

# THE ORIGINS OF THE WORLD WAR

II

*After Sarajevo: Immediate Causes of the War*

BY

SIDNEY BRADSHAW FAY

PROFESSOR OF MODERN EUROPEAN HISTORY  
IN SMITH COLLEGE

**New York**

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

1930

COPYRIGHT, 1928,  
By THE MACMILLAN COMPANY.

---

All rights reserved—no part of this book  
may be reproduced in any form without  
permission in writing from the publisher.

---

Set up and electrotyped.  
Published October, 1928.  
Reissued January, 1929;  
February, 1929; June, 1929;  
January, 1930; May, 1930.

*Printed in the United States of America*

**THE ORIGINS  
OF THE WORLD WAR**

**VOLUME II**

## ABBREVIATIONS

Citations from collections in which the documents antedate July, 1914 (like "Affaires Balkaniques," "G.P.," "Siebert-Schreiner," and "Stieve") are by *volume and page*, because the documents are often long despatches extending over many pages, and a page reference is therefore more precise. But documents of July, 1914 (like those in "A.R.B.," "B.D.," etc.) are mostly short telegrams, and are cited by *serial number* of the publication in which they appear.

Affaires Balkaniques: Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Les Affaires Balkaniques, 1912-1914, 3 vols., Paris, 1922.

A.R.B.: [Austrian Red Book of 1919] Diplomatische Aktenstücke zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges, 1914, 3 vols., Wien, 1919. (Eng. trans., 1920.)

B.B.B.: [British Blue Book] Great Britain and the European Crisis, Correspondence, and Statements in Parliament, together with an Introductory Narrative of Events. London, 1914. (Cd. 7467).

B.D.: British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, vol. XI: Foreign Office Documents, June 28th-August 4th, 1914, collected and arranged with introduction and notes by J. W. Headlam-Morley, London, 1926.

Bogitchevitch: M. Boghitschewitsch, Kriegsursachen. Zurich, 1919. (Eng. trans., 1919; 2nd ed. in French, 1925.)

Bourgeois et Pagès: E. Bourgeois et G. Pagès, Les Origines et les Responsabilités de la Grande Guerre. Paris, 1921.

- Brandenburg: E. Brandenburg, Von Bismarck zum Weltkrieg, Berlin, 1924. (Eng. trans. of 2nd ed., 1927.)
- Conrad: Feldmarschall Conrad von Hötzendorf, Aus meiner Dienstzeit. 5 vols., Wien, 1922-25.
- Deutschland Schuldig?: Deutsches Weissbuch über die Verantwortlichkeit der Urheber des Krieges. 3rd ed., Berlin, 1919. (Eng. trans., 1924.)
- Dirr: Dr. P. Dirr, Bayerische Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch und zum Versailler Schuldspruch. Dritte erweiterte Auflage. Munich and Berlin, 1925.
- Dobrorolski: S. Dobrorolski, Die Mobilmachung der russischen Armee, 1914. Berlin, 1922.
- Frantz: Gunther Frantz, Russlands Eintritt in den Weltkrieg. Berlin, 1924.
- F.Y.B.: [French Yellow Book] Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, La Guerre Européenne, 1914. Paris, 1914.
- Gooss.: Dr. Roderich Gooss, Das Wiener Kabinette und die Entstehung des Weltkrieges, Wien, 1919.
- G.P.: Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871-1914, Sammlung der Akten des Deutschen Auswärtigen Amtes, 40 vols. Berlin, 1922-27.
- Grey: Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-five Years, 1892-1916, 2 vols. New York, 1925.
- Investigating Commission: Die Deutsche Nationalversammlung: Beilagen. . . über die Oeffentliche Verhandlungen des [ersten] Untersuchungsausschusses; Heft I, Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges; Heft II, Militärische Rüstungen und Mobilmachungen. Berlin, 1920-21 (Eng. trans. of Heft I, 1923.)
- Jevtitch: B. Jevtitch, Sarajevski Atentat. Sarajevo, 1922.
- K.A.: Krasnyi Arkhiv, 27 vols. Moskva, 1923-28.
- K.D.: [Kautsky Documents] Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch, edited by Karl Kautsky, Graf Max Montgelas and Prof. Walter Schücking, 4 vols.

- Berlin, 1919; new enlarged edition, 1927. (Eng. trans., 1924.)
- KSF: Die Kriegsschuldfrage: Berliner Monatshefte für internationale Aufklärung, hrsg. von der Zentralstelle für Erforschung der Kriegsursachen; ed. by Alfred von Wegerer. 6 vols. Berlin, 1923 ff.
- L.N.: Un Livre Noir: Diplomatie d'avant-Guerre d'après les Documents des Archives Russes, 1910-1914, ed. R. Marchand, 2 vols. Paris, 1922-23.
- Montgelas, Leitfaden: Graf Max Montgelas, Leitfaden zur Kriegsschuldfrage, Berlin and Leipzig, 1923. (Eng. trans., 1925.)
- M.F.R.: [Materials for the History of Franco-Russian Relations] Materialy po Istorii Franko-Russkikh Ot-noshenii za 1910-1914. Moskva, 1922.
- Paléologue: M. Paléologue, La Russie des Tsars pendant la Grande Guerre, 3 vols. Paris, 1922. (Eng. trans., 1924-1925.)
- Pharos: Professor Pharos [pseud.], Der Prozess gegen die Attentäter von Sarajewo. Berlin, 1918.
- Poincaré: R. Poincaré, Au Service de la France, 4 vols. Paris, 1926-27. (Abridged Eng. trans., 1927 f.)
- Pribram: A. F. Pribram, Die politischen Geheimverträge Oesterreich-Ungarns 1879-1914. Wien, 1920. (Eng. trans., 1920.)
- Renouvin: P. Renouvin, Les Origines Immédiates de la Guerre. 2nd ed. Paris, 1927. (Eng. trans., 1928.)
- R.O.B.: [Russian Orange Book] Ministère des Affaires Étrangères: Recueil de Documents Diplomatiques, Négociations ayant précédé la Guerre, 10/23 Juillet-24 Juillet/6 Aout 1914. Petrograde, 1914.
- Romberg: G. von Romberg, Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book. New York, 1923.
- Schilling's Diary: How the War Began in 1914: Being the Diary of the Russian Foreign Office . . . of July, 1914;

- translated from the original Russian by Major W. Cyprian Bridge. London, 1925.
- Schwertfeger: *Zur Europäischen Politik: Unveröffentlichte [Belgische] Dokumente, herausgegeben unter Leitung von Bernhard Schwertfeger*, 5 vols. Berlin, 1919; 2nd ed., 6 vols., 1925.
- Seton-Watson: R. W. Seton-Watson, *Sarajevo: A Study in the Origins of the Great War*. London, 1925.
- Siebert-Schreiner: G. A. Schreiner, *Entente Diplomacy and the World*. New York, 1921. (Eng. trans., rearranged with annotations, of *Diplomatische Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der Ententepolitik der Vorkriegsjahre*, hrsg. B. von Siebert. Berlin and Leipzig, 1921.)
- S.B.B.: [Serbian Blue Book] *Les Pourparlers Diplomatiques 16/29 Juin-3/16 Aout*. Paris, 1914.
- Stieve: F. Stieve, *Der Diplomatische Schriftwechsel Iswolskis, 1911-1914*, 4 vols. Berlin, 1924.

**THE ORIGINS  
OF THE WORLD WAR**



# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## VOLUME II

| CHAPTER   | PAGE |
|---|------|
| I. THE ARCHDUKE FRANZ FERDINAND . . . . .                                 | 1    |
| Franz Ferdinand and the Army . . . . .                                    | 6    |
| Franz Ferdinand and the Navy . . . . .                                    | 15   |
| Franz Ferdinand's Political Views . . . . .                               | 17   |
| Franz Ferdinand's Marriage . . . . .                                      | 28   |
| The Konopischt Meeting: Legend and Fact . . . . .                         | 32   |
| The Trip to Sarajevo . . . . .  | 43   |
| II. THE ASSASSINATION PLOT . . . . .                                      | 53   |
| Recent Revelations . . . . .  | 57   |
| The <i>Narodna Odbrana</i> . . . . .                                      | 76   |
| The "Black Hand" . . . . .  | 86   |
| The Revolutionary Movement in Bosnia . . . . .                            | 92   |
| Preparation of the Plot in Belgrade . . . . .                             | 112  |
| The Journey of the Assassins from Belgrade to Sarajevo . . . . .          | 117  |
| The Assassination, June 28, 1914 . . . . .                                | 121  |
| III. THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SARAJEVO ASSASSINATION . . . . .          | 127  |
| Motives of the Assassins . . . . .  | 127  |
| The "Bevy of Assassins" and the Austrian "Negligence" . . . . .           | 135  |
| Mr. Pashitch, the <i>Narodna Odbrana</i> , and the "Black Hand" . . . . . | 140  |
| The Serbian Neglect to Arrest the Accomplices . . . . .                   | 146  |
| Did Serbia warn Austria? . . . . .  | 152  |
| IV. THE LEGEND OF THE POTSDAM COUNCIL . . . . .                           | 167  |
| The Persons Alleged to Be Present . . . . .                               | 170  |
| The Kaiser's Attitude toward Delay . . . . .                              | 175  |
| The Real Reasons for Delay . . . . .                                      | 176  |
| The Alleged Selling of Securities in Anticipation of War . . . . .        | 177  |
| Conclusions . . . . .   | 181  |
| V. THE PREPARATION OF THE AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM . . . . .                    | 183  |
| Emperor Francis Joseph . . . . .  | 187  |
| Tisza's Peace Program . . . . .   | 188  |

| CHAPTER   | PAGE    |
|---|---------|
| Berchtold's Appeal for German Support . . . . .   | 198     |
| The Potsdam Conversations, July 5 and 6 . . . . .   | 203     |
| Conclusions as to Germany's Attitude on July 5 and 6 . . . . .                            | 219     |
| Berchtold's Efforts to Convert Tisza . . . . .  | 224     |
| Wiesner's Report of July 13 . . . . .   | 236     |
| The Conversion of Tisza . . . . .   | 239     |
| Austrian Efforts to Deceive Europe . . . . .  | 243     |
| The Final Drafting of the Ultimatum . . . . .   | 249     |
| Austria's Disregard of German Advice . . . . .  | 254     |
| What Foreknowledge Did Germany Have of the Ulti-<br>matum? . . . . .                      | 260     |
| The Ultimatum . . . . .   | 269     |
| <br>VI. THE RUSSIAN DANGER . . . . .  | <br>274 |
| Poincaré's Visit to Russia . . . . .  | 277     |
| Sazonov's Plan for "Partial Mobilization," July 24 . . . . .                              | 286     |
| Warlike Portents at Krasnoe Selo, July 25 . . . . .                                       | 300     |
| The Russian "Period Preparatory to War" . . . . .   | 303     |
| Diplomatic Negotiations and Military Preparations . . . . .                               | 321     |
| Summary . . . . .   | 325     |
| <br>VII. THE SERBIAN REPLY . . . . .  | <br>330 |
| Framing the Serbian Reply . . . . .   | 335     |
| The Substance of the Serbian Reply . . . . .  | 343     |
| The Diplomatic Break between Austria and Serbia . . . . .                                 | 348     |
| <br>VIII. PROPOSALS FOR PRESERVING PEACE . . . . .  | <br>354 |
| England's Key Position . . . . .  | 356     |
| Grey's Proposal for "Direct Conversations" between Vienna<br>and St. Petersburg . . . . . | 362     |
| Grey's Proposal for Mediation between Austria and Russia . . . . .                        | 369     |
| Grey's Proposal for a Conference of Ambassadors, July 26 . . . . .                        | 377     |
| "Direct Conversations" between Vienna and St. Petersburg . . . . .                        | 393     |
| Summary . . . . .   | 400     |
| <br>IX. GERMANY'S BELATED PEACE EFFORTS . . . . .   | <br>402 |
| German Doubts as to "Localization" . . . . .  | 403     |
| German Advice to Austria . . . . .  | 408     |
| The Austrian Declaration of War on Serbia, July 28 . . . . .                              | 417     |
| The Kaiser's "Pledge Plan" . . . . .  | 420     |
| The "Willy-Nicky" Telegrams . . . . .   | 426     |
| Bethmann's Pressure at Vienna . . . . .   | 431     |

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

xi

| CHAPTER   | PAGE |
|---|------|
| X. THE RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION . . . . .                           | 439  |
| Paléologue's Declaration of French Support . . . . .            | 443  |
| The News of the Austrian Declaration of War on Serbia . . . . . | 446  |
| The Tsar's Assent to Russian General Mobilization . . . . .     | 450  |
| The Tsar's Cancellation of General Mobilization . . . . .       | 465  |
| Russian General Mobilization Ordered . . . . .                  | 468  |
| "Mobilization Means War" . . . . .                              | 479  |
| XI. OTHER MOBILIZATIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF WAR . . . . .       | 482  |
| France and the 10-Kilometre Withdrawal . . . . .                | 482  |
| The British Fleet and Warnings to Germany . . . . .             | 492  |
| Bethmann and Moltke . . . . .                                   | 496  |
| Austrian General Mobilization, July 31 . . . . .                | 514  |
| "Threatening Danger of War" in Germany, July 31 . . . . .       | 521  |
| Mobilization in France and Germany, August 1 . . . . .          | 531  |
| England and Belgium . . . . .                                   | 535  |
| XII. CONCLUSION . . . . .                                       | 547  |
| INDEX . . . . .   | 559  |

## CHAPTER I

### THE ARCHDUKE FRANZ FERDINAND

ARCHDUKE FRANZ FERDINAND, who became Heir-Presumptive to the Austrian throne after the death of his father, Karl Ludwig, in 1896, has remained, both living and dead, one of the most enigmatic of political personages. Even Austrians themselves held the most contradictory views as to the supposed purposes and influence of this sphinx. By many he was regarded as the chief of the Austrian militarists, eager for a "preventive war" against Italy or Serbia. Others, however, believed that he had little active influence on Austrian policy. Still others even thought the Heir to the Throne was almost a pacifist. There was the same wide divergence of opinion as to his views on domestic politics. He was commonly believed to hate the Magyars and to favor the Serbs. He was credited with having in mind a regeneration of the Monarchy by giving to the Slavic nationalities an equal political recognition with that enjoyed by the Germans in Austria and by the Magyars in Hungary—that is, he was thought to favor a federalistic "triple" organization of the Monarchy known as "Trialism" in place of the existing "Dualism." By fanatical Serbs, however, he was blindly hated as being a powerful and determined enemy and oppressor, as a man who might well be assassinated in the interests of a Greater Serbia. In fact at the trial of the Sarajevo assassins in October, 1914, Chabrinovitch, who threw the bomb, frankly declared, "The Heir-Presumptive was a man of action—I knew that at the Ballplatz there existed a clique, the so-called war-party, which wanted to conquer Serbia. At its

head stood the Heir-Presumptive. I believed that I should take vengeance on them all in taking vengeance on him." And Princip, who fired the fatal shots, defiantly asserted, "I am not at all sorry that I cleared an obstacle out of our path. He was a German and an enemy of the South Slavs."<sup>1</sup> By Russians likewise he was regarded as an enemy, of whom the Tsar was fortunately rid by the crime of Sarajevo. "Not only in the press, but also in society, one meets almost nothing but unfriendly judgments concerning the murdered Archduke, with the suggestion that Russia has lost in him an embittered enemy," reported the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg. The German Kaiser, on the other hand, in one of those marginal notes which unrestrainedly expressed his inmost thoughts and first impressions, wrote in comment on this report, "The Archduke was Russia's best friend. He wanted to revive the League of the Three Emperors."<sup>2</sup>

The misconceptions and conflicting views current about the Archduke alive, were as nothing to those which circulated upon his death. It was said that he had plotted to displace his uncle; and was planning to break up the Dual Monarchy in alliance with Emperor William by seizing Poland and Venice and by creating two new states over which his sons might ultimately rule, while German Austria was to be added to the German Empire as Emperor William's reward. It was darkly hinted that his tragic death was due to the connivance of Austrian officials, who wanted to prevent these suspected designs, or at least wanted to throw the blame on Serbia and so have a pretext for the annihilation of this neighboring kingdom. Other rumors alleged that his assassination was due to the fact that, as a

<sup>1</sup> Pharos, *Der Prozess gegen die Attentäter von Sarajevo* (Berlin, 1918), pp. 11, 13, 30. The idea that Franz Ferdinand headed the militarist clique and was an enemy of the Serbs was, as will be seen below, wholly incorrect.

<sup>2</sup> Pourtalès to Bethmann, July 13, 1914; K.D., 53.

Roman Catholic, he was planning to attack Italy and restore the Temporal Power of the Pope. One widely-read German author devotes half a chapter to showing that the Scottish-Rite Masons had decreed his death and worked for that purpose through the Masonic Lodge at Belgrade.<sup>3</sup> Amid this mass of conflicting gossip and rumor, where lies the truth about this mysterious man whose death served as the spark which lit the conflagration in Europe? <sup>4</sup>

Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Este, born on December 18, 1863, was the eldest son of Karl Ludwig, brother of Emperor Francis Joseph. His consumptive mother, a daughter of the late Bourbon King of the Two Sicilies, Ferdinand II, died while he was a child, but he was affectionately cared

<sup>3</sup> Reventlow, *Politische Vorgeschichte des grossen Krieges*, Berlin, 1919, pp. 28-38. See below, p. 111, note 103.

<sup>4</sup> There is no satisfactory complete biography of Franz Ferdinand. Of the older biographies written during his lifetime, Paul von Falkenegg, *Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand von Oesterreich-Este* (Vienna, 1908), and H. Heller, *Franz Ferdinand* (Vienna, 1911), deserve mention. In celebration of his fiftieth birthday on December 18, 1913, the *Oesterreichische Rundschau* published a special illustrated edition containing interesting, though superficial, articles by Chlumecky, Sosnosky, Admiral Mirtl, Professor Mycielski and others on Franz Ferdinand as soldier, sailor, traveler, hunter and collector, etc. *Franz Ferdinands Lebensroman* (Stuttgart, 1919), purports to be based on the diary of one of the Archduke's instructors and intimate friends; the anonymous author has a romantic touch, but appears to give much reliable and solid fact. Conrad von Hötzendorf, *Aus Meiner Dienstzeit*, (5 vols., Vienna, 1921-1925), throws much light on the Archduke from the pen of one of those who knew him best. Freiherr von Margutti, personal adjutant to Francis Joseph, was in a position to know intimately the relations between the old Emperor and his imperial nephew; in his interesting reminiscences, *Vom Alten Kaiser* (Vienna, 1921), the chapter on the Archduke reflects unfriendly Vienna gossip. It needs to be corrected by the loyal devotion and intimate personal account of the Archduke's private secretary for a dozen years, Paul Nikitsch-Boules, *Vor dem Sturm: Erinnerungen an Erzherzog Thronfolger Franz Ferdinand* (Berlin, 1925); and by the affectionate appreciation of his military adjutant, Karl Freiherr von Bardolff, "Franz Ferdinand," in *KSF*, V, 599-608, July, 1927. See also the fair-minded and friendly accounts by Count Czernin, *In the World War* (New York, 1919), ch. ii; and the more complete life by Horstenau, in the *Neue Oesterreichische Biographie*; the references in *G.P.*, XL, 45; and the less favorable accounts by R. W. Seton-Watson, *Sarajevo* (London, 1926), ch. iv; and by Eugene Bagger, *Francis Joseph* (New York, 1927), p. 524 ff.

for by a Portuguese stepmother. In his youth he had not been seriously thought of as a possible successor to the throne, until the tragic death of Crown Prince Rudolph at Meyerling in 1889 left Francis Joseph without a direct male heir. Franz Ferdinand had not therefore at first been given any special training in politics, but, like Austrian Archdukes generally, had been placed in the army for a military career. His health had never been robust, owing perhaps to tubercular tendencies inherited from his mother. This tendency at times became so threatening that he often had to spend months at Brioni or Miramar on the warm shores of the Adriatic, where he came to have an intense interest in the creation of an Austrian navy; at other times he sought better health in the dry air of Switzerland at Davos, or in a ten months' trip around the world in 1892-1893. In the fatal spring of 1914 there were those who prophesied that the old Emperor at eighty-four would actually outlive his nephew who had just passed fifty.

Franz Ferdinand's lung trouble appears to have influenced somewhat his life and character. It had not sweetened his temper; it had made him feel that fate had been unfair to him, and had developed in him a tendency to shun society life. The undisguised haste with which many people, especially those connected with the Court, deserted him when he was seriously ill and seemed unlikely ever to come to the throne, hardened the Archduke's character, which was not naturally gentle, increased his distrust of the men who surrounded him, and heightened his contempt for mankind in general. His ill health may also have contributed somewhat to his intense zeal for the Catholic Church, especially after his marriage to a strict Catholic; and it strengthened his iron determination to overcome obstacles and fit himself for the task of ruling the Hapsburg dominions. He learned the languages of the nations over which he seemed likely some day to rule. He also took instruc-

tion from men of science in special branches of knowledge; his later collections in natural science and in art formed a notable museum. To the organization and improvement of the army, and later to the creation of a navy, he began to devote himself with persistent energy and more than average ability.

Since the Archduke had a family to provide for, he spent a considerable part of each year on his estate at Konopischt, where he established a model farm, which, like Wallenstein, he managed very profitably. This determination to live may actually have contributed toward the more vigorous health which he enjoyed in his last years. But he never outgrew his tendency toward aloofness from society and from the public. He had, in fact, very few intimate friends. He did not try to make them. Quite characteristic of his aloofness is a remark which he once made to Conrad von Hotzendorf; they had been discussing the proper basis for the promotion of officers in the army, and the Chief-of-Staff had said that it was his own tendency to think well of a man until he knew something against him, and that he had therefore been sometimes too quick in advancing new officers. The Archduke replied, "We hold opposite views. You think every man is an angel at the outset, and have unfortunate experiences afterwards. I regard every one whom I meet for the first time as a cheap fellow (*gemeiner Kerl*) and wait until he does something to justify a better opinion in my eyes." <sup>5</sup> This was hardly an attitude of mind to make friends, and partly accounts for the hostile and malicious tittle-tattle which circulated so freely about him and his wife at Vienna, and which has found its way into many accounts of him in the Entente countries. But the few friends whom he did admit to his intimacy, who saw him sitting on the floor playing with his children, like his secretaries or like Emperor William, were affectionately devoted to him.

<sup>5</sup> Conrad, I, 338.



## FRANZ FERDINAND AND THE ARMY

Franz Ferdinand's chief interests in life, aside from his hobbies as a hunter and collector and gentleman farmer, were the army, the navy and his wife and children.

In 1906, with the appointment of Major Brosch as his personal adjutant, the Archduke began to exercise a more direct influence on the army. Brosch was an extremely intelligent and able officer, anxious to increase his own influence and also that of the Archduke in military matters. After long opposition he was able to bring it about that the Archduke was given a military chancery (*Militärkanzlei*) of his own, similar to that of the Emperor. Henceforth all the important military documents, as well as the reports of the military attachés, were made out in duplicate so that Franz Ferdinand received a copy at the same moment that the Emperor received his, and the nephew was kept as fully informed as his uncle. In fact he soon came to take a more active part in military reforms and reorganization than the Emperor himself. His activity is indicated by the fact that his military chancery quickly grew from a personnel of two to one of fourteen persons—only two less than the Emperor's own chancery.<sup>6</sup>

Franz Ferdinand regarded the Austro-Hungarian army as a potentially important unifying political instrument for counteracting the disintegrating elements in the Dual Monarchy, as well as for defending it in case of foreign war. He wanted one language of command—German—to be the tongue of at least all the officers, though those who commanded non-German regiments should also be masters of the tongue spoken by the rank and file under their command. It was one of his main aims in life to strengthen and increase the army. It was this aim that lay at the bottom of his hatred of the Magyar politicians who refused

<sup>6</sup> Nikitsch-Boulles, p. 60 f.