



XIANDIN RULIA DE DEDOE SHIJE

# 先秦儒家的道德世界


许建良 著

中国社会科学出版社



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国家“985”哲学社会科学创新基地  
东南大学“科技伦理与艺术”项目成果

## 总 序

东南大学的伦理学科起步于 20 世纪 80 年代前期，由著名哲学家、伦理学家萧焜焘教授、王育殊教授创立，90 年代初开始组建一支由青年博士构成的年轻的学科梯队，至 90 年代中期，这个团队基本实现了博士化。在学界前辈和各界朋友的关爱与支持下，东南大学的伦理学科得到了较大的发展。自 20 世纪末以来，我本人和我们团队的同仁一直在思考和探索一个问题：我们这个团队应当和可能为中国伦理学事业的发展作出怎样的贡献？换言之，东南大学的伦理学科应当形成和建立什么样的特色？我们很明白，没有特色的学术，其贡献总是有限的。2005 年，我们的伦理学科被批准为“985 工程”国家哲学社会科学创新基地，这个历史性的跃进推动了我们对这个问题的思考。经过认真讨论并向学界前辈和同仁求教，我们将自己的学科特色和学术贡献点定位于三个方面：道德哲学、科技伦理和重大应用。

以道德哲学为第一建设方向的定位基于这样的认识：伦理学在一级学科上属于哲学，其研究及其成果必须具有充分的哲学基础和足够的哲学含量；当今中国伦理学和道德哲学的诸多理论和现实课题必须在道德哲学的层面探讨和解决。道德哲学研究立志并致力于道德哲学的一些重大乃至尖端性的理论课题的探讨。在这个被称为“后哲学”的时代，伦理学研究中这种对哲学的执

著、眷念和回归，着实是一种“明知不可为而为之”之举，但我们坚信，它是我们这个时代稀缺的学术资源和学术努力。科技伦理的定位是依据我们这个团队的历史传统、东南大学的学科生态，以及对伦理道德发展的新前沿而作出的判断和谋划。东南大学最早的研究生培养方向就是“科学伦理学”，当年我本人就在这个方向下学习和研究；而东南大学以科学技术为主体、文管艺医综合发展的学科生态，也使我们这些 90 年代初成长起来的“新生代”再次认识到，选择科技伦理为学科生长点是明智之举。如果说道德哲学与科技伦理的定位与我们的学科传统有关，那么，重大应用的定位就是基于对伦理学的现实本性以及为中国伦理道德建设作出贡献愿望和抱负而作出的选择。定位“重大应用”而不是一般的“应用伦理学”，昭明我们在这方面有所为也有所不为，只是试图在伦理学应用的某些重大方面和重大领域进行我们的努力。

基于以上定位，在“985 工程”建设中，我们决定进行系列研究并在长期积累的基础上严肃而审慎地推出以“东大伦理”为标识的学术成果。“东大伦理”取名于两种考虑：这些系列成果的作者主要是东南大学伦理学团队的成员，有的系列也包括东南大学培养的伦理学博士生的优秀博士论文；更深刻的原因是，我们希望并努力使这些成果具有某种特色，以为中国伦理学事业的发展作出自己的贡献。“东大伦理”由五个系列构成：道德哲学研究系列；科技伦理研究系列；重大应用研究系列；与以上三个结构相关的译著系列；还有以丛刊形式出现并在 20 世纪 90 年代已经创刊的《伦理研究》专辑系列，该丛刊同样围绕三大定位组稿和出版。

“道德哲学系列”的基本结构是“两史一论”。即道德哲学基本理论；中国道德哲学；西方道德哲学。道德哲学理论的研究基

础，不仅在概念上将“伦理”与“道德”相区分，而且从一定意义上将伦理学、道德哲学、道德形而上学相区分。这些区分某种意义上回归到德国古典哲学的传统，但它更深刻地与中国道德哲学传统相契合。在这个被宣布“哲学终结”的时代，深入而细致、精致而宏大的哲学研究反倒是必须而稀缺的，虽然那个“致广大、尽精微、综罗百代”的“朱熹气象”在中国几乎已经一去不返，但这并不代表我们今天的学术已经不再需要深刻、精致和宏大气魄。中国道德哲学史、西方道德哲学史研究的理念基础，是将道德哲学史当作“哲学的历史”，而不只是道德哲学“原始的历史”、“反省的历史”，它致力于探索和发现中西方道德哲学传统中那些具有“永远的现实性”精神内涵，并在哲学的层面进行中西方道德传统的对话与互释。专门史与通史，将是道德哲学史研究的两个基本纬度，马克思主义的历史辩证法是其灵魂与方法。

“科技伦理系列”的学术风格与“道德哲学系列”相接并一致，它同样包括两个研究结构。第一个研究结构是科技道德哲学研究，它不是一般的科技伦理学，而是从哲学的层面、用哲学的方法进行科技伦理的理论建构和学术研究，故名之“科技道德哲学”而不是“科技伦理学”；第二个研究结构是当代科技前沿的伦理问题研究，如基因伦理研究、网络伦理研究、生命伦理研究等等。第一个结构的学术任务是理论建构，第二个结构的学术任务是问题探讨，由此形成理论研究与现实研究之间的互补与互动。

“重大应用系列”以目前我作为首席专家的国家哲学社会科学重大招标课题和江苏省哲学社会科学重大委托课题为起步，以调查研究和对策研究为重点。目前我们正组织四个方面的大调查，即当今中国社会的伦理关系大调查、道德生活大调查、伦理—道德素质大调查和伦理—道德发展状况及其趋向大调查。我们的目标和任务，是努力了解和把握当今中国伦理道德的真实状

况，在此基础上进行理论推进和理论创新，为中国伦理道德建设提出具有战略意义和创新意义的对策思路。这就是我们对“重大应用”的诠释和理解，今后我们将沿着这个方向走下去，并贡献出团队和个人的研究成果。

“译著系列”、《伦理研究》丛刊，将围绕以上三个结构展开。我们试图进行的努力是：这两个系列将以学术交流，包括团队成员对国外著名大学、著名学术机构、著名学者的访问，以及高层次的国际国内学术会议为基础，以“我们正在做的事情”为主题和主线，由此凝聚自己的资源和努力。

马克思曾经说过，历史只能提出自己能够完成的任务，因为任务的提出表明完成任务的条件已经具备或正在具备。也许，我们提出的是一个自己难以完成或不能完成的任务，因为我们完成任务的条件尤其是我本人和我们这支团队的学术资质方面的条件还远没有具备。我们期图通过漫漫兮求索乃至几代人的努力，建立起以道德哲学、科技伦理、重大应用为三元色的“东大伦理”的学术标识。这个计划所展示的，与其说是某些学术成果，不如说是我们这个团队的成员为中国伦理学事业贡献自己努力的抱负和愿望。我们无法预测结果，因为哲人罗素早就告诫，没有发生的事情是无法预料的，我们甚至没有足够的信心展望未来，我们唯一可以昭告和承诺的是：

我们正在努力！

我们将永远努力！

樊 浩

谨识于东南大学“舌在谷”

2007年2月11日



## A BRIEF INTRODUCTION

*The Moral World of Confucianism in Pre-Qin Dynasty* is the second one of my three works on Chinese original moral philosophy. (The first one is *The Moral World of Taoism in Pre-Qin Dynasty* which was published by China Social Science Press in December, 2006; and the third one is *The Moral World of Legalists in Pre-Qin Dynasty* which is being written.) It consists of six parts: preface, the moral thought of “ambition is devoted to way-making and action is based on efficacy” of Confucius, the moral thought of “respecting efficacy and enjoying way-making” of Mencius, the moral thought of “obeying the morality and being rational to appropriateness” in *Zhou Yi*, the moral thought of “perfect morality and high intelligence” of Xun Zi, synthetic review.

In a sense, Confucian morality is the synonym of Chinese morality and it is an ancient and well-known topic. The reality itself poses difficult problems for researching: In other words, how can I carry out this research in order to avoid or be far away platitudinous limitations? Hence, the dimension of two entireties and one reality becomes the most appropriate method to try to

solve the challenges. The two entireties mean that one is the dimension of omni-directional thought which not only grasps Chinese moral philosophy but also consults other culture patterns around the world; the other is the arrangement of overall materials which not only concretely analyzes thinkers' materials but also refers to the relevant studying achievements of Chinese and foreign scholars. The one reality means practically reading the thinkers' original literature and truly analyzing studying achievements, thereby finding where the problems are and the solutions of them.

In preface, two big problems are posed. They are the practical principle of research and the essence of Confucian morality. The practical principle of research should be the combination of entirely scanning and overall grasping. Its only standpoint is the reality of China. Besides human standard, the essence of Confucian morality is individual standard. The essence of "authoritative conduct" is loving person, i. e. "showing affection to dear ones". In the practice of concrete authoritative conduct, which takes "showing affection to dear ones" as authoritative conduct, the behavior choice of taking consanguinity as central love-knot becomes the highest pursuit and the maximum orientation. In value orientation of the concrete action, the others who are out of the consanguinity relationship always can't take their deserved positions. Therefore, the Confucian moral practice itself can't bloom the flowers of real social morality. When being promoted in the actual life, the ethical love-knot of person-loving must be in accordance with "serving relatives" and "respecting relatives".

As a result, once the action of person-loving goes into the relationship orbit, the love-knot will become single consanguineous filial sentiment. And along with the movement of human's role place, the filial sentiment will move into all other fields without any changes. Actually, the essential stipulation of "serving relatives" and "respecting relatives" has already confined the person's connotation objectively. That is to say, the relationship of two persons, firstly, is consanguineous and not the relation between two random persons in common social relatives. Therefore, "person-loving" is first the action in consanguinity. In the relation without consanguinity, the action of "person-loving" can't be naturally taken. In static state, the concrete promotion of authoritative conduct is accordance with "serving relatives and respecting relatives". However, in dynamic state, it's the pattern of "putting oneself before others", "introspecting oneself", "doing you would be done by", "one should treat others as one would like to be treated", all prove this point. In the relationship between oneself and others, Confucianism emphasizes oneself first and brings oneself first into the field of vision. Thereby, it analogizes from oneself to others and up to the world. Individual is the original of Confucian morality's coordinate and it manifests the value system of individual standard. The natural accumulation of dynamic practice is the value orientation of "taking oneself as centre" and oneself becomes the criterion of judging everything.

The four parts, the moral thought of "ambition is devoted to way-making and action is based on efficacy" of Confucius, the

moral thought of “respecting efficacy and enjoying way-making” of Mencius, the moral thought of “obeying the morality and being rational to appropriateness” in *Zhou Yi*, the moral thought of “perfect morality and high intelligence” of Xun Zi, belong to individual analysis of moral thought in this book. On the basis of entirely arranging and analyzing thinkers’ materials, their relevant moral thoughts are exhaustively summarized. I try my best to depend on the materials themselves and naturally elicit conclusion from the facts instead of sticking to predecessors’ achievement. And there isn’t any bind of theoretical frame. What it follows is the spirit truth of Taoist “letting everything has its efficacy in its own way”.

In synthetic review, five big problems are enumerated: the confrontation of good and evil, the opposition of virtue and desire, the resistance of appropriateness and benefit, the absence of codes, the narrowness of knowledge.

The confrontation of good and evil. Since the beginning of Mencius’ “good nature” and Xun Zi’s “evil nature”, the situation of formal confrontation of good and evil has been natural formula in practice. In the formed coordinate of confrontation of good and evil, evil hasn’t its own position at all and only has the value as a symbol which is opposite to good. Even if in the thinkers’ own systems, good and evil are opposite too. The effect of practical aspect is that evil can’t be good and good is firmly not evil. And it includes the whole practice process of action. This means the good action has real value only in the opposite struggle against the evil action. Undoubtedly, the extreme value orientation rai-

ses the moral position to an unsuitable height without any basis. In aspect of human nature, to one, he can't be in the route of good all the time and it's natural to be evil once in a while. Confucian thoughts didn't think over or affirm this situation. That is an unrealistic illusion. And the reality was rectified by Japanese thinkers during the process of Confucianism Japanization.

The opposition of virtue and desire. Confucius and Mencius classified desire as the sort of authoritative conduct, appropriateness and morality. And till Xun Zi, he not only put forward the concept of "selfish desire" but also made "fair play" opposite to "selfish desire" and endowed it absolute meaning in theory of value. "Fairness" isn't the accumulation and concentration of "selfishness" and "fairness" is only the rival of "selfishness". Because of those, "selfishness" doesn't get its deserved connotation and doesn't have the right position. *Liji* • *Yueji* put forward "human desire". From "selfish desire" to "human desire", it is fundamental transformation rather than the difference in a single word. Originally, "selfish desire" has the possible aspect of reflecting the desire feature, because the original intention of desire is personal affair which doesn't refer to others. The "human desire" changes the original personal affair into human affairs in general sense. That accomplishes the set of general theory premise for killing human by morality. Since then, the history of China took "human desire" as great scourges and human desire has always been attached by "fair play", so that it hadn't rightful position. The last was "letting the moral codes exist and human desire eradicate" which put one to the condition of just empty

body.

The resistance of appropriateness and benefit. There is the thought of "one possesses both appropriateness and benefit" which means both morality and benefit are necessary for one. But at the aspect of setting the relationship of them, to one, the satisfaction of benefit is very secondary. What should be considered is the achievement of way-making rather than fundamental livelihood such as keeping alive. This is called "morality first". Even if one considers livelihood, he should "eating without demanding fullness and living without demanding safety". Morality is everything and one could take morality as food to live on. When morality conflicts with the benefit, the choice of one should be "thinking justice when seeing benefit", "thinking justice when seeing acquisitions". There is no position for the law which one takes as the basis of his action. When there is contradiction between morality and life, the choice of one is "giving up one's body to achieve virtue", "laying down one's life for appropriateness". The value of morality exceeds the value of life which we can't find its relevant item in Confucian dictionary.

The absence of codes. Confucianism attached importance to internality and mainly developed the part of self-cultivation which is absent in the Taoist model. It forms the system link of self-cultivation and possesses the feature of subjective arbitrariness. Taoism emphasizes the establishment of external unified rule which is way-making. This is a direction from others to one-self and is the fundamental prerequisite and condition which a stable society needs. And it creates a good prerequisite for the

forming of equal value view and good human relationships. When Confucianism absorbed the thought of self-cultivation from Taoism, it absolutely neglected "way-making" which was taken as practical code of self-cultivation. This is relevant to internal temperament which is emphasized by Confucianism. Not only does one possess good nature but also the right of both doing good works and being sage lies in himself. So long as oneself practices, it could come true or it is called "inferring the loving-kindness". However, a fact which can't be neglected is that one possesses desire and if he treats it improperly, it is easy to go into evil. Confucianism mainly depends on the pledge of consanguinity of "authority" to design the satisfaction of human desire. In other words, in consanguinity, authority could voluntarily care for their own satisfaction of human desire. However, authority is only minority. Most persons don't relate to authority at the aspect of consanguinity. Actually, the problem is how to begin "inferring the loving-kindness". But on the concrete link of "inferring the loving-kindness", there is lack of practical consideration. As a result, the theory which possesses the feature of ambiguity and "inferring the loving-kindness" becomes an unknown number of Utopias. It is a kind of irresponsible offense to disregard the external request of code. Undoubtedly, it's harmful to the construction of social codes.

The narrowness of knowledge. The knowledge which was emphasized by Confucianism was the field of morality and other knowledge was neglected. In their field of vision, there was neither universal everything nor others. At the beginning, the mo-

rality which is set up by Confucianism is lack of the filtering of healthy atmosphere. It's one's own affairs that whether someone could possess magnanimity or not. At the aspect of society, peaceful society could come true only through personal self-cultivation. A moral action must be promoted by morality, so in order to practice magnanimity one must possess "efficacy" first. Therefore, Confucian moral impetus is in inner of one's mind. It emphasizes the introspection of one's mind. However, all these are incapable before the practical life. For example, one can't become his own justice in the face of desire. The Confucian moral theory places the moral legislation and judicature on one oneself and inner of one's mind. This can only be the libretto of stage and only produce the effect of deceiving oneself and others. Undoubtedly, it's poisonous opium. They are short of reasonable and scientific pondering and lack macroscopic and comprehensive scanning. Because of considering the morality as it stands, there won't be any morality for ever. The reason is that morality can't have its own kingdom and it must get fixed position and takes his own place in the whole universe and the social system.

In a word, it is a complicated problem to scan the essence of Confucian morality and to investigate its actual effect. One of the reasons is that its essence is individual standard that is shrewdly disguised by authoritative conduct. Therefore, we must think of Confucian morality out of the circle of itself. We must rethink and set the value of Confucian morality beyond the domain of China. Confucian thoughts came out the first position after "a hundred schools of thought contend". Its existent vigor is the



objective fact, which is stupid to neglect the fact. However, any thought is the reflection of the spirit in its era. The Confucian morality couldn't thoroughly be the nutriment of modernization today. Because on the whole, its symbolic function is beyond the applied function. But in the construction of modernization, we can't get rid of absorbing the rational factors of Confucianism, especially the effect on individual accomplishment. However, we can't garble it. The fact that Chinese prefer Confucian morality proves that up to now the practice of absorbing basically lacks the whole grasping and makes us absorb it without measure. We must learn a lesson and absorb it on the basis of whole grasping and dynamic relation between Chinese culture and foreign culture.