The Sacred and Transgression
## Journal for the Study of Christian Culture

神圣与越界

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The Sacred and Transgression

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自启蒙的理性主义高涨以降,对于神圣的论述,无可避免地被理解为理性的对立面,被当作一个"不可言说的"对象。事实上,理性根本无法给予神圣以任何的界定,正是说明了存在着所谓的"界限",而神圣即是作为界限以外的存在,任何未经启蒙承认的对象,均纳入排拒在认识活动"之外","神圣"渐渐地成了一种"现代异端"。

关于"神圣",我们确实是无法谈论它,我们对它的谈论仅仅是谈论它是如何被"划分"出来的。因此,重要在于要找出此一"划分"的动作,经由对此"划分"的理解,才找出某种属于体验以及"界限"或"外边"所取着的作用的"东西"。模拟的说,这是一种比传统的否定神学更为激进的做法,不是经由"否定"通往"肯定",而是对于"否定"本身进行考察,对那种叫着"否定神学"的东西给予"界线",不是通往"外边",而是由"外边"自己起作用。这即是"越界"(transgression)的问题。

法国思想家从布朗肖(Maurice Blanchot),经巴塔耶到福柯,都

把握到理性的界限,并指出"神圣"作为一种"域外"的事务如何形成一种"异己感"(otherness)或他者,并且,这种异己感最终通过"越界"的方式以予呈现作一种可能,神圣即是以这种突破理性界限的方式重新进入我们的生活世界之中。这是一种"冥暗的神圣黑夜"。

<div align="center">一</div>

  福柯一生的工作都在面对"界线"。如果《外边思维》(*La pensée du dehors*)、《词与物》(*Les mots et les choses*)是这时期试图到达"外边"(*dehors*)的脚注,那么《疯狂史》就是福柯思想的主要内文。在《外边思维》中,福柯企图转化"否定神学"(negative theology),"否定神学"的路线原本是通过不停的否定,最终显露言说的无力。但是福柯认为"否定神学"始终还是在"论述"——"尽管他是一种沉默,但最终还是找回了自己。"①福柯将焦点集中在对布朗肖(Maurice Blanchot)的阅读,通过对自反性语言的虚空满盈,使得字词无尽地展开的纯粹外边。利用语言不停的自反到达开启与穿越界线。福柯以"越界"(*transgression*)之方式来"逼近"否定神学所"否定"的,对于早期的他而言,语言确实是穿越界线,开启外边的重要关键,到了后期,则发现谈论界线并不能取消界线,通过语言亦无法取消界线,理性既通过言说来对"疯狂"进行把握。②

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  ① 福柯:《外边思维》,洪维信译(台北:行人出版社,2003 年),第 92 页。[Michel Foucault, *The Thought from Outside* (*La Pensee du dehors*), tras. Hong Weixin (Taipei: Flâneur, 2003), 92.]

  ② Arthur Bradley, *Negative Theology and Modern French Philosophy* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003); James W. Bernauer, *Michel Foucault's Force of Flight: Towards an Ethics for Thought* (London: Humanities, 1990).

如果理性既通过言说来对"疯狂"进行把握,理性早已将"疯狂"加以吸纳,那我们如何能找出"疯狂"甚至"神圣"呢?福柯在《古典时代疯狂史》第一版的序言说道:"在历史中努力回到疯狂历史的零度,在那儿,他是未被区分的经验,是尚未分割的分割自身的经验。"①这里我们看到福柯工作的框架。福柯提出了几个面向的问题:历史(histoire)、本源(origin)、体验与划分,藉此论述这个界线的历史或者本源是否可能。福柯认为文化历史本身就已是划分的产物,他给了这个问题一个解答:"我们只有在划分的行动中,并且由它开始,才能把它们构想为尚未分离的尘埃。"②

也就是说,在《古典时代疯狂史》里,福柯绝非想要通过历史听到疯人讲话(fou),相反,它是理性对自身的考古批判,找出理性如何捕捉疯狂的历史。正是在疯狂被捕捉的历史中,同时也是"神圣"的陨落史。因此,福柯发现要谈论疯狂,不是说出疯狂是什么,亦不是通过理性否定理性,那都如同否定神学一样早已预设了一个肯定的事物。福柯认为,对于疯狂的言说应该是通过对疯狂的"体验"(expérience)的描述,即将此"体验"的过程重现,让"体验"来自我描述,即它是如何成为"疯狂"的。

然而,究竟有没有一种纯粹的"疯狂"?福柯认为,纯粹的疯狂是不可能的。谈论"疯狂"也不是为了否定理性,福柯也早已意识到完全拒绝理性就如同想找出疯狂的本源一样是自相矛盾的。所以福柯才说道:"在我们的文化中,没有疯狂就没有理智。贯穿西

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① 福柯:"第一版序言",收录于《福柯集》,杜小真选编(上海:上海远东出版社,2003年),第1页。[Foucault, "Preface of the First Edition," in *Works of Michel Foucault*, ed. Du Xiaozhen (Shanghai: Far East Press, 2003), 1.]

② 福柯:《古典时代疯狂史》,林志明译(台北:时报文化出版公司,1998年),第 XLIX 页。[Foucault, *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, trans. Lin Zhiming (Taipei: China Times Publishing Co., 1998), XLIX.]

方历史的疯狂的必然性是与这个决定互伴相连的。"①理性终究无法摆脱它所试图言说对象的幽灵，尽管理性不断的对疯狂进行言说，试图将自身与疯狂划分开来，但福柯认为最终必然是徒劳无功的，因为所有对"疯狂"的辨认，都早已显示理性自身已含有对疯狂的认知结构。"理性在无理者身上辨认出疯人的负面性，但也在所有疯的合理内容中认出自身。"②同样的，既然我们无法言说"疯狂"，那又如何言说"神圣"呢？尤其当神圣成为如同疯狂般不可言说的时候，我们又要如何避免掉入另一种划分之中？福柯从理性对于"神圣"划分的痕迹，提出了一种"神圣的体验"：

> 现在问题不再是要求人的理性放弃其骄傲和确定，以便使它可以迷失在牺牲的伟大非理性之中。当古典时代的基督教谈及十字架上的疯狂时，目的只是要打压一种假理性，以便使得真理性散放出永恒的光辉；下凡为人的神，祂的疯狂其实便是智能，只是生活在尘世中的非理性的人，不能认出它来；"被钉上十字架的耶稣……曾经是尘世中的丑闻，世俗眼光中的无知和疯狂。"如今尘世已经接受了基督教，通过历史的波折和人们的疯狂所表露出来的神的秩序，也足以显示目前"基督已成为吾人智慧的顶点"。

二

中世纪时期，十字架上的疯狂让人的一切理性降服，在伟大的

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① 《福柯集》，第 6 页。［Foucault, *Works of Michel Foucault*, 6.］
② 福柯：《古典时代疯狂史》，第 237 页。［Foucault, *Madness and Civilization*: *A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, 237.］

牺牲中，人交付了自身给疯狂。到了十七世纪，这一切都改变了，这即是福柯所谓的疯狂批判意识起点。我们注意到，在加尔文（John Calvin）那里，疯狂成为理性的对立面，尽管是理性的，但疯狂的内容却还是隐匿的。人在众多的神圣疯狂中，找到了智慧的痕迹，十字架上的疯狂成为上帝智慧设计的最高点，一旦疯狂的批判意识大量的涌入时，歌颂上帝的智慧却成了疯狂批判意识最重要的工作，这些智慧也成为了疯狂的内容。加尔文的论点在福柯看来，正是一种来自于基督教在自我划分："现在是基督教徒自己把基督教的非理性排斥在理性边缘。"①加尔文神学表现的，正是基督教理性的诞生，意味着所针对的就是属于基督教非理性的部分，渐渐地，基督教理性显然无法接受上帝十字架上死亡的荣耀是一项丑闻，上帝的旨意与恩典势必需要理性才能被人所理解，"基督教教义"如是诞生了，韦伯笔下的"新教伦理"不正是这样一种"理性"的产物吗？

一则有趣的讲道词如此说到：

我的主阿，您曾志愿成为犹太人眼中的丑闻、异教徒眼中的疯狂；你曾志愿露出发狂的外表；是的，就像《圣经》中记载，我们的救主曾志愿被当作疯人看待，要人相信祂进入了狂怒状态。"他们说祂这时进入狂怒之中（*Dicebant quoniam in furorem versus est*）。"使徒们有时把祂看成一位动怒之人，而祂之所以如此，是要他们见证，证明祂曾怜悯我们所有的残疾弱点，并使我们所有的痛苦状态成为圣洁，以此教导他们以及我们要对落入这些残

① 福柯：《古典时代疯狂史》，第 203 页。[Foucault, *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, 203.]

疾弱点中的人心存悲悯。①

福柯藉此为我们指出,基督教不应该忘记基督的一生都充满着疯狂的力量,对罪恶的宽恕、贫穷的生活、各各他山上丑闻般的死亡。上帝成为众人的羞辱、也成为了外邦人中的丑闻,上帝居然死在羞辱之中,上帝还能被称为上帝嘛?这种死亡,不是英雄荣耀的死亡,而是成为罪犯和强盗一同被钉十字架,祂是羞辱的死亡。祂不是远离群众,默默地进行,而是大张旗鼓,遭受众人的污辱;祂不是荣耀的踏上征途,而是头带荆棘,裸露遭鞭伤的身躯,从耶路撒冷一路走到各各他山上的丑闻展示。可见,这些丑闻不能够被放入理性之内理解,也不应被视为疯狂。十字架的事件就该被视作神圣事件,或者正确地说,神圣疯狂体验就是连结在十字架上的丑闻之中。

三

总之,在"疯狂"被理性压制的年代,"神圣"也无可避免地被理性归类至"疯狂"之列中,或者,它也成为一种欲被理性把握和言说的对象,这与福柯认为"疯狂"被理性划分如出一辙。因此,"神圣"看来也早已随着"疯狂"一同遭到压制。②我们可以通过福柯《古典时代疯狂史》中关于"疯狂"的种种体验的描述,找出个中的"神圣"

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① 《布道辞》引用于 ABELLY,《神之使者,可敬的凡森·德·保罗的一生》(*Vie du venerable serviteru de Dieu Vincent de Paul*),Paris,1664,t. I,第 198 页。转引自《古典时代疯狂史》,第 202 页。[Cited from *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, trans. Lin Zhiming, 202.]

② 参见 J. D. Caputo, "On not knowing who we are: madness, hermeneutics and the night of truth in Foucault," in *Michel Foucault and theology: the politics of religious expérience*, ed. James Bernauer and Jeremy Carrette (Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004).

体验,并且解析"疯狂"、"神圣"的关联处以及如何被理性"异常"的划作同路人。同对待"疯狂"一样,我们并不期待能说出关于"神圣"是什么,而且也注定不可能找到一种纯粹的"神圣"或"神圣"的本源。通过布朗肖、巴塔耶和福柯的思路,寻访在"疯狂"走过并留下的"神圣"之足迹,走在一条"越界"式的"神圣"的"疯狂体验"或"疯狂"的"神圣体验",以及隐藏于诸多"体验"下的"疯狂的神圣"和"神圣的疯狂"。

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The Sacred and Transgression

Chin Ken Pa, Chung Yuan Christian University, Taiwan

Since the rise of rationalism from the Age of Enlightenment, any discourses on holiness would be inevitably be understood as the opposite of reason. The subject of discussion is then treated as the "unspeakable". Actually, the fact that reason cannot give a definition to holiness indicates that there is a "boundary", and holiness refers to the Being beyond the boundary. Since any object denied by Enlightenment is considered "outside" of the epistemological activity, "holiness" has gradually become a "modern heresy".

Admittedly, we cannot talk about "holiness". All our talks are about how it has been "delimited". Therefore, the key is to identify the action of "delimiting". Only by understanding the "delimiting" can we find what is beyond the "boundary" or "outside" yet is still in effect. Analogously speaking, this is a more radical approach than traditional negative theology. "Negation" is no longer the way to "affirmation", but is examined itself. A "boundary" is given to what is called "negative theology"; the "outside" is no longer a means but functioning itself. This is the problem of transgression.

French thinkers from Maurice Blanchot, Georges Bataille to Michel

Foucault have all apprehended the limit of reason, and pointed out how "holiness" as the "extra-territorial" takes on "otherness" and becomes the Other. Moreover, this otherness presents itself as a possibility by means of "transgression". Holiness reenters our life-world by breaking the boundary of reason. This is a "dark night of holiness".

1.

Throughout his life, Foucault had been dealing with "boundary". If *The Thought from Outside* (*La Pensée du Dehors*), *The Order of Things* (*Les Mots et les Choses*) are footnotes that are attempts to reach the "outside" (*dehors*), then *History of Madness* is the corpus carrying his major thought. In *The Thought from Outside*, Foucault tries to transform negative theology. The approach of negative theology was an incessant negation to expose the powerlessness of speaking. However, Foucault asserts that "negative theology" remains a discourse itself, "it finds itself in the end, though it is silent".[①] Foucault puts his focus on reading the works of Maurice Blanchot. By emptying and filling the reflexive language, words can carry on their endless expansion to the pure "outside". The infinite reflexivity of language makes it possible to reach an opening and go beyond the boundary. By means of transgression, Foucault "approaches" what negative theology negates. In his early years, Foucault would admit that language is the key to break the boundary and open up the outside. But later he discovers that one cannot cancel the

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① Foucault, *Maurice Blanchot: The Thought from Outside*, in *Foucault/Blanchot*, trans. Jeffrey Mehlman and Brian Massumi (New York: Zone Books, 1989), 19.

boundary by talking about it, or through the use of language. Reason has taken hold of "madness" with the rational discourse.[1]

If reason can take hold of "madness" by discourse, then reason has already absorbed "madness". How can we identify "madness" or even "holiness"? In the preface of the first edition of *History of Madness*, Foucault says, "An effort is to be made in history to trace the starting point of the history of insanity. Back then, it was an undifferentiated experience, an experience of self-differentiation that has not yet been differentiated."[2] We can see Foucault's framework from this statement. In order to expound whether the history or origin of the boundary line is possible, he has come up with several themes: history (*histoire*), origin, experience, and classification. Foucault believes that the concept of cultural history itself is a product of the classification. He gives his answer: "Only when we are in the action of differentiating and starting with differentiation can we construct them as un-disintegrated dust."[3]

That is to say, in *History of Madness*, what Foucault aims to do is not to hear the voice of the mad (*fou*) throughout history. On the contrary, it is an archeological criticism of reason carried out by reason itself, in order to discover how reason would apprehend the history of madness. The history of madness being apprehended is the very history of

① Bradley Arthur, *Negative Theology and Modern French Philosophy* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003); Bernauer, James W, *Michel Foucault's Force of Flight: Towards an Ethics for Thought* (London: Humanities, 1990).

② Foucault, "Preface", *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, trans. Richard Howard(London: Routledge, 1997), xi-xii.

③ Foucault, "Preface to the Second Edition," *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, trans. Richard Howard, xiv.

the falling of "holiness". Therefore, Foucault finds out that talking about madness is not to identify what madness is or to negate reason by reasoning. Like negative theology, it has pre-supposed something affirmative. Foucault believes that the discourse on madness has to be a description of the experience (*expérience*) of madness. That is to say, it is a re-presentation of the experience in which "experience" describes itself; i.e. how it comes to be "madness".

However, is there a kind of pure "madness"? Foucault maintains that a pure madness is impossible. Talking about "madness" is not to negate reason. Foucault has realized that a full negation of reason is self-contradictory, the same as finding the origin of madness. That is why he says, "In our civilization, there can be no reason if there is no madness. The necessity of madness all through the Western history is linked with this decision."[1] Reason cannot get rid of the specter of what it tries to talk about. Reason has been continuously trying to talk about madness and separate itself from madness. However, it is useless in Foucault's eyes; for all recognition of "madness" has shown that reason itself includes the cognitive construction of madness. "Reason recognizes in the irrational being the negativity of a madman, while recognizing itself in all the rational contents of madness."[2] In the same way, since we cannot speak of "madness", how can we speak of "holiness", especially when holiness is as unspeakable as madness? How can we avoid the trap of another

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① Foucault, "Preface to the First Edition," in *Histoire de la Folie à L'Age Classique* (Paris : Gallimard, 1961), 7.

② Foucault, *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, trans. Richard Howard, 19.

classification?

In the Middle Ages, madness of the Cross has subdued all reason. Man has given himself up to madness. However, by the 17th century, everything has changed. This is what Foucault calls the "starting point of the critical consciousness of madness". We have noticed that to John Calvin, madness is the opposite of reason. The content of madness is rational yet is still hidden. In the numerous cases of holy madness, man finds traces of wisdom. Madness of the Cross is the very apex of God's intellectual design. Once the critical consciousness of madness overwhelms, praising the wisdom of God becomes the most important activity, and the wisdom itself becomes content of madness. To Foucault, Calvin's arguments have originated from a kind of Christian self-classification, "Now it is the Christians themselves who are excluding the irrational from the edge of reason." [1] What Calvinistic theology reveals is the birth of Christian rationalism, with its targets on the irrational elements of Christianity. Gradually, Christian rationalism finds the glory of a God who dies on a Cross a scandal. The will and grace of God requires to be understood by reason, thus the "Christian doctrines" came into being. Isn't Weber's "protestant ethics" a product of such "rationalization"?

Foucault is pointing out to us that Christianity should not forget that

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[1] Foucault, *Madness and Civilization : A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, trans. Richard Howard, 19.

in his entire life, Christ is filled with "insane" powers. He forgives sins, lives a poor life, dies a scandalous death in Golgotha. God has become a public shame, a disgrace among the gentiles. Can God be called God at all, if he dies in shame? This death is not a heroic and glorious death, but a shameful death with criminals and robbers. He does not proceed in silent and seclusion, but suffers public insult. He does not embark on a glorious journey, but wears a crown of thorns, his naked body raw from the lashes. Stumbling his way from Jerusalem to Golgotha, he has become a public exhibition of shame. Therefore, these cannot be understood by reason, nor should they be viewed as sheer madness. The event of the Cross should be viewed as a holy event. Or more correctly, the experience of divine madness is linked with the scandal of the Cross.

3.

All in all, in the ages when "madness" is suppressed by reason, "holiness" is unavoidably classified by reason as "madness". In other words, it has become something to be apprehended and spoken of by reason. This agrees with Foucault's idea: "madness" has been classified by reason. That is why "holiness" seems to be suppressed along with "madness".[1] In Foucault's *History of Madness*, we can find experiences of "holiness" in the experiences of "madness". From this we can see the affinity of "madness" and "holiness", as well as how they have both been

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[1] See J. D. Caputo, "On not knowing who we are: madness, hermeneutics and the night of truth in Foucault," in *Michel Foucault and theology*: *the politics of religious experience*, ed. James Bernauer and Jeremy Carrette (Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004).