




# Foundations of National Power



Edited with Introductions and Other Original Text by

Harold & Margaret Sprout

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# Foundations of National Power

*Also by Harold and Margaret Sprout:*

THE RISE OF AMERICAN NAVAL POWER, 1776-1918

TOWARD A NEW ORDER OF SEA POWER: AMERICAN NAVAL  
POLICY AND THE WORLD SCENE, 1918-1922

## Introduction

THE SECOND WORLD WAR has altered profoundly the relations of the United States with other nations. Venerable foreign policies—such as neutrality toward European wars and avoidance of military alliances with foreign powers—require fresh appraisal in the light of changing conditions. We may court disasters more terrible than those which have befallen Germany and Japan if, as in 1919, we turn our backs on the Old World and try to go about our business as if the war had never occurred.

This is so in part because of the revolutionary character of developments in science and technology. We now have bombing planes capable of carrying several tons of high explosive or incendiary missiles to targets 1,500 miles or more from their base of operations. We are told that robot rocket bombs hurtling down from the stratosphere are but grim harbingers of more deadly weapons “just around the corner.” A world-renowned physicist is reported to have said recently: “It is as if we had uncorked a bottle from which some violent genie has escaped; we cannot get it back into the bottle again.”

Fortunately for us, the Second World War is drawing to a close before the new weapons can be turned against the United States, as they probably would have been had the war continued, and as they almost certainly would be in any future war. We thus have a chance—our last chance in the opinion of qualified observers—to evolve new national policies to shield us from such a fate. The urgency of this task cannot be exaggerated. It provides a compelling incentive for re-inventory and appraisal of the changing world situation in which we find ourselves as a result of the shattering events of the Second World War.

It is now generally accepted that progress toward a more durable world order is possible only within the framework of the existing multi-state system, usually called the family or society of nations. Mobilization for war and the waging of war have everywhere tightened the hold of the state on the individual. The compelling necessity for team-work and the sacrifices of war have simultaneously strengthened the citizen's loyalty to his own country. For better or for worse, the great struggle seems to have pushed far into the background any possibility of creating a super-national world-state, at least in our time. The Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco conferences have been directed to the task of framing

a charter for an international security organization, not a federal union of the victorious nations.

While the basic principles of the multi-state system have survived more or less intact, the war has wrought profound changes in the structure of the society of nations. The global struggle has wrecked some nations, weakened others, strengthened a few, and altered the relations of each and all—our own included. Any random sampling of events emphasizes the sweeping changes that have taken place and are still taking place in the political pattern of our world.

One has only to think of the destruction of the Nazi state which as recently as 1942 held sway from the Atlantic to the Volga. Or the narrow margin by which Great Britain and the whole Allied cause escaped irreparable disaster after the fall of France in 1940. Or the phenomenal rise of Soviet prestige and influence, resulting from the epic defense and victories of the Red Army. Or the tragic change that has come over the fortunes of France, only a generation ago the leading military power in Europe. Or the total break-up of the old European order—economic and political. Or the comparable break-up in the Far East in consequence of the sensational advance and equally sensational defeats of Japan.

The first step—for the ordinary citizen as for the statesman, staff officer, or foreign-office official—is to achieve a clear and realistic view of the current world situation, and of the major trends in sight. We want answers to such questions as: How has the war altered the international position of Great Britain and the British outlook on the world? Can France recover her former standing and influence among the nations? Can the German people play a constructive role in a new world order or must they be subjected indefinitely to international controls? What changes are taking place in eastern and southeastern Europe, in the Mediterranean, and in the Near and Middle East? Will China be rent by civil war or will the Chinese emerge from their long struggle with Japan politically united and prepared to play a large role in world affairs? Can a disarmed and demilitarized Japan still be a menace to security in the Pacific? How strong is the Soviet Union? What do the Russians want—in Europe, in the Middle East, in the Far East? Do Soviet aims conflict seriously with our own? What is the measure of American strength? How has the war affected our national position



in the world? Why should Americans concern themselves with the strength, the aims, and the policies of Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, China, or other nations?

No single person, no single field of knowledge, has the answers to all these and many similar questions which are the active concern of us all. In most instances no conclusive answer is possible. But events will not wait. Our statesmen and their advisers cannot postpone decisions, and they need the support of an aroused and educated public opinion.

It is hoped that *Foundations of National Power* will be of some service in helping Americans to frame a strategy of peace that meets the requirements of national security and fits the facts of the developing world situation. The book offers no panaceas, no cut-and-dried solutions. It has no doctrine other than the conviction of the editors that broad and comprehensive knowledge of the strength, the aims, and the policies of nations is basic to understanding the problem of security in a dynamic world.

The contents of the book are drawn from many sources representing many specialized fields of knowledge. A roster of the authorities quoted would include eminent statesmen, political scientists, historians, economists, demographers, geologists, geographers, physical scientists, engineers, journalists, military experts, and other specialists. Each of these specialties can make its own contribution to an understanding and to the solution of the international problems of our time. The function of the editors has been to fit these specialties together into a pattern or mosaic that is both readily comprehensible and faithful to the realities of our world and to the trends of our age.

The readings selected are not the only ones that could have been chosen. Every topic could be enriched by the inclusion of additional items. Only the inexorable limitation of space has prevented a broader and richer treatment of every country and every subject. At the same time, the editors have tried to make their choices as representative as possible of the best thought on the subjects and areas covered.

The general plan of the book is simple. It is divided into five parts or sections. Part I deals with certain fundamental conditions and factors which have shaped the course of international relations through the centuries. Parts II, III, and IV present the pattern of international rela-



tions and the major political forces at work in each of three great geographical regions or realms. Part V deals with two specific problems of the day—the terms of peace for the enemy states and the bases of a workable international organization to keep the peace and provide security, and a sense of security, for all nations.

The order of treatment, indeed the whole book, is the product of experience gained with a course on world affairs developed in the Navy's college training program. This course was introduced at the personal initiative of the Honorable James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy. It was given experimentally for several terms in the Navy V-12 Program at six universities, and is now a regular feature of the curriculum of the Naval Reserve Officer Training Program.

During the experimental period the course was given at the University of California at Berkeley by Professor Robert J. Kerner; at the University of North Carolina by Professor Samuel T. Emory; at Northwestern University by Mr. William A. Bryan; at the University of Pennsylvania by Professor Robert Strausz-Hupé; at Princeton University by Professor Harold Sprout, Professor John Schroth, and Dr. William Fletcher; and at Yale University by Professor Arnold Wolfers. Under the general editorship of Harold Sprout, but with active assistance and advice from all the men associated with the course, a body of readings was prepared and revised from term to term. These materials constituted the foundation upon which the editors have built the present volume.

Certain strategical ideas incorporated in the chapter introductions and other pieces of original text by the editors were previously presented in the texts originally prepared by Harold Sprout for: (1) *A War Atlas for Americans*. Published in 1944 by Simon & Schuster, Inc., New York, for the Council on Books in Wartime; and (2) Part II of *Geographical Foundations of National Power*. Army Service Forces Manual, M-103. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1944.

Many besides those previously named have contributed generously. Professor Edward Mead Earle of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton has been actively associated with the enterprise from the beginning. Both he and Professor Wolfers of Yale, read and criticized the chapter introductions and other pieces of original text prepared by the editors. In one form or another we have benefited from the advice and criticism of many others, including Dr. Isaiah Bowman, President

of the Johns Hopkins University; Professor Grayson Kirk of Columbia University; Professor David Rowe of Yale University, and Professors Frank Notestein and Taylor Thom of Princeton. Mr. Datus Smith, director of the Princeton University Press, has been not only an efficient publisher but also a helpful and constructive counselor at every stage of the work.

Acknowledgment for permission to use copyrighted materials is made in each instance at the place in the book where the item appears. A more general word of appreciation, however, is due at this point. Without the cooperation of the many copyright owners represented in this volume, the undertaking could not possibly have been completed.

Finally, a word of appreciation to the Secretary of the Navy and to the officers of the Training Activity of the Bureau of Naval Personnel. They have steadfastly supported the educators to whom they entrusted the development of this experiment. Their enthusiasm and encouragement has been a big factor in bringing this volume to completion.

While the editors have thus received help and advice from many sources, we alone are responsible for the final selection of readings and for the views expressed in the chapter introductions and other pieces of original text which appear from place to place throughout the book.

*Princeton, September 1, 1945*

H. S.  
M. S.

# Contents

INTRODUCTION	vi
PART I: BASES OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS	I
1. The Ways of International Politics	3
2. Why Some Nations Are Strong and Others Weak	28
3. The World Stage of International Politics	63
4. The Pattern of World Politics	81
PART II: THE EUROPEAN REALM OF THE GREAT POWERS	121
5. The European Realm	122
6. Great Britain	148
7. France	211
8. Mediterranean and Middle East	264
9. Germany	311
10. Eastern and Southeastern Europe	373
11. The Soviet Union	384
PART III: THE AFRO-ASIAN REALM OF RIVAL IMPERIALISMS	457
12. The Afro-Asian Realm	458
13. Japan	495
14. China: Past, Present, and Future	546
PART IV: THE AMERICAN REALM BETWEEN EUROPE AND ASIA	603
15. The American Realm	604
16. The United States	642
PART V: FOUNDATIONS OF PEACE AND A NEW WORLD ORDER	691
17. The Terms of Peace	692
18. Security for the United States: How Can We Achieve It?	731
INDEX	769

# Part I

## Bases of International Politics



# Chapter 1

## The Ways of International Politics

THE ways of international politics in our time are the ways of the multi-state system. The day may come when most or all of mankind lives under one rule. A single nation, for example, might conquer all the rest and extend its sway over the globe, as Hitler's Germany aspired to do. Or the different peoples of the earth might unite more or less voluntarily into a super-national world federation. Neither eventuality is in prospect today. The war has altered considerably the structure of the multi-state system. Some nations face utter ruin. Many have been frightfully devastated. A few have grown relatively much stronger. But the multi-state system itself, with its emphasis upon national sovereignty, has survived virtually intact.

In certain respects, indeed, the war has even strengthened the system. In many countries the struggle for survival has measurably tightened the moral as well as the physical hold of the state on the individual. For most men the highest loyalty is more than ever loyalty to country. There is little disposition anywhere to put all one's eggs in the basket of unproved internationalism. Such facts have not escaped the attention of practical statesmen. For them as for most of their constituents, the existing multi-state system still constitutes the framework of international politics, into which must be fitted new institutions and new modes of action for safeguarding peace in the future.

One salient feature of the multi-state system is the all but universal disparity between legal rights and status on the one hand, and actual power, influence, and responsibility on the other. As everyone knows, mankind is divided into separate political communities, differing greatly in composition, structure, strength, and external relations. Those occupying a legal status of recognized independence are variously called nations, states, or powers. The strongest of these are called Great Powers. Communities whose recognized status is something less than full sovereignty are called dominions, protectorates, or colonies, depending upon the degree to which they are legally subject to external authority. Such designations, however, often have little practical significance.

There may be much or little correlation between legal status and actual strength and influence. The voice of Canada, a member of the British Commonwealth and legally subject to the British Crown, carries far more weight in international councils than does, for example, the voice of Liberia, Ethiopia, or many another nominally sovereign but actually weak or backward state.

In the absence of a super-national world government to serve as arbiter of human relations which reach beyond the confines of one community, the aims and policies of the various members of the society of nations, backed up by their own force and persuasion, set the pattern of international politics. This has been so for several centuries. It is so today; and there is little evidence that it will not continue to be so for a considerable time to come.

For this reason, the role of national power is basic to any discussion of international politics. That is not to say that power is the only factor, or that power is wholly military. The techniques of exerting influence over one's neighbors are many and varied. They include not only the crude display or use of armed force, but also economic inducements, ideological appeals, and numerous other modes of persuasion. A nation's way of life, its ideals, its philanthropies, its intellectual achievements, its wealth and economic productivity, the qualities of its statecraft, the spirit of its culture, and many other factors all have a bearing upon its relations with other nations and upon its place in the world. But non-military sources of influence can be enormously strengthened or gravely weakened by the presence or absence of military power. The possibility of violence, however remote, is a factor in every international equation, just as it is in most political situations within a single country. The very expression "Great Power," used to designate the strongest nations, is an admission of the widespread recognition that influence tends to become a function of power in the practice of diplomacy as well as in the waging of war.

No one will deny that international relations under our multi-state system fall far short of the ideal of a world state and a universal brotherhood of man. No equilibrium or balance of power among sovereign states of unequal and ever-changing strength, it must be admitted, can hope to have the comparative stability of a national government wielding supreme power over, and commanding the allegiance



of, its constituents. There is always danger that those nations which possess superior power will abuse it. No wholly effective means has yet been found to curb nations seeking to advance their aims by resort to violence.

To admit the imperfections of our world, while doubting the possibility of achieving utopia in one fell swoop, is not (as is so often charged) a counsel of defeatism and despair. There is real hope for a better world, provided the custodians of greatest power can carry over into the peace the united front forged in the heat of battle, and provided further that they will accept the moral restraints as well as the positive responsibilities necessary to win the confidence of the smaller or weaker countries. Later on we shall give some attention to the problem of rebuilding a more durable world order within the framework of the multi-state system. Discussion of that problem, however, should be grounded upon a clear understanding of the elements and practical workings of the multi-state system. A first step in this direction is to explore the nature and role of power, and that is the common focus of the readings selected for this chapter on the "ways of international politics."

## INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS UNDER THE MULTI-STATE SYSTEM

BY BROOKS EMENY

From *Mainsprings of World Politics*, by Brooks Emeny. Headline Series, No. 42. Copyright 1942 by Foreign Policy Association, New York; reproduced by permission. Dr. Emeny is author of *The Strategy of Raw Materials*; and co-author, with the late Frank Simonds, of *The Great Powers in World Politics*.

THE history of the modern world has been marked by four great peace settlements: Westphalia, 1648, which brought to a close the Thirty Years War; Utrecht, 1713, which ended the War of the Spanish Succession; Vienna, 1815, which followed the defeat of Napoleon; and Versailles, 1919, which terminated World War I.

Of these four settlements the Peace

of Westphalia was historically the most significant in several respects. In the first place, it brought to a close a long succession of bloody religious conflicts and settled the principle that Europe could remain half Catholic and half Protestant. But even more important, it established the idea of the nation as a sovereign independent unit, and defined the modern state system.

Europe at that time marked the limits of western civilization, except for certain colonial areas. The other regions of the earth were either unexplored or comprised the peoples of Oriental and Mohammedan culture, to whom the concept of the sovereign independent state was completely foreign.

Since that time the world has become

universally organized along the lines of the European state system. As western civilization has spread and embraced the entire surface of the earth, all peoples have accepted the idea of the territorially defined sovereign independent state. Under this system no nation owes allegiance to a higher sovereign authority nor brooks any interference with its internal or external affairs, unless by its own choice or through forced submission to the superior power of another state or coalition.

It is in these respects that the peace settlements of Utrecht, Vienna and Versailles are historically of great interest. Each marked the reconstruction of the state system following a tremendous upheaval which arose from the attempt of a single nation or coalition to destroy that system by conquest. Thus the idea of Louis XIV and of Napoleon that France should dominate the Continent and thereby upset "the balance of power" between the nations of Europe, was as intolerable to British sovereign interests as to the other nations, victims of French conquests. The similar ambitions of Germany under Wilhelm II and Hitler have been productive of identical reactions, though on a tremendous world-wide scale.

Wars have existed from earliest times between groups of mankind. They are not, therefore, peculiar to the nation-state system. In fact the western world has known but two periods of relative peace. The first of these periods existed during the single sovereignty of the Roman Empire. . . . The second period prevailed during the medieval Papacy, under whose temporal powers some moderating influence over the conflicting ambitions of ruling princes was exercised. In neither instance, however, did the sovereign independent state, as we understand it, exist.

With the development of the nation-

state system, the nature of wars has varied from century to century. Between the Peace of Westphalia and the French Revolution, conflicts between nations were primarily dynastic struggles. The rivalry of the sovereign princes for possession of larger territories and colonial holdings typified this period. But since Europe was composed of sovereign independent states, the attempt of any one or combination of them to gain sufficient power to threaten the security of the others, served to upset the existing equilibrium. Thus the balance-of-power system became the natural by-product of the nation-state system. The wars of Louis XIV, of Napoleon, of Kaiser Wilhelm II and of Nazi Germany have each in turn challenged that system with identical reactions on the part of nations whose security was thereby threatened.

But if the wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were largely dynastic, those of the nineteenth and twentieth have become primarily nationalistic. It was the French Revolution that introduced a new phase in the conflict of states by giving rise in Europe and the rest of the world to a strong spirit of nationalism. During most of the nineteenth century this generally took the form of irredentist or ethnic struggles, motivated by the desire of groups of people with like background and customs, or speaking the same language, to unite under a single sovereignty. The unification of Italy, through the efforts of Mazzini and Garibaldi, and of Germany under Bismarck, were both an expression of this desire and resulted in the creation of two Great Powers.

World War I gave impetus to another force with explosive potentialities, i.e. economic nationalism. This came as a natural result of the ever-tightening squeeze of competition between nations