



大学专业英语系列教程

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*Selected Readings  
in Psychology*

沈德灿 沈政 选  
张 华 注

# 心理学 专业英语教程

图书馆

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**Selected Readings in Psychology**  
**心理学专业英语教程**

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# 大学专业英语系列教程

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# 总 序

辜正坤

西学东渐给东方的外语出版界造成一种奇特的景观：在相当短的时间内，外语出版物的数量扶摇直上，使它种民族语出版物相对汗颜，这是可以理解的。日本明治维新之后，就出现过类似的情形，外语（尤其是英语）原著注释读物动辄一套就是数百本，洋洋大观。毫无疑问，这对推进日本的外语教学起到了非常重要的作用。时至今日，其效应已经明显昭示出来：当今的中国各大学发表的论文为 SCI 所收录者，最多者一年达 500 篇，而东京大学一年就达 40000 篇，两者相距 80 倍！如果以为日本的论文数量必与其科学水平成正比，因而中国大学的科学研究水平就落后了东大 80 倍的话，恐怕是一种很大的误解。其中的奥妙之一，就在于日本学者的英语水平普遍较高，许多论文是直接用英文写成，因此容易被世界各地的媒体注意到，其入选 SCI 的机会也就相对增多。反观中国学者的论文，绝大多数用汉语写成，少量靠懂英语的学者翻译，只有极少量的学者能够自己用英文直接写作。因此，大多数的中国论文是难以进入西方学者的视野的。当然入选 SCI 的机会也就相对少得多了。当然，这并非是说，中国的科研水平就反过来比日本高，而是说，由于中国学者英语写作水平普遍偏低的原因，其实际的科研水平未能在英语世界的文献中充分显示出来。由此可以明白，提高中国学者的英语能力（尤其是阅读文献与用英语写作的能力）是一件非常迫切的事。

然而，改革开放二十多年来的英语学习大潮虽然使许多中国

人在英语学习方面获得了较高的造诣,上了一个较为理想的台阶,但是有更多的人却老在一个水平上徘徊不前:要学的教材已经学了,该考的科目已经通过了,但是,面对英语的殿堂,人们并没有登堂入室的感觉。听说能力未能应付裕如或者情有可原,因为学习者可以抱怨没有相应的可以一试身手的客观条件,但是在阅读方面,例如阅读文史哲数理化的专业文献方面,却仍是磕磕绊绊、跋前疐后,字典不离手,冷汗不离身。这种处于瓶颈地带,欲罢不可、欲进不能的促迫感,源于一个关键的原因:缺乏专业外语文献阅读训练。学校里使用的基础英语教材编得再好,也只能解决基础问题,不能解决超过基础的专业阅读问题。正如要做游泳健儿的人只在游泳池里按照游泳要领奋力拨拉了一阵池水,自觉亦有劈波斩浪之感,但与真正的河涛海潮相比,终究属于两重洞天。

于是,就产生了这一整套专业英语阅读教程。

它的目标非常明确,无非是要把英语知识与技能的培训和高层次系统知识的灌输二者有机结合起来,达到既学语言又学知识的目的;既温故,又知新。照我看来,这是最有效率的学习与巩固方略。

如前所述可以明白,这套教程不只是对一般想要提高英语实际水平的人有用,对于专家学者或研究人员,也有很大的好处。一个人无论多么博学多才,也不太可能对各个专业的英语经典文献和地道表达都了然于胸,因此,当需要在尽可能短的时间内对某专业的英语经典文献或概念有所把握时,这一整套书无疑不会使人们失望。

这套书的编选思路最初萌发于1991年,当时称作《注释本英文世界文化简明百科文库》。编者当时曾会同北京大学英语系大学英语教研室教师和北京大学出版社若干编辑共商过具体编选事宜,并由北京大学出版社出版。尔后还进行过多次类似的讨论。文库分上、中、下三编,每编含精选名著一百种左右。在编选思路

上,力求达到雅俗共赏,深入浅出,系统全面。在系统性方面,注意参照《大英百科全书》和《中国大百科全书》的知识框架,用英文把更为完备的知识系统介绍给读者。在实用性方面,亦注意选材的内容与词汇量与现行的英语教材、实际英语教学水平相呼应。

本编为上编,除可供大学英语分科专业阅读选用教材之用外,亦可供社会上一般读者提高英语水平、直接经由阅读原著而掌握某一专业知识之用。基本的编辑方针是 1) 选目必须系统、广泛,尽可能把大学的重要专业都包容进去(包括人文社会科学和理工科专业); 2) 选目可大致分三类: A. 简史类; B. 名篇、名著类; C. 比较规范的或经典的西方专业教材类; 3) 每册书的字数最好在 20 万字上下(个别可以例外)。至于其他具体事项,则随书说明。

教育部在 1999 年亦强调大学英语教学不能停留在基础英语教学上,而要逐步过渡到教授专业分科英语,使学生尽可能进入阅读专业英语文献的水平。因此这套教材的产生是适得其时的。

当然,它的具体效果如何,还有待检验。好在这套教材的编注与出版都是一个较长的过程,这期间可望获得有关方面的建议与批评,以期使它精益求精,日臻完善。

是为序。

2001 年于北京大学英语系

## 出版说明

《心理学专业英语教程》精选十九世纪末期和二十世纪的 17 位世界著名心理学家的代表作品。17 篇心理学名著反映了心理学及其流派的发展,为心理学专业的研究生、本科生、心理学爱好者以及需要扩大知识范围,培养交叉学科研究能力和构建跨学科知识框架的学生提供学习英语的文献,也是为学习心理学专业英语的学生编写的教材。

在每篇名著注释后面,我们编有练习题及答案,以便更好地帮助大家理解每篇文章的主要观点。练习除问答题、判断正误以外,还将作品中一些较难较长的句子挑选出来,要求译成中文,其目的是对复杂句子的结构有清楚的理解。阅读心理学家的名篇不仅帮助大家对其某一学科历史的发展有明确了解,更重要的是通过阅读原著提高英语水平和能力。在所选文章中,有大量的短语、习语及词汇,为了帮助大家有效地掌握它们,我们还设计了选词填空题,希望提高语言的语用能力。

我们热诚希望得到各界专家、学者和广大读者的批评、指导和支持。

编注者

1999 年 9 月 27 日



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# 1. The Association of Ideas

James Mill

詹姆斯·穆勒(James Mill 1773—1836)是苏格兰联想主义心理学家。他在心理学方面最重要的贡献是完成《人心现象的分析》一书。他继承了英吉利联想主义传统。早期他的联想主义包含机械论的观点,认为简单观念由于机械的结合,造成复杂观念并把机械观的联想主义推演到极端的地步。穆勒认为一切心理现象源于感觉,心理状态是由感觉与观念决定的,观念是感觉的摹本和影象,观念互相联合即产生更复杂的观念。他在观念感觉、意识的看法上表现了极端联想主义者的片面性。

《观念的联合》(The Association of Ideas)是詹姆斯·穆勒的代表作品《人心现象的分析》中的第三章。此文发表于1829年。当时的新启蒙运动对心理学发展具有重要意义,主要表现为功利主义和联想主义这两种学说的紧密联系。功利主义的动机学说代表边沁(Jeremy Bentham, 1748—1832)对功利主义的享乐主义作了有力的表述。他认为个体应该选择那些将使人得到最大快乐和最小痛苦的行动来安排他或她的生活。快乐和痛苦的值由相应感觉的强度延续性、确定性和接近性来决定。近代不可知论的代表休谟(David Hume, 1711—1776)把心理内容区分为印象和观念并提出三条联想律,即相似律、时空接近律和因果律。穆勒热心解释边沁的享乐主义,同时追随休谟的区别感觉与它们的复本—观念学说,力图把所有心理活动归结为联想,把因果关系归结为固定的联想链。

“To have a clear view of the phenomena of the mind, as mere affections or states of it, existing successively, and in a certain series, which we are able, therefore, to predict, in consequence of<sup>①</sup> our knowledge of the past, is, I conceive, to have made the most important acquisition which the intellectual inquirer can make.<sup>②</sup>”

Brown,<sup>③</sup> Lectures, i. 544.

THOUGHT succeeds thought; idea follows idea, incessantly. If our senses are awake, we are continually receiving sensation<sup>④</sup>, of the eye, the ear, the touch, and so forth; but not sensations alone. After sensations, ideas are perpetually excited of sensations formerly received; after those ideas, other ideas; and during the whole of our lives, a series of those two states of consciousness, called sensations, and ideas, is constantly going on<sup>⑤</sup>. I see a horse; that is a sensation. Immediately I think of his master; that is an idea. The idea of his master makes me think of his office; he is a minister of state: that is another idea. The idea of a minister of state makes me think of public affairs; and I am led into a train of political ideas; when I am summoned to dinner. This is a new sensation, followed by the idea of dinner, and of the company with whom I am to partake it. The sight of the company and of the food are other sensations; these suggest ideas without end; other sensations perpetually intervene, suggesting other ideas: and so the process goes on.

In contemplating this train of feelings, of which our lives consist, it first of all strikes the contemplator, as of importance to ascertain, whether they occur casually and irregularly, or according to a certain order.

With respect to<sup>⑥</sup> the SENSATIONS, it is obvious enough that they occur, according to the order established among what we call the objects of nature, whatever those objects are; to ascertain more and more of which order is the business of physical philosophy in all its branches.

Of the order established among the objects of nature, by which we mean the objects of our senses, two remarkable cases are all which here we are called upon to notice; the SYNCHRONOUS ORDER and the SUCCESSIVE ORDER<sup>⑦</sup>. The synchronous order, or order of simultaneous existence, is the order in space; the successive

order, or order of antecedent and consequent existence, is the order in time. Thus the various objects in my room, the chairs, the tables, the books, have the synchronous order, or order in space. The falling of the spark, and the explosion of the gunpowder, have the successive order, or order in time.

According to this order, in the objects of sense, there is a synchronous, and a successive, order of our sensation. I have SYNCHRONICALLY, or at the same instant, the sight of a great variety of objects; touch of all the objects with which my body is in contact; hearing of all the sounds which are reaching my ears; smelling of all the smells which are reaching my nostrils; taste of the apple which I am eating; the sensation of resistance both from the apple which is in my mouth, and the ground on which I stand; with the sensation of motion from the act of walking. I have SUCCESSIVELY the sight of the flash from the mortar fired at a distance, the hearing of the report, the sight of the bomb, and of its motion in the air, the sight of its fall, the sight and hearing of its explosion, and lastly, the sight of all the effects of that explosion.

Among the objects which I have thus observed synchronically, or successively; that is, from which I have had synchronical or successive sensations; there are some which I have so observed frequently; others which I have so observed not frequently; in other words, of my sensations some have been frequently synchronical, others not frequently; some frequently successive, others not frequently. Thus, my sight of roast beef and my taste of roast beef, have been frequently SYNCHRONICAL; my smell of a rose, and my sight and touch of a rose, have been frequently synchronical; my sight of a stone, and my sensations of its hardness, and weight, have been frequently synchronical. Others of my sensations have not been frequently synchronical: my sight of a lion, and the hearing of

his roar; my sight of a knife, and its stabbing a man. My sight of the flash of lightning, and my hearing of the thunder, have been often SUCCESSIVE; the pain of cold, and the pleasure of heat, have been often successive; the sight of a trumpet, and the sound of a trumpet, have been often successive. On the other hand, my sight of hemlock, and my taste of hemlock, have not been often successive; and so on.

It so happens, that, of the objects from which we derive the greatest part of our sensations, most of those which are observed synchronically, are frequently observed synchronically; most of those which are observed successively, are frequently observed successively. In other words, most of our synchronical sensations, have been frequently synchronical; most of our successive sensations, have been frequently successive. Thus, most of our synchronical sensations are derived from the objects around us, the objects which we have the most frequent occasion to hear and see; the members of our family; the furniture of our houses; our food; the instruments of our occupations or amusements. In like manner<sup>®</sup>, of those sensations which we have had in succession; we have had the greatest number repeatedly in succession<sup>®</sup>; the sight of fire, and its warmth; the touch of snow, and its cold; the sight of food, and its taste.

Thus much with regard to<sup>®</sup> the order of SENSATIONS; next with regard to the order of IDEAS.

As ideas are not derived from objects, we should not expect their order to be derived from the order of objects; but as they are derived from sensations, we might by analogy expect, that they would derive their order from that of the sensations; and this to a great extent is the case<sup>®</sup>.

Our ideas spring up, or exist, in the order in which the sensa-

tions existed, of which they are the copies<sup>Ⓜ</sup>.

This is the general law of the "Association of Ideas"; by which term, let it be remembered, nothing is here meant to be expressed, but the order of occurrence.

In this law, the following things are to be carefully observed.

1. Of those sensations which occurred synchronically, the ideas also spring up synchronically. I have seen a violin, and heard the tones of the violin, synchronically. If I think of the tones of the violin, the visible appearance of the violin at the same time occurs to me. I have seen the sun, and the sky in which it is placed, synchronically. If I think of the one, I think of the other at the same time.

One of the cases of synchronical sensation, which deserves the most particular attention, is, that of the several sensations derived from one and the same object; a stone, for example, a flower, a table, a chair, a horse, a man.

From a stone I have had, synchronically, the sensation of colour, the sensation of hardness, the sensations of shape, and size, the sensation of weight. When the idea of one of these sensations occurs the ideas of all of them occur. They exist in my mind synchronically; and their synchronical existence is called the idea of the stone; which, it is thus plain, is not a single idea, but a number of ideas in a particular state of combination.

Thus, again, I have smelt a rose, and looked at, and handled a rose, synchronically; accordingly the name rose suggests to me all those ideas synchronically; and this combination of those simple ideas is called my idea of the rose.

My idea of an animal is still more complex. The word thrush, for example, not only suggests an idea of a particular colour and shape, and size, but of song, and flight, and nestling, and eggs,

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and callow young, and others.

My idea of a man is the most complex of all; including not only colour, and shape, and voice, but the whole class of events in which I have observed him either the agent or the patient.

2. As the ideas of the sensations which occurred synchronically, rise synchronically, so the ideas of the sensations which occurred successively, rise successively.

Of this important case of association, or of the successive order of our ideas, many remarkable instances might be adduced. Of these none seems better adapted to the learner<sup>ⓑ</sup> than the repetition of any passage, or words; the Lord's Prayer<sup>ⓐ</sup>, for example, committed to memory. In learning the passage, we repeat it; that is we pronounce the words, in successive order, from the beginning to the end. The order of the sensations is successive. When we proceed to repeat the passage, the ideas of the words also rise in succession, the preceding always suggesting the succeeding, and no other. *Our* suggests *Father*, *Father* suggests *which*, *which* suggests *art*; and so on, to the end<sup>ⓑ</sup>. How remarkably this is the case, any one may convince himself, by trying to repeat backwards<sup>ⓑ</sup>, even a passage with which he is as familiar as the Lord's Prayer. The case is the same with numbers. A man can go on with the numbers in the progressive order, one, two, three, &c. scarcely thinking of his act; and though it is possible for him to repeat them backward, because he is accustomed to subtraction of numbers<sup>ⓑ</sup>, he cannot do so without an effort.

Of witnesses in courts of justice it has been remarked, that eye-witnesses, and ear-witnesses, always tell their story in the chronological order; in other words, the ideas occur to them in the order in which the sensations occurred; on the other hand, that witnesses, who are inventing, rarely adhere to<sup>ⓑ</sup> the chronological order.



3. A far greater number of our sensations are received in the successive, than in the synchronical order. Of our ideas, also, the number is infinitely greater that rise in the successive than the synchronical order.

4. In the successive order of ideas, that which precedes, is sometimes called the suggesting, that which succeeds, the suggested-idea<sup>⑨</sup>; not that any power is supposed to reside in the antecedent over the consequent<sup>⑩</sup>; suggesting, and suggested, mean only antecedent and consequent, with the additional idea, that such order is not casual but, to a certain degree, permanent.

5. Of the antecedent and consequent feelings, or the suggesting, and suggested; the antecedent may be either sensations or ideas; the consequent are always ideas. An idea may be excited either by a sensation or an idea. The sight of the dog of my friend is a sensation, and it excites the idea of my friend. The idea of Professor Dugald Stewart delivering a lecture, recalls the idea of the delight with which I heard him; that, the idea of the studies in which it engaged me; that, the trains of thought which succeeded; and each epoch of my mental history<sup>⑪</sup>, the succeeding one, till the present moment; in which I am endeavouring to present to others what appears to me valuable among the innumerable ideas of which this lengthened train has been composed<sup>⑫</sup>.

6. As there are degrees in sensations, and degrees in ideas; for one sensation is more vivid than another sensation, one idea more vivid than another idea; so there are degrees in association. One association, we say, is stronger than another: First, when it is more permanent than another; Secondly, when it is performed with more certainty; Thirdly, when it is performed with more facility.

It is well known, that some associations are very transient, others very permanent. The case which we formerly mentioned,