

大学专业英语系列教材

人文科学专业 英语教程

A COURSE IN
HUMANITIES-BASED
ENGLISH

高等学校文科教材

主编 谌馨荪

编者 郭庆民 章安祺

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第一册

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大学专业英语系列教材

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前 言

《大学专业英语系列教材》是根据教育部最新颁布的《大学英语教学大纲》的基本要求，为大学英语学习四年不断线而编写的一套教材。该套教材的编写得到教育部高等教育司的大力支持。

本套教材分法学专业英语、经济专业英语、管理专业英语、人文专业英语四个系列，每一系列包含三个分册，每一分册供一个学期使用。全套教材由复旦大学、中国人民大学、南京大学、对外经济贸易大学联合编写，南京大学杨治中教授担任总主编。法学专业英语教程由赵建、夏国佐教授主编；管理专业英语教程由邱东林、华宏鸣教授主编；经济专业英语教程由翟象俊教授主编，参加编写的有张勇先、王学文教授等；人文专业英语教程由谌馨荪教授主编，参加编写的有郭庆民、章安祺教授。全书由专业英语教师和公共英语教师共同编写。

本系列教材具有如下特点：

一、考虑到我国大学生学完两年后的实际水平，课文的选材、注解和练习以《大学英语教学大纲》所要求的四级为基础。

二、教材在内容和语言上贯彻循序渐进的原则。在内容上，第一册主要涉及本专业的原理和基础知识，第二、三册主要涉及本专业的历史及专家论点；其要旨在于帮助学生完成从基础英语到专业英语的过渡；在语言上，选材从难度、可读性等方面出发，贯穿了由浅入深的原则。

三、考虑到《大纲》对专业英语学时和阅读量的要求，我们采用了“主、副”课文制，对主课文从注解和练习两方面进行了重点处理，用作教师课内重点讲解的内容，副课文主要供学生课后自学，以便对主课文从语言和知识两方面起到巩固作用。

四、本教材强调理解的准确性和学生的应用能力，因此，练习针对这两方面进行了重点编写，配有理解、语言应用（包括词汇应用、语篇应用）练习，理解题强调准确理解、思考、分析、评价、讨论，每课练习中所采用的例句从知识和语言上均与主课文或已学过的课文有关。

五、为方便自学，书后提供了主课文的参考译文和练习答案。

六、全套四种教材在遵循总的编写原则的同时，又根据各自课程的知识特点自成体系。

由于本书编写仓促，不足之处在所难免，敬请读者指正幸甚。

编 者

1999年6月

使用说明

本书为大学专业英语系列教材人文类第一册，供大学英语三年级的学生使用。

第一册共包括十个单元。每单元由课文、生词、注释、练习、阅读文章一和阅读文章二及其练习组成。

参照教育部对学科类别的划分，并根据我国多数大专院校人文学科实际开设的必修、选修课程的情况，第一册的课文选材依次包括哲学、历史学、伦理学、宗教学、语言学、美学、文艺学、文学理论、新闻学、文化学；内容涉及以上学科的最基本知识，文章多选自于相关领域里的名家名著。在尽力涵盖主要人文学科的同时，本教材以人文学科的研究与分析方法为主线，突出诸学科的共性，涉及人文学科学生必须掌握或了解的知识，力图使本书的十个单元在一定程度上达到有机的统一。

课文生词的释义基本采用英、汉双解形式，学生应该参考这两种释义来理解课文。对非本专业的课文，学生更应该参照这两种释义，以便对相关概念或词汇的内涵有较清楚的理解。生词的选择和释义以教育部公布的《大学英语教学大纲通用词汇表》中的四级词汇为起点。

课文的注释主要包括有关背景知识和部分语言难点。

练习一旨在培养学生理解作者的主要观点，并归纳课文的主要内容的能力；形式包括问答题、填充题和选择题。练习二侧重于培养学生在上下文中较准确地理解词义和语句的能力。练习三、四的目的是巩固课文中所学的、并在专业阅读中常用的词汇和词组的用法；练习要求学生自己研究这些用法，并据此在新的语句中使用；相应地，练习三的语句内容多涉及人文学科内容，练习四的内容与其课文涉及的知识紧密相关。练习五为写作练习，旨在培养学生用英语概括和分析课文内容的能力。

阅读文章一、二供学生课下自学用。文章在题材上与课文基本属于同一领域，但涉及的知识内容更加具体，以达到巩固课文内容、进一步扩展和应用知识的目的。体裁更加多样化，除议论文和说明文以外，还包括书信、传记、访谈、小说等。对文章涉及的背景知识进行了注解，涉及到的生词可以在书后附录三的总词汇表中查阅，文章后主要配有理解练习和翻译练习。同时，教师也可以根据学生的专业情况，斟酌使用这些文章作为课上讲解内容。

书后有三个附录。附录一提供了每单元部分练习题的答案，属于理解性练习的简答题和填充题的答案则留给任课教师处理。附录二是课文译文，仅供参考；附录三是总词汇表，包括课文、阅读文章一和阅读文章二中出现的生词和词组。

最后需要说明的是，教师可根据学生的专业情况对本书的内容进行灵活处理。

编者

1999年7月

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Unit One

About the Author

Around the beginning of the twentieth century there was a strong reaction among many philosophers, especially in the Anglo-American world, to metaphysical (形而上学的) idealism (唯心主义) in all its various forms. These new realists, as they were called, were motivated to a considerable extent by what they regarded to be the inability of metaphysical idealism to make sense out of science, with its implicit faith in the existence of an independent, real world. They wanted to show how perception does give us genuine knowledge of objects.

Bertrand Arthur William Russell (1872 – 1970) was among the strongest realist voices of the time. He developed his realism from a so-called phenomenistic (现象学的) theory of perception and the adoption of what he took to be “the logical-analytic method.” The main problem that philosophical realism faces is how to account for errors in perception and how to avoid the possibility that all of perception is systematically misleading regarding the actual state of the world insofar as all our knowledge is necessarily partial and incomplete.

*In the selection from *Our Knowledge of the External World* (1914) that follows, Russell formulates his arguments in a very lucid (透彻的) manner.*

Text:

THE REALITY OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD

Bertrand Russell

In every philosophical problem, our investigation starts from what may be

called "data," by which I mean matters of common knowledge, vague, complex, inexact, as common knowledge always is, but yet somehow commanding our assent as on the whole and in some interpretation pretty certainly true. In the case of our present problem, the common knowledge involved is of various kinds. There is first our acquaintance with particular objects of daily life — furniture, houses, towns, other people, and so on. Then there is the extension of such particular knowledge to particular things outside our personal experience, through history and geography, newspapers, etc. And lastly, there is the systematisation of all this knowledge of particulars by means of physical science, which derives immense persuasive force from its astonishing power of foretelling the future. We are quite willing to admit that there may be errors of detail in this knowledge, but we believe them to be discoverable and corrigible by the methods which have given rise to our beliefs, and we do not, as practical men, entertain for a moment the hypothesis that the whole edifice may be built on insecure foundations. In the main, therefore, and without absolute dogmatism as to this or that special portion, we may accept this mass of common knowledge as affording data for our philosophical analysis. . . .

The first thing that appears when we begin to analyse our common knowledge is that some of it is derivative, while some is primitive; that is to say, there is some that we only believe because of something else from which it has been inferred in some sense, though not necessarily in a strict logical sense, while other parts are believed on their own account, without the support of any outside evidence. It is obvious that the senses give knowledge of the latter kind: the immediate facts perceived by sight or touch or hearing do not need to be proved by argument, but are completely self-evident. Psychologists, however, have made us aware that what is actually given in sense is much less than most people would naturally suppose, and that much of what at first sight seems to be given is really inferred. This applies especially in regard to our space-perceptions. For instance, we instinctively infer the "real" size and shape of a visible object from its apparent size and shape, according to its distance and our point of view. When we hear a person speaking, our actual sensations usually miss a great deal of what he says, and we supply its place by unconscious inference; in a foreign language, where this process is more difficult, we find ourselves apparently grown deaf, requiring,

for example, to be much nearer the stage at a theatre than would be necessary in our own country. Thus the first step in the analysis of data, namely, the discovery of what is really given in sense, is full of difficulty. We will, however, not linger on this point; so long as existence is realised, the exact outcome does not make any very great difference in our main problem.

The next step in our analysis must be the consideration of how the derivative parts of our common knowledge arise. Here we become involved in a somewhat puzzling entanglement of logic and psychology. Psychologically, a belief may be called derivative whenever it is caused by one or more other beliefs, or by some fact of sense which is not simply what the belief asserts. Derivative beliefs in this sense constantly arise without any process of logical inference, merely by association of ideas or some equally extra-logical process. From the expression of a man's face we judge as to what he is feeling: we say we *see* that he is angry, when in fact we only see a frown. We do not judge as to his state of mind by any logical process: the judgment grows up, often without our being able to say what physical mark of emotion we actually saw. In such a case, the knowledge is derivative psychologically; but logically it is in a sense primitive, since it is not the result of any logical deduction. There may or may not be a possible deduction leading to the same result, but whether there is or not, we certainly do not employ it. If we call a belief "logically primitive" when it is not actually arrived at by a logical inference, then innumerable beliefs are logically primitive which psychologically are derivative. The separation of these two kinds of primitivenesses is vitally important to our present discussion.

When we reflect upon the beliefs which are logically but not psychologically primitive, we find that, unless they can on reflection be deduced by a logical process from beliefs which are also psychologically primitive, our confidence in their truth tends to diminish the more we think about them. We naturally believe, for example, that tables and chairs, trees and mountains, are still there when we turn our backs upon them. I do not wish for a moment to maintain that this is certainly not the case, but I do maintain that the question whether it is the case is not to be settled off-hand on any supposed ground of obviousness. The belief that they persist is, in all men except a few philosophers, logically primitive, but it is not psychologically primitive; psychologically, it arises only through our having

seen those tables and chairs, trees and mountains. As soon as the question is seriously raised whether, because we have seen them, we have a right to suppose that they are there still, we feel that some kind of argument must be produced, and that if none is forthcoming, our belief can be no more than a pious opinion. We do not feel this as regards the immediate objects of sense: there they are, and, as far as their momentary existence is concerned, no further argument is required. There is accordingly more need of justifying our psychologically derivative beliefs than of justifying those that are primitive.

New Words and Expressions

command/kə'mɑ:nd/v. t.	deserve and get 应得; 博得
assent/ə'sent/n.	agreement with a statement, opinion, etc.; mental acceptance 同意, 赞成
systematisation/ˌsɪstɪmətaɪ'zeɪʃən/n.	action or process of systematizing 系统化
persuasive/pə(:)'sweɪsɪv/a.	capable of or skilled in persuading; tending or fitted to persuade 有说服力的; 劝导性的
persuade v. t.	劝说
foretell/fə'tel/	tell of (an event etc.) before it takes place; predict, prophesy 预言; 预示
(foretold/fə'təʊld/) v. t.	
corrigible/'kɒrɪdʒəbl/a.	able to be corrected 可改正的, 可纠正的
entertain/ˌentə'teɪn/v. t.	keep or maintain in the mind; cherish 怀着; 持有
hypothesis/'haɪ'pɒθɪsɪs/	proposition put forward merely as a basis for reasoning or argument, without any assumption of its truth 假设; 前提
(pl. hypotheses/'haɪ'pɒθɪsɪz/) n.	
edifice/'edɪfɪs/n.	building, esp. a large and stately one 大建筑物, 大厦
in the main	for the most part; mainly 基本上; 主要地
dogmatism/'dɒgmətɪzəm/n.	positive assertion of opinions; system of philosophy with principles based on reasoning alone, not experience 武断; 教条主义
dogma/dɒgmə/n.	教义, 教条
derivative/dɪ'rɪvətɪv/a.	derived or obtained from another; coming from a source; not original 被引出的, 衍生的
derive v. t.	取得; 衍生出
psychologist/saɪ'kɒlədʒɪst/n.	expert in or student of psychology 心理学家

perception /pə'seɪʃən/ <i>n.</i>	state of being or process of becoming aware or conscious of a thing through any of the senses 感觉; 知觉
perceive <i>v. t.</i>	感觉; 发觉
instinctively /ɪn'stɪŋktɪvli/ <i>ad.</i>	in an instinctive manner, by instinct 本能地
instinct /ɪn'stɪŋkt/ <i>n.</i>	本能; 下意识
sensation /sen'seɪʃən/ <i>n.</i>	perception by the senses 感觉; 知觉
sense <i>n.</i>	感官; 感觉
inference /ɪn'fɜːrəns/ <i>n.</i>	action or process of inferring; (<i>logic</i>) drawing of a conclusion from data or premises 推论, 推断, 推理
infer <i>v. t.</i>	推论, 推断
linger /'lɪŋgə/ <i>v. i.</i>	spend a long time (<i>over</i> or <i>on</i> a subject or <i>round</i> a place) 徘徊; 驻留; 详谈
entanglement /ɪn'tæŋɡlmənt/ <i>n.</i>	action of entangling; the condition or an instance of being entangled 纠缠; 纠纷
entangle /ɪn'tæŋɡl/ <i>v. t.</i>	缠住; 牵连
assert /ə'sɜːt/ <i>v. t.</i>	declare formally and distinctly 宣称; 断言
innumerable /ɪn'ju:mərəbl/ <i>a.</i>	too many to be counted; countless 无数的; 数不清的
number <i>n.</i>	数
diminish /dɪ'mɪnɪʃ/ <i>v. i.</i>	become less or smaller; decrease 减少; 减小
off-hand /'ɔ:f 'hænd/	at once, straightaway 立刻; 不加准备地
(或 offhand) <i>ad.</i>	
forthcoming /fɔ:θ'kʌmɪŋ/ <i>a.</i>	about or likely to come forth or appear; approaching (in time) 即将到来的, 即将出现的
come forth	出来; 涌现
pious /'paɪəs/ <i>a.</i>	characterized by, having, or showing respect to God or gods; heartfelt 虔诚的; 诚恳的
momentary /'məʊməntəri/ <i>a.</i>	lasting only a moment 瞬息间的, 短暂的
moment <i>n.</i>	片刻; 时刻

Study & Practice

I. Comprehension Questions

Answer the questions either by providing your own answers or by making a choice from the four suggested answers.

1. Why should our study of any philosophical problem start from the analysis of "data" according to Russell? What are the data?
2. What might happen if we did not analyze matters of our common knowledge?
 - A) We would be unable to know them at all.
 - B) Our conclusions would lack proper foundations.
 - C) Science would stop its progress.
 - D) There would be no extension of our knowledge.
3. Knowledge that we believe on its own account, "without the support of any outside evidence" is _____.
 - A) primitive
 - B) derivative
 - C) psychologically primitive
 - D) logically primitive
4. Why is it difficult to identify what is really perceived by our senses? Does this difficulty make our knowledge of the external world impossible?
5. The conclusion we reach about a person's state of mind from his facial expression is _____.
 - A) logically sound
 - B) psychologically derivative
 - C) primitive
 - D) unfounded
6. The separation of psychologically primitive knowledge from logically primitive knowledge is important because _____.
 - A) we then find that a lot of our beliefs are built on insecure foundations.
 - B) logically primitive knowledge constitutes a larger part of our knowledge of the external world
 - C) we know then psychologically primitive knowledge is never to be readily trusted
 - D) such a separation enables us to know better the true nature of our knowledge
7. Why is the belief called "logically primitive" that a mountain is still there even if we do not see it at the time? Give one example of our beliefs which might be regarded as not "logically primitive".
8. One of the major differences between primitive beliefs and derivative beliefs is that _____.
 - A) the latter need more argument for their truthfulness
 - B) the former need more explanation for their truthfulness
 - C) the latter are always true beyond any doubt
 - D) the former are always true beyond any doubt

II. Dealing with Unfamiliar Words

It is important to learn to read without a dictionary. Word meaning can be worked out by looking for various clues.

Look closely at how the italicized word(s) in each sentence or part of a sentence is

formed and then, together with other clues available from the context, work out its meaning. (The first one is done as an example).

1. And lastly, there is the *systematisation* of all this knowledge of particulars by means of physical science, ...

meaning: 系统化; clue: system

2. We are quite willing to admit that there may be errors of detail in this knowledge, but we believe them to be *discoverable* and *corrigible*...

meaning: _____ clue: _____

meaning: _____ clue: _____

3. The first thing that appears when we begin to analyse our common knowledge is that some of it is *derivative*, while some is primitive; ...

meaning: _____ clue: _____

4. When we hear a person speaking, our actual *sensations* usually miss a great deal of what he says, and we supply its place by unconscious *inference*; ...

meaning: _____ clue: _____

meaning: _____ clue: _____

5. ... then *innumerable* beliefs are logically primitive which psychologically are derivative.

meaning: _____ clue: _____

6. ... our confidence in their truth tends to *diminish* the more we think about them.

meaning: _____ clue: _____

7. ... we feel that some kind of argument must be produced, and that if none is *forthcoming*, our belief can be no more than a pious opinion.

meaning: _____ clue: _____

8. ... there they are, and, as far as their *momentary* existence is concerned, no further argument is required.

meaning: _____ clue: _____

III. Word Study

Study how the following words or phrases are used in the text. Then fill in the blanks with their appropriate forms.

vague

command

in the case of

acquaintance

immense

give rise to

entertain

primitive

perceive

in regard to

assert

deduction

1. Common sense _____ the existence of a reality.
2. The relation between perception, the perceiver, the object _____, and the knowledge that results from this process gained special attention in the early 20th century.
3. This is a form of _____ that consists of a major premise (大前提), a minor premise (小前提), and a conclusion.
4. Students received a basic training to gain a(n) _____ with materials and processes.
5. In 1793 John Quincy Adams published a series of articles that defended President George Washington and his policy of neutrality (中立) _____ war between France and Great Britain.
6. This human consciousness generates increasingly complex social arrangements that in turn _____ a higher consciousness.
7. Rousseau (卢梭) believed that the natural, or _____, state is morally superior to the civilized state.
8. Jefferson wrote his most famous document, the Declaration of Independence. It, then, had a(n) _____ impact in both America and Europe.
9. Settlement (定居) by one people can also result in the native people becoming a minority, as _____ Native Americans.
10. He could not _____ my sympathy nor even my interest.
11. It sounds fantastic that such beliefs could be seriously _____.
12. He stated that only abstract reasoning yields genuine knowledge, whereas reliance on sense perception produces _____ and inconsistent opinions.

IV. Cloze

Fill in the blanks with the correct prepositions.

All sciences, in the broadest sense, aim at uncovering truths, but in doing so what are they aiming at? The question, "What is truth?", or "What makes anything true?" belongs not _____ any particular science but to philosophy. Philosophers themselves are fundamentally divided _____ the meaning and importance of the question: some regard it _____ philosophy's distinctive question, towards answering which all their more specific enquiries are _____ essence directed; others count the issue as confused, or _____ so general that nothing useful can be said. Asking "What makes it true that cyanide (氰化物) is poisonous?" will call forth one answer; "What makes it true that Mozart is a greater composer than Mendelssohn?" demands another. It hardly seems likely that there will be anything common _____ both answers that reflects a common concern with truth, in addition _____ their diverse concerns _____ medicine and music. Philosophers thus persuade that there is no real question of truth. We can make little _____ the continuing opposition _____ the two major traditional answers to that question: the correspondence and coherence theories of

truth. The correspondence theory holds that the truth of a statement or belief lies _____ a relation of congruence (一致) or conformity to the fact or state _____ affairs it describes. The coherence theory denies that the truth of any of our beliefs can be a matter of matching up to completely independent facts, emphasizing instead the interdependence and organization of our total system of beliefs.

V. Writing

According to Russell, our common knowledge is always “vague” and “inexact”. Give one example of common knowledge and analyze why it is vague and inexact. Write your composition in no less than 150 words.

Reading Passage One:

PHILOSOPHERS' DOUBTS

D. Z. Phillips¹

What is philosophy about? Before I went to university, but knowing that philosophy was going to be one of the subjects I was to study there, I read a well-known introduction to philosophy in the hope of answering that question. My first impression was that the philosopher is an ultra-cautious person. Philosophers do not rush into saying that we know this or that, as most people do. They step back and think about things. Although we say we know all sorts of things, strictly speaking — philosophers conclude — we do not.

Given this view of philosophy, it seemed to me that the usefulness of philosophy was evident. Philosophy is a way of sharpening our thinking. It teaches us to be cautious, and not to be over-hasty in reaching our conclusions. By imposing its strict demands philosophy tightens up our standards of knowledge. Our day-to-day assumptions are shot through with contradictions and inconsistencies. A great deal of reflection is necessary before we can arrive at what we really know. Philosophy is an indispensable guide in this reflection. This view of the usefulness of philosophy was reflected in the views of many educationalists, and this is still the case. They favour introductory classes in philosophy, even for those whose primary intentions are to study other subjects. The pencil needs to be sharpened before it can write with sufficient care about other topics.

This straightforward view of philosophy was given a severe jolt, however, when I read

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