

CRITIQUE OF THE HEGEMONIC STABILITY THEORY

王在帮著 时事出版社

霸权稳定论批判


——布雷顿森林体系的历史考察



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FOREWORD

The purpose of this book, a revised April 1992 doctoral dissertation, is intended to criticize the Theory of Hegemonic Stability, the mainstream of the Political Economy of International Relations advanced by some western scholars, through historical analysis of the connection between hegemony and stability of international economic system.

From 1985 to 1988, the author, majoring in the history of international relations as a postgraduate in Nanjing University under professor Wu Shimin, touched by the inclination in China to focus on the political aspect in the study on the history of international relations, began to consider synthetical study on the political, economic relations and so on and drew some thoughts about it in the article entitled "Logical Assumptions about Marxist Branch of International Relations Study" (in Qilu Journal, No. 1, 1988). After my selection by professor Wang Shengzu as a doctoral candidate in the summer of 1988 when the National Educational Commission had approved the priority project of social scientific research "Critique of the Hegemonic Stability Theory" drawn and submitted by professor Wang Shengzu and vice professor Lu Minghua, I undertook the principal tasks of the research project and related with the Political Economy of International Relations.

It was difficult for such a young scholar as the author with a short time study on the history of international relations and lit-

the systematic exercise in international economics to undertake the task because of the risks on the way to an unknown area and necessity of having rich elementary knowledge of multidiscipline and analysing seriously much diplomatic documents, economic data and the foreign economic policymaking of the the countries concerned for a researcher to make a cross study of international politics and international economics and criticize the theory. Though I had read some Marx's politico — economic works including "On Capital" before that, there was, after all, a long way to go from general political economy to international political economy. It was merely with the convictions that I took the plunge that everything must have its beginning, that Chinese scholars, being influenced by the available culture atmosphere of a country adhering to Marxism for a long time, should and could advance our own view, and that combining both the learning and studying processes into one, consulting others on the subject and pooling their wisdom might make up my weakness. It is fortunate that my efforts have been duly rewarded.

The book consists of introduction, major body (three parts) and conclusion.

In the introduction, on the basis of a review of the backgrounds, the main viewpoints and the critiques of the theory, the author points out the wrongness of the theory, the weakness of the critical theories and the significance of going further into the question.

In part one, probing into the failure of the world monetary and economic conference, the monetary cooperation first among the United States, France and the United Kingdom, then among

thd Allied and Associated countries, and the birth of the Bretton Woods System, I have found that it is wrong to attribute the rise of the Bretton Woods System to the rise of the Untied States as the western scholars did, since the steady enhancement of the cooperation among the Anti-Fascist countries concluding with the birth of the Bretton Woods System, as some stability of a sub-system or a compromise among the imperialist countries, was the outcome of the increasingly acute struggles between the Fascist countries and Anti-Fascist countries, as the unstability of the system. In 1930s, the struggles among the great powers for the hegemony of the world caused the failure of the world monetary economic conference and formation of the economic and monetary blocs. The resort to force and war on the part of the Fascist countries such as Germany, Japan and Italy pushed by the exclusion of the blocs made the United States, France and Great Britain cooperate in the monetary area in turn. The expansion of the conflict between the Fascist countries and the Anti-Fascist countries evolved the tripartite cooperation to the plans for general cooperation after war among the Allied and Associated countries. I concluded that one main contradiction will emerge from the development of the plural ones sooner or later and make the others mitigate. Of course, it is also wrong to deny the effects of the American power. But the Americal power only resulted in its dominant position in the structure of the cooperation, that is, the hegemony of the U. S. dollar. It is over simplified to draw the conclusion from the effects of American power on its position that the cooperation reflected in the birth of the Bretton Woods System also resulted from that power, because the question of

whether countries cooperate or not is different from that of in what structure they do.

In part two, analysing the negotiation and enforcement of the Financial Agreement between the United States and the Great Britain, the birth of European Recovery Program and exchange adjustment of 1949, the formation of EPU and the effects of the American security policy on the convertibility of the European currencies, I have come to the conclusions as follow: first, the multilateral free exchange, with its free competition principle, had to be based on the relative balance of power. The hegemony, whether as the preponderance of the material resources or as the position in international system resulted from the preponderance repels free international economic system. The hegemony and the multilateral free international economic system exclude each other. Second, it is necessary for the weak countries to take protective discriminations such as trade restriction and exchange control against the hegemonic power. Without such discriminations, the stronger competition from the hegemonic power would destroy the weak economies and put off the implementation of the multilateral free principle, that is to say, hegemony make international system unstable. Third, It is to a great extent depended on the existence of some greater external challenge than the discriminations put into practice by the weaks to be ready for multilateral competition whether the stronger would tolerate the discriminations. Otherwise, the compulsory policy often adopted by the hegemon to make use of its power to carry out its own propositions in economic area in a situation of plural and even political contradictions would result in the economic collapse of the

weak. Only the emerging of the main contradiction could make the hegemon tolerate the discriminations as the cost of seeking allies and strategic superiority.

In the last part, discussing the operation and collapse of the Bretton Woods System and the collaboration among the west developed countries in the monetary affairs after hegemony due to the existence of the bipolar structure, the development of north-south contradiction and the transnational capital connexions among the trilateral countries fostered in the cold war structure instead of the inertia of the international regimes, I have pointed out that the western monetary crisis in the 1960s resulted from the contradiction between the balance of power and the hegemony of the U. S. dollar and the hegemonic policy of U. S., that the cooperations and compromises among the developed countries presupposed the east-west confrontation and the north-south contradiction, and that the balance of power or decline of the hegemony doesn't mean the collapse of the multilateral free exchange system so long as the concerned countries are in the either aspect of the main contradiction, political and strategic needs would, on the contrary, make related countries take adjustment costs according to their changed power position and uphold the stability of their international economic system jointly.

In the conclusion, a summary critique of the Theory of Hegemonic Stability, I advanced the concept of "zero-sum of affinity degree". On the basis of my own systematic dialectical viewpoints on the international political economy. I think further that with the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the threats existed before from the Warsaw Pact Bloc, it will be in-

creasingly difficult for the western developed countries to uphold economic cooperation and accommodation among themselves, and that the co-existence of the inclination to make blocs and mutual pervasion will be the major trend in the future development of international economic relations.

On the occasion of the book's publication, I am grateful, and dedicate the book, to my tutors, late professor Wang Shengzu, professor ShiLei and vice-professor Lu Minghua. During the years, professor Wang's strict and matter — of — fact style of study had benefitted me a great deal. Only with professor Shi's acceptance could I continue to study and complete my dissertation under him after professor Wang's death. In the course of selecting topic, drawing outline, and writting, professor Lu gave me a lot of help and discussed many questions with me. I am also indebted to many other gentlemen for their various help in the course of my study and approval, encouragement and criticism on the dissertation. They are Zhou Jirong in China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR); Guo Shixian, PuShan, Qiu Yuanlun and Sun Shulin in Chinese Academy of Social Science; Lu Yi, Xie Deyuan, Zhang Zhiyi and Jiang Shiguan in Foreign Affairs College; Liu Tongshun and Zhu Mingquan in Fudan University; Zhao Baoxu in Peking University and Wu Shimin, Wang Juefei, Zhang Shudong, Zhu Yingquan, Shi Yin-hong and Li Qianheng in Nanjing University. The inputting of the dissertation by Miss Yang Shuxin of QuFu Normal University during her sparetime convenience the revision and printing of it later on. At the difficult moment for the academic works to be published, it is with the great help of the leaders such as Shen

Qurong, Guo Chuanling of CICIR and Peng Zhibin, He Guīquan of the Current Affairs Publishing House that the book have come out. I should feel grateful to them. Lastly, I particularly express heartfelt thanks to my wife Li Shaoyi for her bearing all house-duties while upholding her learning and working for several years which made me apply myself to study. I would get help and encouragement from her when I am confronted with difficulty and setback. It is surely lucky to be accompanied by such a woman in the journey of life and dedication.

With a short time engagement in the Political Economy of International Relations, the book, as an exercise in composition, is a try at most. Therefore, it is inevitable to be biased in collecting, distinguishing and applying materials or in demonstrating viewpoints. Precisely because of this, I sincerely hope readers to criticise. All my wishes will be met if the publication of the book can arouse more Chinese scholars to be engaged in the area and have the effects of throwing crude remarks to draw forth better ones.

China Institute of Contemporary
International Relations
October, 1993.

Wang Zai bang

前 言

霸权稳定论乃西方国际关系政治经济学主流派观点，出于对其基本观点的怀疑，本书旨在通过具体研究布雷顿森林体系的兴衰，分析霸权与国际经济体系稳定与否之间的关系，对该理论进行辨析。

自1985年秋至1988年夏，我在南京大学攻读国际关系史专业硕士学位，师事吴世民教授。其间，有感于国内国际关系史研究中存在的政治关系单一化倾向，逐渐萌发从事政治经济诸方面综合研究的念头。时发拙文《马克思主义国际关系学的逻辑设想》（刊于《齐鲁学刊》1988年第1期），即已谈及此意。因对国外研究动态知之不多，文中尚未使用国际关系政治经济学的提法，只是大致勾划出从事综合研究的几点设想。与此同时，王绳祖教授、卢明华副教授主持申报的博士点重点科研项目“霸权稳定论批判”获国家教委批准。1988年秋转事王绳祖教授后，承蒙先生信任，承担该项目主题研究任务，由此与国际关系政治经济学结缘。

向一个全新的领域挺进需要承担风险。将国际政治学与国际经济学结合起来，进行跨学科研究，须具备两方面的坚实基础。对霸权稳定论这一西方国际关系政治经济学主流派观点进行历史辨析，又需要分析大量外交文件和经济资料，深入发掘有关国家对外经济政策的决策动因。这对于一个入门国际关系史研究不久的青年学者来说，其难度可想而知。此前，我曾一般性地阅读过部分马克思主义政治经济学著作，包括《资本论》在内。然而，从一般政治经济学到国际政治经济学，毕竟有一段不小的距离。鉴

于国内在这方面的研究尚未起步，加之自身缺乏系统的国际经济学训练，我不得不将学习与研究过程合二为一，并多方拜师，集思广益，以资弥补。凡事总要有个开端，置身于一个长期坚持马克思主义的国度，受既有文化氛围的影响，中国学者应当而且有能力在国际关系政治经济学领域提出自己的主张。凭借这一信念，我贸然闯入迷宫。经过努力，幸有所得。

全书由绪论、正文（三部分）和尾声组成。

在绪论中，笔者从回顾霸权稳定论提出的历史背景和基本观点入手，指出了该理论的荒谬性、批评理论的软弱无力及进一步研究的意义。

在正文第一部分中，通过探讨1933年世界经济与货币会议失败的原因，分析1936年英法美及此后联盟与联系国之间的货币合作，研究布雷顿森林体系的确立，笔者发现，在帝国主义时代，由于竞争和垄断并存，决没有国际经济体系的绝对稳定。但是，否认帝国主义时代存在合作、妥协乃至国际体系的部分、相对稳定，也过于简单。在30年代，大国之间争夺世界霸权的斗争，导致世界货币与经济会议破产及经济货币集团的形成。经济与货币集团的排他主义推动德日意法西斯国家诉诸武力，法西斯国家侵略的威胁反过来迫使英法美三国在货币领域进行合作。法西斯国家与反法西斯国家之间冲突扩大，使三方协议进而演变为战后联合国家的广泛合作计划。因此，多元化矛盾并存难分主次的局面不会持久，一种矛盾迟早会上升到主要矛盾地位使其他矛盾趋于缓和，从而使冲突与合作并存。像西方学者那样，将布雷顿森林体系的建立归因于美国的崛起是错误的，美国的庞大实力只是导致美国在该合作结构中处于支配地位即美元霸权。因为合作本身是一回事，合作的方式和结构是另一回事。从整个国际体系看，帝国主义争霸必然导致不稳定，局部国际体系的稳定作为帝国主义各国间的妥协，乃是争夺发展到一定阶段的产物，它并不必然依赖于

霸国的存在。

正文第二部分研究英美财政协定的谈判与实施，分析欧洲复兴方案的出笼、1949年汇率调整、欧洲支付同盟的建立以及美国安全政策对西欧货币可兑性的影响。笔者认为，多边自由汇兑体系必须以相对均势为基础，因为，这种体系的基本原则是自由竞争，而无论是物质资源优势，还是由这种优势导致的霸国在国际体系中的地位，霸权都排斥自由竞争。霸权与多边自由的国际经济体系相互排斥，弱小国家必须采取诸如贸易限制、外汇管制之类的反霸歧视性保护措施。没有这种歧视性措施，强国的竞争将摧毁弱小国家的经济，从而推迟实施多边自由原则，造成有霸不稳。因此，强国能否容忍弱小国家实行歧视至关重要。在各国间多元化政治矛盾并存主次难分的情况下，霸国极易在经济领域凭借实力强行贯彻其政策主张，从而破坏弱小国家经济。只有随着主要矛盾的出现，霸国面临更强有力的外部挑战，才能些微收敛其高压政策，容忍他国某些歧视以谋结与国，争取战略优势。战后西方多边自由国际货币体系得以投入运营是以整个国际体系的不稳定即冷战为前提的。

正文第三部分讨论布雷顿森林体系的运营与崩溃，分析西方发达国家在美国霸权衰落后继续在货币领域中进行合作的事实。笔者指出，60年代的西方货币危机源于实力对比关系的相对均势与美元霸权及美国霸权主义政策之间的矛盾。只要相关各国处于主要矛盾的一个方面，均势或霸权衰落并不必然意味着多边自由汇兑体系的崩溃。政治战略方面的需要与维持合作的共识将迫使各国依据现存实力承担调整代价，共同维护其国际经济体系的稳定。三边地区各国在美国霸权衰落后继续合作的原因在于，国际关系的两极格局依旧，南北矛盾有所发展，在冷战格局中培植起来的三边地区的跨国资本联系加强了各国旨在应付危机的努力，而不是什么国际体制的惯性作用。发达国家之间的妥协合作是以

东西方对抗和南北矛盾加深为前提的。

尾声部分是对霸权稳定论的总结性批评。依据本人在国际关系政治经济学方面的系统辩证观点，笔者提出了“亲合度总和为零”的概念，并进而认为，冷战结束后，以往面临的来自华约集团的威胁不复存在，西方发达国家之间在维持经济领域合作与妥协方面将愈益困难，集团化倾向和彼此渗透加强相并存将构成未来一段时间西方国际经济关系的主要特征。

值此拙作付梓之际，我当首先感谢导师王绳祖教授（已故）、石磊教授和卢明华副教授。寒窗几载，王老的教诲和他倡导的严谨求实的学风使我受益匪浅。王老仙逝后，蒙石磊先生不弃，我才得以继续学业，并在其指导下完成论文。从论文选题、拟定提纲到具体写作，副导师卢明华先生给予我大量帮助，和我进行了许多富有益处的讨论。谨以此书献给我的导师们。其次，在研究过程中，中国现代国际关系研究所周纪荣先生、中国社会科学院世界经济与政治研究所郭世贤先生、外交学院鲁毅先生、解德源先生、复旦大学的刘同舜先生、朱明权先生和南京大学吴世民先生，均给予我不同程度的帮助。脱稿后，中国社会科学院浦山先生、袁元伦先生和孙叔林先生、北京大学赵宝煦先生、南京大学王觉非先生、李乾亨先生、张树栋先生、朱瀛泉先生和时殷红先生、以及外交学院张之毅先生和蒋士理先生，又给予充分肯定，提出许多宝贵意见。曲阜师范大学杨淑信老师在百忙中帮我将论文输入软盘，大大方便了文稿的修改和印刷。适逢学术著作“出版难”的局面，幸赖中国现代国际关系研究所领导谌取荣、郭传玲先生和时事出版社的彭致斌与何桂全先生鼎力相助，本书才得以问世。谨此向这些先生表示感谢。最后，我当特别向贤妻李绍毅表示深切的谢意。几年来，她在坚持工作和学习的情况下，几乎包揽全部家务，使我得以潜心从事研究工作。每当遇到困难和挫折，我总能得到她的鼓励与支持。在事业和人生的旅途中，得与

这样一位女性为伴，可为一幸。

我从事国际关系政治经济学领域的研究时间不长，因之，本书充其量是一部习作，一次尝试。对当代西方国际政治经济学主流派进行历史的辨析，无论在资料的搜集、鉴别和运用，还是观点论证方面，都难免有失偏颇。惟其如此，诚希读者批评。本书问世倘能引起中国学者投身到该领域研究，收到抛砖引玉之效，我愿尽遂

王在帮

1993年10月于北京

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