

中央财经大学学术著作基金资助出版

# 宏观调控中的 中央与地方关系

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CENTRAL  
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN MACRO-CONTROL

欧阳日辉 著



中国财政经济出版社

中央财经大学

学术著作基金资助出版

# 宏观调控中的中央 与地方关系

The Relations Between the Central and Local  
Governments in Macro-Control

欧阳日辉 著

中国财政经济出版社

**图书在版编目 (CIP) 数据**

宏观调控中的中央与地方关系 / 欧阳日辉著. — 北京: 中国财政经济出版社, 2008. 6

中央财经大学学术著作基金资助出版

ISBN 978 - 7 - 5095 - 0639 - 4

I. 宏… II. 欧… III. 宏观调控 - 中央和地方的关系 - 研究 - 中国 IV. F123.14

中国版本图书馆 CIP 数据核字 (2008) 第 054527 号

中国财政经济出版社出版

URL: <http://www.cfeph.cn>

E-mail: [cfeph@cfeph.cn](mailto:cfeph@cfeph.cn)

(版权所有 翻印必究)

社址: 北京市海淀区阜成路甲 28 号 邮政编码: 100036

发行处电话: 88190406 财经书店电话: 64033436

北京财经印刷厂印刷 各地新华书店经销

880 × 1230 毫米 32 开 13.375 印张 306 000 字

2008 年 6 月第 1 版 2008 年 6 月北京第 1 次印刷

印数: 1—3 000 定价: 26.00 元

ISBN 978 - 7 - 5095 - 0639 - 4/F · 0516

(图书出现印装问题, 本社负责调换)

## 序

## 何 盛 明

为了稳定宏观经济形势，近年来我国宏观经济政策经历了一系列调整。然而，当前我国仍然面临国际收支失衡、流动性过剩的双重挑战，固定资产投资仍处于高位运行，房地产价格稳中有升，通货膨胀压力不断增大，货币信贷增长仍然偏快。在2003年以来的宏观调控中，地方政府受到了多方的责难和批评，很多人把宏观调控效果不佳归咎于财政分权和地方政府的投资冲动。

到底是谁在抵制宏观调控政策？财政分权、中央与地方关系对宏观调控绩效有哪些影响？假如是地方政府影响了宏观调控绩效，地方政府为什么要抵制或扭曲中央的宏观政策？欧阳日辉博士的著作《宏观调控中的中央与地方关系》围绕我国转型期制度环境、政府竞争、政府规模三条分析线索，从市场与政府的关系、政府间的分权和集权的关系、政府规模与政府行政能力的关系三个视角，运用公共选择理论系统分析转型期中央与地方关系对宏观调控的影响。欧阳日辉博士从中央与地方关系的视角研究宏观调控，抓住了转型期改善我国宏观调控的关键，选题具有十分重要的现实意义和理论价值。

《宏观调控中的中央与地方关系》以“经济人”假设作为逻辑起点，从公共选择视角构建了转型期中央与地方关系对宏观调控影响的理论分析框架。作者提出制度环境是影响宏观调控绩效的主要因素，在转型期相对“软化”的制度环境中，地方政府经济行为扭曲，主要表现为扩大预算外收入、隐性融资、经营土地。作者认为政府竞争是影响宏观调控绩效的重要因素，地方政府拥有经济自主权，掌握资源配置，在招商引资中展开竞争，隐性干预金融，与中央在转移支付和房地产市场进行博弈，地方政府间竞争造成市场分割和重复建设、破坏了宏观经济的平稳运行。作者认为政府层级也是影响宏观调控绩效的重要因素，五级政府管理体制导致宏观调控政策执行的“漏斗效应”，地方政府官员的政治晋升竞争在经济上表现出“换届效应”，政府规模过大大放大了这些效应。

针对前面的研究，《宏观调控中的中央与地方关系》提出通过制度创新构建中央与地方关系，从改革中改善和加强宏观调控。具体改革措施包括坚持体制改革与改善宏观调控相结合、完善省以下财政体制改革、从政府竞争向市场竞争的转变。作者提出，树立科学发展观和正确政绩观，加快政府职能转变，明确政府与市场的关系，划分中央与地方各级政府的事权和财权，完善分税制，构建以自主创新为主导的发展战略，对于规范中央和地方关系、改善宏观调控尤为重要。

宏观调控涉及一系列错综复杂的问题，研究起来并非容易的事情。我认为加强对以下几方面的重视和认识是必要的：

第一，高度重视体制因素对宏观调控的影响。改革开放以来，我国开始实行宏观调控，特别是针对1993年出现的通货膨胀的调控，并在1996年顺利实现了经济“软着陆”。但是，在

“软着陆”以后，我国宏观经济运行中的深层次矛盾也较充分地暴露出来，集中表现为结构性矛盾、制度性矛盾和体制性矛盾；而且，这三种矛盾交织并发、错综复杂，梗塞了宏观经济政策的传导。我国宏观调控之所以配置一定的行政手段，实施所谓的“组合拳”，就是因为我国社会主义市场经济体制还不完善。这些深层次矛盾已经成为宏观调控的巨大阻力，只有坚定不移地坚持改革才能彻底解决这些问题。

第二，深入研究地方政府与中央政府在宏观调控中的博弈。中央与地方最基本的经济政治关系是财政税收关系，利益关系是中央与地方关系的核心。财政分权之后，中央政府将经济的剩余索取权和控制权分配给地方，增强了地方与中央博弈的能力。在GDP考核体制下，地方政府为了辖区内的经济增长和显示政绩，充分利用中央政府的授权，在制度安排上与中央政府讨价还价，在政策执行过程中根据自身利益最大化原则理解和贯彻宏观调控政策，在经济发展过程中地方政府间展开了激烈的竞争。要破解中央与地方的博弈局面，完善宏观调控体系，必须从体制改革入手，在法律上明确界定中央与地方各级政府的事权与财权。

第三，深刻认识政府与市场的关系。我国三十年来的改革就是围绕政府与市场而展开的，政府不断明确和转变职能，市场在资源配置中的基础性作用逐步增强。目前我国经济发展过程中出现的矛盾和问题，深层次的原因是政府宏观管理体制与市场机制没有形成合力，政府职能错位，政府与市场关系扭曲。改善宏观调控，需要政府转变职能、领导转变观念，在资源配置过程中树立“市场第一、政府第二”的观念，从立法上明确界定政府职能以及各个部门和各个层级的职责。比如，刺激和扩大内需主要应当靠市场进行调节，宏观调控政策应当处于辅助地位，其作用

效果是有限的。过分依赖财政政策调整市场需求，事倍而功半。处理不好，还会导致债务危机，而债务危机反过来又会对宏观经济运行产生负面影响。

第四，认真研究宏观调控中的财政风险。财政风险是最大的风险，应当引起全社会充分的关注。社会各方面的风险，如企业的风险、银行的风险等，有相当大的部分最终都要转化为政府的风险，转化为财政风险。地方政府从辖区利益出发，造成显性和隐性债务、预算外收入膨胀、挪用社保基金和住房公积金等现象，积累了巨大的财政风险。化解财政风险要解决财政支出范围和分配格局存在的“缺位”与“越位”并存的现象，严格按照公共财政的要求，科学划分中央与地方的财权和事权，完善省以下公共财政体制建设。

第五，改善宏观调控的根本在于毫不动摇地坚持改革。宏观调控虽然能够解决一些问题，但显然不能从根本上解决体制问题，因为宏观调控主要局限在经济领域，而改革不仅仅局限在经济领域，而是针对具有多元利益主体的社会领域，所解决的问题是根本问题。如果放弃体制改革或者体制改革不深入，我们再次面临经济过热时，宏观调控的阻力会越来越大。所以，要使我国经济又好又快发展，既要不断规范和完善宏观调控，更要不断深化经济体制改革，进一步完善市场经济体制。中央政府已经明确提出改善宏观调控和加快经济体制改革，不可偏废。2007年12月中央经济工作会议提出，2008年要把防止经济增长由偏快转为过热、防止价格由结构性上涨演变为明显通货膨胀作为当前宏观调控的首要任务。同时，中央提出要以更大的决心和力度攻坚克难，从解决当前矛盾入手，继续深化国有企业、财税金融、政府机构和社会管理体制改革。

《宏观调控中的中央与地方关系》是欧阳日辉在其博士后出站报告的基础上修订而成的，对以上几个方面的问题都有研究，并提出了客观独到的见解。在出站报告的写作过程中，我们曾经就报告中的一些问题进行过深入讨论。本书的出版，作为合作导师，我感到非常高兴。我希望本书的出版，有助于加强和深化对宏观调控的认识，有助于推动宏观调控的研究，有助于广大读者了解我国的宏观调控。当然，书中也存在一些不足之处，比如对策研究部分显得单薄，所以，我也希望欧阳日辉博士再接再厉，在今后的研究中不断取得新进展。

2008年2月28日



# ABSTRACT

## **The Relations Between the Central and Local Governments in Macro-Control**

Ouyang Rihui

In order to stabilize macro-economic situation, Chinese government has implemented a series of readjustment on macro-economic policy in recent years. Since the new round of macro-control was launched in 2003, local governments have been criticized and censured, and the unsatisfactory performance of macro-control is imputed by many to fiscal decentralization and local governments' investment impulsion. Centering on the institutional environment in China's transition to the socialist market economy, the principal-agent relations between the central and local governments, government levels and the fiscal scale, this book incorporates the progressive feature of China's reform path into the systematic and comprehensive analysis of the influence of the relations between the central and local governments on macro-control in terms of the relations between government and mar-

ket, the decentralization and centralization between the central and local governments, and the relations between the government scale and administration ability.

With the hypothesis of economic man as the logic starting point of the study, this book first comments the hypothesis of economic man, interest groups and the theory of institutional change. It then analyzes the relations between the central and local governments in the transitional period from the perspective of public choice theory. Also, it analyzes the three levels (the level of policy, organization and operation) in the establishment and implementation of economic policies, the interests of governments in the period of transition to markets and interests conflict among governments, and the interests of governments and that of government officials. The concept of macro-control, its target, the subject and object in its implementation and the related policy measures are illustrated. Thus, the theoretical framework for the study of the influence of the relations between the central and local governments on macro-control performance, i. e., institutional environment, government behavior and government scale, is constructed.

The study investigates the relations between the central and local governments and the process of macro-control in a historical way. In order to make the study full of sense of history, the writer provides a brief survey of the relations between the central and local governments in ancient China, in planned economy system period and since reform and opening up. The macro-controls since reform and opening up are analyzed, and the experience in and problems with each macro-control are summarized as well, among which the problem of institutions and

of interests are expounded in particular.

Institutional environment is the main factor affecting macro-control performance. This book investigates the relatively "soft" property rights environment in transitional period: ambiguous property rights and "soft" government budget constraint. And the role of local governments is also "soft", which is manifested as a double role of policy-maker and executor or organizer in economic growth. Thereby the rational choice for the local governments in their implementing the central government's macro-economic policy is to implement the policy selectively. Fiscal decentralization promotes the bettering of the market mechanism and results in the forming of three types of governments. With the analysis of fiscal decentralization, the book also studies the investment behavior of local governments in fixed assets. In the "soft" institutional environment, the economic behavior of local governments is distorted, which is reflected in expanding extra-budgetary income, implicit financing and land trade.

Intergovernmental competition is the major factor affecting macro-control performance and also the main reason for local governments' being censured in recent years. With economic autonomy and the power of resources allocation, local governments carry out competitions in attracting foreign investments and interfere in finance implicitly. In this book, the influence of the vertical intergovernmental competitions on macro-control is analyzed, in which the game in financial transfer payments and real estate market of the central and local governments is the focus. Exploring the influence of intergovernmental competition on macro-control, this book points out it is those competi-

tions that result in market segmentation and repeating construction. The three roles of the central government in inter-local-governmental competitions are: the judge of competition strategy, the preferential policy-provider and the supporter of weak local governments. Moreover, this book constructs a simple mathematical model and analyzes the influence of the regional economic growth promoted by local governments on the operation of macro-control in the framework of intergovernmental competition.

Government levels and fiscal scale are also the important factors affecting macro-control performance. In this book, the evolvement of the levels of local governments in ancient China is investigated, and the forming and disadvantages of the five-level government structure in modern China are also explored. The fiscal federalism of the U. S. and its experience are introduced as well. While analyzing the influence of the five-level government structure on macro-control, this book points out that fiscal decentralization may expand the scale of local governments and lead to fiscal difficulties in countries and towns; there are too many levels in governments and the principal-agent link is too long, both of which will result in the "funnel effect" of macro-economic policies; the promotion of local government officials is manifested as "expiration effect" in economy; and the over expansion of government scale amplifies these effects. In the book, the theory of interest groups is applied in the analysis of government scale, the forming of rent-seeking and interest groups, and the game among interest groups as well with a case study illustrating the game process.

Based on the above study, this book proposes that to construct

harmonious relations between the central and local governments, deepening institutional restructuring , improving the socialist market economy , and improving macro-control should be carried out in parallel, the reform of fiscal systems at and below the provincial level should be improved and intergovernmental competition should be transformed into market competition. This is an all-round reform resolution. In other words, the improvement of the performance of China's macro-control cannot merely depend on macro-control itself, but should benefit from reform, among which, to establish the Scientific Outlook on Development and a correct view on evaluating cadres' performances, to accelerate the transformation of government functions, to specify the central and local government's power in affairs and finance, to better tax sharing system and establish the development strategy led by independent innovations are particularly important for regulating the relations between the central and local governments and improving macro-control performance .



<b>第四章 制度环境与宏观调控绩效</b> .....	(128)
第一节 转型期相对“软化”的产权制度环境 .....	(129)
第二节 财政分权与地方政府行为扭曲 .....	(149)
第三节 “软化”制度环境中的地方政府行为 .....	(169)
<b>第五章 政府竞争与宏观调控绩效</b> .....	(186)
第一节 资源配置、政府行为与政府利益 .....	(187)
第二节 地方政府与中央政府的竞争 .....	(206)
第三节 地方政府之间的竞争与宏观调控 .....	(235)
<b>第六章 政府规模与宏观调控绩效</b> .....	(257)
第一节 中国政府层级的历史演变和国际比较 .....	(258)
第二节 五级政府管理体制对宏观调控政策的 扭曲 .....	(283)
第三节 引入利益集团的宏观调控绩效 .....	(306)
<b>第七章 以制度创新构建中央与地方关系</b> .....	(327)
第一节 坚持体制改革与改善宏观调控 .....	(328)
第二节 财权与事权：关于完善分税制的思考 .....	(342)
第三节 地方经济发展：从政府竞争到市场竞争 .....	(353)
<b>结束语 地方政府的“苦衷”</b> .....	(366)
<b>参考文献</b> .....	(370)
<b>后 记</b> .....	(400)

# CONTENTS

<b>Chapter 1</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	( 1 )
Part 1	Research Background and Significance	( 1 )
Part 2	Summary of the Literature: The Influence of the Relations Between the Central and Local Governments on Marco-Control	( 5 )
Part 3	Basic Concepts, Logic Structure and Metho- dology of the Book	( 10 )
Part 4	Main Ideas and Innovative Points of the Book	( 22 )
<b>Chapter 2</b>	<b>Macro-Control: Analytical Framework Ba- sed on Public Choice Theory</b>	( 28 )
Part 1	Hypothesis of “Economic Man”, Interest Groups and Change of Economic Institutions	( 29 )
Part 2	The Relations Between the Central and Local Governments in the Period of China’s Trans ition to the Socialist Market Economy: A	



Public Choice Perspective	( 51 )
Part 3 Marco-Control and Its Restraint Factors in Political and Economic Institutions	( 66 )
<b>Chapter 3 A Historical Exploration of the Relations Between the Central and Local Governments and of Marco-Control</b>	( 80 )
Part 1 The Institutional Change of the Relations Between the Central and Local Governments on the Basis of Interests Relations	( 81 )
Part 2 The Change of China's Marco-Control Policy since Reform and Opening-up	( 104 )
Part 3 The Problem of Institutions and Interests in Marco-Control	( 121 )
<b>Chapter 4 Institutional Environment and Marco-Control Performance</b>	( 128 )
Part 1 The Relatively "Soft" Property Rights Institutional Environment in China's Transition to the Socialist Market Economy	( 129 )
Part 2 Financial Decentralization and the Distorted Behavior of Local Governments	( 149 )
Part 3 The Influence of the Behavior of Local Governments in "Soft" Institutional Environment on Marco-Control Performance	( 169 )