

SERIES STUDIES IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

中美关系研究丛书 ● 汪熙 主编

# 美国特使 在 中国

屠传德 著



1945年11月，美国总统杜鲁门任命马歇尔为总统特使，来华调停中国内战，推行美国对华政策。本书记述了马歇尔的这一使华过程。

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# 美国特使在中国

(1945 年 12 月—1947 年 1 月)

屠传德 著

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## 内 容 提 要

1945年11月,美国总统杜鲁门任命马歇尔为总统特使,来华调停中国内战,推行美国对华政策。本书记述了马歇尔的这一使华过程,分析了马歇尔调处失败的种种原因,揭示了当时美国政府对华政策的错误本质。

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American Special Envoy in China  
(1945. 12—1947. 1)

By Tu Chuande

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## 主 编 前 言

本书是一本论述马歇尔来华调处国共关系的专著。也是一本较好的教学参考书。

1945年第二次世界大战的结束,标志着法西斯与反法西斯的殊死战斗已经告一终结。共同的敌人已经从地平线上消失,促使美、苏、中(包括中国共产党)结成盟友的纽带已不复存在。世界的主要矛盾正在转化。在新的全球性的政治格局里,美国和苏联在欧洲和亚洲都形成了对峙的局面。这两大强国都在从它们各自的国家利益考虑,调整对外政策以适应新的国际环境。

战争虽然结束,局势仍极动荡。在中国这一块关键性的地域,内战正迫在眉睫。复杂的是,中国内战的结局不仅是政治领导权的转移问题,而且是两种不同社会制度的交替问题,因而也是这一地域今后国际政治力量的较量与平衡问题。这就不能不引起美国决策人的严重关注。事实上,在德、意法西斯已经覆灭,日本侵略者还在作困兽犹斗的时候,随着世界矛盾的明显转化,美国已相应地形成了扶蒋反共的政策方向。1945年4月赫尔利公开发表反对中国共产党的讲话不过是一个表面的标志而已。

但是在国共对峙中,美国若明目张胆地卷入中国内战,帮助蒋介石来消灭中国共产党,这在当时是冒天下之大不韪的事,美国总统这样做,会在国内、国外遇到很大的麻烦,可能付出沉重的代价;但是眼看着蒋介石倒台,那也是不堪设想的。怎么办?杜鲁门总统在关键性的时刻派出了关键性的人物。于是,马歇尔使华这场戏就出台了。老练的马歇尔为了美国的长期战略目标服务,一只手想

“不露痕迹”地扶住蒋介石不倒台；另一只手又要“貌似公正”地把中国人民进步力量压下去，把它捏进蒋政权的体制之内。这一台戏很不好唱，结果唱砸了锅，以失败而告终。

尽管如此，这一段历史却给我们留下很多值得回顾和探索的东西。马歇尔使华前后，是美国战后对华政策的转换时期，也是中美关系演变的一个关键时刻。对这一段历史我们是应该认真加以审定的。美国同行在这个问题上早已写了不少的东西，但我国学者由于众所周知的原因动手迟了一点。感谢党的十一届三中全会为活跃学术讨论创造了条件。现在也该轮到中国学者来谈一些看法了。

屠传德同志对这一段历史的研究已花了好几年的功夫。同美国同类问题的专著相比，他除了引证美国方面的资料以外，还较大量地运用了中国的资料，这样就有可能把问题的探究引向更深入一步。当然，假若我们有关部门能向学者更多地开放一些可以开放的档案资料，我相信，我们在这一方面的研究还可以做得更好一些。我们期待着这一天的早日到来。

汪 熙

1987年4月于复旦校园

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## 提 要

1945年11月,美国驻华大使帕特里克·J·赫尔利辞职,美国政府的对华政策面临三种抉择:

其一,完全摆脱一切牵连。这是美国政府不愿意做的。支持国民党政府,是美国在雅尔塔会议期间就确立的方针;而没有美国政府的帮助,国民党政府将会被击败。

其二,进行军事干涉。这一政策是不可能采取的。这不仅是因为中国疆域辽阔,更重要的是由于美国必须、也已经将其主要的力量放在欧洲。

其三,由美国出面调处国共两党关系,以便在中国建立起一个联合政府。美国政府乐意采取第三种抉择。这一抉择既不会有损于美国的目标,又能避免美国在亚洲卷入军事冲突。

马歇尔在第二次世界大战中有着光彩夺目的经历,斯大林对他也颇为赞赏,于是,美国总统杜鲁门任命马歇尔作为特使前往中国推行美国对华政策。

马歇尔的调处努力经历了两个阶段。

在第一阶段期间(1945年12月至1946年3月),他的调处一般是公正的。他采取了一系列有利于国共和平解决争端的措施,推动了停战协定、政协协定、整军协定和东北停战协定的达成。如暂停运输国民党军至华北,从而抑制了华北的内战。

在第二阶段期间(1946年4月中旬至1946年11月14日),蒋介石发动大规模内战。马歇尔仍积极于从事调停工作,因为他认为只有如此才对国民党最有利。马歇尔请求杜鲁门总统向蒋介石

施加压力，并要求美国政府对国民党实行武器禁运。但马歇尔也实行援蒋。譬如，他同意美国政府将价值八亿多美元的剩余物资以极低廉的价格出售给国民党政府。在国民党拥有大量的军火时，实行暂时的武器禁运来抑制国民党内战是不会有有效的；而给蒋的物质援助则直接鼓励了蒋将局部内战升级为全面内战。于是，马歇尔调处不可避免地失败了。

马歇尔失败的根本原因在于美国对华政策本身。战后是中国人民在中国共产党领导下走向解放与独立的时代。尽管美国政府多少注意到了这一点，但为了实现她在中国的目标，她仍以支持国民党政府作为她对华政策的基石，在此基石上，想通过政治调处来解决国共争端。但当蒋介石为了维持他的独裁统治而发动内战时，美国政府别无选择，只有支持他所发动的内战。这种支持所产生的结果，反过来阻碍了马歇尔的调处。

导致马歇尔调处失败的直接原因在蒋介石。尽管蒋介石知道马歇尔试图通过政治手段来挽救国民党，但他知道他的政府太腐败，以致不能在与中共的政治较量中赢得胜利。于是，他就企图通过内战去避免这种失败。结果，毁了马歇尔政治解决国共争端的使命，也最终毁了国民党在大陆的统治权。

## **Abstract**

In November 1945 after the resignation of Patrick J. Hurley, the American ambassador to China, the U. S. government faced three alternatives in its China policy. First, it could free itself from any entanglement in China. The United States was loathe to do this, however, since the policy of supporting the Kuomintang to make China a stable force in Asia had been laid down at the Yalta Conference, and it was clear that without help from the American government the Kuomintang would be defeated by the Communists. The second alternative was to intervene militarily. This option was untenable, however, not only because of China's vast territory, but even more importantly because of the fact that the U. S. had already deployed its main forces in Europe. The third alternative was to try to mediate between the Kuomintang and the Communists, in the hope of establishing a pro-American coalition government. The American government preferred this third choice, which without hurting U. S. goals would allow the country to avoid military involvement in Asia.

President Truman picked George C. Marshall to be special envoy to China in charge of implementing America's China policy, because of the excellence of Marshall's performance during World War I and because of Stalin's praise of him. Marshall's efforts at mediation went through two stages. During the first

stage (December 1945 to March 1946), his mediation was generally impartial. He took a series of steps—such as pushing for the completion of the cease-fire agreement, the agreement to carry out political consultation, the agreement to reorganize the troops, and the Northeast China cease-fire agreement—which were helpful moves toward effecting a peaceful resolution of the dispute between the Kuomintang and the Communists. A notable example was his success in suspending the shipping of Kuomintang troop to Northeast China, which restrained the civil war in that region.

During the second stage of Marshall's tenure (mid-April 1946 to his return to America) Chiang Kai-shek launched a large-scale civil war. Marshall remained actively engaged in mediation during this period, since he believed that a political solution would be most beneficial to the Kuomintang. He even asked President Truman to put pressure on Chiang to alter his policy and demanded that the U. S. government place an embargo upon the Kuomintang. Marshall did offer assistance to Chiang, however, such as when at one point, in order to prevent Chiang's collapse, he approved the sale of over 800 million U. S. dollars' worth of war surplus to the Kuomintang at low prices. Marshall's efforts ended in failure, because the embargo he pushed for proved ineffective in the face of the size of the Kuomintang's existing armory, while the material support that he gave Chiang encouraged Chiang to upgrade the civil war from a partial to a full-scale one.

The root of Marshall's failure lay in America's China policy itself. The post-war period was a time when the Chinese people

were moving toward liberation and independence under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Although the U. S. government took some note of this, in trying to realize its goals in China, the strengthening of the Kuomintang remained the cornerstone of its China policy, and it was with this end in mind that it pursued political means to end the civil war and resolve the dispute between the Kuomintang and the Communists. Since Chiang would not discard his autocratic powers and his war policy, the U. S. had no choice but to support him in the civil war he launched. However, that support produced results which worked directly against Marshall's efforts at mediation.

The direct cause of Marshall's failure at mediation was Chiang Kai-shek himself. Although Chiang knew that Marshall was trying to save the Kuomintang through political means, he realized that his government was too corrupt to win the political struggle with the Communists, and so resorted to civil war in an attempt to avoid defeat. As a result, he undermined Marshall's plan; ultimately, Chiang's action also led to the destruction of the Kuomintang's political power on the mainland.

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