Edited by Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone

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Second Edition

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Preface

The format of the book and the general purpose remain substantially unchanged in the new edition, but each chapter was updated and revised in the light of the changes that took place in Eastern Europe since the publication of the original edition, namely to cover the late 1970s and the early 1980s, especially the events in Poland and their impact in Eastern Europe. By mutual consent Andrew Gyorgy withdrew from the editorship, leaving the undersigned as the sole editor. Regrettably also, Robert R. King was not available to update the Bulgaria and Romania chapters. Fortunately, however, replacement contributions were secured from Patrick Moore (Bulgaria) and Walter Bacon, Jr. (Romania). It was decided also to drop the chapter on Eurocommunism because in the 1980s its importance declined and its relevance to East European parties faded. Jiri Valenta agreed to provide instead a new contribution: "The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: Crisis, Intervention, and Normalization." The editor has, in addition, provided a general introduction.

Special thanks—for both editions—are due to Janet Rabinowitch, senior sponsoring editor of Indiana University Press. Her support, good judgment, and superb editorial skills were indispensable in making this volume a better book than it would otherwise have been.

T.R-H.

Preface to First Edition

The success of a volume like *Communism in Eastern Europe* depends on the interplay of several factors and on the cooperation of a number of colleagues. The editors gratefully acknowledge the patience and support of their co-authors and of the publisher, Indiana University Press, who agreed from the inception of this project with the two principal underlying assumptions:

(1) That there is a need for a comprehensive, lucid, and technically accurate general textbook in the field of East European politics designed for junior-senior as well as graduate courses in the fields of politics and international affairs; and

(2) That the volume should be organized around two types and patterns of approaches, namely, individual country-by-country case-studies, buttressed by certain significant *functional* chapters illuminating the key supranational and interregional problem areas of East Central Europe.

Consequently, our book is divided into twelve chapters, eight of which are individual country studies, while four present a broad panorama of such regionally oriented subjects as the role and function of Eastern Europe in world politics; the economic development of the area; the impact of contemporary Eurocommunism; and certain key aspects of current political and leadership changes in Eastern Europe. The individual authors were asked by the editors to focus on the following key subjects: the geopolitical background of the country involved; the size and distinctive characteristics of the population; the relevant features of the nation's historic development, with particular emphasis on the turbulent interwar period of dictatorships and semidictatorships throughout the region; and various psychological and sociological forces which have helped shape the last three decades. Other factors considered were the political party structures—the dominant right-wing elements as well as the slowly emerging underground leftist groups—which set the stage for a fullfledged Communist "takeover."

Our colleagues and fellow authors were also requested to consider in some detail, as part of the structural focus of a typical "country" chapter, the current state of cultural affairs, human rights, dissenters and defectors, and—in general—issues related to the theory and practice of human rights. These important considerations lead inevitably to discussion of the scope, intensity, and overall effectiveness of political opposition in the given East European country, its chances of asserting

itself and of having its voice heard. Such issues have been particularly interesting in connection with recent Hungarian and Polish developments, and probably least relevant in the German Democratic Republic and Bulgaria.

A review of the recent past and of current developments inevitably foreshadows a cautious preview of possible future events in the countries of East Central Europe, and both our individual country and functional chapters do speculate about certain contingencies broadly related to the future of the Soviet control of the eight East European countries, and their more than 150 million inhabitants. Of course, such future predictions and ideological forecasts have to be restrained and careful by definition, given the tenuous "balance-of-power" position and geopolitical character of most of Eastern Europe.

While the book considers broadly the evolution of this region since the end of World War II in 1945, it deals primarily with the events of the 1970s and with projections for the 1980s. In Soviet political terms, the stress is on post-Khrushchev developments, i.e., the 1964–79 period. Among the main themes treated are nationalism; intra-bloc political and economic integration through WTO and CMEA; Eurocommunism; and detente. It is hoped that the volume will strike a useful balance between the myriad long- and short-term issues confronting Eastern Europe, one of the world's more conflict-ridden political regions.

Because so many languages are involved in this book, diacritical and accent marks have been deleted from foreign words. The short bibliography at the end of each country chapter is intended as a guide to further reading, not as a list of sources on which the chapter is based.

T.R.-H.
A.G.

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Introduction

Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone

Contrary to Western preconceptions, Eastern Europe is neither homogeneous nor monolithic. The region is, in fact, a mosaic of peoples and cultures of ancient and highly differentiated origins and varied historical experience often marked by bitter intraregional conflicts. It is only the "communism" of the title of this book that imposes a unity on the area. The Communist systems of Eastern Europe to be studied here were not the product of spontaneous, indigenous growth but a result of the post–World War II settlement, based on the realities of political and military power, which advanced the East—represented by the Soviet Union—into the heart of Europe. In all but two of the countries under review, Communist systems were introduced by the Soviet armed forces, notwithstanding the fact that in Czechoslovakia the Communist party received the most votes in the first postwar (and the last free) elections of 1946. The two exceptions are Albania and Yugoslavia, where communism emerged in the wake of a civil war and a genuine revolution. But on the whole, the establishment of Communist regimes after World War II represented a major historical discontinuity for the countries of the region.

The so-called Eastern Europe of today is the East Central Europe of the interwar period; the German Democratic Republic includes the core of Prussia and Saxony. These are truly "The Lands Between" (to borrow the title of a well-known book[1]), through which runs Europe's great East-West cultural division dating from the split of the Roman Empire in the fourth century, the Western half dominated henceforth by Catholic Rome and the Eastern part by Orthodox Byzantium. In modern times the influence of Byzantium was supplanted by that of Imperial Russia in the northeast and by the Ottoman Empire in the southeast Danube basin and the Balkans. The Roman heritage of Western Christianity and culture was carried on in the North by the Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom until it was partitioned by Russia, Prussia, and

Austria in the eighteenth century, and in the Southwest by the Habsburgs' Dual Monarchy. The Germans, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, and Hungarians have been on the Western side and the Romanians, Bulgarians, and Albanians on the Eastern side of the great cultural division. The line runs right through the middle of modern Yugoslavia, dividing the Catholic Croats and Slovenes from the Orthodox Serbs, Montenegrins, and Macedonians, as well as from the Moslems of Bosnia and of Albanian Kosovo.

In ethnolinguistic terms, the Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, Slovenes, Serbs, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Bulgarians, and Bosnian Moslems are all Slavs; the Hungarians (Magyars) are the descendants of Eastern nomadic peoples; the Albanians of ancient Illyrians; and the Romanians, apparently, of ancient Dacians and Latin-speaking Roman settlers.

National memories are cherished equally by the peoples of the region, such as the Poles and the Hungarians who had historical states prior to the twentieth century, by those such as the Croats or the Bulgarians whose medieval kingdoms fell to foreign conquest, and by those such as the Romanians whose national identity grew out of convergence of related people. All have translated national historical traditions into fervent nationalism, which, early in this century, helped to destroy the empires among which they had been divided. Most were able to realize their national aspirations in the states that emerged in East Central Europe in the interwar period, although some of them, the Croats and the Slovaks among others, remain frustrated to this day. But after World War II all found themselves again under foreign domination, this time by the Soviet Union; only two of the countries, Yugoslavia and Albania, succeeded in striking out on their own. "Fraternal" (working) class ties are supposed to be at the basis of the unity of Soviet bloc states ruled now by Communist parties, but nationalism has remained as the region's major and most disruptive force. It has been the main source of intrabloc conflicts and of resistance to bloc integration policies promoted by the Soviet Union. As the touchstone of popular loyalties, it has also been crucial in the efforts of Communist regimes to generate domestic legitimacy.

In power now for more than thirty-five years, the Communist regimes all share basic systemic principles modeled on the Soviet system, even though there is much differentiation in detail. The key political principle is the leading role of the party, which means that the party has a monopoly of political power, appropriated on the strength of its ideologically defined role as the "vanguard" of the working class. Here ideology is a substitute for the sanction of periodic popular approval: because of its "advanced social consciousness," it is assumed

that the party has the only correct knowledge of the "objective laws" governing historical progress, which entitles it to a monopoly of power and gives its decisions the force of universal laws. This premise has several immediate practical consequences.

First, assuming that the meaning of constitutionalism as understood in the West is the imposition of restraints on, and the institutionalization of, the exercise of political power, Communist systems are preconstitutional. Although they all have formal constitutions, these serve to provide a legal framework, a *Rechtstaat*, for the party's governance of society but place no restraints whatsoever on the party's power; thus there is no framework for its institutionalization, no *Politischerstaat*.[2] Because political power is not institutionalized, neither is political succession; a leadership struggle is substituted for the constitutional transfer of power. Elections (with one-party or party-led bloc candidates) and legislatures (which meet to give formal assent to party decisions) have socialization, mobilization, and support-building functions, which should not be confused with the more familiar western role of representing popular sovereignty.

Second, the maintenance of a monopoly of power requires the existence of coercive mechanisms whose powers are only subject to the party's political will: the police in the first instance but ultimately also the armed forces, the internal function of which is the "defense of socialism," i.e., the defense of the party's power. Third, because the party's rule is legitimated by ideology, the system cannot tolerate any ideological challenge. It thus requires also the monopoly of communications and consequently the imposition of censorship. Fourth, the party's monopoly of power precludes the existence of subsystem autonomy. Any political and social organizations not initially controlled by the party are either destroyed or eventually subordinated to the party's will. The latter has been the case with Eastern Europe's churches, for example, except for Poland's Roman Catholic church, which has proved too strong. Because no social groups are allowed to express independent viewpoints—by definition, no social conflict exists in Communist societies (only madmen, counterrevolutionaries, or imperialist agents can be in opposition to the party)—the system has no institutionalized mechanisms for conflict resolution.

All Communist regimes have duplicate institutional structures: there is a party bureaucracy and a parallel state bureaucracy. The first makes decisions and supervises their implementation; the second carries them out. The relationship between the party and the state apparatuses largely circumscribes the arena of Communist politics. The state's subordination to the party's will or, in other words, the exercise by the party of its leading role, is safeguarded by a number of intricate mecha-

nisms: the principle of "democratic centralism" (decisions flow from the top down); the principle of *nomenklatura* (all important appointments are subject to the party's decision or approval); incorporation of top government and social leaders into the party decision-making bodies; maintenance of parallel structures as noted above; and the "eyes and ears" role played by party cells, which unite party members in all political, administrative, economic, and social institutions and organizations in the country. In practice, the dividing line between party functionaries as decision makers and state bureaucrats as executors is blurred, not the least because everybody in any position of authority is also a party member. Despite the absence of formal pressure groups, special interests find expression in factional struggles within key bureaucracies. Other control mechanisms are the procuracy and the courts (there is no Western-type independent judiciary), which enforce "socialist legality," and the secret police, who enforce political conformity.

Communist regimes are mobilizing regimes, but they lack mechanisms for change in response to pressures generated by their own policies' interaction with a given society's social forces and political culture. In East European countries efforts to introduce change have operated under double constraints. The first obstacle has been the indivisibility of the party's leading role, which has made unacceptable the type of change attempted by the Hungarian revolution of 1956, by the Prague Spring of 1968, or by Poland's Solidarity of 1980–81. Regardless of safeguards offered to preserve the system, these efforts at reform breached the systemic principles outlined above and threatened the survival of ruling elites. Within each country's political culture a range of accommodations might well be feasible (the examples of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and of Yugoslavia are indicative), if it were not for the second constraint: the presence, power, and determination of the Soviet Union.

For East Europeans, Soviet influence and policy in the region have a historical echo. The USSR is the twentieth century's double anachronism: its political system follows the blueprint of a nineteenth-century ideology, superimposed on the world's last surviving multi-ethnic empire. Yet the Soviet Union sees the East European regional subsystem as an extension of the Soviet "family of nations" and as the nucleus of the "world socialist system." Given the heterogeneous historical and cultural background of Eastern Europe, the pressures for change there cannot but be on a collision course with the systemic requirements described above and with bloc integration policies pursued by the Soviet Union.

The pressures for change in Eastern Europe have been felt in three

major areas, although their focus and intensity have varied from country to country and over time. The demands for some recognition, at least, of political pluralism and civil and human rights have proved futile, as the history of the region since World War II demonstrates, and prospects were no better in 1984 than they were in 1948. The push for economic reforms has been dictated by the imperatives of economic growth and performance and consumer satisfaction, but any change that would undercut the power of the Communist party has proved largely impossible, except in Yugoslavia, which is free of Soviet constraints, and in Hungary, which has been performing a balancing act between the command and the "socialist market" economic models. The pressures for national self-determination in multi-ethnic systems have foundered on the same shoals, again with the exception of Yugoslavia, where the party's leading role was diluted in the 1960s by economic reforms and liberalization. In Yugoslavia *de facto* autonomous republican parties have emerged that run the country on the basis of a collective consensus. The Yugoslav and Romanian examples show that nationalism is not necessarily incompatible with the leading role of the party, provided that concessions to nationalism do not also include concessions to pluralism.

As Andrzej Korbonski has astutely noted in the Poland chapter[3] and in his other works, every type of nation-building crisis identified by Almond and Powell[4] has occurred in Communist Eastern Europe, sometimes in one and the same country. With the exception of the German Democratic Republic—a rump of the German nation—and multi-ethnic Yugoslavia, few of the countries suffer from an identity crisis, but all, to a greater or lesser degree, have undergone a legitimacy crisis and related crises of penetration and participation. Many have also experienced a distribution crisis. Poland currently is in the acute stage of every one of the aforementioned crises except for that of identity. At the other extreme, Hungary and perhaps Bulgaria have been the most successful in resolving, at least for the time being, the problems that generate these crises.

In the search for legitimacy, which has been crucial for East European Communist regimes, identification with nationalism has been indispensable. Yugoslavia and Albania have left the bloc altogether. If it were not for geostrategic reasons, Romania might have done the same. Romania's assertion of nationalism as the proper basis of communism, and of national interest in foreign policy, has proved highly dysfunctional to bloc integration. Other regimes have adopted an astute and selective use of national symbolism for legitimation purposes, in most cases with considerable success (for obvious reasons the GDR has had a problem in this regard). Even in Poland, the use of the national army

to destroy political opposition in the name of national survival (General Jaruzelski's coup of December 1981) has facilitated the party's task.

"Goulash communism" has been the other important prop of Communist legitimacy, its effectiveness dependent on the regime's ability to deliver the goods. Hungary has been most successful in this regard, as were for a time, post-1968 Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, and Bulgaria.

On the whole, political instability has characterized post-1945 Eastern Europe. The degree of instability has been proportionate to the gap in historical continuity between the system and the society, and between communism and the national political culture. Coercion, either internal or through outside intervention, has been essential for the maintenance of communism. But, after more than thirty-five years of Communist rule, the Soviet Union and its system have had an impact. The national consensus has been undermined by a cleavage between society as a whole and the Communist "New Class," which, in the interest of self-preservation, favors maintenance of the status quo and opposes change. Also, negative traits pervasive in Soviet society have seeped slowly but relentlessly into East European societies at large. These include social alienation—from the party, the government, and political pursuits in general; endemic alcoholism; and such survival mechanisms as corruption, theft, bribery, influence peddling, snitching on neighbors and coworkers, contempt for the law, and an ability to bypass, subvert, and hoodwink the authorities.

The combined use, by the Soviet Union, of the carrot-and-stick technique and manipulation of the self-preservation instincts of the countries' Communist elites has resulted in a progressive, albeit slow, integration of East European polities into the Soviet state system. Moscow orchestrates interparty contacts, overseas synchronization of state structures, and coordinates foreign policy. Coordinated economic planning and sectoral integration proceeds within the CMEA. Last but not least, the success of military integration can best be measured by the changing nature of the sequence of intervention: in Hungary in 1956 the Soviet armed forces had to intervene alone: in 1968 in Czechoslovakia the intervention was carried out formally by Warsaw Pact members (with Romania's abstention); in 1981 in Poland the intervention was accomplished internally, by Polish hands, in the form of a military coup.

NOTES

1. Alan Palmer, *The Lands Between; A History of East-Central Europe Since the Congress of Vienna* (New York: Macmillan, 1970).

2. George Brunner, "The Functions of Communist Constitutions," *Review of Socialist Law,* no. 2, 1977.

3. Below, pp. 50–85.

4. Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Comparative Politics: Systems, Process, and Policy* (Boston: Little Brown, 1966), pp. 35–37.

1 Eastern Europe in World Perspective

Vernon V. Aspaturian

As the world nears the turn of the century, the importance and visibility of the countries of Eastern Europe, both as a collective entity and as individual international actors, are likely to increase and the foreign policy activity of the East European states is correspondingly bound to be more complicated. The relationship of individual East European states to the Soviet Union at any given time will remain the single most important and uncomplicated variable conditioning the international behavior of the states in the region. In spite of Soviet desires to the contrary, the Soviet connection will be forced to compete with other conditioning factors and determinants and the Soviet variable will continue to erode slowly. Whether the erosion will be sufficient to bring about a fundamental restructuring of Soviet-European relationships by the year 2000 cannot be precisely forecast on the basis of existing trends. The ultimate character of the resolution of the festering and boiling "Polish problem" and the unresolved succession issues generated by Brezhnev's death will play important roles in shaping future relationships.

Until comparatively recent times, Eastern Europe did not exist as a distinct geographical, regional, or political concept; its role on the world stage was marginal. Today, Eastern Europe is recognized as one of the major geo-political regions of the world. Before World War II and particularly before World War I, global or world politics were essentially colonial and imperial politics and the exclusive province of a handful of Great Powers, all located in Europe except for the United States and Japan. Eastern Europe, like most of the non-European world, was essentially an object of great-power politics rather than an actor on the European stage, to say nothing of the world stage. Knowledge of, not to mention contact with, the world beyond its immediate proximity was nil, except for the awareness of a vast and generous America to which millions of East Europeans migrated after 1900.