







WALTER LAFEBER

UPDATED NINTH EDITION

AMERICA, RUSSIA, AND THE COLD WAR, 1945-2002



America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945–2002

UPDATED NINTH EDITION

Walter LaFeber
Cornell University



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America, Russia, and the Cold War
1945–2002

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To Sandy

About the Author

WALTER LAFEVER was born and raised in Indiana, attended Hanover College, and then received his Master of Arts degree from Stanford University and his Doctor of Philosophy degree from the University of Wisconsin at Madison. His books include *The American Age: U.S. Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad Since 1750* (2nd ed., 1994); *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America* (2nd ed., 1993); *The Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical Perspective* (2nd ed., 1989); and *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1865–1898* (1963). He also wrote *The American Search for Opportunity*, Volume II of the *Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations* (1994). *The Clash: U.S.-Japan Relations Throughout History* (1997) won the Bancroft and Hawley prizes. *Michael Jordan and the New Global Capitalism* was published in 1999. Since 1968, Professor LaFeber has been the Marie Underhill Noll Professor of American History at Cornell University, and in 1994, he was named a Stephen H. Weiss Presidential Teaching Fellow. In 2002, he was named to the Andrew and James Tisch Distinguished University Professorship.

Foreword

"The United States always wins the war and loses the peace," runs a persistent popular complaint. Neither part of the statement is accurate. The United States barely escaped the War of 1812 with its territory intact. In Korea in the 1950s the nation was forced to settle for a stalemate. A decade later in Vietnam, the United States clearly lost the war. At Paris in 1782, and again in 1898, American negotiators drove hard bargains to win notable diplomatic victories. Yet the myth persists, along with the equally erroneous American belief that we are a peaceful people. Our history, in fact, is studded with conflict and violence. From the Revolution to the Cold War, Americans have been willing to fight for their interests, their beliefs, and their ambitions. The United States has gone to war for many objectives—for independence in 1775, for honor and trade in 1812, for territory in 1846, for the Union in 1861, for humanity and empire in 1898, for neutral rights in 1917, and for national security in 1941. Since 1945, the nation has been engaged in two limited wars in Asia with disappointing outcomes and a brief conflict in the Middle East that ended in a decisive victory over Iraq.

This volume on the Cold War is part of a series of books designed to examine in detail critical periods relating to American involvement in foreign wars. Since the first edition appeared in 1967, Professor LaFeber has carefully revised his account to explain the course of the Cold War as it moved from periods of intense crisis and confrontation to times of relative stability. In recent editions, he has

paid special attention to the dramatic events that ended the Cold War, notably the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the tearing down of the Berlin Wall, and the demise of the Soviet Union itself in 1991. In this edition, he surveys the troubled state of U.S.-Russian affairs in the decade since the end of the Cold War, enabling the reader to see how the half-century of conflict between the superpowers led to today's uneasy relationship.

Robert A. Divine

Preface to the Updated Ninth Edition

This updated Ninth Edition was planned after the attacks of September 11th, 2001. In the original Ninth Edition, which became available about the time of the tragedies in New York City, Washington, and southern Pennsylvania, a new chapter had been added on the foreign policies of the Clinton and Yeltsin-Putin presidencies, as well as an introduction to the initial foreign policies of George W. Bush's administration. That chapter and other rewritten pages noted as well the effects of the technology revolution that took hold in the 1980s and 1990s. Every other chapter of the Ninth Edition was updated to include recent scholarship and materials from openings of the United States, Soviet, and Chinese archives (with the Woodrow Wilson Center's Cold War International History Project indispensable for the Soviet and Chinese documents). The revisions also included eliminating a number of sentences that once seemed clear and important.

In its new Chapter XV, this updated Ninth Edition analyzes the world that emerged after September 11th. It focuses on the reasons for terrorism, the important changes in the Islamic world that has become a focus for U.S. diplomacy, and the American response—especially the Bush Doctrine, which has historic implications for U.S. relations with Iraq, India, and Pakistan among other nations—to that post-September 11th world. The chapter also discusses the surprisingly

close relationship that has allowed the U.S. military to project immense power into areas where that power did not earlier exist. These areas include large, strategically located, and oil-rich countries in Central Asia which most Americans could not have identified on a map, but which are now homes for the men and women of the United States military. In addition to those thanked in the Acknowledgments, I am greatly indebted to Molly Egan and Rebecca Meyer, who did vital research work against deadlines; and Steve Drummond, Jill Moline, and Kimberly McGrath of McGraw-Hill who not only made excellent suggestions, but somehow patiently rushed this updated edition into publication.

I am especially indebted to those who have found this book useful. Many readers have been kind enough to take time to tell me about the parts of the narrative that worked and those that did not. I have tried to fix faulty parts without changing the book's purpose: to provide an overview of especially American, but also Soviet/Russian, foreign relations during the Cold War and after, while suggesting the general theme that domestic needs largely shape the foreign policies of both the United States and the countries with which it engages. The 1980s–1990s vividly demonstrated, in wholly different ways on the American and Russian sides, that foreign policies are no more effective than domestic circumstances allow. That axiom will not change after September 11, 2001.

Website

An accompanying website (www.mhhe.com/lafeber) is also new to the Ninth Edition and has been expanded in the Updated Ninth Edition. Visit the site to find primary source documents and links to relevant websites, organized by chapter.

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Walter LaFeber
February 2001

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Introduction: The Burden of History (to 1941)

The Cold War dominated American life after 1945. It cost Americans \$8 trillion in defense expenditures, took the lives of nearly 100,000 of their young men and women, ruined the careers of many others during the McCarthyite witch hunts, led the nation into the horrors of Southeast Asian conflicts, and in the 1980s helped trigger the worst economic depression in forty years. It was not the most satisfying chapter in American diplomatic history.

These tragedies can be understood—and, it is hoped, some future disasters averted—only by understanding the causes of this struggle between the United States and Russia. The conflict did not begin in 1945 or even with the communist victory in Russia during 1917. The two powers did not initially come into conflict because one was communist and the other capitalist. Rather, they first confronted each other on the plains of north China and Manchuria in the late nineteenth century. That meeting climaxed a century in which Americans had expanded westward over half the globe and Russians had moved eastward across Asia.

Until that confrontation the two nations had been good friends. Whenever conflicts arose (as over settlements in California and Alaska), the Russians retreated before the demands of U.S. expansionists. Encounters outside the New World, however, could not be settled so easily. Americans swept across a continent while sending out tentacles of trade that quickly seized upon Asia as the great potential market for their magnificently productive farms and factories.

By the 1890s Russia, after five centuries of expansion, controlled a grand continental empire containing (like the United States) peoples of many cultures. Americans believed that a “manifest destiny” of supernatural force directed their conquests. The Russians similarly viewed their tsar, or emperor, as an instrument of God’s will.

But the two nations also differed sharply. The American empire was decentralized, or “federal,” with states and outlying territory enjoying considerable freedom. The Russian empire was tightly centralized, with an army of bureaucrats working antlike for the tsar (and, later, a small Communist party elite in Moscow). Russian officials agreed that only rigidly enforced order from above could preserve the nation. Such bureaucracies are not renowned for imagination and originality. (In part because of the resulting uncreativity, Russia, both before and after 1917, necessarily borrowed technology and new industrial methods from the West.¹) The oppressive bureaucracy also was brutal, especially in the post-1880 era when it condemned political dissenters to Siberian prison camps and accelerated pogroms against Russian Jews. Anti-Russian feelings spread across the United States. Congress threatened to cut trade with the tsar. Mark Twain caught the mood when he exclaimed that if the regime could be ended only with dynamite, “then thank God for dynamite.”

Americans were also finding another fault with their former friends. The United States honored no bureaucracies, but businesspeople who moved across the oceans to profit in open world marketplaces. Russians, however, moved across land, not water. They developed an empire that was more political than commercial. After annexing land in Asia, they tried to control it tightly by closing the markets to foreign businesspeople with whom they could not compete. This highlighted the problem between the two countries in the 1890s: the United States believed its prosperity increasingly required an “open door” to trade in China’s rich province of Manchuria, but the Russians were determined to colonize and close off parts of Manchuria. Two hostile systems confronted each other, much as they would during 1945 in Eastern Europe, and for many of the same reasons.

From the 1890s until 1917 the United States tried to contain Russian expansion, usually by supporting Japan, which, for its own purposes, also wanted an open Manchuria. President Theodore

¹Robert Wesson, “Soviet Russia: A Geopolitical View,” *Survey*, XVII (Spring 1971): 1–13.