


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Dictionary Of PHILOSOPHY

ANCIENT • MEDIEVAL • MODERN

DAGOBERT D. RUNES
AND 72 AUTHORITIES



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DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY

edited by

Dagobert D. Runes

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Preface

The aim of this dictionary is to provide teachers, students and laymen interested in philosophy with clear, concise, and correct definitions and descriptions of the philosophical terms, throughout the range of philosophic thought. In the volume are represented all the branches as well as schools of ancient, medieval, and modern philosophy. In any such conspectus, it is increasingly recognized that the Oriental philosophies must be accorded ample space beside those of the western world.

The great field that must be compressed within the limits of a small volume makes omissions inevitable. If any topics, or phases of a subject, deserve space not here accorded them, it may be possible in future editions to allow them room; I take this occasion to invite suggestions and criticism, to that end.

Clarity and correctness would be more easily secured if there were concord among philosophers. Scarcely any two thinkers would define philosophy alike; nor are they likely to agree as to the significance of its basic concepts. The value of a one-volume dictionary, nonetheless, makes the effort worthwhile.

"Dictionaries are like watches," Samuel Johnson said; "the best cannot be expected to go quite true, but the worst is better than none."

I trust that the present volume will serve as reliably as the chronometer of today, in the time-pattern of the philosophic world.

I owe a debt of profound appreciation to every one of the many collaborators that have so generously contributed to the Dictionary. Especially do I wish to acknowledge my gratitude to Professors William Marias Malisoff and Ledger Wood. Needless to say, the final responsibility, as to the general plan of the volume, together with the burden of any shortcomings, rests solely upon the editor.

THE EDITOR

A

Abailard, Peter: (1079-1142) Was born at Pallet in France; distinguished himself as a brilliant student of the trivium and quadrivium; studied logic with Roscelin and Wm. of Champeaux. He taught philosophy, with much emphasis on dialectic, at Melun, Corbeil, and the schools of St. Geneviève and Notre Dame in Paris. He was lecturing on theology in Paris c. 1113 when he was involved in the romantic and unfortunate interlude with Héloïse. First condemned for heresy in 1121, he became Abbot of St. Gildas in 1125, and after returning to teach theology in Paris, his religious views were censured by the Council of Sens (1141). He died at Cluny after making his peace with God and his Church. Tactless, but very intelligent, Abailard set the course of mediaeval philosophy for two centuries with his interest in the problem of universals. He appears to have adopted a nominalistic solution, rather than the semi-realistic position attributed to him by the older historians. Chief works: *Sic et Non* (c. 1122), *Theologia Christiana* (c. 1124), *Scito Teipsum* (1125-1138) and several *Logical Glosses* (ed. B. Geyer, *Abaelard's Philos. Schrift.* BGPM, XXI, 1-3).

J. G. Sickes, *Peter Abaelard* (Cambridge, Eng., 1932).—*V.J.B.*

Abdera, School of: Founded by the Atomist Democritus. Important members, Metrodorus of Chios and Anaxarchus of Abdera (teacher of Pyrrho, into whose hands the school leadership fell), thus inspiring Pyrrhonism. See *Democritus, Pyrrhonism*.—*E.H.*

Abduction: (Gr. *apagoge*) In Aristotle's logic a syllogism whose major premiss is certain but whose minor premiss is only probable.—*G.R.M.*

In Peirce: type of inference yielding an explanatory hypothesis (q.v.), rather than a result of deductive application of a "rule" to a "case" or establishment of a rule by induction.

Ab esse ad posse valet, a posse ad esse non valet consequentia: Adage expressing the permissibility of arguing from facts to possibility and denying the validity of arguments proceeding from possibility to reality.—*J.J.R.*

Ābhāsa, ābhāsana: (Skr.) "Shining forth", the cosmopsychological process of the One becoming the Many as described by the Trika (q.v.) which regards the Many as a real aspect of the ultimate

reality or Parama Siva (cf. Indian Philosophy). Reflection, objectivity.—*K.F.L.*

Abheda: (Skr. "not distinct") Identity, particularly in reference to any philosophy of monism which does not recognize the distinctness of spiritual and material, or divine and essentially human principles.—*K.F.L.*

Abravanel, Don Isaac: Exegete and philosopher (1437-1508), was born in Lisbon, Portugal, emigrated to Toledo, Spain, and after the expulsion settled in Italy. He wrote a number of philosophical works, among them a commentary on parts of the *Guide*. He follows in most of his views Maimonides but was also influenced by Crescas.—*M.W.*

Abravanel, Judah: Or Judah Leon Medigo (1470-1530), son of Don Isaac, settled in Italy after the expulsion from Spain. In his *Dialoghi d'Amore*, i.e., Dialogues about Love, he conceives, in Platonic fashion, love as the principle permeating the universe. It emanates from God to the beings, and from the beings reverts back to God. It is possible that his conception of universal love exerted some influence upon the concept of Amor Dei of Spinoza.—*M.W.*

Absolute: (Lat. *absolvere* to release or set free)

Of this term Stephanus Chauvin in the *Lexicon Philosophicum*, 1713, p2 observes: "Because one thing is said to be free from another in many ways, so also the word absolute is taken by the philosophers in many senses." In Medieval Scholasticism this term was variously used, for example: freed or abstracted from material conditions, hence from contingency; hence applicable to all being; without limitations or restrictions; simply; totally; independent; unconditionally; uncaused; free from mental reservation.

Much of this Medieval usage is carried over and expanded in modern philosophy. Absolute and Absolutely signify perfection, completeness, universality, non-relativity, exemption from limitation or qualification, unconditionality; hence also the ineffable, unthinkable, indeterminable; strictly, literally, without reservation, not symbolically or metaphorically. *E.g.* "Absolute truth," "absolute space," "absolute Ego," "absolutely unconditioned," "absolutely true."—*W.L.*

Absolute Ego: In Fichte's philosophy, the Ego or Subject prior to its differentiation into an empirical (or historical) self and not-self.—*W.L.*

Absolute Idealism: See *Idealism, Hegel*.—W.L.
Absolute, The: (in *Metaphysics*) Most broadly, the terminus or ultimate referent of thought. The Unconditioned. The opposite of the Relative (Absolute). A distinction is to be made between the singular and generic use of the term.

A. While Nicholas of Cusa referred to God as "the absolute," the noun form of this term came into common use through the writings of Schelling and Hegel. Its adoption spread in France through Cousin and in Britain through Hamilton. According to Kant the Ideas of Reason seek both the absolute totality of conditions and their absolutely unconditioned Ground. This Ground of the Real Fichte identified with the Absolute Ego (q.v.). For Schelling the Absolute is a primordial World Ground, a spiritual unity behind all logical and ontological oppositions, the self-differentiating source of both Mind and Nature. For Hegel, however, the Absolute is the All conceived as a timeless, perfect, organic whole of self-thinking Thought. In England the Absolute has occasionally been identified with the Real considered as unrelated or "unconditioned" and hence as the "Unknownable" (Mansel, H. Spencer). Until recently, however, it was commonly appropriated by the Absolute Idealists to connote with Hegel the complete, the whole, the perfect, i.e. the Real conceived as an all-embracing unity that complements, fulfills, or transmutes into a higher synthesis the partial, fragmentary, and "self-contradictory" experiences, thoughts, purposes, values, and achievements of finite existence. The specific emphasis given to this all-inclusive perfection varies considerably, i.e. logical wholeness or concreteness (Hegel), metaphysical completeness (Hamilton), mystical feeling (Bradley), aesthetic completeness (Bosanquet), moral perfection (Royce). The Absolute is also variously conceived by this school as an all-inclusive Person, a Society of persons, and as an impersonal whole of Experience.

More recently the term has been extended to mean also (a) the All or totality of the real, however understood, and (b) the World Ground, whether conceived idealistically or materialistically, whether pantheistically, theistically, or dualistically. It thus stands for a variety of metaphysical conceptions that have appeared widely and under various names in the history of philosophy. In China: the *Wu Chi* (Non-Being), *T'ai Chi* (Being), and, on occasion, *Tao*. In India: the Vedantic *Ātman* (Self) and *Brahman* (the Real), the Buddhist *Bhūtatathatā* (indeterminate Thatness), *Vigñaptimātra* (the One, pure, changeless, eternal consciousness grounding all appearances), and the Void of Nāgārjuna. In Greece: the cosmic matrix of the Ionians, the One of the Eleatics, the Being or Good of Plato, the World Reason of Stoicism, the One of Neo-Platonism. In patristic and scholastic Christianity: the creator God, the *Ens Realissimum*, *Ens Perfectissimum*, *Sui Causa*, and the God of mysticism generally (Erigena, Hugo of St. Victor, Cusa, Boehme, Bruno). In modern thought: the Substance of Descartes and

Spinoza, the God of Malebranche and Berkeley, the Energy of materialism, the Space-Time of realism, the Pure Experience of phenomenalism, the *ding-an-sich* (q.v.) of Kant.

B. Generically "an absolute" or "the absolute" (pl. "absolutes") means (a) the real (thing-in-itself) as opposed to appearance; (b) substance, the substantial, reals (possessing aseity or self-existence) as opposed to relations; (c) the perfect, non-comparative, complete of its kind; (d) the primordial or uncaused; (e) the independent or autonomous.

Logic. (a) Aristotelian logic involves such absolutes as the three laws of thought and changeless, objectively real classes or species. (b) In Kantian logic the categories and principles of judgment are absolutes, i.e. a priori, while the Ideas of reason seek absolute totality and unity. (c) In the organic or metaphysical logic of the Hegelian school, the Absolute is considered the ultimate terminus, referent, or subject of every judgment.

Ethics and Axiology. Moral and axiological values, norms, principles, maxims, laws are considered absolutes when universally valid objects of acknowledgment, whether conditionally or unconditionally (e.g. the law of the best possible, the utilitarian greatest happiness principle, the Kantian categorical imperative).

Aesthetics. Aesthetic absolutes are standards, norms, principles of aesthetic taste considered as objective, i.e. universally valid.—W.L.

Absolutism: The opposite of Relativism.

1. **Metaphysics:** the theory of the Absolute (q.v.).
2. **Epistemology:** the doctrine that objective or absolute, and not merely relative and human, truth is possible.
3. **Axiology:** the view that standards of value (moral or aesthetic) are absolute, objective, superhuman, eternal.
4. **Politics:** Cult of unrestricted sovereignty located in the ruler.—W.L.

Absolutistic Personalism: The ascription of personality to the Absolute.—R.T.F.

Absorption: The name *law of absorption* is given to either of the two dually related theorems of the propositional calculus,

$$[p \vee pq] \equiv p, \quad p[p \vee q] \equiv p,$$

or either of the two corresponding dually related theorems of the algebra of classes,

$$a \cup (a \cap b) = a, \quad a \cap (a \cup b) = a.$$

Any valid inference of the propositional calculus which amounts to replacing $A \vee AB$ by A , or $A[A \vee B]$ by A , or any valid inference of the algebra of classes which amounts to replacing $A \cup (A \cap B)$ by A , or $A \cap (A \cup B)$ by A , is called *absorption*.

Whitehead and Russell (*Principia Mathematica*) give the name *law of absorption* to the theorem of the propositional calculus,

$$[p \supset q] \equiv [p \equiv pq].$$

A. C.

Abstract: (Lat. ab, from + trahere, to draw) A designation applied to a partial aspect or quality considered in isolation from a total object, which is, in contrast, designated concrete.—L.W.

Abstracta: Such neutral, purely denotative entities as qualities, numbers, relations, logical concepts, appearing neither directly nor literally in time. (Broad)—H.H.

Abstractio imaginatiois: According to the Scholastics a degree of abstraction below that of reason and above that of the senses, which do abstract from matter, but not from the presence of matter, whereas the imagination abstracts even from the presence of matter, but not from its *appendices*, or sensible qualities.—J.J.R.

Abstractio intellectus seu rationis: According to the Scholastics the highest degree of abstraction is that of reason which abstracts not only matter and its presence, but also from its *appendices*, that is, its sensible conditions and properties, considering essence or quiddity alone.

—J.J.R.

Abstraction: (Lat. ab, from + trahere, to draw)

The process of ideally separating a partial aspect or quality from a total object. Also the result or product of mental abstraction. Abstraction, which concentrates its attention on a single aspect, differs from *analysis* which considers all aspects on a par.—L.W.

In logic: Given a relation *R* which is transitive, symmetric, and reflexive, we may introduce or postulate new elements corresponding to the members of the field of *R*, in such a way that the same new element corresponds to two members *x* and *y* of the field of *R* if and only if *xRy* (see the article *relation*). These new elements are then said to be obtained by *abstraction* with respect to *R*. Peano calls this a method or kind of definition, and speaks, e.g., of *cardinal numbers* (q.v.) as obtained from classes by abstraction with respect to the relation of equivalence—two classes having the same cardinal number if and only if they are equivalent.

Given a formula *A* containing a free variable, say *x*, the process of forming a corresponding monadic function (q.v.)—defined by the rule that the value of the function for an argument *b* is that which *A* denotes if the variable *x* is taken as denoting *b*—is also called *abstraction*, or *functional abstraction*. In this sense, abstraction is an operation upon a formula *A* yielding a function, and is relative to a particular system of interpretation for the notations appearing in the formula, and to a particular variable, as *x*. The requirement that *A* shall contain *x* as a free variable is not essential: when *A* does not contain *x* as a free variable, the function obtained by abstraction relative to *x* may be taken to be the function whose value, the same for all arguments, is denoted by *A*.

In articles herein by the present writer, the notation $\lambda x[A]$ will be employed for the function obtained from *A* by abstraction relative to (or, as we may also say, with respect to) *x*. Russell, and Whitehead and Russell in *Principia Mathematica*, employ for this purpose the formula *A* with a circumflex \wedge placed over each (free) occurrence of *x*—but only for propositional functions. Frege (1893) uses a Greek vowel, say ϵ , as the variable relative to which abstraction is made, and employs the notation

$\epsilon(A)$ to denote what is essentially the function in extension (the "Werthverlauf" in his terminology) obtained from *A* by abstraction relative to ϵ .

There is also an analogous process of functional abstraction relative to two or more variables (taken in a given order), which yields a polyadic function when applied to a formula *A*.

Closely related to the process of functional abstraction is the process of forming a class by abstraction from a suitable formula *A* relative to a particular variable, say *x*. The formula *A* must be such that (under the given system of interpretation for the notations appearing in *A*) $\lambda x[A]$ denotes a propositional function. Then $\exists x(A)$ (Peano), or $\exists(A)$ (Russell), denotes the class determined by this propositional function. Frege's $\epsilon(A)$ also belongs here, when the function corresponding to *A* (relatively to the variable ϵ) is a propositional function.

Similarly, a relation in extension may be formed by abstraction from a suitable formula *A* relative to two particular variables taken in a given order.—A.C.

Scholz and Schweitzer, *Die sogenannten Definitionen durch Abstraktion*, Leipzig, 1935.—W. V. Quine, *A System of Logistic*, Cambridge, Mass., 1934. A. Church, review of the preceding, *Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society*, vol. 41 (1935), pp. 498-603. W. V. Quine, *Mathematical Logic*, New York, 1940.

In psychology: the mental operation by which we proceed from individuals to concepts of classes, from individual dogs to the notion of "the dog." We abstract features common to several individuals, grouping them thus together under one name.

In Scholasticism: the operation by which the mind becomes cognizant of the universal (q.v.) as represented by the individuals. Aristotle and Thomas ascribe this operation to the active intellect (q.v.) which "illuminates" the image (phantasm) and disengages from it the universal nature to be received and made intelligible by the possible intellect.—R.A.

Abstractionism: (Lat. ab, from + trahere, to draw) The illegitimate use of abstraction, and especially the tendency to mistake abstractions for concrete realities. Cf. W. James, *The Meaning of Truth*, ch XIII. Equivalent to A. N. Whitehead's "Fallacy of misplaced concreteness."—L.W.

Abstractum (pl. *abstracta*): (Lat. ab + trahere, to draw) An abstractum, in contrast to a concretum or existent is a quality or a relation envisaged by an abstract concept (e.g. redness, equality, truth etc.). The abstractum may be conceived either as an ideal object or as a real, subsistent universal.—L.W.

Ab universali ad particulare valet, a particulari ad universale non valet consequentia: Adage stating the validity of arguments making the transition from the general to the particular and denying the permissibility of the converse process.—J.J.R.

Academy: (Gr. *akademia*) A gymnasium in the suburbs of Athens, named after the hero *Academos*, where Plato first taught; hence, the Platonic school of philosophy. Plato and his

immediate successors are called the Old Academy; the New Academy begins with Arcesilaus (c. 315—c. 241 B.C.), and is identified with its characteristic doctrine, probabilism (q.v.).

—G.R.M.

Accident: (Lat. *accidens*) (in Scholasticism) Has no independent and self-sufficient existence, but exists only in another being, a substance or another accident. As opposed to substance the accident is called *praedicamentale*; as naming features of the essence or quiddity of a being *accidens praedicabile*. Accidents may change, disappear or be added, while substance remains the same. Accidents are either proper, that is necessarily given with a definite essence (thus, the "faculties of the soul" are proper accidents, because to sense, strive, reason etc., is proper to the soul) or non-proper, contingent like color or size.—R.A.

In Aristotelian logic, whatever term can be predicated of, without being essential or peculiar to the subject (q.v.). Logical or predicabile (q.v.)—opposed to property (q.v.)—is that quality which adheres to a subject in such a manner that it neither constitutes its essence nor necessarily flows from its essence; as, a man is *white* or *learned*.

Physical or predicamental (q.v.)—opposed to substance (q.v.)—that whose nature it is to exist not in itself but in some subject; as *figure*, *quantity*, *manner*.—H.G.

Accidentalism: The theory that some events are undetermined, or that the incidence of series of determined events is unpredictable (Aristotle, Cournot). In Epicureanism (q.v.) such indeterminism was applied to mental events and specifically to acts of will. The doctrine then assumes the special form: Some acts of will are unmotivated. See *Indeterminism*. A striking example of a more general accidentalism is Charles Peirce's *Tychism* (q.v.). See *Chance*, *Contingency*.—C.A.B.

Acervus argument: A Sophistical argument to the effect that, given any number of stones which are not sufficient to constitute a heap, one does not obtain a heap by adding one more: yet eventually, if this process is repeated, one has a heap.—C.A.B.

Achilles argument: Zeno of Elea used a reductio ad absurdum argument against the possibility of motion. He urged that if we assume it possible we are led to the absurdity that Achilles, the fastest runner in Greece, could not catch a proverbially slow tortoise. The alleged grounds for this are that during the time, t_1 — t_2 , which it takes Achilles to traverse the distance between his position and that of the tortoise at time t_1 , the latter even at his slow rate of speed would have moved on a finite distance farther.—C.A.B.

Cf. B. Russell, *Scientific Method in Philosophy*; Lewis Carroll, "Achilles and the Tortoise," *Mind*.

Acosmism: (Gr. *kosmos*, world) Theory of the non-existence of an external, physical world. See *Subjective Idealism*.—W.L.

Acquaintance. Knowledge by: (Lat. *ad-cognitare*, to make known) The apprehension of a

quality, thing or person which is in the direct presence of the knowing subject. Acquaintance, in the strict sense, is restricted to the immediate data of experience but is commonly extended to include the things or persons perceived by means of such data. See *Description*, *Knowledge by*.

—L.W.

Acroasmatic: Communicated orally. Applied especially to Aristotle's more private teachings to his select advanced students. Hence, esoteric, abstruse.—C.A.B.

Act: (in Scholasticism) (1) Operation; as, the intellect's *act*. In this sense, it is generally referred to as *second act* (see below).

(2) That which determines or perfects a thing; as *rationality perfects animality*.

Commanded: An act, originating in the will but executed by some other power; as *walking*.

Elicited: The proper and immediate act of the will, as *love* or *hate*.

First: (1) The prime form of a thing, in the sense of its essence or integrity. The *second act* is its operation. Thus the physical evil of blindness is the absence of the *first act*, i.e., a perfection due to man's integrity; while the moral evil of sin is an absence of the second act, i.e., a perfection demanded by righteous operation. (2) *First act* may also designate the faculty or principle of operation, as *the will*; while *second act* stands for its operations.

Human: (humanus) Deliberate act; e.g. painting.

Of Man: (hominis) Indeliberate act; e.g. digestion. Opposed to *passive* or *subjective* potency (q.v.).

Formal: A substantial or accidental form thought of as determining a thing to be what it is rather than to be something else. E.g. the substantial form of fire determines the composite in which it exists, to be fire and nothing else. Likewise the accidental form of heat determines a body to be warm rather than cold.

Informative: Form, or that which is like a form in some composite, e.g. the soul in man or knowledge in the intelligent soul.—H.G.

Act-character: (Ger. *Aktcharakter*) In Husserl: Intentionality.—D.C.

Action: (in Scholasticism) *Immanent:* The terminus is received in the agent, as in a subject; as *contemplation*.

Transient: The terminus is received in a subject distinct from the agent; as *ball-throwing*.—H.G.

Activism: (Lat. *activus*, from *agere*, to act) The philosophical theory which considers activity, particularly spiritual activity, to be the essence of reality. The concept of pure act (*actus purus*) traceable to Aristotle's conception of divinity, was influential in Scholastic thought, and persists in Leibniz, Fichte and modern idealism.—L.W. Negatively, a repudiation of the intellectualistic persuasion that an adequate solution of the truth problem can be found through an abstract intellectual inquiry. Positively, a view of action as the key to truth, similar to Fichte's view. The true and sound standard of action is an independent spiritual life, independent in bringing

the world and life in accord with its values. Spiritual life grows by the active aid of human cooperation to ever higher dimensions. Spiritual being is achieved by the vital deeds of individuals. (Eucken)—H.H.

In the Personalistic sense activism applies not only to the continuous creative willing which underlies all reality but also to knowledge which calls for an unceasing divine activity which is a sort of occasionalism. (Malebranche: *Recherche de la vérité*, Book I, Chap. XIV.) Charles Secrétan: "To be is to act."—R.T.F.

Act Psychology: (Lat. *actum*, a thing done) A type of psychology traceable to F. Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte* (1874) which considers the mental act (e.g. the act of sensing a red color patch) rather than the content (e.g. the red color) the proper subject matter of psychology. (See *Intentionalism*).—L.W.

Acts: In ethics the main concern is usually said to be with acts or actions, particularly voluntary ones, in their moral relations, or with the moral qualities of acts and actions. By an act or action here is meant a bit of behavior or conduct, the origination or attempted origination of a change by some agent, the execution of some agent's choice or decision (so that not acting may be an act). As such, an act is often distinguished from its motive, its intention, and its maxim on the one hand, and from its consequences on the other, though it is not always held that its moral qualities are independent of these. Rather, it is frequently held that the rightness of an act, or its moral goodness, or both, depend at least in part on the character or value of its motive, intention, maxim, or consequences, or of the life or system of which it is a part. Another question concerning acts in ethics is whether they must be free (in the sense of being partially or wholly undetermined by previous causes), as well as voluntary, in order to be moral, and, if so, whether any acts are free in this sense. See *Agent*.—W.K.F.

Actual: In Husserl: see *Actuality*.

Actual: (Lat. *actus*, act) 1. real or factual (opposed to *unreal* and *apparent*) 2. quality which anything possesses of having realized its potentialities or possibilities (opposed to *possible* and *potential*). In Aristotle: see *Energeia*.

Actuality: In Husserl: 1. (Ger. *Wirklichkeit*) Effective individual existence in space and time, as contrasted with mere possibility. 2. (Ger. *Aktualität*) The character of a conscious process as lived in by the ego, as contrasted with the "inactuality" of conscious processes more or less far from the ego. To say the ego lives in a particular conscious process is to say the ego is busied with the object intended in that process. Attending is a special form of being busied.—D.C.

Actuality: The mode of being in which things affect or are affected. The realm of fact; the field of happenings. Syn. with existence, sometimes with reality. Opposite of: possibility or potentiality. See *Energeia*.—J.K.F.

Actus Purus: See *Activism*.—L.W.

Ad hoc: A dubious assumption or argument ar-

bitrarily introduced as explanation after the fact. **Adeism:** Max Müller coined the term which means the rejection of the *devas*, or gods, of ancient India; similar to atheism which denies the one God.—J.J.R.

Adequation: (Ger. *Adäquation*) In Husserl: verification; fulfilment.—D.C.

(Lat. *adequatio*) In Aquinas: relation of truth to being.

Adhyātman: (Skr. *adhi*, over and *ātman*, s.v.) A term for the Absolute which gained popularity with the reading of the Bhagavad Gītā (cf. 8.3) and which Ralph Waldo Emerson rendered appropriately "Oversoul" (cf. his essay *The Oversoul*).—K.F.L.

Adiaphora: (Gr. indifferent) A Stoic term designating entities which are morally indifferent.

—C.A.B.

Adler, Alfred: (1870-1937) Originally a follower of Freud (see *Psychoanalysis*; *Freud*), he founded his own school in Vienna about 1912. In contrast to Freud, he tended to minimize the rôle of sexuality and to place greater emphasis on the ego. He investigated the feelings of inferiority resulting from organic abnormality and deficiency and described the unconscious attempt of the ego to compensate for such defects. (*Study of Organic Inferiority and its Psychical Compensations*, 1907). He extended the concept of the "inferiority complex" to include psychical as well as physical deficiencies and stressed the tendency of "compensation" to lead to over-correction. (*The Neurotic Constitution*, 1912; *Problems of Neurosis*, 1930).—L.W.

Adoptionism: A christological doctrine prominent in Spain in the eighth century according to which Christ, inasmuch as He was man, was the Son of God by adoption only, acknowledging, however, that inasmuch as He was God, as was also the Son of God by nature and generation. The Church condemned the teaching.

—J.J.R.

Advaita: (Skr. "non-duality") The Vedāntic (q.v.) doctrine of monism advocated by Śāṅkara (q.v.) which holds the Absolute to be personal in relation to the world, especially the philosophically untutored, but supra-personal in itself (cf. *nirguna*, *saguna*); the world and the individual to be only relatively, or phenomenally, real; and salvation to consist in insight or *jñāna* (q.v.) after dispelling the *māyā* (q.v.) of separateness from the divine.—K.F.L.

Adventitious Ideas: Those ideas which appear to come from without, from objects outside the mind. Opposite of innate ideas. Descartes' form of the ontological argument for God was built upon the notion of adventitious ideas.—V.F.

Aeon: According to the Gnostics a being regarded as a subordinate heavenly power derived from the Supreme Being by a process of emanation. The totality of aeons formed the spiritual world which was intermediary between the Deity and the material world of sensible phenomena, which was held to be evil.—J.J.R.

Aequilibrium indifferentiae: The state or condition of exact balance between two actions, the motives being of equal strength. Thomas Aquinas

held that in such a condition "*actus haberi non potest, nisi removeatur indifferentia*." This is effected by a determination *ab intrinseco*, or *ab extrinseco*, which disturbs the equipoise and makes it possible for the agent to act.—J.J.R.

Aesthetic Judgment: (German *aesthetische Urteilskraft*) The power of judgment exercised upon data supplied by the feeling or sense of beauty. Kant devotes the first half of the *Critique of Judgment* to a "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment." (See *Kantianism and Feeling*.)—O.F.K.

On the origin of the term, see *Aesthetics*.

Aesthetics: (Gr. *aesthetikos*, perceptive) Traditionally, the branch of philosophy dealing with beauty or the beautiful, especially in art, and with taste and standards of value in judging art. Also, a theory or consistent attitude on such matters. The word *aesthetics* was first used by Baumgarten about 1750, to imply the science of sensuous knowledge, whose aim is beauty, as contrasted with logic, whose aim is truth. Kant used the term *transcendental aesthetic* in another sense, to imply the a priori principles of sensible experience. Hegel, in the 1820's, established the word in its present sense by his writings on art under the title of *Aesthetik*.

Aesthetics is now achieving a more independent status as the subject (whether it is or can be a "science" is a disputed issue) which studies (a) works of art, (b) the processes of producing and experiencing art, and (c) certain aspects of nature and human production outside the field of art—especially those which can be considered as beautiful or ugly in regard to form and sensory qualities. (E.g., sunsets, flowers, human beings, machines.)

While not abandoning its interest in beauty, artistic value, and other normative concepts, recent aesthetics has tended to lay increasing emphasis on a descriptive, factual approach to the phenomena of art and aesthetic experience. It differs from art history, archeology, and cultural history in stressing a theoretical organization of materials in terms of recurrent types and tendencies, rather than a chronological or genetic one. It differs from general psychology in focusing upon certain selected phases in psychophysical activity, and on their application to certain types of objects and situations, especially those of art. It investigates the forms and characteristics of art, which psychology does not do. It differs from art criticism in seeking a more general, theoretical understanding of the arts than is usual in that subject, and in attempting a more consistently objective, impersonal attitude. It maintains a philosophic breadth, in comparing examples of all the arts, and in assembling data and hypotheses from many sources, including philosophy, psychology, cultural history, and the social sciences. But it is departing from traditional conceptions of philosophy in that writing labelled "aesthetics" now often includes much detailed, empirical study of particular phenomena, instead of restricting itself as formerly to abstract discussion of the meaning of beauty, the sublime, and other categories, their objective or subjective nature, their rela-

tion to pleasure and moral goodness, the purpose of art, the nature of aesthetic value, etc. There has been controversy over whether such empirical studies deserve to be called "aesthetics", or whether that name should be reserved for the traditional, dialectic or speculative approach; but usage favors the extension in cases where the inquiry aims at fairly broad generalizations.

Overlapping among all the above-mentioned fields is inevitable, as well as great differences in approach among individual writers. Some of these stress the nature and varieties of form in art, with attention to historic types and styles such as romanticism, the Baroque, etc., and in studying their evolution adopt the historian's viewpoint to some extent. Some stress the psychology of creation, appreciation, imagination, aesthetic experience, emotion, evaluation, and preference. Their work may be classed as "aesthetics", "aesthetic psychology", or "psychology of art". Within this psychological group, some can be further distinguished as laboratory or statistical psychologists, attempting more or less exact calculation and measurement. This approach (sometimes called "experimental aesthetics") follows the lead of Fechner, whose studies of aesthetic preference in 1876 helped to inaugurate modern experimental psychology as well as the empirical approach to aesthetics. It has dealt less with works of art than with preference for various arbitrary, simplified linear shapes, color-combinations and tone-combinations.

If the term "experimental" is broadly understood as implying a general mode of inquiry based on observation and the tentative application of hypotheses to particular cases, it includes many studies in aesthetics which avoid quantitative measurement and laboratory procedure. The full application of scientific method is still commonly regarded as impossible or unfruitful in dealing with the more subtle and complex phenomena of art. But the progress of aesthetics toward scientific status is being slowly made, through increasing use of an objective and logical approach instead of a dogmatic or personal one, and through bringing the results of other sciences to bear on aesthetic problems. Recent years have seen a vast increase in the amount and variety of artistic data available for the aesthetician, as a result of anthropological and archeological research and excavation, diversified museum collections, improved reproductions, translations, and phonograph records.—T.M.

Aetiology: (Gr. *aitiologieo*, to inquire into) An inquiry into causes. See *Etiology*.—V.F.

Aeviternity: (Lat. *aevum*, never-ending time) Eternity conceived as a whole, apart from the flux of time; an endless temporal medium in which objects and events are relatively fixed.

—R.B.W.

Affect: (Lat. *ad* + *facere*, to do) The inner motive as distinguished from the intention or end of action. Cf. Spinoza, *Ethics*, bk. III.—L.W.

Affective: (Lat. *affectio*, from *afficere*, to affect)

The generic character supposedly shared by pleasure, pain and the emotions as distinguished from the ideational and volitional aspects of consciousness. See *Affect*.—L.W.

Affinity (chemical): A potential of chemical energy; driving force; attraction. The term should be defined rigorously to mean the rate of change of chemical energy with changes in chemical mass.—W.M.M.

Affirmation of the consequent: The fallacy of affirmation of the consequent is the fallacious inference from B and $A \supset B$ to A . The law of affirmation of the consequent is the theorem of the propositional calculus, $q \supset [p \supset q]$.
A.C.

Affirmative proposition: In traditional logic, propositions A, I were called *affirmative*, and E, O , *negative* (see *logic, formal*, § 4). It is doubtful whether this distinction can be satisfactorily extended to propositions (or even to sentences) generally. A.C.

A fortiori: A phrase signifying all the more; applied to something which must be admitted for a still stronger reason.—J.J.R.

Āgama: (Skr.) One of a number of Indian treatises composed since the 1st cent. A.D. which are outside the Vedic (q.v.) tradition, but are regarded authoritative by the followers of Vishnuism, Shivaism, and Shaktism. Amid mythology, epic and ritualistic matter they contain much that is philosophical.—K.F.L.

Agathobiotik: A good life or the good life.

—C.A.B.

Agathology: (Gr.) The science of the good.

—C.A.B.

Agent: In ethics an agent is always a person who is acting, or has acted, or is contemplating action. Here it is usually held that to be a moral agent, i.e. an agent to whom moral qualities may be ascribed and who may be treated accordingly, one must be free and responsible, with a certain maturity, rationality, and sensitivity—which normal adult human beings are taken to have. Ethics is then concerned to determine when such an agent is morally good or virtuous, when morally bad or vicious, or, alternatively, when he is acting rightly and when wrongly, when virtuously and when viciously. See *Act*.—W.K.F.

Agglutination: (Lat. *ad* + *glutinare*, to paste) Philologically, a method of formation in language whereby a modification of meaning or of relation is given to a word by adherence or incorporation of distinct parts or elements.
—H.H.

Aggregate: 1. In a general sense, a collection, a totality, a whole, a class, a group, a sum, an agglomerate, a cluster, a mass, an amount or a quantity of something, with certain definite characteristics in each case.

2. In *Logic and Mathematics*, a collection, a manifold, a multiplicity, a set, an ensemble, an assemblage, a totality of elements (usually numbers or points) satisfying a given condition or subjected to definite operational laws. According to Cantor, an aggregate is any collection of separate objects of thought gathered into a whole;

or again, any multiplicity which can be thought as one; or better, any totality of definite elements bound up into a whole by means of a law. Aggregates have several properties: for example, they have the "same power" when their respective elements can be brought into one-to-one correspondence; and they are "enumerable" when they have the same power as the aggregate of natural numbers. Aggregates may be finite or infinite; and the laws applying to each type are different and often incompatible, thus raising difficult philosophical problems. See *One-One*; *Cardinal Number*; *Enumerable*. Hence the practice to isolate the mathematical notion of the aggregate from its metaphysical implications and to consider such collections as symbols of a certain kind which are to facilitate mathematical calculations in much the same way as numbers do. In spite of the controversial nature of infinite sets great progress has been made in mathematics by the introduction of the Theory of Aggregates in arithmetic, geometry and the theory of functions. (German, *Mächtigkeitsigkeit, Menge*; French, *Ensemble*).

3. In logic, an "aggregate meaning" is a form of common or universal opinion or thought held by more than one person.

4. In the philosophy of nature, aggregate has various meanings: it is a mass formed into clusters (anat.); a compound or an organized mass of individuals (zool.); an agglomerate (bot.); an agglomeration of distinct minerals separable by mechanical means (geol.); or, in general, a compound mass in which the elements retain their essential individuality.—T.G.

(in mathematics): The concept of an aggregate is now usually identified with that of a class (q.v.)—although as a historical matter this does not, perhaps, exactly represent Cantor's notion.—A.C.

Agnoiology: (Gr. *agnoia* + *logos*, discourse on ignorance) J. F. Ferrier (1854) coined both this term and the term epistemology as connoting distinctive areas of philosophic inquiry in support of ontology. Agnoiology is the doctrine of ignorance which seeks to determine what we are necessarily ignorant of. It is a critique of agnosticism prior to the latter's appearance. Ignorance is defined in relation to knowledge since one cannot be ignorant of anything which cannot possibly be known.—H.H.

Agnosticism: (Gr. *agnostos*, unknowing) 1. (epist.) that theory of knowledge which asserts that it is impossible for man to attain knowledge of a certain subject-matter.

2. (theol.) that theory of religious knowledge which asserts that it is impossible for man to attain knowledge of God.

Agnosy: Ignorance, especially universal ignorance.
—C.A.B.

Aham brahma asmi: (Skr.) "I am brahman", the formula of the Brhadāranyaka Upanishad 1.4.10, denoting the full coincidence of the human and divine, arrived at not so much by a spontaneous mystic insight as by logical deduction from the nature of world and self.—K.F.L.

Ahamkāra: (Skr.) Literally "I-maker", the prin-

ciple generating the consciousness of one's ego or personal identity; the ground of apperception.—*K.F.L.*

Ahantā: (Skr. "I-ness") Selfhood, state of being an ego; the subject in knowledge.—*K.F.L.*

Ahimsā: (Skr.) Non-injury, an ethical principle applicable to all living beings and subscribed to by most Hindus. In practice it would mean, e.g., abstaining from animal food, relinquishing war, rejecting all thought of taking life, regarding all living beings akin. It has led to such varied phenomena as the Buddhist's sweeping the path before him or straining the water, the almost reverential attitude toward the cow, and Gandhi's non-violent resistance campaign.—*K.F.L.*

Ahriman: (Middle Persian) Zoroaster, in building upon an ancient Indo-Iranian antecedent, expounded a thoroughgoing dualism in which Ormazd (s.v.) is the good, Ahriman the evil principle, corresponding to the Christian God and Devil, locked in combat on all levels of thought and existence. In that they are reciprocal and of a dialectic necessity, this dualism has, philosophically, the implication of a monism which was, indeed, ethically and eschatologically elaborated in the Zoroastrian optimism that postulates the ultimate victory of Ahura Mazda (s.v.) or Ormazd.—*K.F.L.*

Ai: (C.) Love; love for all people as a practical way to social welfare (chien ai) (Mo Tzu, between 500 and 396 B.C.); love for all, which is identical with true manhood (jên) (Hsu Yü, 767-824 A.D.).—*W.T.C.*

Ākāśa: (Skr.) "Ether"; space; in Indian philosophy the continuum that is to be postulated in connection with the *paramāṇus* (q.v.).—*K.F.L.*

Aksara: (Skr.) "Imperishable", a descriptive synonym for *brahman* (q.v.), the Absolute, in the Upanishads (q.v.); has also the meaning of "syllable".—*K.F.L.*

Albertists: The appellation is conferred on any disciple of Albertus Magnus. In particular it was applied to a group of Scholastics at the University of Cologne during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. It was the age of the struggles between the nominalists and the realists, who controlled the University of Cologne, but were themselves split into factions, the Thomists and the Albertists. The latter taught that the *universalia in re* and *post rem* were identical, and that logic was a speculative rather than a practical science. The principal Albertists were Heinrich von Kampen, Gerhard von Harderwyk, and Arnold von Lugde.—*J.J.R.*

Albertus, Magnus: St., O.P. (1193-1280) Count of Bollstädt, Bishop of Ratisbon, Doctor Universalis, was born at Lauingen, Bavaria, studied at Padua and Bologna, entered the Dominican Order in 1223. He taught theology at the Univ. of Paris from 1245-48, when he was sent to Cologne to organize a new course of studies for his Order; St. Thomas Aquinas was his student and assistant at this time. Later his time was given over to administrative duties and he was made Bishop of Ratisbon in 1260. In 1262 he gave up his bishopric and returned to a life of writing, teaching and controversy.

Of very broad interests in science, philosophy and theology, Albert popularized a great part of the corpus of Aristotelian and Arabic philosophic writings in the 13th century. His thought incorporates elements of Augustinism, Aristotelianism, Neoplatonism, Avicennism, Boethianism into a vast synthesis which is not without internal inconsistencies. Due to the lack of critical editions of his works, a true estimate of the value of his philosophy is impossible at present. However, he must have had some influence on St. Thomas, and there was a lively Albertinian school lasting into the Renaissance. Chief works: *Summa de Creaturis*, *Comment. in IV Lib. Sent.*, *Philos. Commentaries* on nearly all works of Aristotle, *De Causis*, *De intellectu et intellig.*, *Summa Theologiae* (*Opera Omnia*, ed. Borgnet, 38 vol., Paris, 1890-99).—*V.J.B.*

Alcuin: (c. 730-804) Was born in Northumbria and studied at the School of York under Egbert. In 781 he was called to head the Palatine School of Charlemagne. He died at St. Martin of Tours. It is his general influence on the revival of Christian learning that is significant in the history of philosophy. His psychology is a form of simplified Augustinianism. His treatise, *De animae ratione ad Eulaliam Virginem*, is extant (PL 101).—*V.J.B.*

Alexander, Samuel: (1859-1938) English thinker who developed a non-psychic, neo-realistic metaphysics and synthesis. He makes the process of emergence a metaphysical principle. Although his inquiry is essentially *a priori*, his method is empirical. Realism at his hands becomes a quasi-materialism, an alternative to absolute idealism and ordinary materialism. It aims to combine the absoluteness of law in physics with the absolute unpredictability of emergent qualities. Whereas to the ancients and in the modern classical conception of physical science, the original stuff was matter and motion, after Minkowski, Einstein, Lorenz and others, it became indivisible space-time, instead of space and time.

Thus nature begins as a four-dimensional matrix in which it is the moving principle. Materiality, secondary qualities, life, mentality are all emergent modifications of proto-space-time. Mind is the nervous system blossoming out into the capacity of awareness. Contemplative knowledge, where the object is set over against the mind, and the actual being, or experiencing, or enjoying of reality, where there is no inner duplicity of subject and object, constitute the two forms of knowledge. Alexander conceives the deity as the next highest level to be emerged out of any given level. Thus for beings on the level of life mind is deity, but for beings possessing minds there is a *nisus* or urge toward a still higher quality. To such beings that dimly felt quality is deity. The quality next above any given level is deity to the beings on that level. For men deity has not yet emerged, but there is a *nisus* towards its emergence. S. Alexander, *Space, Time and Deity* (1920).—*H.H.*

Alexandrian School: A convenient designation for the various religious philosophies that flour-

ished at Alexandria from the first to the fourth centuries of the Christian era, such as Neo-Pythagoreanism, the Jewish Platonism of Philo, Christian Platonism, and Neo-Platonism. Common to all these schools is the attempt to state Oriental religious beliefs in terms of Greek philosophy.—G.R.M.

Alexandrists: A term applied to a group of Aristotelians in Italy during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Besides the Scholastic followers of Aristotle there were some Greeks, whose teaching was tinged with Platonism. Another group, the Averroists, followed Aristotle as interpreted by Ibn Rushd, while a third school interpreted Aristotle in the light of the commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias, hence were called Alexandrists. Against the Averroists who attributed a vague sort of immortality to the active intellect, common to all men, the Alexandrists, led by Pomponazzi, asserted the mortality of the individual human soul after its separation from universal reason.—J.J.R.

Al Farabi: Died 950, introduced Aristotelian logic into the world of Islam. He was known to posterity as the "second Aristotle". He continued the encyclopedic tradition inaugurated by Al Kindi. His metaphysical speculation influenced Avicenna who found in the works of his predecessor the fundamental notion of a distinction between existence and essence, the latter not implying necessarily in a contingent being the former which therefore has to be given by God. He also emphasizes the Aristotelian notion of the "first mover". The concretization of the universal nature in particular things points to a creative power which has endowed being with such a nature. Al Farabi's philosophy is dependent in certain parts on Neo-Platonism. Creation is emanation. There is an *anima mundi* the images of which become corporeal beings. Logic is considered as the preamble to all science. Physics comprises all factual knowledge, including psychology; metaphysics and ethics are the other parts of philosophy. Cf. Baeumker, *Alfarabi, Ueber den Ursprung der Wissenschaften*, Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Philos. d. MA. 1916. Vol. XIX. M. Horten, *Das Buch der Ringsteine Farabis*. ibid. 1906. Vol. V.

—R.A.

Al Gazali: Born 1059 in Tus, in the country of Chorasan, taught at Bagdad, lived for a time in Syria, died in his home town 1111. He started as a sceptic in philosophy and became a mystic and orthodox afterwards. Philosophy is meaningful only as introduction to theology. His attitude resembles Neo-Platonic mysticism and is anti-Aristotelian. He wrote a detailed report on the doctrines of Farabi and Avicenna only to subject them to a scathing criticism in *Destructio philosophorum* where he points out the self-contradictions of philosophers. His main works are theological. In his writings on logic he wants to ensure to theology a reliable method of procedure. His metaphysics also is mainly based on theology: creation of the world out of nothing, resurrection, and so forth. Cf. H. Bauer, *Die Dogmatik Al-Ghualis*, 1912.—R.A.

Algebraization: (Ger. *Algebraisierung*) In Husserl: Substitution of algebraic symbols (indeterminate terms) for the words (determinate terms) in which the material content of an objective sense is expressed. See *Formalization*.—D.C.

Algebra of logic is the name given to the Nineteenth Century form of the calculi of classes and propositions. It is distinguished from the contemporary forms of these calculi primarily by the absence of formalization as a *logistic system* (q.v.) The propositional calculus was also at first either absent or not clearly distinguished from the class calculus; the distinction between the two was made by Peirce and afterwards more sharply by Schröder (1891) but the identity of notation was retained.

Important names in the history of the subject are those of Boole (q.v.), De Morgan (q.v.), W. S. Jevons, Peirce (q.v.), Robert Grassmann, John Venn, Hugh MacColl, Schröder (q.v.), P. S. Poretsky.—A.C.

Algedonic: (Gr. *algos*, pain + *hēdonē*, pleasure) Term applied to feelings of pleasure or pain.

—L.W.

Algorithm (or, less commonly, but etymologically more correctly, *algorism*): In its original usage, this word referred to the Arabic system of notation for numbers and to the elementary operations of arithmetic as performed in this notation. In mathematics, the word is used for a method or process of calculation with symbols (often, but not necessarily, numerical symbols) according to fixed rules which yields effectively the solution of any given problem of some class of problems.

A. C.

Al Kindi: Of the tribe of Kindah, lived in Basra and Bagdad where he died 873. He is the first of the great Arabian followers of Aristotle whose influence is noticeable in Al Kindi's scientific and psychological doctrines. He wrote on geometry, astronomy, astrology, arithmetic, music (which he developed on arithmetical principles), physics, medicine, psychology, meteorology, politics. He distinguishes the active intellect from the passive which is actualized by the former. Discursive reasoning and demonstration he considers as achievements of a third and a fourth intellect. In ontology he seems to hypostasize the categories, of which he knows five: matter, form, motion, place, time, and which he calls primary substances. Al Kindi inaugurated the encyclopedic form of philosophical treatises, worked out more than a century later by Avicenna (q.v.). He also was the first to meet the violent hostility of the orthodox theologians but escaped persecution. A. Nagy, *Die philos. Abhandlungen des Jacob ben Ishaq al-Kindi*, Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1897, Vol. II.—R.A.

All: *All* and *every* are usual verbal equivalents of the universal quantifier. See *Quantifier*.—A.C.

Allen, Ethan: (1737-1789) Leader of the Green Mountain Boys and of their famous exploits during the American Revolution. He is less known but nonetheless significant as the earliest American deist. His *Reason, the Only Oracle*

of *Man* (1784), expressed his opposition to the traditional Calvinism and its doctrine of original sin. He rejected prophecy and revelation but believed in immortality on moral grounds. He likewise believed in free will.—*L.E.D.*

Allgemeingültig: (Ger. allgemein + gelten, universally valid) A proposition or judgment which is universally valid, or necessary. Such propositions may be either empirical, i.e., dependent upon experience, or *a priori*, i.e., independent of all experience. In Kant's theoretical philosophy the necessary forms of the sensibility and understanding are declared to have universal validity *a priori*, because they are the *sine qua non* of any and all experience.—*O.F.K.*

Al-Mukamis, David Ibn Merwan: Early Jewish philosopher (died c. 937). His philosophic work, *Book of Twenty Tractates* shows influence of the teachings of the Kalam (q.v.); reasoning follows along lines similar to that of Saadia.

—*M.W.*

Als Ob: (Ger. as if) Fictional; hypothetical; postulated; pragmatic. The term was given currency by Hans Vaihinger's *Die Philosophie des Als Ob* (1911), which developed the thesis that our knowledge rests on a network of artfully contrived fictions which are not verifiable but pragmatically justifiable. While such fictions, employed in all fields of human knowledge and endeavor, deliberately falsify or circumvent the stream of immediate impressions, they greatly enhance reality.—*O.F.K.*

Alteration: (Lat. alter, other) In Aristotle's philosophy change of quality, as distinguished from change of quantity (growth and diminution) and from change of place (locomotion).—*G.R.M.*

Altruism: (*Alter*: other) In general, the cult of benevolence; the opposite of Egoism (q.v.). Term coined by Comte and adopted in Britain by H. Spencer.

1. For Comte Altruism meant the discipline and eradication of self-centered desire, and a life devoted to the good of others; more particularly, selfless love and devotion to Society. In brief, it involved the self-abnegating love of Catholic Christianity redirected towards Humanity conceived as an ideal unity. As thus understood, altruism involves a conscious opposition not only to egoism (whether understood as excessive or moderate self-love), but also to the formal or theological pursuit of charity and to the atomic or individualistic social philosophy of 17th-18th century liberalism, of utilitarianism, and of French Ideology.

2. By extension the term has come to mean the pursuit of the good of others, whether motivated by either self-centered or other-centered interest, or whether by disinterested duty. By some it is identified with the protective and other-regarding feelings, attitudes, and behavior of animal life in general; while by others its use is restricted to mean such on the level of reflective intelligence.—*W.L.*

Ambiguous middle, fallacy of: See *quaternio terminorum*.

Amechanical: Term applied to psychologically

conditioned movements. (Avenarius).—*H.H.*

Ammonius, Saccus: Teacher of Plotinus and Origen and reputed founder of Neo-Platonism.

—*M.F.*

Amnestic: Characterised by amnesia, loss of memory.—*C.A.B.*

Moral: Action, attitudes, state or character which is neither moral nor immoral, i.e., which is outside the moral realm. Neither right nor wrong. Ethically indifferent. Non-moral. Non-ethical. See Moral, Immoral, Ethics.—*A.J.B.*

Amphiboly: Any fallacy arising from ambiguity of grammatical construction (as distinguished from ambiguity of single words), a premiss being accepted, or proved, on the basis of one interpretation of the grammatical construction, and then used in a way which is correct only on the basis of another interpretation of the grammatical construction.—*A.C.*

Ampliative: (Lat. ampliari, to make wider; Ger. Erweiterungsurteil) Synthetic; serving to expand. In an *ampliative* judgment the predicate adds something not already contained in the meaning of the subject-term. Contrasted with *analytic* or *explicative*.—*O.F.K.*

Anādi: (Skr.) Beginningless, said of the Absolute and the world.—*K.F.L.*

Anagogic: (Gr. mystical) Usually employed as a noun in the plural, signifying an interpretation of Scripture pointing to a destiny to be hoped for and a goal to be attained; as an adjective it means, pertaining to the kind of interpretation described above.—*J.J.R.*

Analogy of Experience: (Ger. Analogien der Erfahrung) Kant's three dynamic principles (substantiality, reciprocity, and causality) of the understanding comprising the general category of *relation*, through which sense data are brought into the unity of experience. (See *Kantianism*.)

O.F.K.

Analogy: (*in Scholasticism*) Predication common to several inferiors of a name, which is accepted in different senses, in such a manner, nevertheless, that some principle warrants its common applicability. Accordingly as this principle is sought in the relations of cause and effect, proportion or proportionality there are distinguished various types of *analogy*.

Analogy of attribution: Is had when the principle of unity is found in a common concept to which the inferiors are related either by cause or effect. Moreover this common concept must refer principally and *per se* to a prime reality to which the inferiors are analogous. Thus food, medicine and pulse are said to be *healthy*. In this case the common concept is *health* which applies principally and *per se* to the animal; however, food, medicine and pulse are related to it through the various forms of cause and effect.

Analogy of proportion: Is had when the principle of unity is found, not in the relations of two or more to a common concept but in the interrelation of two concepts to themselves. This relation may be one of similitude or order. Thus *being* is predicated of substance and quan-

tity, not because of their relations to a third reality which primordially contains this notion, but because of a relation both of similitude and order which they have to each other.

Analogy of proportionality: Is had when the principle of unity is found in an equality of proportions. This analogy is primarily used between material and spiritual realities. Thus *sight* is predicated of ocular vision and intellectual understanding "*eo quod sicut visus est in oculo, ita intellectus est in mente*".—H.G.

Analogy: Originally a mathematical term, *Analogia*, meaning equality of ratios (Euclid VII Df. 20, V. Dfs. 5, 6), which entered Plato's philosophy (*Republic* 534a6), where it also expressed the epistemological doctrine that sensed things are related as their mathematical and ideal correlates. In modern usage analogy was identified with a weak form of reasoning in which "from the similarity of two things in certain particulars, their similarity in other particulars is inferred." (*Century Dic.*) Recently, the analysis of scientific method has given the term new significance. The observable data of science are denoted by concepts by inspection, whose complete meaning is given by something immediately apprehendable; its verified theory designating unobservable scientific objects is expressed by concepts by postulation, whose complete meaning is prescribed for them by the postulates of the deductive theory in which they occur. To verify such theory relations, termed epistemic correlations (*J. Un. Sc.* IX: 125-128), are required. When these are one-one, analogy exists in a very precise sense, since the concepts by inspection denoting observable data are then related as the correlated concepts by postulation designating unobservable scientific objects. —F.S.C.N.

Analogy of Pythagoras: (Gr. *analogia*) The equality of ratios, or proportion, between the lengths of the strings producing the consonant notes of the musical scale. The discovery of these ratios is credited to Pythagoras, who is also said to have applied the principle of mathematical proportion to the other arts, and hence to have discovered, in his analogy, the secret of beauty in all its forms.—G.R.M.

Analysis: (Chemical) The identification and estimation of chemical individuals in a mixture; the identification and estimation of elements in a compound; the identification and estimation of types of substances in complex mixtures; the identification and estimation of isotopes in an "element".—W.M.M.

Analysis, intentional: (Ger. *intentionale Analyse*) In Husserl: Explication and clarification of the essential structure of actual and potential (horizontal) synthesis by virtue of which objects are intentionally constituted. As *noematic*, intentional analysis discovers, explicates, and clarifies, the focally and horizontally intended objective sense (and the latter's quasi-objective substrates) in its manners of givenness, positedness, etc., and yields clues to the corresponding noetic synthesis. As *noetic* or *constitutorial*, intentional analysis discovers, isolates, and clari-

fies these synthetically constituted structures of consciousness. See *Phenomenology*.—D.C.

Analysis (mathematical): The theory of real numbers, of complex numbers, and of functions of real and complex numbers. See *number*; *continuity*; *limit*.—A.C.

Analytic: (Gr. *analytike*) Aristotle's name for the technique of logical analysis. The *Prior Analytics* contains his analysis of the syllogism, the *Posterior Analytics* his analysis of the conditions of scientific or demonstrable knowledge. —G.R.M.

In Kant. One of two divisions of general logic (the other being *Dialectic*) which discovers by analysis all the functions of reason as exercised in thought, thus disclosing the formal criteria of experience and truth. (See *Kantianism*). —O.F.K.

See also *Meaning*, *Kinds of*.

Analyticity: See *Meaning*, *Kinds of*; *Truth*, *semantical*; *Valid*.

Analytic Judgment: (Ger. *analytisches Urteil*) In Kant: A judgment in which the predicate concept is included within the subject concept, as analysis should or does disclose. Such a judgment does not require verification by experience; its sole criterion is the law of contradiction. (See *Kantianism*).—O.F.K.

Analytic, Transcendental: In Kant: The section of the Critique of Pure Reason which deals with the concepts and principles of the understanding. Its main purpose is the proof of the categories within the realm of phenomena. —A.C.E.

Analytical Jurisprudence: Theory of Austin, Markby, Holland, Salmond, etc., considering jurisprudence the formal science of positive law. Its main task is to analyze the necessary notions of law. Term coined by Henry Sumner Maine. —W.E.

Anamnesis: (Gr. *anamnesis*) Calling to mind; recollection; in Plato, the process whereby the mind gains true knowledge, by recalling the vision of the Ideas which the soul experienced in a previous existence apart from the body. —G.R.M.

Ānanda: (Skr.) Joy, happiness, bliss, beatitude, associated in the thinking of many Indian philosophers with *mokṣa* (q.v.); a concomitant of perfection and divine consciousness (cf. *sat-cit-ānanda*).—K.F.L.

Ananya: (Skr. "not other") Designating the non-otherness of the cosmic principle from the individual.—K.F.L.

Anarchism: This doctrine advocates the abolition of political control within society: the State, it contends, is man's greatest enemy—eliminate it and the evils of human life will disappear. Positively, anarchism envisages a homely life devoted to unsophisticated activity and filled with simple pleasures. Thus it belongs in the "primitive tradition" of Western culture and springs from the philosophical concept of the inherent and radical goodness of human nature. Modern anarchism probably owes not a little, in an indirect way, to the influence of the primitivistic strain in the thought of Jean Jacques Rousseau.

In a popular sense the word "anarchy" is often used to denote a state of social chaos, but it is obvious that the word can be used in this sense only by one who denies the validity of anarchism.—*M.B.M.*

Anattā-vāda: (Pāli) Theory (*vāda*) of the non-existence of soul (*anattā*), one of the fundamental teachings of Gautama Buddha (q.v.) who regarded all ideas about the soul or self wrong, inadequate or illusory.—*K.F.L.*

Anaxagoras, of Klazomene: (about 430 B.C.) As a middle-aged man he settled in Athens; later he was accused of impiety and forced to leave the city. Anaxagoras taught that there is an infinity of simple substances, that is, such as are only divisible into parts of the same nature as the whole. These "seeds" are distributed throughout the universe. Their coming together gives rise to individual things, their separation entails the passing away of individual things. To account for the *cause of motion* of these "seeds" or elemental substances Anaxagoras conceived of a special kind of matter or "soul-substance" which alone is in motion itself and can communicate this motion to the rest. Now, since the universe displays harmony, order and purposiveness in its movements, Anaxagoras conceived this special substance as a mind-stuff or an eternal, imperishable Reason diffused throughout the universe. Anaxagoras was thus the first to introduce the teleological principle into the explanation of the natural world. Cf. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*; Diels, *Frag. d. Vorsokr.*—*M.F.*

Anaximander: (6th Cent. B.C.) With Thales and Anaximenes he formed the Milesian School of Greek Philosophy; with these and the other thinkers of the cosmological period he sought the ground of the manifold processes of nature in a single world-principle or cosmic stuff which he identified with "the Infinite". He was the first to step out of the realm of experience and ascribed to his "Infinite" the attributes of eternity, imperishability and inexhaustibility. Cf. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*; Diels, *Frag. d. Vorsokr.*—*M.F.*

Anaximenes: (6th Cent. B.C.) With Thales and Anaximander he belongs to the Milesian School of Greek Philosophy; as an Ionian he sought a cosmic material element which would explain the manifold processes of the natural world and declared this to be *air*. Air, he felt, had the attribute of infinity which would account for the varieties of nature more readily than water, which his predecessor Thales had postulated. Cf. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*; Diels, *Frag. d. Vorsokr.*—*M.F.*

Anergy: The hypothesis interpreting sensations in terms of the infinite phases of negative energy, which is motion less than zero. (Montague).—*H.H.*

Anglo-Catholic Philosophy: Anglo-Catholicism is the name frequently used to describe the Church of England and her sister communions, including the Episcopal Church in America. As a religious system, it may be described as the maintenance of the traditional credal, ethical and

sacramental position of Catholic Christianity, with insistence on the incorporation into that general position of the new truth of philosophy, science and other fields of study and experience. Historically, the Anglo-Catholic divines (as in Hooker and the Caroline writers) took over the general Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy of the schools; their stress, however, was more on the Platonic than the Aristotelian side: "Platonism", Dr. Inge has said, "is the loving mother-nurse of Anglicanism." Statements of this position, modified by a significant agnosticism concerning areas into which reason (it is said) cannot penetrate, may be found collected in *Anglicanism* (edited by More and Cross). A certain empiricism has always marked Anglo-Catholic theological and philosophical speculation; this is brought out in recent writing by Taylor (*Faith of a Moralist*), the writers in *Lux Mundi* (edited by Gore) and its modern successor *Essays Catholic and Critical*.

In genera, Anglo-Catholic philosophy has been an incarnational or sacramental one, finding God in the Biblical revelation culminating in Christ, but unwilling to limit his self-disclosure to that series of events. Incarnationalism provides, it is said, the setting for the historic Incarnation; general revelation is on sacramental lines, giving meaning to the particular sacraments. For Anglo-Catholic philosophical theology, in its central stream, the key to dogma is the cumulative experience of Christian people, tested by the Biblical revelation as source and standard of that experience and hence "classical" in its value. Revelation is the ultimate authority; the Church possesses a trustworthiness about her central beliefs, but *statement* of these may change from age to age. Sometimes this main tendency of Anglo-Catholic thought has been sharply criticized by thinkers, themselves Anglicans (cf. Tennant's *Philosophical Theology*); but these have, in general, served as useful warnings rather than as normal expressions of the Anglican mind.

In very recent years, a new stress has been laid upon the dogmatic side of Christianity as expressed in liturgy. This has been coupled with a revived interest in Thomism, found both in older philosophers such as A. E. Taylor and in younger men like A. G. Hebert (cf. his *Grace and Nature*, etc.).—*W.N.P.*

Angst: (Ger. dread) Concern or care, which are the essence of dread. (Heidegger).—*H.H.*

Anima Mundi: See: *The World Soul, Bruno.*

Animalitarianism: A term used by Lovejoy in *Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity* for the belief that animals are happier, more admirable, more "normal", or "natural", than human beings.—*G.B.*

Animism: (Lat. anima, soul) The doctrine of the reality of souls.

1. Anthropology: (a) the view that souls are attached to all things either as their inner principle of spontaneity or activity, or as their dwellers. (b) the doctrine that Nature is inhabited by various grades of spirits. (s. Spiritism).

2. **Biology, Psychology:** the view that the ground of life is immaterial soul rather than the material body.

3. **Metaphysics:** the theory that Being is animate, living, ensouled (s. Hylozoism, Personalism, Monadism).

4. **Cosmology:** the view that the World and the astronomical bodies possess souls (s. World Soul).—W.L.

Annihilationism: The doctrine of the complete extinction of the wicked or impenitent at death. Edward White in England in the last century taught the doctrine in opposition to the belief in the eternal punishment of those not to be saved.—V.F.

Anoetic: (Gr. a + noetikos, from nous, the mind) Applied to pure sensations, affective states and other pre-cognitive or non-cognitive states of mind.—L.W.

Anschauung: A German term used in epistemology to mean intuition or perception with a quality of directness or immediacy. It is a basic term in Kant's philosophy, denoting that which presents materials to the intellect through the forms of space and time. These forms predetermine what types of objects (schemata) can be set up when the understanding applies its own forms to the facts of sense. Kant distinguished "empirical" intuitions (a posteriori) of objects through sensation, and "pure" intuitions (a priori) with space and time as the forms of sensibility. The characteristics and functions of *Anschauung* are discussed in the first division (*Aesthetic*) of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Caird disputes the equivalence of the Kantian *Anschauung* with intuition; but it is difficult to find an English word more closely related to the German term.—T.G.

Anselmian argument: Anselm (1033-1109) reasoned thus: I have an idea of a Being than which nothing greater can be conceived; this idea is that of the most perfect, complete, infinite Being, the greatest conceivable; now an idea which exists in reality (*in re*) is greater than one which exists only in conception (*in intellectu*); hence, if my idea is the greatest it must exist in reality. Accordingly, God, the Perfect Idea, Being, exists. (Anselm's argument rests upon the basis of the realistic metaphysics of Plato).—V.F.

Anselm of Canterbury, St.: (1033-1109) Was born at Aosta in Italy, educated by the Benedictines, entered the Order c. 1060. Most of his writings were done at the Abbey of Le Bec in Normandy, where he served as Abbot. In 1093 he became Archbishop of Canterbury, which post he occupied with distinction till his death. Anselm is most noted for his much discussed "ontological" argument to prove the existence of God. His theory of truth and his general philosophy are thoroughly Augustinian. Chief works: *Monologium*, *Proslgium*, *De Veritate*, *Cur Deus Homo* (in PL 158-9).—V.J.B.

An Sich: (Ger. literally in or by self. Lat. in se) Anything taken in itself without relation to anything else, especially without relation to a knowing consciousness. In Hegel's philosophy

whatever has disowned its relations is *an sich*. In this status it reveals its inner potentialities. Thus in Hegel's system *an sich* frequently refers to that which is latent, undeveloped, or in certain connections, that which is unconscious. Kant used *an sich* more loosely to describe anything independent of consciousness or experience. Thus he contrasted the "*Ding-an-sich*" (thing-in-itself) with appearance (phenomenon), the latter being a function of consciousness, the former outside all consciousness.—O.F.K.

Ansichtslosigkeit: (Ger. point-of-viewlessness) Objectivity, or the unmediated approach to bare fact. (Heidegger).—H.H.

Antar-ātman: (Skr.) "Inner self", a term for the self found in the Upanishads (q.v.). A similar concept is *antar-yāmin*, meaning "inner controller".—K.F.L.

Antecedent: In a sentence of the form $A \supset B$ ("if A then B"), the constituent sentences A and B are called *antecedent* and *consequent* respectively. Or the same terminology may be applied to propositions expressed by these sentences.

A.C.

Anthropocentric: Literally, centering in man. A term which may be used in connection with extreme humanism, viewing the world in terms only of human experience.—V.F.

Anthropolatry: (Gr.) The worshipping or cult of a human being conceived as a god, and conversely of a god conceived as a human being. The deification of individual human beings was practiced by most early civilizations, and added much colour to the folklore and religion of such countries as Egypt, Greece, India and Japan. The human origin of *anthropolatry* is illustrated by the failure of Alexander the Great to obtain divine honours from his soldiers. In contrast, the Shinto religion in Japan still considers the emperor as a "visible deity", and maintains shrines devoted to brave warriors or heroes. Monotheistic religions consider *anthropolatry* as a superstition.—T.G.

Anthropology, Philosophical: (in Max Scheler) The philosophical science concerned with the questions about the essence of man.—P.A.S.

Anthropopathism: (Gr. anthropos, man; pathein, suffer) Sometimes referred to as the pathetic fallacy, i.e., attributing human feelings illegitimately to situations or things lacking such capacities.—V.F.

Anticipation: (Lat. ante, before + capere, to take) The foreknowledge of future events and experiences. Anticipation, in contrast to expectation, is allegedly immediate and non-inferential cognition of the future. See *Expectation*; *Foreknowledge*.—L.W.

In Lucretius, the Scholastics, Fr. Bacon, and Leibniz, it means a hypothesis without confirmation.

Anticipations of experience: In Kant's *Crit. of pure Reason* (*Antizipationen der Wahrnehmung*) the second of two synthetic principles of the understanding (the other being "Axioms of Intuition") by which the mind is able to determine something *a priori* in regard to what is in itself empirical. While the mind cannot