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*A Research on the Restraints of Government Pursuit upon
Russian Transitional Economic Policies*



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序

殷红的学术专著《俄罗斯转轨经济政策中政府诉求约束研究》，是在其博士论文的基础上修改而成的。我认为，这是近年来转轨经济学领域一部具有开创意义的研究成果。

转轨是20世纪末期以来令世人瞩目的问题，在转轨国家中俄罗斯颇具典型性。关于俄罗斯转轨一直是转轨经济学研究的重点方向，而“休克疗法”等转轨经济政策，更是转轨研究的焦点问题。学者们从不同的角度、运用各种理论加以解释和评说，可以说，有关研究几乎穷尽了世人对转轨问题的所有认知和理解，对俄罗斯转轨的解读也比较深刻。尽管如此，关于俄罗斯转轨在学术界仍存有争议，一些问题并未真正解决，比如叶利钦政府为何选择休克疗法式的激进转轨政策？或者说，这一转轨政策的背后有着怎样的动机和追求？政府是转轨的推动者、决策人，其动机和目标是否会对转轨政策产生关键性的影响？带着这些疑问，本书作者将研究视角转向了政府——转轨政策的制定主体，从政府的经济人性质出发，提出了“政府诉求”的概念，构建了政府诉求解释转轨经济政策的理论框架，并在此基础上对俄罗斯转轨作出了重新的解读和评价。

无论是研究视角，还是在方法论上，本书都独具特色，在理论上实现了重大突破，具体表现在如下三个方面：

（一）作者突破了以往围绕转轨政策本身的政治经济分析，而是追根溯源，从转轨政策的源头，即政策的制定者——政府入手，通过对其行为动机和目标的剖析，探究转轨政策产生的客观过程，这为更加合理、公正地解读俄罗斯转轨提供了一种新途径。

（二）本书以“政府是经济人”作为理论基点，但突破了公共选择理论中狭隘的政府利己主义，从政府的地位、影响等特殊经济

人的性质出发，强调政府具有维护公众利益的利他动机，当然这在很大程度上是受到政权合法性的约束。在将政府的自利性与利他性进行综合的方法论基础上，作者分析了政府制定经济决策的动机和目标，并将之概括为“政府诉求”。在对政府诉求概念进行规范、系统的梳理之后，作者又提出了影响和决定政府诉求的内生条件，即意识形态、政治稳定、经济因素及外部环境，并对每种条件对政府诉求的影响进行了静态与动态的分析。至此，作者构建出政府诉求解释转轨经济政策的理论框架，从而为转轨政策的实证分析提供了一种新的理论方法和工具。

（三）从政府诉求视角审视俄罗斯转轨，我们发现，叶利钦政府采取激进的休克疗法启动转轨，即使是不合适的，但却是不可避免的。试图通过彻底摧垮传统制度的基础、建立改革的政治不可逆转，是叶利钦政府树立的改革目标，而采取大破大立的休克疗法则是实现这一目标的实施途径。

政府诉求理论的构建是建立在当代西方经济学理论的基础上，同时又是对已有理论的融合与发展。制度变迁理论中的国家理论和意识形态理论，公共选择理论的政府经济人思想等，都是本文理论构建的思想来源。可以认为，其理论构建的基础是扎实、可信的。

在本论文的答辩过程中，由来自南开大学、吉林大学以及辽宁大学的知名教授组成的答辩委员会，对该论文给予了很高的评价，认为这是“转轨经济学研究领域的前沿”、“具有开创性的论文”、“是一篇优秀的论文”。作为老师，看到学生的辛勤努力换来了丰硕的成果，不禁感到由衷的欣慰。我相信殷红博士能够继续努力，坚持不懈，以更加饱满的热情投身于经济学的事业中，在学术研究的道路上有更大的作为。

程 伟

摘 要

截至 2008 年，俄罗斯经济转轨已经走过 16 个年头，在历史的长河中这只是弹指一挥间，然而，对于俄罗斯来讲，却是国家命运发生重大转折的历史时期。这期间俄罗斯经历两位总统，他们给俄罗斯带来了不同的命运。叶利钦时期经济持续衰退并陷入全面危机，而普京时期经济快速增长、政治经济形势全面好转。对此，一些学者判定，这是由于叶利钦政府制定了错误的转轨经济政策，特别是以休克疗法实施经济转轨，是一种根本错误的选择；普京政府制定了正确的经济政策和措施，因而带来经济形势的全面好转。对于这种过于简单的理解，一些严肃的学者显然不会同意，于是他们从初始条件、政治约束等角度出发，将研究的注意力转向政策背后的客观条件及历史原因，从中得出更加客观、合理的解释。尽管如此，关于俄罗斯转轨政策仍存有疑问，比如究竟如何评价转轨初期的休克疗法，学界并没有形成共识。这是因为现有解释仍然不能反映事实的全貌，因而对其评价仍显得不够客观、合理。在现有研究中几个关键的问题显然被忽略了，叶利钦政府何以制定休克疗法式的激进转轨政策？普京政府为何建立可控的市场经济？政府决策的动机是什么？产生这些动机的原因又是什么？政府是经济转轨的推动者、决策人，是经济政策制定的主体，政府的目的必然对经济决策产生直接的影响。因此，关注并解释经济决策背后的政府动机和目的，应当是理解以及评价转轨经济政策的关键。本书从政府目的出发，提出政府诉求新理论，并运用这一理论重新解读俄罗斯的转

轨经济政策。只有当我们从各个角度去观察俄罗斯的经济转轨时，它的面貌才会更加完整、性质才会更加清晰，对其评价才能更加全面、客观，也更接近科学。

分析政府的行为动机和目的，其必要性源自政府的性质。根据公共选择理论，政府是理性经济人，政府制定经济决策的目标是追求其私利的最大化。政府的私利在于维护和巩固政权、谋求连任等。该理论认为，政府在制定经济决策时因为谋私而被利益集团俘获，结果是损害经济效率，造成政府失灵，因此政府干预经济是有害而无益的。政府诉求理论沿用政府经济人这一理论基点，但认为，利益集团是政治体系中的次体系，不能构成经济决策的主导力量，在经济决策中发挥决定性和主导性作用的是政府。同时政府诉求理论认为，作为理性经济人，政府谋求私利，然而，作为国家的载体，政府也能超越经济人的自利性，拥有更高的追求，即谋求公众利益和国家利益。“国家要对经济的增长、停滞或衰退负最终责任”。国家/政府的职责促使它努力维护和提高公众利益、国家利益。同时，国家的特殊地位和影响决定其目标不仅仅是谋求私利，维护和提高社会整体利益、国家利益同样是政府追求的目标。维护和提高公众利益，意味着政府获得大多数民众的支持，民众的支持标志着政权的合法性，政权合法性即意味着政权的巩固和稳定。可见，政府这一特殊经济人在谋求私利时必须兼顾公众利益，政府不能为所欲为。

政府也不是无所不能。由于受到现实条件的约束，政府常常要在各种利益之间做出权衡和选择。政府诉求绝非一般意义上的政府目标，它是政府在个体利益与整体利益、少数人利益与多数人利益、社会利益与国家利益，特别是政治利益与经济利益之间做出权衡后选择的有重大意义的政府目标。政府诉求不是既定的，它始终处于动态的形成与调整当中。决定和影响政府诉求产生及发生变化的主要因素有：意识形态、政治环境、经济条件和经济形势以及外部环境。这些因素在不同的客观条件和历史环境下，对政府诉求产

生不同影响，其作用的主次地位不断地转换，从而带动政府诉求不断地发生转变。政府诉求决定经济政策的方向和内容，并间接地影响经济政治的结果。

在上述理论思想的基础上，本书构建了政府诉求解释转轨经济政策的基本分析框架。这就是，首先提出转轨经济政策中的政府诉求，它们既是政府明确提出的目标，也是隐含在经济政策背后的政府意图。政府诉求是内生的，因而是可实证的，所以接下来从制约和影响政府诉求产生、变化的因素，即意识形态、政治环境、经济条件和经济形势以及外部环境四个方面，分别对政府诉求的形成进行论证。最后从政府诉求的角度出发理解和评价转轨经济政策带来的经济政治结果。运用构建的理论框架分析俄罗斯不同时期的政府诉求，及其对转轨经济政策的直接影响和对经济政治结果的间接影响，是本书研究的任务所在。鉴于政府诉求不是一般意义的政府目标，所以研究集中于俄罗斯转轨时期具有重要意义的转轨经济政策。这些经济政策既决定根本性制度结构如产权制度的性质，也反映转轨经济模式以及国家发展道路。转轨初期的休克疗法以及股权换贷款私有化政策、普京时期可控的市场经济决策以及新能源政策，符合上述含义，因而成为政府诉求实证分析的对象。

通过实证分析，本书得出一些结论和启示。从叶利钦到普京，俄罗斯的经济形势发生了巨大变化。这与两个时期采取不同的转轨经济政策和措施有着密切的关系。这些政策和措施表明，从叶利钦到普京，俄罗斯的转轨模式及发展道路发生了重大转变。决定这一重大转变的关键因素是政府诉求发生了变化。从叶利钦时期建立改革不可逆转的政治目标，转向了普京时期通过建立可控市场经济实现强国富民的发展目标。促使政府诉求发生变化的是不同的历史环境和客观条件，从意识形态到政治环境，从经济条件、经济形势到外部政治经济环境，都不同程度地对政府诉求产生影响并形成约束。从政府诉求角度的分析，加深了我们对俄罗斯经济转轨的理解，比如转轨初期实施的激进的休克疗法，在政府诉求理论的解释

下，这一经济决策显示出其客观的合理性及必然性，正如有学者指出的，“俄罗斯经济转轨启用激进方式，即使是不合适的，但却是不可避免的”。

政府诉求理论的提出对经济学特别是政治经济学具有重要的意义。首先，它拓展了这一领域研究的视角和范式。政府是经济决策的主导力量，作为理性经济人，政府有追求自身利益最大化的动机和目标，任何忽视对政府及其行为动机、目标的研究都可能导致片面或不客观；其次，政府诉求理论从政府经济人的特殊性出发，纠正了公共选择理论的偏颇和片面，指出政府的目标不仅是谋求私利，而且还包括维护和提高公众利益。因此，更为重要的意义是，政府诉求理论表明，在一定的历史条件下政府干预经济是必要且有益的，例如普京政府对能源战略部门采取的经济干预和整治，是将有利的外部行情转化为俄罗斯经济全面好转的关键因素。政府诉求理论论证了政府干预经济的意义所在。

政府诉求理论的出现对经济学家提出了新要求。第一，经济学家为政府提供政策建议时，既要提出纯经济的政策目标和工具，这是必要的参考系；同时经济学家如果也考虑到政府诉求，并提出进一步的、折中性的建议，或者是为政策制定者描绘政策可能带来的各种后果，站在政府的立场，设身处地替政府着想，那么提供的建议可能更有现实性，因而更可能被政府采纳。第二，经济学家的职责之一是全面、客观、科学地解释经济政策。而任何具有上述意义的对经济政策的理解和评价，都不应当忽视对政府诉求问题的考察和研究，否则将是片面、失实的，因而也是不科学的。

ABSTRACT

As of 2008 the economic transition has gone through 16 years in Russia. It is only a very short period of time in the history of mankind, however, for Russia, this is a historical phase in which great transition in the nation's fate has taken place. During this period, several presidents who have brought different fates to Russia have been in power. The Yeltsin period witnessed the continuous slump in economy and the occurrence of full-scale crisis, whereas in the Putin period, the economy has grown at a rapid speed, the political and economic situations have taken a favourable turn in an all round way. As for the two phenomena, Some scholars hold that the wrong transitional economic policy made by the Yeltsin government, especially the application of shock therapy to the economic transition, is totally a wrong decision. The Putin government has formulated correct economic policies and measures, thus leading to the improvement in the economic situation. This is an over-simple understanding with which rigorous scholars would evidently disagree. Therefore, they proceeded from the perspectives such as initial condition and the political restriction, focusing their research on the objective condition and the historical causes behind the policy, so as to obtain a more objective and reasonable explanation. Nevertheless, questions over the Russian transitional policy still exist, such as how to evaluate the shock therapy at the early stage of the transition, on which the academic circle has not reached a consensus. This is because the current explanations cannot present a full picture of the facts, and therefore, the evaluation still does

not seem to be objective and reasonable. Some key issues are obviously neglected in the current research. Why did the Yeltsin government formulate the radical transitional policy of shock therapy? Why has the Putin government set up a controllable market economy? What are the motivations for the government to make those decisions? What has caused these motivations? The government is the propellant and the decision-maker of the economic transition, as well as the subject in formulating the economic policy. It is definite that the goal of the government would directly influence the economic policy; hence the key to the understanding and evaluation of the transitional economic policy is to explain and pay attention to the government's motive and goal, which lie behind the economic policy. This book proceeds from the goal of the government, proposes the new theory of government appeal, and uses the theory to re-interpret the transitional economic policy in Russia. Only when examined from various perspectives, could the physiognomy of the economic transition in Russia be more complete, its features more distinct, and the evaluation be more comprehensive, objective, and more scientific.

The necessity of analyzing the motive and the goal of the government originates from the features of it. According to Public Choice Theory, government is a rational economic man, whose goal of formulating economic policy is to gain the maximum private interests. The private interests of the government lie in safeguarding and stabilizing the regime, seeking the successive term, etc. The theory holds that when formulating economic policies, the government is influenced by interest groups in pursuing its private interests, which results in the impairment of economic efficiency and the failure of the government. Therefore, the government's interference in economy does more harm than good. The Government Pursuit Theory still holds the theoretic base that the government is an economic man, but it believes that the interest group is the subsystem of the

political system and can not be the leading power in making economic decision, and that the government plays a decisive and dominant role in making economic decisions. Meanwhile, Government Pursuit Theory holds that the government, as a rational economic man, will pursue private interests, while as the carrier of the nation, the government can exceed the self-interest of the economic man and has a higher pursuit—the pursuit of the public and national interests. “The government should take the ultimate responsibility of its economic growth, stagnation or recession.” The duty towards the nation prompts the government to safeguard and promote public and national interests. Meanwhile, determined by the special status and influence of the government, its goal should not merely be the pursuit of private interests. Maintaining and promoting the collective social interests and national interests is also the goal of the government. To safeguard and promote public interests means that government will have the support of the people, which makes the regime legitimate. A legitimate regime means that it is consolidated and stabilized. It is clear that as a special economic man, the government must take public interests into consideration when pursuing its private interests. The government cannot do whatever it wants at random.

The government is not omnipotent. Due to the restriction of the actual conditions, the government often balances and makes a choice between different interests. Government Pursuit is not the goal of the government in its general sense. It is the significant goal of the government after balancing the private and collective interests, minority and majority interests, social and national interests, especially political and economic interests. Government appeal is not fixed. It is always in the dynamic process of formation and adjustment. The factors that decide and influence the emergence and the change of government Pursuit are as follows: ideology, political environment, economic condition and economic situa-

tion, as well as external environment. These factors, in different objective conditions and historical environment, have various influences on government appeal, and their functional positions change continuously, thus leading to the consistent change in government pursuit. Government pursuit determines the direction and content of economic policy, and indirectly influences the result of economic policy.

Based on the above-mentioned theory, this book builds the analytical framework of applying government pursuit to the explanation of transitional economic policy. Namely, the government appeal in transitional economic policy is firstly proposed, which is not only the goal set by the government, but also the intention of the government implied behind the economic policy. The government pursuit is inherent, thus it can be substantiated. Therefore, the formation of government pursuit is demonstrated respectively in the following four aspects: ideology, political environment, economic condition and economic situation, as well as external environment, which are the factors that restrict and influence the emergence and the change of government appeal. Finally, from the perspective of government pursuit, the economic and political result brought about by transitional economic policy is understood and evaluated. The goal of this book is to apply the theoretical framework to the analysis of government pursuit in different periods of Russia as well as its direct influences of transitional economic policy and indirect influences of economic political result. Since government pursuit is not the goal of the government in its general sense, the research concentrates on the significant transitional economic policy in the transitional period of Russia. These economic policies not only determine the features of fundamental institutional structure such as property order, but also reflect the transitional economic modes and the development of the nation. The shock therapy and the privatization policy of exchanging equity with loan at the early stage of the transition, the

decision of controllable market economy as well as New Energy Policy in the Putin period all conform with the implication mentioned above, thus becoming the objects of empirical analysis of government pursuit.

This book has drawn conclusions and insights from the empirical analysis. Great changes which took place in the economic situation of Russia from the reign of Yeltsin to Putin are closely related to the different transitional economic policies and measures in these two periods. The policies and measures have shown the significant transition in the transitional mode and the development of Russia from Yeltsin to Putin. The key factor that determines the significant transition is the change in government pursuit, which is transformed from the political goal of irreversible reform set up during the Yeltsin period to the developmental goal of making Russia and its people more prosperous by setting up a controllable market economy in the Putin period. It is the different historical environments and the objective conditions that lead to the change in government pursuit. Various factors, from ideology to political environment, from economic condition and economic situation to external political economic environment, have exerted their influences on the government and have become the restraint factors to some degree. The analysis from the perspective of government pursuit has enhanced our understanding of the economic transition in Russia. Take the radical shock therapy adopted at the early stage of transition for example, when explained by Government Pursuit Theory, this economic policy has shown its objective rationality and inevitability. As some scholars have pointed out, "even though the radical way of economic transition in Russia is not suitable, it is inevitable."

Government Pursuit Theory is of great significance in economics, especially in political economics. Firstly, it has broadened the horizon and increased the paradigms of research in this field. The government is a dominant force in making the economic policy. As a rational economic

man, the government has the motivation and the goal to realize its maximum private interests. Any study that overlooks the motivation and the goal of government would be unilateral or subjective. Secondly, proceeding from the distinctiveness of government as an economic man, Government Pursuit Theory rectifies the bias and unilateral Public Choice Theory, by pointing out that the goal of the government is not only to pursue its private gain, but to safeguard and promote public interests as well. Therefore, as Government Pursuit Theory indicates, a more significant point is that it is essential and beneficial for the government to intervene in economy. Under certain historical conditions, it is necessary for the government to intervene in economy, such as the economic intervention and renovation in the energy sector by the Putin government, which was a key factor of transforming a beneficial external market into the overall improvement in Russian economy. Government Pursuit Theory demonstrates the significance of governmental economic intervention.

The emergence of Government Pursuit Theory has made new requests to economists. Firstly, when presenting policy proposal to the government, economists should propose pure-economic policy objectives and instruments, which is a necessary reference frame. Meanwhile, if economists have government pursuit in mind and propose a further and moderate suggestion, or describe possible results of the policy for its makers, meanwhile putting themselves in the position of the government, then the proposal might be more realistic, thus more likely to be adopted by the government. Secondly, one of the responsibilities of economists is to give an overall, objective and scientific explanation to the economic policy. Any understanding and evaluation of economic policy with the above-mentioned implication should not neglect investigation and research in government pursuit, otherwise, it would be unilateral and dishonest, and therefore, unscientific.

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