

The critical dimension of social inquiry is also cut short in structural-functional analysis, for it does not permit a systematic separation of the utopian, purposive-rational, and ideological contents of value systems. According to Parsons, cultural values are made binding for social action in institutions; the latter integrate "value orientations" and "motivational forces," thus securing the normative validity of social roles. Habermas found this construction overly harmonistic.

In the framework of action theory, motives for action are harmonized with institutional values, that is, with the intersubjectively valid meaning of normatively binding behavioral expectations. Nonintegrated motive forces that find no licensed opportunity for satisfaction in the role system are not analytically grasped. We may assume, however, that these repressed needs, which are not absorbed into social roles, transformed into motivations, and sanctioned, nevertheless have their interpretations. Either these interpretations "overshoot" the existing order and, as utopian anticipations, signify a not-yet-successful group identity; or, transformed into ideologies, they serve projective substitute gratification as well as the justification of repressing authorities . . . In relation to such criteria, a state of equilibrium would be determined according to whether the system of domination in a society realized the utopian elements and dissolved the ideological contents to the extent that the level of productive forces and technical progress made objectively possible. Of course, society can then no longer be conceived as a system of self-preservation . . . Rather, the meaning, in relation to which the functionality of social processes is measured, is now linked to the idea of a communication free from domination.[12]

As these last lines indicate, the incorporation of historico-hermeneutic and critical moments into the analysis of social systems bursts the functionalist framework, at least insofar as the latter is understood on the model of biology. The validity of functional analysis presupposes (among other things) that it is possible to specify empirically the boundaries of the system in question, the goal state the system tends to achieve and maintain, the functional requirements for self-maintenance, and the alternative processes through which they can be met. This is the case

above all in biology; an organism is easily demarcated from its environment and the state in which it maintains itself can be characterized in terms of necessary processes with specifiable tolerances. The same cannot be said for social systems. In the course of history not only the elements but the boundaries and the goal states of societies undergo change; consequently, their identity becomes blurred. A given modification might be regarded either as a learning process and regeneration of the original system or a process of dissolution and transformation into a new system. There is apparently no way to determine which description is correct independently of the interpretations of members of the system.[13]

Habermas concluded that if social systems analysis incorporated the historico-hermeneutic and critical dimensions as suggested, it could no longer be understood as a form of strictly empirical-analytic science; it would have to be transformed into a historically oriented theory of society with a practical intent. The form such a theory would take was that of a "theoretically generalized history" or "general interpretation" which reflectively grasped the formative process of society as a whole, reconstructing the contemporary situation with a view not only to its past but to its anticipated future. It would be a critical theory of society.

II

On Habermas' own account the methodological views advanced in *Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften* and *Knowledge and Human Interests* do not represent a final statement of his idea of a critical social theory.[14] He sees them rather as guideposts on his way to formulating a systematic conception; this latter task has been the focus of his work for the past decade. The essays collected in this volume provide an overview of the results. As Habermas repeatedly reminds us, they are not "results" in the sense of "finished products"; his conception of critical theory is presented rather as a "research program." While he is concerned to argue its validity, he is aware of its hypothetical status, aware that a program of this magnitude requires considerable development before its fruitfulness—theoretical and practical—can be

adequately judged. Nevertheless, its main outlines have taken on a definite shape in recent years. It might best be described as a three-tiered research program. The ground level consists of a general theory of communication—as Habermas calls it, a universal pragmatics—at the next level this theory serves as the foundation for a general theory of socialization in the form of a theory of the acquisition of communicative competence; finally, at the highest level, which builds on those below it, Habermas sketches a theory of social evolution which he views as a reconstruction of historical materialism. In the remainder of this introduction, I shall make a few general remarks about each of these subprograms and about Habermas' application of the ideas developed in them to the analysis of contemporary society.

1. As mentioned above, one of the conclusions of Habermas' examination of psychoanalysis was that, as a theory and therapy of systematically distorted communication, it necessarily presupposed a general theory of (nondistorted) communication. This is only a particular instance of a more general conclusion he had reached earlier: that the normative-theoretical foundations of critical theory would have to be sought in that distinctive and pervasive medium of life at the human level, viz. language. In his inaugural lecture of June 1965 at Frankfurt University, he had declared: "What raises us out of nature is the only thing whose nature we can know: language. Through its structure autonomy and responsibility are posited for us. Our first sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and unconstrained consensus. Autonomy and responsibility together (*Mündigkeit*) comprise the only idea we possess a priori in the sense of the philosophical tradition." [15] Of course at that time this was little more than a declaration—that the normative-theoretical foundations of critical theory were badly in need of renewal, that neither dialectical materialism nor a retreat to pure philosophy was adequate to this task, that earlier attempts by the members of the Frankfurt School to articulate and ground a conception of rationality that essentially transcended the narrow confines of "instrumental" thought had not in the end succeeded, and that the solution was to be found in a theory of language.

It is only with the formulation of the basic ideas of his com-
munication theory that this declaration has assumed the more
definite form of a research program. The first essay translated
(and somewhat revised) for this volume, "What is Universal
Pragmatics?," provides the best available statement of the strategy
and structure of that program.[16] The central idea is introduced by
way of contrast to the usual restriction of rational reconstruction
to the syntactic and semantic features of language in abstraction
from its pragmatic dimension, which is normally brought in sub-
sequently as a domain for empirical (rather than logical or purely
linguistic) analysis. The idea of a universal pragmatics rests on
the contention that not only phonetic, syntactic, and semantic
features of *sentences,* but also certain pragmatic features of
utterances, not only language but speech, not only linguistic com-
petence but communicative competence, admit of rational recon-
struction in universal terms. Habermas is arguing then "that
communicative competence has as universal a core as linguistic
competence. A general theory of speech action would thus de-
scribe that fundamental system of rules that adult subjects master
to the extent that they can fulfill the conditions for a happy em-
ployment of sentences in utterances, no matter to which individual
languages the sentences may belong and in which accidental con-
texts the utterances may be embedded." The competence of the
ideal speaker must be regarded as including not only the ability
to produce and understand grammatical sentences but also the
ability to establish and understand those modes of communica-
tion and connections with the external world through which
speech becomes possible. Pragmatic rules for situating sentences
in speech actions concern the relations to reality that accrue to a
grammatically well-formed sentence in being uttered. The act of
utterance situates the sentence in relation to external reality
("the" world of objects and events about which one can make
true or false statements), to internal reality (the speaker's "own"
world of intentional experiences that can be expressed truthfully/
sincerely or untruthfully/insincerely), and to the normative real-
ity of society ("our" social life-world of shared values and norms,
roles and rules, that an act can fit or fail to fit, and that are them-
selves either right—legitimate, justifiable—or wrong). Regarded

from this pragmatic point of view, it becomes clear that speech necessarily (even if often only implicitly) involves the raising, recognizing, and redeeming of "validity claims." In addition to the (implicit) claim that what he utters is comprehensible, the speaker also claims that what he states is true (or if no statement is made, that the existential presuppositions of his utterance's propositional content are fulfilled); that his manifest expression of intentions is truthful or sincere; and that his utterance (his speech *act*) is itself right or appropriate in relation to a recognized normative context (or that the normative context it fits is itself legitimate). The claims to truth, truthfulness, and rightness place the speaker's utterance in relation to extralinguistic orders of reality; the universal-pragmatic infrastructure of speech consists of general rules for arranging the elements of speech situations within a coordinate system formed by "the" external world, one's "own" internal world, and "our" shared social life-world. It is obvious that a fully developed universal pragmatics would provide a unifying framework for a variety of theoretical endeavors usually assigned to disparate and only occasionally related disciplines—from the theory of knowledge to the theory of social action.

2. It was a characteristic tenet of the early Frankfurt School that basic psychological concepts had to be integrated with basic socioeconomic concepts because the perspectives of an autonomous ego and an emancipated society were essentially interdependent. In this way, critical theory was linked to a concept of the autonomous self that was, on the one hand, inherited from German Idealism but was, on the other hand, detached from idealist presuppositions in the framework of psychoanalysis. Habermas too starts from the interdependence of personality structures and social structures, of forms of identity and forms of social integration; but the socio-psychological framework he deploys involves much more than a readaptation of psychoanalysis. It is an integrated model of ego (or self-) development that draws on developmental studies in a number of areas, ranging from psycholinguistics and cognitive psychology (including studies of moral consciousness) to social interactionism and psychoanalysis (in-

cluding analytic ego psychology).[17] The task, as he sees it, is to work out a unified framework in which the different dimensions of human development are not only analytically distinguished but in which their interconnections are also systematically taken into account. Beyond this, the empirical mechanisms and boundary conditions of development have to be specified. This is clearly an immense task, and Habermas is still in the process of working out an adequate research program. The general (and tentative) outlines of his approach are nevertheless clear. He adopts a competence-development approach to the foundations of social action theory; the basic task here is the rational reconstruction of universal, "species-wide," competences and the demonstration that each of them is acquired in an irreversible series of distinct and increasingly complex stages that can be hierarchically ordered in a developmental logic. The dimensions in which he pursues this task correspond to the universal-pragmatic classification of validity claims, that is, to the four basic dimensions in which communication can succeed or fail: comprehensibility, truth, rightness, and truthfulness. Each of these specifies not only an aspect of rationality, but a "region" of reality—language, external nature, society, internal nature—in relation to which the subject can become increasingly autonomous. Thus ontogenesis may be construed as an interdependent process of linguistic, cognitive, interactive, and ego (or self-) development.

Only the first three of these can be regarded as particular lines of development; the ontogenesis of the ego is not a development separable from the others but a process that runs complementary to them: the ego develops in and through the integration of "internal nature" into the structures of language, thought, and action. Of course, the acquisition of universal competences represents only one, the structural, side of identity formation; the other side is affect and motive formation. Unless the subject is able to interpret his needs adequately in these structures, development may be pathologically deformed. Thus a general theory of ego development would have to integrate an account of the interdependent development of cognitive, linguistic, and interactive development with an account of affective and motivational development.

The second essay translated for this volume, "Moral Develop-

ment and Ego Identity," focuses on one strand of this complex:
the development of moral consciousness. Using Kohlberg's hier-
archical schema for the ability to make moral judgments, Haber-
mas places it in a larger action-theoretic framework by coordi-
nating the stages of this ability with stages in the development of
interactive competence: "I shall proceed on the assumption that
'moral consciousness' signifies the ability to make use of inter-
active competence for *consciously* dealing with morally relevant
conflicts." He then goes on (in part IV of the essay) to consider
the motivational (as distinguished from the structural or "cog-
nitive") side of moral consciousness, that is, the psychodynamics
of developmental processes (formation of superego, defense
mechanisms). This perspective makes it possible to comprehend
the frequent discrepancies between moral judgment and moral
action. The essay as a whole provides an example of how new
perspectives are opened by viewing the separate domains of de-
velopmental studies in an integrated framework with both struc-
tural and affective-motivational aspects.

   3. The third and fourth essays delineate the properly socio-
logical level of Habermas' program: the theory of social evolu-
tion. He understands this as a reconstruction of historical ma-
terialism, which turns on the thesis that developments in the
sphere of social integration have their own logic: "I am convinced
that normative structures do not simply follow the path of de-
velopment of reproductive processes . . . but have an internal his-
tory." This is obviously the fruit of his long-standing insistence
that *praxis* cannot be reduced to *techne,* nor rationality to pur-
posive or instrumental rationality, that rationalization processes
in the sphere of communicative action or interaction are neither
identical with nor an immediate consequence of rationalization
processes in the sphere of productive forces. In working out the
logic of development of normative structures, Habermas' strategy
is to employ structural comparisons with the developmental logic
worked out for ontogenetic processes in the framework of his
theory of communicative competence. This is, of course, a new
version of an old strategy, and there is no lack of historical ex-
ample for the pitfalls that attend drawing parallels between in-