

Classics of Humanities

英汉双语·人文经典

the Chrysanthemum
and the Sword



菊与刀

[美]本尼迪克特◎著 汝 敏◎译

英汉双语经典插图版



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
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CHAPTER I

Assignment: Japan



第一章

任务：日本



The JAPANESE were the most alien enemy the United States had ever fought in an all-out struggle. In no other war with a major foe had it been necessary to take into account such exceedingly different habits of acting and thinking. Like Czarist Russia before us in 1905, we were fighting a nation fully armed and trained which did not belong to the Western cultural tradition. Conventions of war which Western nations had come to accept as facts of human nature obviously did not exist for the Japanese. It made the war in the Pacific more than a series of landings on island beaches, more than an unsurpassed problem of logistics. It made it a major problem in the nature of the enemy. We had to understand their behavior in order to cope with it.

The difficulties were great. During the past seventy-five years since Japan's closed doors were opened, the Japanese have been described in the most fantastic series of "but also" ever used for any nation of the world. When a serious observer is writing about peoples other than the Japanese and says they are unprecedentedly polite, he is not likely to add, "But also insolent and overbearing." When he says people of some nation are incomparably rigid in their behavior, he does not add, "But also they adapt themselves readily to extreme innovations." When he says a people are submissive, he does not explain too that they are not easily amenable to control from above. When he says they are loyal and generous, he does not declare, "But also treacherous and spiteful." When he says they are genuinely brave, he does not expatiate on their timidity. When he says they act out of concern for others' opinions, he does not then go on to tell that they have a truly terrifying conscience. When he describes robot-like discipline in their Army, he does not continue by describing the way the soldiers in that Army take the bit in their own teeth even to the point of insubordination. When he describes a people who devote themselves with passion to Western learning, he does not also enlarge on their fervid conservatism. When

在美国曾经全力以赴作战的敌人中，日本人是我们最不了解的对手。从来没有一场战争中曾有过这么一个主要对手，由于它的行为和思考习惯与我们完全迥异，以至于需要我们对它认真加以考虑。我们就像1905年的沙皇俄国一样，在和一个全副武装并经过严格训练的民族作战，但它并不是西方文化传统中的一员。被西方国家视为人类天性的战争惯例，很明显在日本人那里并不存在。正因为如此，在太平洋的战争并不仅仅是一系列海岸登陆作战，也远比那些后勤上几乎无法解决的难题更加严重。这些困难使得了解敌人天性成为一个主要难题，为了解决它，我们不得不去了解日本人的行为。

困难是巨大的。在75年前，自从日本紧闭的大门被打开后，对日本的描述总是出现在一系列最令人匪夷所思的作品中，那些作品总是运用“但又”这一固定句型，这在世界上其他任何国家都是没有过的。当一个严肃的观察家在描述日本之外的民族时，他可能会说，“他们是前所未有的礼貌民族”，他不太可能会再加一句“但是他们又傲慢专横”；当他描述一些民族在行为中表现出无与伦比的顽固时，他不会加上一句“但是他们又非常容易适应极端的革新”；当他描述一个民族性情驯服时，他通常不会解释说他们并不是那么容易驯服于上级的控制；当他说他们忠诚且有雅量时，他不会宣称“但是他们又背信弃义、满腹怨恨”；当他说他们天生神勇时，他不会详细叙述他们如何怯懦；当他说这一民族的人完全是按照别人的观点来行事时，他不会接下去说他们怀有一颗真诚得令人吃惊

he writes a book on a nation with a popular cult of aestheticism which gives high honor to actors and to artists and lavishes art upon the cultivation of chrysanthemums, that book does not ordinarily have to be supplemented by another which is devoted to the cult of the sword and the top prestige of the warrior.

All these contradictions, however, are the warp and woof of books on Japan. They are true. Both the sword and the chrysanthemum are a part of the picture. The Japanese are, to the highest degree, both aggressive and unaggressive; both militaristic and aesthetic, both insolent and polite, rigid and adaptable, submissive and resentful of being pushed around, loyal and treacherous, brave and timid, conservative and hospitable to new ways. They are terribly concerned about what other people will think of their behavior, and they are also overcome by guilt when other people know nothing of their misstep. Their soldiers are disciplined to the hilt but are also insubordinate.

When it became so important for America to understand Japan, these contradictions and many others equally blatant could not be waved aside. Crises were facing us in quick succession. What would the Japanese do? Was



1853年，马希·佩里准将被委托将美国总统米拉德·费尔摩的一封信交给日本官方。7月，他的中队的四艘蒸汽铁甲战舰不理日本的禁令驶入了浦贺湾。可以想象，只见过木制帆船的日本人首次见到这些发出巨大声响、喷吐着烟雾的钢铁怪物时是何等的惊慌和恐惧。图为1853年7月6日佩里参观日本城堡。

的良心；当他描述说他们的军人都被训练得像机器人时，他不会继续描述那些军队中的士兵如何不服管训，甚至犯上作乱；当他描述说一个民族将自己所有热情都奉献给学习西方时，他不会再详细描述该民族极端热忱的守旧性格。当一个人写了一本书来讲述一个普遍崇尚美感的民族，说他们极端尊敬演员、艺术家，以及丰富的菊花养殖艺术时，他通常不会被迫再写一本书来补充说，这个民族如何崇敬刀剑，以及武士如何具有无土威望。

但是，所有这些矛盾表现，却正是有关日本的论著中的经纬；而且这些都千真万确。刀与菊都是这幅画的组成部分。从最大程度上来说，日本人天生好斗，但又非常温和；穷兵黩武，但又珍视美感；孤介傲慢，但又彬彬有礼；顽固强硬，但又柔顺善变；驯服谦恭，但又不听摆布；非常忠诚，但又易于叛变；天生神勇，但又胆小怯懦；固执守旧，但又顺应潮流。他们极端重视别人怎么看待他们的行为；同时，在发觉别人没有发现他们的过失时，他们为战胜自己的羞耻心而窃喜。他们的士兵被严格训练成武器，但是这些人又富有反抗精神。

当美国了解日本已经成为当务之急时，我们不能将这些矛盾表现和其他一些同样喧嚣的矛盾表现都弃之一旁。严重事态接二连三地出现在我们面前。下一步日本人会怎么办？如果没有攻入其本土，日本会投降吗？我们应该直接轰炸日



capitulation possible without invasion? Should we bomb the Emperor's palace? What could we expect of Japanese prisoners of war? What should we say in our propaganda to Japanese troops and to the Japanese homeland which could save the lives of Americans and lessen Japanese determination to fight to the last man? There were violent disagreements among those who knew the Japanese best. When peace came, were the Japanese a people who would require perpetual martial law to keep them in order? Would our army have to prepare to fight desperate bitter-enders in every mountain fastness of Japan? Would there have to be a revolution in Japan after the order of the French Revolution or the Russian Revolution before international peace was possible? Who would lead it? Was the alternative the eradication of the Japanese? It made a great deal of difference what our judgments were.

In June, 1944, I was assigned to the study of Japan. I was asked to use all the techniques I could as a cultural anthropologist to spell out what the Japanese were like. During that early summer our great offensive against Japan had just begun to show itself in its true magnitude. People in the United States were still saying that the war with Japan would last three years, perhaps ten years, more. In Japan they talked of its lasting one hundred years. Americans, they said, had had local victories, but New Guinea and the Solomons were thousands of miles away from their home islands. Their official communiques had hardly admitted naval defeats and the Japanese people still regarded themselves as victors.

In June, however, the situation began to change. The second front was opened in Europe and the military priority which the High Command had for two years and a half given to the European theater paid off. The end of the war against Germany was in sight. And in the Pacific our forces landed on Saipan, a great operation forecasting eventual Japanese defeat. From then on our soldiers were to face the Japanese army at constantly

本皇宫吗？从日本战俘身上我们可以期望得到什么？在针对日本军队和日本本土的宣传中我们应该怎么表达，才能挽救美国人的生命，并且削弱日本人那种战斗到最后一个人的信念？这些问题在很多非常了解日本的人中间也都存在着激烈的争论。当和平来临，是不是只有靠永久的军事管制才能保证他们遵守秩序？我们的战士是否要被迫在日本的每一个山口要塞与拼死决战的日本兵战斗到底？在世界和平成为现实之前，日本是否也得来一场革命，就像法国大革命或者俄罗斯革命？谁来领导这场革命？除了根除日本人，还有没有别的替代方式？这些问题也让美国人感到众说纷纭，莫衷一是。

1944年6月，我被指派研究日本。我接手的任务是，要使用我作为一个文化人类学家的所有技能，来拼出日本人到底像什么。那年夏初，我们针对日本的巨大攻势已经开始展现其真正的威力。美国人仍然在说对日本的战争将要维持3年的时间，也许10年，也许更长；而日本人则认为它会持续一个世纪。他们说尽管美国取得了局部的胜利，但是新几内亚和所罗门群岛离日本本土还有数千英里之遥，他们的官方公报几乎不承认他们在海上的失败。日本人仍然视自己为胜利者。

但是，6月时，形势发生了逆转。在欧洲，第二战场开辟，最高统帅部在两年半时间里一直给予欧洲战场的军事优先权已没有必要再继续下去。结束针对德国的战争已经指日可待。在太平洋上，我们的军队已经在塞班岛登陆^[1]，这一军事行动预示着日本彻底的失败。从此以后我们的战士离日本兵越来越近，就要与其

closer quarters. And we knew well, from the fighting in New Guinea, on Guadalcanal, in Burma, on Attu and Tarawa and Biak, that we were pitted against a formidable foe.


In June, 1944, therefore, it was important to answer a multitude of questions about our enemy, Japan. Whether the issue was military or diplomatic, whether it was raised by questions of high policy or of leaflets to be dropped behind the Japanese front lines, every insight was important. In the all-out war Japan was fighting we had to know, not just the aims and motives of those in power in Tokyo, not just the long history of Japan, not just economic and military statistics; we had to know what their government could count on from the people. We had to try to understand Japanese habits of thought and emotion and the patterns into which these habits fell. We had to know the sanctions behind these actions and opinions. We had to put aside for the moment the premises on which we act as Americans and to keep ourselves as far as possible from leaping to the easy conclusion that what we would do in a given situation was what they would do.

My assignment was difficult. America and Japan were at war and it is easy in wartime to condemn wholesale, but far harder to try to see how your

短兵相接。从新几内亚、瓜达康纳尔岛、缅甸、阿图、塔拉瓦岛和比耶克岛的战役中，我们清楚知道，我们已经给了可怕的敌人重重一击。

于是，在1944年6月，回答上述一系列关于日本的问题已经变得很迫切。这些问题当中，不管是军事的还是外交的，也不管它是出自最高决策的要求，还是被抛撒在日本前线的传单中所提出的问题，对每一个问题给予深入解答已经很重要。在对日本的战斗中，我们必须了解的不仅仅是东京当权者们的目的和动议，也不仅仅是日本漫长的历史，也不仅仅是经济和军事的统计资料，我们必须了解的是，日本政府能指望人民做什么。我们不得不尝试去理解日本人的思维和情感习惯，以及这些习惯所形成的模式。我们不得不去了解在他们的行为和观点背后的制约力量。我们不得不将美国人采取行动的前提抛在一边，尽可能不轻率地得出一个结论：在一个给定的条件下，我们怎么做，他们也会怎么做。

我的任务是困难的。美国和日本正在交战，在战争状态中很容易对对方全盘否定；而且，要试图通过敌人自己的眼睛来看他们如何看待生活，这就很困难了。问题就是，如果处在他们的境地，他们会如何采取行动，而不是我们将如何采取行动。我不得不试图将战争中的日本人的行为作为我的一项资产——即有利条件来加以利用，而不是作为一种负债——即不利条件来运用。我不得不运用



与其他被侵略的国家不同，日本人将佩里作为开国的恩人来纪念，并每年在美国战舰登陆地点举行“黑船祭”。图为1953年日本政府为纪念佩里到访100周年发行的邮票。





enemy looks at life through his own eyes. Yet it had to be done. The question was how the Japanese would behave, not how we would behave if we were in their place. I had to try to use Japanese behavior in war as an asset in understanding them, not as a liability. I had to look at the way they conducted the war itself and see it not for the moment as a military problem but as a cultural problem. In warfare as well as in peace, the Japanese acted in character. What special indications of their way of life and thinking did they give in the way they handled warfare? Their leaders' ways of whipping up war spirit, of reassuring the bewildered, of utilizing their soldiers in the field—all these things showed what they themselves regarded as the strengths on which they could capitalize. I had to follow the details of the war to see how the Japanese revealed themselves in it step by step.

The fact that our two nations were at war inevitably meant, however, a serious disadvantage. It meant that I had to forego the most important technique of the cultural anthropologist: a field trip. I could not go to Japan and live in their homes and watch the strains and stresses of daily life, see with my own eyes which were crucial and which were not. I could not watch them in the complicated business of arriving at a decision. I could not see their children being brought up. The one anthropologist's field study of a Japanese village, John Embree's *Suye Mura*, was invaluable, but many of the questions about Japan with which we were faced in 1944 were not raised when that study was written.

As a cultural anthropologist, in spite of these major difficulties, I had confidence in certain techniques and postulates which could be used. At least I did not have to forego the anthropologist's great reliance upon face-to-face contact with the people he is studying. There were plenty of Japanese in this country who had been reared in Japan and I could ask them about the concrete facts of their own experiences, find out how they judged them, fill in from their descriptions many gaps in our knowledge which as an anthropologist I believed

他们自己的行为方式来看待他们在战争中的所作所为——不是为了暂时的军事难题，而是作为一个文化难题来看待它。不管在战争期间还是和平时期，日本人都以自己的方式生活。他们的生活方式和思维方式给他们处置战争的方式提供了怎样的特殊暗示？他们的领袖激励士气的方式、安抚惶惑民心的方式、在战场上调兵遣将的方式——所有这些显示出来的他们视为可资利用的力量到底是什么？我不得不认真研究这些战争中的细节，来看看日本人一步步所展现出的他们自己到底是什么样的。

但是，我们两个国家尚处在交战中，这一事实不可避免地意味着这是一个严重的不利因素。它意味着我不得不放弃文化人类学者最重要的一项技术：田野调查。我不能去日本，不能住在他们家里来观察他们日常生活的细节，并运用我自己的眼睛来观察对于他们来说哪些是关键细节，哪些是细枝末节。我不能观察到他们在一项复杂事务中如何做出决定；也不能看看他们抚育培养孩子的过程。约翰·艾勃里^[2]的《须惠村》^[3]是一本有关日本乡村的田野研究，这本书非常珍贵，但是在写作这本书时，许多1944年要面对的关于日本的问题都还没有出现。

尽管面对这么多的困难，作为一个文化人类学社会研究者，我确信还是有一些可以利用的方法和公理。至少，我还可以运用文化人类学最倚重的方法：与所研究的民族面对面接触。在美国有很多日本人，他们在日本被培养起来，我可以向他们询问他们所经历的各种具体事实，观察他们怎么判断这些事实，从他们的

were essential in understanding any culture. Other social scientists who were studying Japan were using libraries, analyzing past events or statistics, following developments in the written or spoken word of Japanese propaganda. I had confidence that many of these answers they sought were embedded in the rules and values of Japanese culture and could be found more satisfactorily by exploring that culture with people who had really lived it.

This did not mean that I did not read and that I was not constantly indebted to Westerners who had lived in Japan. The vast literature on the Japanese and the great number of good Occidental observers who have lived in Japan gave me an advantage which no anthropologist has when he goes to the Amazon headwaters or the New Guinea highlands to study a non-literate tribe. Having no written language such tribes have committed no self-revelations to paper. Comments by Westerners are few and superficial. Nobody knows



日裔美国人

“珍珠港事件”（此后的调查发现确实有夏威夷的日裔美国人为日军提供情报）发生之后，日本对美国宣战。一夜之间，美国的所有日本裔人，不管是高级工程师还是家庭妇女，不管是老人还是刚刚出生的小孩，都成为日本间谍的嫌疑人。美国政府担心日裔美国人中有人会为日本政府服务，于是“先发制人”地把日裔美国人都圈到集中营里去。全美大约11万的日裔美国人，大多数是第二、第三代的日裔美国人，被送往在中西部特别修建的10个实际上是集中营的“relocation centers”（重新安置中心），住进了与世隔绝的生活圈中。直到战争结束，美国才陆续解散了这些集中营。也正是这些人为本尼迪克特的研究提供了大量素材。

描述中来填充我们的知识中的诸多空白。作为一个人类学者，我相信这些知识对于理解任何文化都是非常重要的。其他一些研究日本的社会科学家的方式是，借助图书馆的资料来分析历史事件和统计数据，观察日本各种文字宣传和口头宣传中所运用的词汇的迁移变化。我相信他们所发现的答案是建立在规则以及日本文化价值基础之上的，但是，如果能对人们置身其中的文化进行研究，将会获得更加令人满意的答案。

说这些并不意味着我不读书，也不意味着我没有向生活在日本的西方人请教。有关日本的大量文学作品以及曾经居住在日本的优秀的西方观察家们，他们给我提供了一种人类学者所不具备的优势——因为人类学者必须去亚马逊河流源头或者新几内亚高地研究那些还没有文字的部落；这些部落因为没有书写文字，无法用纸张来展现自我，因此西方对他们的评述很少而且肤浅，也就没有人知道他们过去的历史。在没有前人的任何帮助的情况下，田野调查者必须发现这些部落的经济生活运转方式，发现他们的社会分层如何，发现他们宗教生活中的顶级

