



大学专业英语系列教程

*Selected Readings
in Politics*

陈恢钦 选
齐子鑫 编
张 华

政治学 专业英语教程

北京大学出版社



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大学专业英语系列教程

政治学 专业英语教程

《政治学专业英语教程》精选了从文艺复兴到20世纪中期的15位欧美著名政治思想家的16篇英语文章，语言地道，注释翔实，并配有中文的作者介绍和背景介绍。每课设计有精当的练习，以提高语言能力。本书是政治学专业师生和英语学习爱好者的首选英语阅读教材。

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总 序

辛正坤

西学东渐给东方的外语出版界造成一种奇特的景观：在相当短的时间内，外语出版物的数量扶摇直上，使它种民族语出版物相对汗颜，这是可以理解的。日本明治维新之后，就出现过类似的情形，外语（尤其是英语）原著注释读物动辄一套就是数百本，洋洋大观。毫无疑问，这对推进日本的外语教学起到了非常重要的作用。时至今日，其效应已经明显昭示出来：当今的中国各大学发表的论文为 SCI 所收录者，最多者一年达 500 篇，而东京大学一年就达 40,000 篇，两者相距 80 倍！如果以为日本的论文数量必与其科学水平成正比，因而中国大学的科学研究水平就落后了东大 80 倍的话，恐怕是一种很大的误解。其中的奥妙之一，就在于日本学者的英语水平普遍较高，许多论文是直接用英文写成，因此容易被世界各地的媒体注意到，其入选 SCI 的机会也就相对增多。反观中国学者的论文，绝大多数用汉语写成，少量靠懂英语的学者翻译，只有极少量的学者能够自己用英文直接写作。因此，大多数的中国论文是难以进入西方学者的视野的。当然入选 SCI 的机会也就相对少得多了。当然，这并不是说，中国的科研水平就反过来比日本高，而是说，由于中国学者英语写作水平普遍偏低的原因，实际的科研水平未能在英语世界的文献中充分显示出来。由此可以明白，提高中国学者的英语能力（尤其是阅读文献与用英语写作的能力）是一件非常迫切的事。

然而，改革开放二十多年来的英语学习大潮虽然使许多中国

人在英语学习方面获得了较高的造诣,上了一个较为理想的台阶,但是有更多的人却老在一个水平上徘徊不前:要学的教材已经学了,该考的科目已经通过了,但是,面对英语的殿堂,人们并没有登堂入室的感觉。听说能力未能应付裕如或许情有可原,因为学习者可以抱怨没有相应的可以一试身手的客观条件,但是在阅读方面,例如阅读文史哲数理化的专业文献方面,却仍是磕磕绊绊、跋前疐后,字典不离手,冷汗不离身。这种处于瓶颈地带,欲罢不可、欲进不能的促迫感,源于一个关键的原因:缺乏专业外语文献阅读训练。学校里使用的基础英语教材编得再好,也只能解决基础问题,不能解决超过基础的专业阅读问题。正如要做游泳健儿的人只在游泳池里按照游泳要领奋力拨拉了一阵池水,自觉亦有劈波斩浪之感,但与真正的河涛海潮相比,终究属于两重洞天。

于是,就产生了这一整套专业英语阅读教程。

它的目标非常明确,无非是要把英语知识与技能的培训和高层次系统知识的灌输二者有机结合起来,达到既学语言又学知识的目的;既温故,又知新。照我看来,这是最有效率的学习与巩固方略。

如前所述可以明白,这套教程不只是对一般想要提高英语实际水平的人有用,对于专家学者或研究人员,也有很大的好处。一个人无论多么博学多才,也不太可能对各个专业的英语经典文献和地道表达都了然于胸,因此,当需要在尽可能短的时间内对某专业的英语经典文献或概念有所把握时,这一整套书无疑不会使人们失望。

这套书的编选思路最初萌发于1991年,当时称作《注释本英文世界文化简明百科文库》。编者当时曾会同北京大学英语系大学英语教研室教师和北京大学出版社若干编辑共商过具体编选事宜,并由北京大学出版社出版。尔后还进行过多次类似的讨论。文库分上、中、下三编,每编含精选名著一百种左右。在编选思路

上,力求达到雅俗共赏,深入浅出,系统全面。在系统性方面,注意参照《大英百科全书》和《中国大百科全书》的知识框架,用英文把更为完备的知识系统介绍给读者。在实用性方面,亦注意选材的内容与词汇量与现行的英语教材、实际英语教学水平相呼应。

本编为上编,除可供大学英语分科专业阅读选用教材之用外,亦可供社会上一般读者提高英语水平、直接经由阅读原著而掌握某一专业知识之用。基本的编辑方针是1) 选目必须系统、广泛,尽可能把大学的重要专业都包容进去(包括人文社会科学和理工科专业);2) 选目可大致分三类:A. 简史类;B. 名篇、名著类;C. 比较规范的或经典的西方专业教材类;3) 每册书的字数最好在20万字上下(个别可以例外)。至于其他具体事项,则随书说明。

教育部在1999年亦强调大学英语教学不能停留在基础英语教学上,而要逐步过渡到教授专业分科英语,使学生尽可能进入阅读专业英语文献的水平。因此这套教材的产生是适得其时的。

当然,它的具体效果如何,还有待检验。好在这套教材的编注与出版都是一个较长的过程,这期间可望获得有关方面的建议与批评,以期使它精益求精,日臻完善。

是为序。

2001年于北京大学英语系

前 言

《政治学专业英语教程》精选了从文艺复兴时期到 20 世纪中期的 15 位世界著名政治思想家的 16 篇经典著作。它反映了近代西欧、北美一些主要国家的各种政治思想的发生和发展的历史,同时也有助于我们了解政治思想发展过程中各个政治家的政治主张和政治思想。政治思想是受一定经济关系所制约的,它反映了某一阶层或某一社会集团根本利益的政治要求和政治见解,集中表现为各种政治观点、政治理论和政治学说。因此本书为政治学专业的研究生、本科生,对政治学、哲学及思想史感兴趣的同学,以及需要扩大知识范围、培养进行交叉学科研究能力和构建跨学科知识框架的学生提供了学习英语文献和了解西方政治思想史的必备材料。

我们对每篇名著进行了语言注释,目的是帮助读者在阅读中扫清语言困难,更好地理解原著的思想。为读者今后顺利阅读政治思想方面的原著奠定一个扎实的基础。在每篇文章的注释后面,我们还编写了练习题目。阅读名家之作,不仅了解其闪光的思想,更重要的是通过阅读提高英语阅读水平和能力。书后附有答案及词汇表,可供读者学习参考。

此书编写过程中,我们得到了政治学专业的教授和研究生的帮助,得到了北京大学出版社编辑们的大力支持。我们在此表示感谢,同时也热诚希望得到各界专家学者和广大读者的批评指正。

编者

2001 年 3 月

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1. The Prince (君主论)

Niccolo Machiavelli
(尼科洛·马基雅弗利)

The Prince

《君主论》(1513)是马基雅弗利的代表作,是他对佛罗伦萨几百年间的“政治经验和激烈改革”以及他本人多年从政经验的理论总结。在这部著作中,马基雅弗利一反古代和中世纪研究政治问题的方法,从人和人的经验出发,总结了意大利长期战争分裂的原因,提出建立强有力的中央集权国家,以实现意大利统一的方案。其中,特别是他摆脱了神学,摆脱了道德,而从“人”本性出发对政治进行理论考察的研究方法,第一次把政治问题看作是纯粹的权力问题,为近代资产阶级政治学开拓了道路。在此书中,他教佛罗伦萨的统治者如何巩固其统治并进而统一意大利的。这也是使马基雅弗利成为西方近代第一个注重统治术的思想家。

Niccolo Machiavelli

尼科洛·马基雅弗利(1469—1527)是意大利早期资产阶级政治家、思想家,近代资产阶级政治思想的奠基人之一。他在政治思想方面的主要著作有:《君主论》(1513)、《论提图斯·李维的前十卷》(1513)、《佛罗伦萨史》(1525)等。马基雅弗利注重实际,从人的历史和现实的经验出发研究政治问题是他政治思想的一个特点。他改变了中世纪的神学观点,把政治问题建立在现实的基础上。他还反对古代思想家把道德的良善作为政治追求的目标,认

为国家的根本问题就是统治权，政治就是权力，统治者应以夺取权力和保持权力为目的。马基雅弗利从人的经验出发，否定了人天生是一个政治动物的命题，并将国家看作是分散的人为了生命和财产安全而建立的组织，并将国家的根本问题看作是统治权的问题，从而第一次在政治理论上将政治和道德区分开来。从他起，权力便成为国家一切机构与法律的基础。

XXI

How A Prince Should Act to Acquire Reputation^①

Nothing gives a prince more prestige than undertaking great enterprises and setting a splendid example for his people. In our day we have Ferdinand of Aragon, the present king of Spain^②. He may be considered a new prince, since from being a weak king he has risen to become, for fame and glory, the first prince of Christendom^③; and if you consider his actions, you will find all of them very great and some of them extraordinary. At the beginning of his reign he attacked Granada^④, and that enterprise was the cornerstone of his reign^⑤. For some time he carried on the siege in a leisurely way, and without any outside distractions; he kept all the barons of Castille preoccupied with it, and while they were thinking of the war, they never considered the changes he was making in the state.^⑥ Thus he acquired reputation and authority over them without their being aware of it^⑦. Money from the Church and the people enabled him to recruit big armies, and in the course of this long war to build a military establishment which has since won him much honor. Apart from this, he made use of the pretext of religion to prepare the way for still greater projects, and adopted a policy of pi-

ous cruelty in expelling the Moors from his kingdom and despoiling them; his conduct here could not have been more despicable nor more unusual. ⑧ On the same pretext, he attacked Africa; he carried out a campaign in Italy; and finally he assaulted France. Thus he has always been planning and carrying out some great design which has enthralled and preoccupied the minds of his subjects, and kept them fascinated with the outcome of his schemes. ⑨ And his various projects have risen one out of the other, so that they have never allowed men leisure to take concerted action against him.

It is also helpful for a prince to give special evidence of his ability in internal affairs, as we hear about Messer Bernabò of Milan; whenever anyone did anything special affecting the state, whether for good or evil, he chose a way of rewarding or punishing him that gave rise to comment ⑩. It should be a prince's major concern in everything he does to give the impression of being a great man and of possessing excellent insight.

A prince will also be well thought of when he is a true friend or an honest enemy, that is, when, without any hedging, he takes a stand for one side and against another. ⑪ It is always better to do this than to stand on one's neutrality; because if two of your powerful neighbors come to blows ⑫, they are either such people that you have to fear the winner, or they are not. In either case, it will be better for you to assert yourself and wage open war ⑬; because, in the first case, when you do not take sides, you are bound to be the prey of the winner, to the pleasure and satisfaction of the loser ⑭. Then you have no excuse, nothing to defend you, nobody to take you in; a winner never wants doubtful friends, who would not support him in adversity, and a loser will not take you in because you

were not willing to take your chances with him, sword in hand.¹⁵

When Antiochus came into Greece, brought there by the Aetolians to drive out the Romans, he sent ambassadors to the Achaeans to persuade them to neutrality; meanwhile the Romans were persuading the Achaeans to take up arms on their side.¹⁶ The matter came up for consideration in the Achaean council, and when Antiochus's envoy had spoken for neutrality, the Roman ambassador answered: "What these people tell you about not getting mixed up in a war could not be more opposed to your real interests¹⁷; if you do that, whatever the outcome of the war, you will fall prey to the victors, without any hope of mercy".

As a general thing, anyone who is not your friend will advise neutrality, while anyone who is your friend will ask you to join him, weapon in hand. Weak-minded princes who want to avoid present dangers generally follow the path of neutrality and generally come to grief¹⁸. But when the prince declares himself like a man in favor of one side, even if this ally wins and becomes so powerful that you are at his mercy, still he owes you something, he is your friend.¹⁹ Men are never so dishonest that they will show gross ingratitude by turning immediately on their helpers.²⁰ Besides, victories are never so decisive that the victor does not have to maintain some moderation, some show of justice. But even if your ally loses, you will still be dear to him; he will help you as long as he can, and be a staunch ally²¹ when your fortune rises again.

As for the second case, when neither of the two powers who are at odds is so strong that you have to be afraid of his winning, it is all the more sensible for you to take sides, since you are now able to ruin one with the aid of the other, who would have saved him if

he had any sense. ② The winner, whoever he is, will be at your mercy, and the side to which you throw your weight is bound to win ③. And here let me say that a prince should never ally himself with someone more powerful than himself in order to attack a third party, except in cases of absolute necessity. ④ As I said before, when your ally wins, you remain his prisoner; and princes ought to avoid, as far as they can, being under the control of other people. The Venetians joined with the king of France against the duke of Milan; they could perfectly well have avoided this alliance, which led directly to their ruin. ⑤ There are of course times when an alliance cannot be avoided (for example, the Florentines had to join in when the pope and the king of Spain sent armies to subdue Lombardy), and then the prince must take sides, for the reasons given above. No leader should ever suppose he can invariably take the safe course ⑥, since all choices involve risks. In the nature of things, you can never try to escape one danger without encountering another; but prudence consists in knowing how to recognize the nature of the different dangers and in accepting the least bad as good.

A prince ought also to show himself an admirer of talent [*virtù*], giving recognition to men of ability [*uomini virtuosi*] and honoring those who excel in a particular art. Moreover, he should encourage his citizens to ply their callings in peace ⑦, whether in commerce, agriculture, or in any other business. The man who improves his holdings should not be made to fear that they will be taken away from him; the man who opens up a branch of trade should not have to fear that he will be taxed out of existence. ⑧ Instead, the prince should bestow prizes on the men who do these things, and on anyone else who takes the pains to enrich the city or state in some

special way. He should also, at fitting times of the year^⑨, entertain his people with festivals and spectacles. And because every city is divided into professional guilds and family groupings, he should be inward with these people, and attend their gatherings from time to time, giving evidence of his humanity and munificence, yet avoiding any compromise to his dignity, for that must be preserved at all costs.^⑩

XXII

On A Prince's Private Counselors

Choosing his ministers is a matter of no small importance to a prince, since they will be good or bad, depending on his judgment. The first notion one gets of a prince's intelligence comes from the men around him; when they are able and loyal, you may be sure he is wise, because he knew enough to recognize their ability and command their loyalty. When they are otherwise, you can always form a poor opinion of the prince, because he made an error in his very first choice.^⑪

Nobody who knew that Messer Antonio da Venafrò was a minister of Pandolfo Petrucci, prince of Siena, could fail to consider Pandolfo a thoroughly worthy man, since he had this sort of minister.^⑫ There are, in fact, three sorts of brains: one understands on its own, another understands what others tell it, and the third understands neither itself nor other people. The first sort is superb, the second sort very good, the third sort useless. Thus it necessarily followed that if Pandolfo was not of the first sort, he must have been of the second; since a man who has wit enough to discern good words and deeds from bad ones, even if he could not invent the good