

ENGLISH READING

挑战大学英语考试辅导丛书

四级时文阅读

国际事务热点聚焦

北京大学

黄正鸿

侯育清

编

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
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CONTENTS

目 录

New World Disorder 失衡的新世界	1
The Three Ifs of a Clinton Doctrine 克林顿主义的三假设	17
Meet George W. Reagan 认识“乔治·里根”	22
Here Comes the Son 子承父业的小布什	28
“I Am a Blessed Person” “我是个幸运儿”——小布什采访录	44
Tipper Steps Out 面向公众的戈尔夫人	50
The Dynasty: the Kennedys 权力世家——肯尼迪家族	60
The Art of Being JFK JR. 身为肯尼迪的艺术	68
Fortune And Misfortune 幸与不幸的肯尼迪家族	86
A Soldier's Story 二战英雄被辱记	95
Is Poverty Fixable? 即便在美国, 贫困能消除吗?	114
Promoting the Next SAR 澳门的繁荣之道	122
Pudong, the Challenger 浦东, 挑战者	127
New-Found Power 印尼华人的崛起	135
Kasmier: Once More to the Brink 克什米尔: 再一次走向悬崖边缘	147
South Korea: Cleaning House 南韩: 清理门户	154
Japan on the Defensive 日本的“防卫”	160
Survival of the Fittest 死里逃生的叶利钦	166
Who's Clean? 俄罗斯政坛有谁还清白? ——纽约银行洗钱案透视	176
Reopening Old Wounds 重揭二战伤疤	184
Sun Yat-sen 中国革命之父孙逸仙	189
The Diarist: Anne Frank 安妮·弗朗科的日记人生	197

Ehud Barak 以色列新任总理巴拉克	204
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New World Disorder

失衡的新世界

尽管作者完全站在美国的立场上,为美国的利益而殚精竭虑,但我们仍然能够看出北约对南联盟的野蛮轰炸带来多么大的消极影响:正是美国的短视造成了这场战争,并严重损害了中美关系、俄美关系,就连北约内部也似乎四分五裂——整个世界失去了平衡。

而人权干涉以及炮舰政策,也将北约带进了一个危险的境地,违背了它最初的宗旨。人权干涉的多重标准、自相矛盾与力不从心……美国的确应该好好考虑考虑了,究竟是谁搅乱了这个世界。

A war at the far edge of the Balkans has had political consequences extending far beyond Kosovo. In Russia, an outraged^① sense of humiliation^② over NATO's actions has spread from the elites^③ to the population at large and threatens to blight^④ U.S.-Russian relations for years to come. In Beijing, the virulent^⑤ reaction to the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade has vented^⑥ frustrations^⑦ with the roller-coaster^⑧ nature of Sino-American relations that have accumulated for many months.^[1] And in Europe, the seeming unity of the Atlantic Alliance has grown brittle^⑨: key allies are eying the exits; domestic opposition is mounting; the newly admitted members in Central Europe are uncomfortable that their first allied activity is as part of a NATO-initiated^⑩ war.

The causes in Russia and China are plain enough. Their leaders are products of societies that interpret decisions about

war and peace according to whether they enhance a nation's security or other vital interests. If they can discern^① no such traditional rationale^② to U.S. behavior, they ascribe^③ our motives not to altruism^④ but to a hidden agenda for domination.^[2]

In Europe, the situation is more complex. The allies share our motives but are beginning to question our judgment. And they find themselves under increasing domestic pressure as the damage from the bombing of Serbia compounds^⑤ the devastation^⑥ of Kosovo.

A generation gap has exacerbated^⑦ the crisis. The formative experiences of the Clinton administration's key personnel were either in the trenches of the Vietnam protest movement, or in presidential campaigns—or both. Suspicious of the role of power in foreign policy, they use it ineffectively and without conviction^⑧. They emphasize the so-called “soft” issues, like the environment, and have little concern with notions of the international equilibrium or of traditional U.S. interests, which they scorn^⑨ as outdated. Obsessively driven by public-opinion polls, they are ever tempted to treat foreign policy as an extension of domestic politics. Their diplomacy is quite skillful in dealing with short-term tactical^⑩ issues but obtuse^⑪ with respect to strategy; adept^⑫ at “spinning” public opinion but oblivious^⑬ to a generation's worth of lessons about the limitations of air power and the futility^⑭ of notions of “graduated escalation^⑮.”

The rejection of long-range strategy explains how it was possible to slide into the Kosovo conflict without adequate consideration of all its implications^⑯—especially the visceral^⑰ reaction of almost all nations of the world against the new NATO doctrine^⑱ of humanitarian^⑲ intervention.^[3] Before the start of the bombing, it was conventional wisdom in Washington that Serbia's historic attachment to Kosovo was exaggerated^⑳ and that Slobodan Milosevic was

looking for a pretext³¹ to get rid of the incubus³² it represented—which a few days of bombing was supposed to supply. But what if Serbia, the country that fought the Turkish and Austrian empires and defied Hitler and Stalin at the height of their powers, did not yield³³? How far were we willing to go? Not to ground war, it was announced at the very beginning, tempting Milosevic to test his endurance to sustained bombing. No provision³⁴ was made for a war of attrition³⁵ or the flood of refugees³⁶ it was bound to create—not to speak of the ethnic cleansing³⁷ that the war has accelerated and intensified.

From the start, there has been a vast gap between the rhetoric³⁸ and the means with which to back it up. Allied pronouncements have ritually³⁹ compared Milosevic to Hitler. But the transparent reluctance to accept casualties⁴⁰ signaled that the Alliance would not make the commitment⁴¹ necessary to overthrow⁴² the accused tyrant⁴³. Now, if the outcome is to be some kind of compromise, Milosevic will inevitably be legitimized and emerge⁴⁴ as a valid interlocutor⁴⁵. By justifying the war in terms requiring total victory while conducting a strategy impelling⁴⁶ compromise, NATO has maneuvered⁴⁷ itself into a trap.

Several fateful decisions were taken in those now seemingly far-off days in February, when other options were still open. The first was the demand that 30,000 NATO troops enter Yugoslavia, a country with which NATO was not at war, and administer a province that had emotional significance as the origin of Serbia's independence. The second was to use the foreseeable⁴⁸ Serb refusal as justification for starting the bombing.

Rambouillet⁴⁹ was not a negotiation—as is often claimed—but an ultimatum⁵⁰. This marked an astounding⁵¹ departure for an administration that had entered office proclaiming its devotion to the U. N. Charter and multilateral procedures⁵².^[4] The

transformation of the Alliance from a defensive military grouping into an institution prepared to impose its values by force occurred in the same months that three former Soviet satellites joined NATO. It undercut repeated American and allied assurances that Russia had nothing to fear from NATO expansion, since the Alliance's own treaty proclaimed it to be a purely defensive institution.

Kosovo has thereby become a symbol of Russia's post-cold-war frustrations. The tribulations^⑤ of Yugoslavia, Moscow's traditional friend (leaving aside the interruption of the Tito years), emphasized Russia's decline and have generated a hostility toward America and the West that may produce a nationalist and socialist Russia—akin^⑥ to the European Fascism of the 1930s. This would be a sorry end for the administration's policy of supporting Russian reform and coaxing^⑤ Russia closer to the West.^[5]

This is why the expectations attached to the Russian mediation in Kosovo seem excessive. Russian leaders would hardly be brokenhearted if the outcome in Kosovo weakens NATO. A Russian intermediary^⑤ faces a double dilemma^⑤: if he is seen as supporting the NATO program, he will lose standing at home; if he induces us to reduce our demands, he will become a scapegoat^⑤ in the American domestic debate over compromising our war aims. Russia's most constructive role in my view would be as full participant at a conference for political arrangements in the Balkans *following* a ceasefire.

To its credit, the administration from the beginning has recognized the importance of bringing Russia into the international community. But it has identified this effort primarily with democratic reform and market economics inside Russia and nonproliferation^⑤ abroad. All this accentuates^⑥ the Russian sense of having come under a kind of colonial tutelage^⑥.^[6] Russia, in turn, has clung^② to many aspects of its traditional

diplomacy: seeking to reduce our influence, especially in the Middle East. Russia's image of itself as an historic player on the world stage must be taken seriously. This requires less lecturing and more dialogue; less sentimentality⁶³ and more recognition that Russia's national interests are not always congruent⁶⁴ with ours; less sociology and more foreign policy.

Before the attack on its Belgrade embassy, China's reaction to the air war was more muted⁶⁵ than Russia's—but equally negative. Every nation views international events through the prism⁶⁶ of its history. And to China, the new NATO doctrine of humanitarian intervention evokes Europe's unilaterally⁶⁷ proclaimed civilizing mission in the 19th century, which led to the fragmentation of China and a series of Western interventions.^[7] These humiliations were followed in the 20th century by the so-called Brezhnev doctrine that proclaimed the Kremlin's right to punish by force of arms communist regimes⁶⁸ that strayed from⁶⁹ its ideological⁷⁰ line. Indeed, it was to resist the Brezhnev doctrine that China moved to restore its relations with the United States in 1971.

That policy of close ties between the United States and China is now questioned in both capitals. President Clinton's policy has built on the conviction of all his predecessors since Richard Nixon that both China and the United States have much to gain from cooperation and risk exhausting themselves by confrontation. For China, a breakdown in relations would deal a severe blow to its economic program and modernization. For America, it would ensure turmoil⁷¹ throughout Asia, leaving China's neighbors torn by the need to choose between the world's most populous country, whose 5,000 years of history give it a special place in Asia, and America, the world's only superpower.

That cooperative policy is losing momentum⁷² on our side largely because of a stalemate⁷³ between the administration and

opponents who see China as our principal strategic threat. The stalemate arises from the administration's tendency to present its policy of engagement with China less in terms of common objectives than as a better method of achieving its critics' objectives. A "strategic partnership" has been proclaimed, but real strategic discussions on the highest level have been rare amid disputes over issues ranging from Taiwan to human rights to nonproliferation. And the administration has felt obliged to balance its China policy with periodic bows to its critics.

A good example was the visit to Washington in early April of Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji—generally considered among the most reformist and market-oriented of the Chinese leaders. That visit was bracketed^⑧ by the announcement—just before Zhu's arrival—that the United States would support a U. N. resolution condemning China's human-rights practices, and immediately afterward by the sale of long-range radars to Taiwan. And during the visit, the administration declined to sign an agreement on China's entry into the World Trade Organization, for which the Chinese had made major concessions^⑨ and which they had reason to believe would be the centerpiece of Zhu's visit. (To compound Zhu's embarrassment, the administration published all the concessions he had made.)

Whatever one's view of the substance of these decisions, their timing conveyed an impression of a government driven by its critics into subordinating^⑩ to domestic politics a policy that should be based on mutual national interests.^[8]

The bombing of the Belgrade embassy was the match that set off the explosion^⑪. Mutual suspicions fed on each other. The Chinese viewed the president's original apology—made as a response to a question at a press conference during a visit to Oklahoma and linked to a justification^⑫ of NATO bombing—as inadequate. Americans considered the Chinese violence against

the American Embassy in Beijing unacceptable. But if the Sino-American relationship is not to spiral^⑨ toward a confrontation, it is essential to call a halt to mutual recrimination^⑩ and seek to restore a dialogue.

The leaders of both countries seem aware that a confrontation would be catastrophic^⑪ for both sides as well as for the peace of the world. But both are under pressure from ideological opponents at home. However, there is no way to dodge^⑫ this debate. In the United States, the critics are serious and so must be the administration.

The critics of a cooperative China policy fall into two camps. The first group holds that the emergence of China as a major power automatically threatens American vital interests, especially under communist leadership. A second group is concerned about specific Chinese policies from human rights to proliferation^⑬. To be sure, China's actions on many fronts reflect the unsentimental^⑭ policy of an emerging power. Nevertheless, Sino-American disagreements can be kept short of confrontation by patient and firm diplomacy. And there are many areas of congruent interests. If, in the absence of a direct challenge, the emergence of China as a major power and its political system are turned into the occasion for American hostility, we will be embarked on^⑮ a lonely course without support from any major nation in either Europe or Asia.^[9] I would warn against such an adventure that will distort our Asian policy for decades. There is no more important task for American foreign policy than to design a strategy recognizing and managing adversarial elements in our relations with China, yet drawing Beijing further into the international system. We must not repeat in Asia the emotional and unthought-out policies that brought us such grief in the Balkans. The law of unintended consequences still operates.

Despite the seeming unity of the NATO summit, Kosovo has made a debate about the Alliance's future inevitable[Ⓢ]. It is being delayed by horror at Milosevic's barbarities[Ⓢ] and by the paradox[Ⓢ] that Europe's new left-wing governments—especially in Germany and Italy—are afraid of being accused of undermining[Ⓢ] their conservative[Ⓢ] predecessors' legacy[Ⓢ] of pro-American and pro-NATO foreign policy. But these new governments are likely to consider that they have now paid enough homage[Ⓢ] to the traditions of allied solidarity[Ⓢ]. They can be expected to be influenced by the mounting[Ⓢ] indignation[Ⓢ] of their rank and file[Ⓢ], who would be protesting in the streets of Germany in the tens of thousands had former chancellor[Ⓢ] Helmut Kohl won the election and carried out a similar policy.^[10] Once the Kosovo crisis is over—or if the war drags on—these constituencies[Ⓢ] will become more dominant. And their influence has already been shown in the unprecedentedly[Ⓢ] abrupt refusal of the German chancellor to consider ground troops for Kosovo.

The issues ducked[Ⓢ] at the NATO summit[Ⓢ] brook[Ⓢ] no further delay. Specifically, what is the proper mission of NATO in so-called “out of area” conflicts? What are the relative roles of Europe and America? Does the Alliance have a serious political or military strategy for stabilizing parts of Europe or adjacent strategic regions?

Europe (the U. K. included) has already begun to draw the conclusion from Kosovo that it needs to accelerate the elaboration of its own institutions in order to enhance its autonomy[Ⓢ] from the United States—hardly a vote of confidence in the middle of a war. But if Europe will not supply the resources for this task—as is likely—the Alliance will be left with the worst of all scenarios[Ⓢ]: a Europe asserting greater freedom of action from the United States but with little actual ability to act

alone; and an America estranged¹⁰ from Europe.

No issue is more in need of rethinking than the concept of humanitarian intervention put forward as the administration's contribution to a new approach to foreign policy. The air war in Kosovo is justified as establishing the principle that the international community—or at least NATO—will henceforth punish the transgressions¹¹ of governments against their own people. But we did not do so in Algeria, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Croatia, Rwanda, the Caucasus, the Kurdish areas and many other regions. And what will be our attitude to emerging ethnic conflicts in Asia, for example in Indonesia and the Philippines? The answer often given is that we act where we are able to without undue¹² risk, not elsewhere. But what are the criteria for this distinction? And what kind of humanism expresses its reluctance to suffer military casualties by devastating the civilian economy of its adversary¹³ for decades to come?

Moral principles are expressed in absolutes. But foreign policy must forever be concerned with reconciling¹⁴ ends and means. The fact that ethnic cleansing is repugnant¹⁵ does not obviate¹⁶ the need to devise the most appropriate response. At every stage of the Kosovo tragedy, other mixes of diplomacy and force were available, though it is not clear they were ever seriously considered. A strategy that vindicates¹⁷ its moral convictions only from altitudes above 15,000 feet—and in the process devastates Serbia and makes Kosovo unlivable—has already produced more refugees and casualties than any conceivable alternative mix of force and diplomacy would have. It deserves to be questioned on both political and moral grounds.

The United States can take pride in elevating¹⁸ human rights to an integral part of foreign policy. But when one observes the progression from the call for moral pressure of the 1970s, to economic sanctions¹⁹ in the 1980s, to military intervention in the 1990s, the time has come to call for a definition

of purposes and a dialogue on the relationship between objectives and methods. But this is for the future. Now that the credibility^⑩ of the Atlantic Alliance has been staked^⑪, we must persist—with ground troops if necessary—until Serb military forces leave Kosovo and the refugees are allowed to return.^[11]

The paradox is that a country that thinks of itself as acting in the name of universal values is seen by too many others as acting arbitrarily, or inexplicably^⑫, or arrogantly^⑬. A re-examination of the prevailing premises of our foreign policy is overdue^⑭. This is a tall order for the last 18 months of an administration heretofore^⑮ more given to tactics than strategy, more to Band-Aids than to healing. The agenda will not be completed in the time left. But if the president encourages a debate on a new agenda before the end of his term, he will have left an important legacy.

[By Henry A. Kissinger from *Newsweek*, May 31, 1999]

Notes 注释

- ①outrage 愤怒的
- ②humiliation 丢脸, 屈辱
- ③elite 精英
- ④blight 使枯萎, 妨碍, 摧残
- ⑤virulent 充满恶感的
- ⑥vent 发泄(感情)
- ⑦frustration 沮丧, 失望
- ⑧roller-coaster 过山车, 云霄飞车
- ⑨brittle 易碎的, 不牢靠的
- ⑩initiate 发起, 发动
- ⑪discern 洞察, 识别
- ⑫rationale 理论基础, 基本原理
- ⑬ascribe 归咎于, 归因于

- ⑭altruism 利他主义
- ⑮compound 混合, 混带着
- ⑯devastation 彻底毁坏
- ⑰exacerbate 使加重
- ⑱conviction 令人信服的道理
- ⑲scorn 蔑视, 不屑做
- ⑳tactical 战术上的
- ㉑obtuse 迟钝的
- ㉒adept 擅长的
- ㉓oblivious 不在意的, 没有觉察到的
- ㉔futility 徒劳, 无效果的行动
- ㉕graduated escalation 逐步升级
- ㉖implication 牵连, 涉及
- ㉗visceral 内部的, 出自内心的
- ㉘doctrine 教条, 教义
- ㉙humanitarian 人道主义的, 人权的
- ㉚exaggerate 夸大, 夸张
- ㉛pretext 借口, 托词, 假像
- ㉜incubus 令人十分忧虑的问题
- ㉝yield 屈服, 放弃
- ㉞provision 准备, 防备
- ㉟a war of attrition 消耗战
- ㊱refugee 难民
- ㊲ethnic cleanse 种族清洗
- ㊳rhetoric 雄辩言辞
- ㊴ritually 习惯性地
- ㊵casualty 伤亡者
- ㊶commitment 承诺, 义务
- ㊷overthrow 推翻
- ㊸tyrant 暴君
- ㊹emerge 摆脱出来, 显露
- ㊺interlocutor 对话者
- ㊻impell 驱使, 推动

- ④⑦maneuver 移动, 调动
- ④⑧foreseeable 可预见的
- ④⑨Rambouillet 朗布依埃协议(战争之前北约要求南联盟签署的协议)
- ⑤⑩ultimatum 最后通牒
- ⑤⑪astound 使震惊
- ⑤⑫multilateral procedure 多边条约
- ⑤⑬tribulation 苦难, 忧患
- ⑤⑭akin 类似的, 相同的
- ⑤⑮coax 哄、用好话劝说
- ⑤⑯intermediary 中间人, 调解人
- ⑤⑰dilemma 左右为难, 两难境地
- ⑤⑱scapegoat 替罪羊
- ⑤⑲nonproliferation 防止核武器扩散
- ⑤⑳accentuate 强调, 着重指出
- ⑥①tutelage 监护, 保护
- ⑥②cling 紧握, 缠住
- ⑥③sentimentality 感情用事
- ⑥④congruent 符合的, 一致的
- ⑥⑤mute 缄默
- ⑥⑥prism 棱镜
- ⑥⑦unilaterally 单方面的
- ⑥⑧regime 政体, 政权
- ⑥⑨stray from 迷失, 走失
- ⑦⑩ideological 思想体系的, 意识形态的
- ⑦⑪turmoil 混乱, 骚乱
- ⑦⑫momentum 势头, 动力
- ⑦⑬stalemate 僵持, 僵局
- ⑦⑭bracket 把……相提并论
- ⑦⑮concession 让步
- ⑦⑯subordinate 使处于次要位置
- ⑦⑰explosion 爆炸
- ⑦⑱justification 辩解的理由