

中央研究院
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中華民國五十八年春季

臺灣・南港

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CULTUROLOGY—ITS EVOLUTION AND PROSPECTS

An Integral Theory of Culture

WEN-SHAN HUANG⁽¹⁾

"Several scholars of various countries have advocated the establishment of a special science of culturology devoted to a study of cultural phenomena, differentiated from the science of sociology which deals with social phenomena. Later on something more will be said about culturology as a special science. On the science of culturology, see Leslie White's *The Science of Culture* (New York, 1949); A. L. Kroeber's *The Nature of Culture* (Chicago, 1952); A. Hilckman's *Geschtsphilosophie, Kulturwissenschaft, Soziologie*, and Wen-shan Huang's *Collected Essays on Culturology* (Canton, 1939), and the *Theoretical Trends of Culturology* (Taipei, 1959). As distinguished from the Austrian-German cultural morphology, most of these culturologists do not fully subscribe to the main theses of totalitarian theories of cultural integration."—Pitrim A. Sorokin, *Sociological Theories of Today* (Harper & Row, New York, 1966, p. 205).

"Wen-shan Huang also promoted the adaption of "Culturology", or the Science of Culture, as an independent discipline to include the study of cultural phenomena by the use of the cultural historical method. Since 1934 he had published several books in this field. In 1939 he issued a book entitled: *Collected Papers on Culturology*, which was followed by another book, *Culturology, and its Place in the Domain of Social Science* (1940). It is remarkable that Leslie A. White, a most brilliant American anthropologist of the Evolutionist School, holds almost the same position in this respect, despite their differences in philosophical assumptions."⁽²⁾

"Huang Wen-shan's long-pondered system of Culturology may well prove an event in the history of ideas.... It was in those days (1934) that Huang first advanced his conception of Culturology as an independent social science, with a matter and method singular to itself. Hints and adumbrations of the

(1) Former Faculty Member of the New School for Social Research and University of Southern California. National Visiting Professor, National Science Committee, Republic of China and Visiting Professor of the National Taiwan University (1968-1969).

(2) Huang Wen-Shan and Ho Lien-Kwei, Recent Developments and Trends in Ethnological Studies in China, Selected Papers of the Fifth International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, Philadelphia, Sept. 6-9, 1956. Edited by Anthony F. C. Wallace, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press.

conception had appeared in the works of various scholars, and one notion of it had been set forth as "the science of culture" by the cultural anthropologist Leslie White, which Huang qualifies as "Neo-Comteian." Indeed, already in 1909, Wilhelm Ostwald, the great German chemist and philosopher of "Energetie," who was a friend of William James, had employed the term in his "Energetic Foundations of the Science of Culture", but obviously with a "neo-Comteian" intention. As is not unusual in the history of ideas, those seem to have occurred, among students of civilization who had a concern regarding the nature and role of mankind's cultures, each working unaware of the others, the idea that culture might be taken for an independent variable, the subject matter of an autonomous discipline. In due course, as the originators became aware of each others' studies, they made their divergences subjects of discussion and debate, and "culturology" began to figure in the literature of the social sciences as well as in the works of culturologists. As the history of ideas goes, it is still a newcomer, perhaps still the youngest of the social sciences, certainly among the most challenging for matter and method. In its development, Wen-shan Huang counts as a pioneer. His *System of Culturology* is the fruit of practically a life-time of devoted research, carried on amid pressing duties as head of a family, of a public servant of authentic Chinese democracy, and often under conditions of considerable personal danger. Like other innovations in the history of ideas, it cannot fail to illuminate as well as to deepen old controversies, and to arouse new ones as it turns the thoughts of students of culture in new directions toward new insights."⁽³⁾

* * * * *

On the basis of as much information as any cultural anthropologist, or ethnologist, or cultural morphologist possesses on the general tenets and trends in contemporary times, I did try to point out about 1934 that Culturology, a science devoted to the study of cultural phenomena and cultural systems, should take its place among the sciences, because of the fact that culture is a phenomenon sui generis, having particular processes, mechanisms of change, structures, patterns, and laws of its own. Since culture, not social life, is the most distinctive heritage and achievement of humanity, culturology should be regarded as the supreme science and should supplant sociology at the apex in the hierarchy of the classification of sciences as suggested by August Comte.

According to Pitrim A. Sorokin, "...all the theories that claim that the social and the cultural phenomena are quite different from each other and as such can and

(3) Horace M. Kallen, Introduction to Wen-shan Huang's *System of Culturology*, Taipei, Taiwan: Chung Hwa Book Company (1968).

should be studied independently from each other—the cultural reality by the science of culturology and the social phenomena by sociology—go too far in their contentions. Earlier examples of such theories are given by the formal school in sociology (Simmel, Richard, Vierkandt, von Wiese). Recent theories of this sort are exemplified by the conceptions of social and cultural phenomena of Becker, Znaniecki, White, Wen-shan Huang, Dollard, C. Kluckhohn, O. Mowrer, and Bidney.” He further advances: “Somewhat more cogent reasons for a separate study of cultural systems by the science of culturology and of social systems by sociology are given by Wen-shan Huang. In his own formation these reasons are as follows:

1. Culturology is a new science that has emerged from sociology.
2. The greatest reason is that the structure of the cultural system is different from that of the social system. Cultural system is content. Social system is form. The total culture (content) of any family, state, political party, university, corporation is constructed by the values and meanings of language, science, religion, aesthetics, ethics, politics, economics, philosophy, law, and technology. One or many parts of cultural values are in the possession of all groups and become the dynamic agency or medium of their existence. Social systems or groups, such as the state or corporation, are the forms of organizations determined by law or ethics.
3. The social system is the continuator or agent and not the creator of the cultural system. Social systems or groups can be linked logically with certain cultural systems that are not created by social systems.
4. As agencies of cultural systems, two type of social systems can be mentioned: one is a continuator of a special kind of cultural value, such as religious or philosophical or political value; the other includes all kinds of cultural values, such as the family or the state.
5. The nature of social and cultural systems is not identical. A cultural system is a value system, whereas a social system is a system of interacting human beings. A social system, in its organization aspect, is mainly determined by legal and ethical cultural systems.
6. Cultural system and cultural process has its own life determined by its own laws. Hence the study of culture inevitably becomes an independent science with its own aim, level, scope, and laws.
7. Culture is not only superorganic, but also superpsychological, supersocial. It has its own mode of being.
8. A system of culturology should include at least the life of culture, the nature of culture, the structure of culture, the dynamics of culture, the types

(4) Pitrim A. Sorokin, *Sociological Theories of Today*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1936, pp. 328-391).

of culture, and cultural laws."⁽⁴⁾

In spite of Sorokin's criticism that an adequate cognition of any sociocultural phenomenon requires a cognition of all the three dimensions, viz. personality, society and culture, and their interrelationship with one another, he was of the opinion that practically all the above propositions are in an essential agreement with his own theory in this field.⁽⁵⁾ With my own experience with, and reactions to, the development of the general theory of culture, the evolution and prospects of culturology may be described in the following three stages:

Stage I: The Embryological Period. The basic frame of reference of culturology, namely, a clear analysis of the concept, method, and principles of this science can be roughly traced in the developments of the sciences of sociology, ethnology, and cultural morphology. First, Comte, under the influence of the eighteenth century historians, economists, and cultural philosophers, expanded the idea of society to include the entire culture. His society is, according to Znaniecki, a cultural system maintained by the biological continuous population living within a geographically circumscribed area. The people who belong to it are united not by natural, but by cultural bonds; common political structure, mores, technology, economic organization, language, religion, art, and knowledge. Those cultural activities are distinct but independent functions of society; consequently, sociology as the science of society is also the inclusive science of culture, and all the special cultural sciences are its components. This conception was not the result of objective studies of relationships between cultural phenomena within particular societies; it was due to Comte's attempt to combine his new science with his theory of the three progressive stages through which total historical civilizations passed. Thus conceived, Comte's conception of society as a cultural system maintained that the culture of a society is systematically integrated. As a matter of fact, Znaniecki had long ago pointed out that the social system is not only different from that of the cultural, but also can be studied separately.⁽⁶⁾ However, we may consider that sociology is the predecessor of culturology, despite Comte's idea of society and culture being rooted in the age-old political theory.

Second: the most significant schievement in anthropology at the end of the nineteenth century is the development of a naturalistic and autonomous science of culture, for which Tylor argued so cogently. It rests squarely upon the possibility of explaining culture processes in terms of themselves. Edward Tylor in 1871 developed his ideas in the following passage: "Culture or Civilization, taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that a complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals; law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits aquired by man as

(5) Sorokin, *Ibid.*, p. 391.

(6) Florian Znaniecki, *Cultural Sciences, Their Origin and Development*. University of Illinois Press, 1963, pp. 380-381.

a member of society. The condition of culture among the various societies of mankind, in so far as it is capable of being investigated on general principles, is a subject apt for the study of laws of human thought and action. On the one hand, the uniformity which so largely pervades civilization may be ascribed, in great measure, to the uniform action of uniform causes: while on the other hand its various grades may be regarded as stages of development or evolution, each the outcome of previous history, and about to do its proper part in shaping the history of the future. To the investigation of these two great principles in several departments of ethnography, with especial consideration of the civilization of the lower tribes as related to the civilization of the higher nations, the present volumes are devoted.”⁽⁷⁾ It was this conception—the science of culture—that Lowie subscribed to in the first paragraph of his famous *Primitive Society*.

Third: Cultural Morphology, sometimes also known as culturology, a science specifically devoted to the study of vast sociocultural systems, first emerged in Austria and Germany. As Othmar Anderle has pointed out: “Thinking in terms of civilization has supplanted thinking in terms of nations.... This has become apparent in science, where the emphasis has been shifted from peoples and nations to more comprehensive structures and processes in civilizations.... Since Spengler, we have called the science which deals with what is formal in the structural aspects of cultural phenomena “Cultural Morphology”. This term was, however, not introduced by Spengler, but by Leo Frobenius. Today, Spengler is looked upon as the classical cultural morphologist. As far as the subject is concerned, there were cultural morphologists long before Spengler (like Giambattista Vico).”⁽⁸⁾

Observing these trends in the history of thought, sociology, cultural anthropology are in fact different approaches to the same material, i.e. the culture of mankind. Therefore, it is proper to say that cultural anthropology is not only the allied science of culturology, but a way by which the new field of culturology can be achieved.

Stage II: The Period of Construction. Beginning with the earliest part of the 20th century, until recently, many social scientists both in the East and the West have been attempting to establish the scientific concept of culture, and the principles, as well as the directions, by which the Science of Culture or Culturology can be formed. As of today, the full development of this science and the delimitation of its boundaries remain chiefly the task for culturologists to take during the third stage of cultural study. “Among contemporary anthropologists,” as noted by David

(7) Edward B. Tylor, *The Science of Culture*, Chap. 1 of *Primitive Culture* (London, John Murray & Co., 1871, 2 vols.) p. 1.

(8) Othmer F. Anderle, *Sorokin and Cultural Morphology*, in P. J. Allen (ed.), *P. A. Sorokin in Review*, pp. 94-95.

(9) David Bidney, *Theoretical Anthropology*, New York: Columbia University, 1953, pp. 52-53.

Bidney, "Levi-Strauss, White, and Hoebel, may be cited as "culturologists" who still adhere to Kroeber's original concept of the cultural superorganic, although in the revised edition of his *Anthropology* (1948), Kroeber himself, no longer adheres to the sharp antithesis between the organic and the superorganic which he formerly professed...."⁽⁹⁾

The term culturology was, no doubt, first applied by W. Ostwald, a German chemist and philosopher, to the study of cultural phenomena. "It appeared as Kulturologie, in his writings as early as 1909, and was employed in many of his writings thereafter (Das System der Wissenschaften, in *Die Forderung des Tages*, Leipzig: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft, 1910, p. 129; see also *The System of the Sciences*-Rice Institute Pamphlet, Vol. II, No. 3, 1915 pp. 101-90). Ostwald distinguished culturology from sociology. The latter term is too broad, he said, since its focus upon social interaction would include all living species; 'social' and 'cultural' are not synonymous. And this focus upon interaction excludes, or admits only incidentally, tools, utensils, dwellings, philosophies, art, and other elements of culture"⁽¹⁰⁾ Ostwald has shown us, perhaps more clearly than any other philosophers that culturology should be an independent science separated from sociology. He has not hesitated to advance his theory and has taken pains to emphasize that the recognition and description of cultural phenomena is different from the studying and narration of social interactions.

Among contemporary anthropologists, men of the stature of Alfred A. Kroeber expressed large measure of accord with Ostwald. Although not using the term culturology himself, Kroeber often mentioned 'cultural mechanics', 'cultural engineering,' 'cultural psychology', and 'cultural energy.' During his long career as a distinguished anthropologist of world order, he felt that the autonomy of the study of culture had been won and established. Milton Singer, in his Forward to his *An Anthropologist Looks at History*, has this to say:

"Kroeber's conscious and single-minded separation of the cultural aspects of phenomena from the non-cultural was justified by the results. In the study of civilizations, it led Kroeber to illuminate many problems and processes—the problems, for example, of the delimitation of civilizations, their distinctiveness, internal consistency, continuities, and discontinuities. These have not yielded much to the normal methods of historians or of anthropologists. Kroeber's

(10) Quoted from Leslie A. White's "Culturology," *Dictionary of Social Sciences* ed. by Julius Gould, W. L. Kolb, The Free Press, Illinois, 1965. See also White's "Culturology", *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, New York: The Macmillan Co., and The Free Press, 1968, pp. 547-551.

(11) A. I. Kroeber, *An Anthropologist Looks at History* (University of California Press, 1963, p. ix).

approach to these problems, in terms of style patterns, their growth, clustering culminations, decline, reconstitution, and disintegration, has given us the beginnings of an understanding of the rise and decline of civilizations; not as a product of race, environment, or great men, but as a phenomenon of cultural creativity. The method has also led Kroeber to investigate how the civilizations of Asia, Europe, Africa, and America are interrelated in purely cultural terms.”⁽¹¹⁾

In spite of the fact that Kroeber did not wish to discourage anyone who uses the term culturology, he may be classified as a first rank culturologist of the century.⁽¹²⁾

In his work, *The Science of Culture: A Study of Man and Civilization* (New York, 1949), Leslie A. White deals with the youngest child in the family of science—Culturology. As he sees it: “In the perspective culture is an organization of things and events dependent upon symbols—language, customs, tools, beliefs, etc.,—considered in an extra-somatic context, and further considered as a process sui generis, quite apart from its human carriers. Culturology, therefore, is the scientific study and integration of cultural phenomena per se.” Except for his philosophical standpoint derived from historical materialism, he maintains a series of propositions with which I find myself enthusiastically in accord. He seems to have developed the following propositions:

1. Culture is superorganic and extrasomatic.
2. Culture constitutes a separate and distinct level of phenomena.
3. Culture elements act and react upon each other, according to the laws of their own.
4. Culture facts should be related to other cultural facts and are not to be explained by being related to any “psychological level”, still less to the biological level.
5. Culture, as a closed system, can be explained only in terms of culture.
6. The evolution of culture can be measured in terms of “amount of energy harnessed per capita.”
7. Culture not only can be studied apart from psychology and sociology, but it must be studied by a new science—the Science of Culture, or Culturology.
8. Culturology is the master-science, fortelling what the future holds for the human race.

Despite the criticisms of C. W. M. Hart (*The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol.

(12) See Kroeber's *The Superorganic* (1917); *On the Principle of Order in Civilization as Exemplified by Changes in Fashion* (1919); *Athropology* (1923); *Configurations of Culture Growth* (1944).

LVI, No. I, July, 1950) and David Bidney (American Anthropologist, Vol. 52, No. 4, Part. Oct-Dec., 1950), American social scientists seem to find "no intrinsic objection to the use of the term "culturology" to connote a science of culture." (Bidney). It is quite significant that the noted historian H.E. Barnes considered White as the "Father of Culturology".⁽¹³⁾

However, there are two types of criticism directed at White's theory, and they should not be overlooked at this point. First, Bidney has consistently raised the following arguments: "Of course Culturology as a science of culture is not necessarily to be interpreted in terms of White's "Neo-Comtean philosophy of science and his Marxian, materialistic, deterministic philosophy of culture history." Furthermore, he proceeds to add: "What seems to have been overlooked is that White's Culturology also involves a materialistic philosophy of culture history which reduces the whole concept of a science of culture to absurdity. It is one thing to treat cultural phenomena provisionally "as if" they were independent of other types of phenomena and to proceed with the survey of the relations and sequences of cultural forms, as Kroeber is prepared to do: it is another, and very objectionable matter, to assume dogmatically that culture necessarily involves a theory of the primacy of technology and of the totalitarian integration of culture on the materialistic basis. To proceed in practice "as if" these were the case is not to entertain a scientific, methodological fiction, but rather to accept in the name of science, a sophisticated twentieth-century myth."⁽¹⁴⁾ The questions raised by Bidney are still alive in the world today. I think we shall have to face them in our time.

Second, as to another type of criticism, a passage from Kroeber's *White's View of Culture*, is appropriate for our present purpose. Kroeber says:

"The efficient causes of cultural phenomena unquestionably are men: individual personalities who are in interpersonal and social relations. It seems to me that this cannot be denied, and that there is neither use nor honesty in trying to whittle any of it away. But manifestations of culture come characteristically in certain forms, patterns, or configurations, many of which are large, ramifying, and enduring. Now, while persons undoubtedly make and produce these cultural forms, our knowledge of persons-and very largely also our knowledge of societies of persons-has failed conspicuously to explain cultural forms; to derive specific cultural effects from specific psychic or social causes. In fact, psychological and social concepts or mechanisms are not even much good at

(13) Harry E. Barnes, Forward in G.E. Dole's and R.L. Carneiro's *Essays in the Science of Culture in Honor of L.A. White*, New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1960.

(14) David Bidney, *Theoretical Anthropology* (New York Columbia University, 1953, 25-26). see also Marvin Harris, *The Rise of Anthropological Theory. A History of Theories of Culture*; New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., pp. 634-653 for further criticism on White's other theories.

describing cultural forms. Such descriptions or characterizations begin to mean something only when they are made on the culture level—in terms of intercultural relations and cultural values.” (*American Anthropologist*, Vol. 50, No. 3, Part 1, July-Sept. 1948).

It may be noted that Kroeber did look “as if” the future science would be more concerned with culture, or the “science of culture” or his basic position and philosophy, are both sound and modern. On the other hand, in regard to the problem of cultural determinism versus free will, he is not favorable to White’s view: that man’s control over civilization is an anthropocentric illusion. Judging from the foregoing arguments, I am also of the opinion that White has failed not only to justify his materialistic determinism in the interpretation of the science of culture, but also failed to present it in a logical and understandable way showing that human beings have no power to change culture at all. To quote Marx: “Philosophers have merely explained the world in different ways, but the main point is to change it.”

Stage III: The Period of Synthesis. There is already evidence of reasonably rapid and impressive success in carrying out the task of establishing a science of culture-culturology-by the works of sociologists, cultural anthropologists and cultural morphologists in both the Western and Eastern world.⁽¹⁵⁾ To me, if there is an independent science of culture distinct from sociology and psychology, we must be able to make a clear distinction between sociological enquiries, problems, methods, theories and explanations and those of the science of culture on the one hand, to synthesize some of the valid conceptions that have been so far advanced by social scientists on the other. It would be significant and vital at this stage for us to present an integral theory of culture which might be a starting point for the broader perspective in the coming age of culturology—in a new metamorphosis.

AN INTEGRAL THEORY OF CULTURE

The study of culture or civilization is at least as old as sociology or psychology. Writers concerned themselves with the problems of civilization long before culturology as a scientific theory had been adhered to by modern anthropologists, or cultural morphologists, or sociologists. In China, I Ching, the Book of Changes, attributed to Fu Hsi, Wen Wang, Chou Kung and Confucius before the Christian era, developed many theories concerning the patterns of cultural change, and the laws of cultural dynamics. Some of them are basically sound, judging by the knowledge of the 20th century. Of course, the study of Kultur, or Kulturwissenschaft, or civilizations was

(15) Immediately after World II, Chen Szu-ching had published 4 volumes on the *Introduction to Culturology* (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1947), and Tseng Mo published a small volume, entitled *The Essence of Culturology* (Taipei, 1959). (all in Chinese, besides my own publications mentioned above.)

treated mainly as belonging to history or the philosophy of history in the 19th century, particularly in Germany. Modern thinkers, Danilevsky, Spengler, Toynbee, Liang Shou-ming, Kroeber, and Sorokin may be said to be continuing this tradition, each in his own distinctive way.

It may safely be said that the majority of the sociologists, anthropologists and cultural morphologists of the last hundred years in their treatment of cultural matter have invariably adopted the so-called "cultural approach". But, it was only during the last fifty years that culturologists emerged with their emphasis on the clarification of their methods, principles, theories and explanations with a view to the formulation of a comprehensive cultural synthesis—an integral theory of culture—the final aim of which is, of course, to establish some sort of "cultural uniformities", or "rhythms", or "trends", or "laws". Looking at the future, it is almost predictable that a generalized science of "cultural reality" will imperatively develop or emerge because of the accomplishments of the scholars of the previous decades in the West as well as in the East.

There is no need to point out that all sciences are still young, and culturology is the youngest member of the family. However, despite the fact that it has encountered considerable opposition among sociologists and anthropologists, an integral theory of culture may be tentatively synthesized as the following:

(1) Concept of Culture. "The most significant accomplishment of anthropology in the first half of the twentieth century", Kroeber said, "has been the extension and clarification of the concept of culture". Although White is not at all prepared to accept this statement, Kroeber and Kluckhorn did a great service to culturology in assembling the most significant definitions of culture proposed by scholars of different disciplines.⁽¹⁶⁾ As for Kroeber himself, he had proposed a definition in four points. According to him, culture is transmitted by interconditioning of zygotes, it is suprapersonal and anonymous, and it falls into patterns or regularities of form, style, and significance. His fourth point is that culture embodies values.⁽¹⁷⁾ No matter whether one accepts it or not, the birth of the scientific concept of culture has actually laid the foundation on which culturology may be established.

However, as to the problems of the meaning of "cultural reality", the nature of "cultural causality", no uniformity of conclusions, so far as we can judge, has been ascertained. Is culture a reality *sui generis*, or a kind of autonomous form, or an ontological level, or an "abstract pattern", or a configuration external to human behavior? Kroeber and Kluckhorn, according to White, appear to be definitely committed to the view that "culture is an abstraction". "Culture is inevitably an abstraction; it is basically a form or pattern...an abstraction". White further

(16) Robert O. Manners and David Kaplan (ed.), *Theory in Anthropology*, Chicago: Aldine Co., 1968 pp. 15-17.

(17) A. L. Kroeber, *Nature of Culture*, The University of Chicago Press, 1952, p. 104.

points out that they seem to use the term in two different senses: (1) a form pattern, and (2) a statistical concept of average or mean.... They think concrete behavior is the subject-matter of psychology, whereas forms or patterns, abstracted from behavior are culture and are therefore the subject-matter of culture-anthropology.

Undoubtedly, what Kroeber and Kluckhohn's emphasise is that culture is an abstraction, an "ideal type", in the methodological sense of Max Weber. On the other hand, White uses the term culture to label "objective things and events in the external world". This is, of course, the "concrete aspect of culture, such as a Chinese porcelain vase, pot, axe, song, ritual, or an act, or an event. It "is what it is...." He further adds, "Culture is the name of a class of things and events in the external world; the conception of culture, a conception (why use the ambiguous term "abstraction"?) in the mind of the culturologist." With this understanding, White concludes that "the subject-matter of any science is a class of objectively observable things and events, not abstraction. This shift in conception of culture will, therefore, only make the achievement of a science more difficult."⁽¹⁸⁾ In our judgment, no body would deny that culture as formulated in Tylor's classic definition, is not an objective, observable things or events in the external world, but no one also would deny that culture as a conception is not an abstraction. In Max Weber's sense, all the terms such as 'nation', 'clan', 'class', 'proletariat', are abstractions. Why not 'culture'? So long as economics or sociology can study these phenomena in abstraction, why can not culturologists do the same for culture?

From a philosophical point of view, according to Bidney, the most significant feature of current definitions of culture is the fact that they presuppose either a realistic or an idealistic approach. The cultural realists, including instrumentalists and even the humanists, as a group, tend to conceive culture as an attribute of human social behavior and usually define culture in terms of acquired habits, customs, and institutions. The individual is regarded not only as having voluntary orientation and creative ability, but also having determinative effects. On the other hand, the transcendental idealists (Spengler, Kroeber, Sorokin) and historical materialists (White) conceive culture as a superorganic reality or force, which has nothing to do with the individual (cultural determinism). Bidney puts it:

"The social heritage is conceived differently by realists and idealists. The former, putting the emphasis upon heritage, hold that the cultural heritage consists of the body of material artifacts, as well as of non-material ideas, institutions, customs, and ideas. This is exemplified in the work of Boas, Lowie and Malinowski. On the other hand, the idealists, implicitly following in the

(18) Leslie A. White, On the Concept of Culture, in Robert O. Manners and David Kaplan (ed), *Theory in Anthropology*, Chicago: Aldine, 1968, pp. 17-19.

tradition of Plato and Hegel, maintain that the social heritage is a 'superorganic' stream of ideas, and that and particular culture is an abstraction from the historical complex of ideational traditions. This position, is exemplified in the work of Kroeber, Sorokin, and Spengler, may be termed 'objective idealism', since its advocates regard culture as a heritage of ideas that have a transcendent reality—their own independent of the individuals or societies which happen to bear them. A similar transcendent conception of culture is put forth by historical materialists, such as Leslie A. White, but the latter regarded technology and the material conditions of social life as the primary or determining factors in the evolution of culture."⁽¹⁹⁾

Cultural realism and cultural idealism are of course concepts of polarity which may be compared with naturalism and humanism. The split of these forces has a long history in the West. An alternative position, taken originally by Kroeber in his essay on *The Superorganic* and in his work *Configurations of Culture Growth*, and reintroduced by Margaret Mead in *Continuities in Cultural Evolution* through her distinction between cultural macro-evolution and cultural micro-evolution, attempts to combine a humanistic, individualistic approach with a naturalistic, deterministic, evolutionary.⁽²⁰⁾ We are beginning to wonder why culturology at some future date may not, in its integral theory, take up a position of 'culturalism'—the combination of realism and idealism, humanism and naturalism. Synthesis of the two systems is probably the only way leading to metamorphosis in culture or civilization.

(2) The Concept of the Separation of Sociology and Culturology. The objection to separating the science of sociology from the science of culture generally uses the the argument that social and cultural phenomena must be studied as functional whole. This position can be exemplified by the remark of Toynbee, who says:

"Thus, while it is true that the ideas of culture and society refer to realities of two different orders that ought not be confused with each other; it is also true that when we come to study the "cultures" and "societies" that have been the historical exemplification of these two general ideas, it proves impossible, in practice, to study either apart from the other."⁽²¹⁾

The same position is held by other scientists, who say:

"The subject matter of anthropology is both society and culture, and the two things are, in fact, inseparable."⁽²²⁾

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- (19) David Bidney, *Theoretical Anthropology*, New York: Columbia University, 1953, pp. 25-26.
 - (20) Margaret Mead, *Continuities in Cultural Evolution*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964 p. 152.
 - (21) Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History*, New York: Oxford University Press, (1964) Vol. XII, p. 609.
 - (22) G. R. Willey and P. Phillips, *Method and Theory in American Archaeology* (1958), pp. 2-3.

In his reaction to my theory of culturology, Sorokin takes almost the same point of view. He says:

"Practically all these propositions are in an essential agreement with my own theory in this field, with the exception one point—Wen-shan Huang's over-emphasis on the difference and separateness of cultural and social systems and his theory at once shows that he himself does not carry on this contention. Indeed, his very definition of these systems as "form" and "content" of the same superorganic reality (separated from its content form becomes largely empty); his proposition that the social system in its organizational aspect is determined by legal and ethical cultural systems; and his delineation of the properties of each system by comparing them with those of the other, demonstrate clearly the inseparability of these systems or dimensions from each other. His stressing their difference is correct, like stressing the difference of one side of a hand from the other side. But just as an adequate knowledge of the whole hand is impossible without knowledge of both of its sides, and knowledge of either side is hardly possible without that of the other side, so also an adequate cognition of any sociocultural phenomenon requires a cognition of all its three dimensions and their interrelationship with one another."⁽²³⁾

As we have already shown, we do not deny the interrelationship of the cultural and social dimensions, but the differentiation of the two systems has always been overlooked by eminent authorities such as Toynbee and Sorokin. Kroeber, discussing *White's View of a Science of Culture*, has said: "The best way to distinguish different branches of science is by reference to the class of empirical systems with which they are primarily concerned, the task of any branch of science being to discuss the general characteristics of a class of empirical systems. Thus mechanical science deals with mechanical systems, one branch of chemistry with molecular systems, physiology with organic systems, and so on. Psychology is correctly defined, not as the study of behavior, but as the study of psychical systems, and a system of this kind consists of the psychical events that occur in a particular human beings throughout the course of his life. Sociology is also not to be defined as the study of behavior; it is an attempt to discover the general characteristics of social systems. The components or elements of a social system are persons, not acts of behavior or mental events. A person is, for example, an Englishman, a father, a member of a trade union, a Methodist, and so on. A social system is a system of the association of persons in a social structure. The sociologist studies the form of association found amongst human beings." If this reasoning is logically sound, we can naturally conclude that the empirical study of culturology is the cultural system. Kroeber

(23) Pitrim A. Sorokin, *Sociological Theories of Today*. New York: Harper and Row, 1966, p. 391.

insists that culture is a reality that cannot be explained in terms of anything but itself, and that what is cultural must be distinguished from what is social. And he also points out that social insects (ants, termites, etc.) possess society and not culture. In fact, for the purpose of pointing out the difference between "culture" and "society", the following thesis was advanced by myself almost thirty years ago, (1934) namely:

1. The theoretical basis of the distinction between "cultural" and "social" phenomena is established first by Bernhard Stern. According to him, the beginning of social life preceded the creation of culture; and social life is certainly different from that of cultural life. It has been pointed out, all insects or sub-animals have only social behaviors but not cultural behaviors. The social behavior of these insects or sub-human animals is only of hereditary origin, and it is not through the accumulation of intentional learning. Stern, thus, also suggested that the term "society" only means the process of interaction and should not be enlarged to embody the stimulating "cultural pattern", for in this case, the result would be either to ignore the importance of the function of culture or neglect the internal change of culture. Most of the contemporary sociologists, it seems to me, have agreed that the term "society" means this type of process or such human relationship.
2. The crucial point of the difference between cultural life and social life is language. According to anthropological evidence, the basic difference between the cultural life of human beings and the social life of sub-human animals is that human beings are able to invent pronunciation and language, while sub-human animals are not. On the other hand, it is also evident that language is essential to social life, human or sub-human, meanwhile it is also one of the basic characteristics of the formation of cultural life. Due to the creation of culture, human behavior is influenced by the external and artificial form, and begins to respond. Eventually, the social behavior, as restricted and interacted on by the cultural factors, begins to form the manifold human living type, culture.
3. Social life is the necessary requirement for the cultural development and diffusion. However, according to the postulate mentioned above, a social system is based on organic possibility, and the necessary condition of cultural development and diffusion in social life. Once social life is established, cultural traits and cultural systems will form a kind of phenomena which has its own history and causality and is independent of individuals. The demonstration of cultural force is both thorough and factual. For instance, the courtship in human society is not only restricted by natural conditions but also of cultural function.