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# ANCIENT WARFARE

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## 古代战争与 西方战争文化

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Harry Sidebottom 著 晏绍祥 译



通识教育  
双语文库

A VERY SHORT  
INTRODUCTION

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# Preface

This book deals with war between about 750 BC and AD 650. It concentrates on the classical cultures of Greece and Rome, although some of their enemies, peoples such as the Persians, Carthaginians, Germans, Huns, Arabs, and so on, get a look in. There are reasons beyond the author's academic specialization for this focus.

War was at the core of the classical cultures. Although, contrary to popular ideas, they were not always at war, and when they were they did not always seek open battle. The Greeks and Romans for long periods of time were generally successful in war, and war was never far from their minds. The ancient Mediterranean world produced sophisticated thinking specifically about war, much of which is still of relevance today. Concepts drawn from war were also used to structure thinking in many other areas. War was considered to be one of the main ways to distinguish one culture from another. Within the classical cultures, war was central to the construction of masculinity and thoughts about the differences between men and women. At the most intimate level, ideas from war were used by individuals to understand and construct their own personalities. In the Greek and Roman worlds almost everything you read, heard, or looked at could evoke warfare.

The Greeks and Romans liked to believe that they made war in a way that was different both from earlier peoples and from other contemporary peoples. This makes for a discrete area of study.

Some modern scholars have picked up on the classical cultures' ideas of their distinctiveness in war-making and, linking this to classical influences on modern Western culture, have come up with the concept of a 'Western Way of War'; a continuity of practices that they claim runs from ancient Greece to the modern West. Exploration and re-evaluation of this concept is central to this book.

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Those scholars who see a continuity in a 'Western Way of War' tend to define it as follows. It is the desire for open, decisive battle, which aims at the annihilation of the enemy. Ideally it is conducted by heavily armed infantry fighting hand to hand. The battle is won by courage, which is instilled in part by training and discipline. This is often linked to the combatants having political freedom and being landowners – so-called 'civic-militarism'. This 'Western Way of War' is seen as having been invented by the Greeks, inherited by the Romans, and somehow surviving the European Middle Ages, before flowering again in the Renaissance, whence it comes directly to the modern West.

In this book the 'Western Way of War' is interpreted differently; not so much as an objective reality, a genuine continuity of practices, but more as a strong ideology which since its creation by the Greeks has been, and still is, frequently reinvented, and changed with each reinvention. Those who subscribe to the ideology do not necessarily fight in a very different way to others, it is just that often they genuinely think they do.

Some earlier cultures fought in ways not all that dissimilar from the Greeks. The Assyrians clearly looked for open, decisive battle in which they attempted to annihilate their opponents. Their armies were trained, disciplined, composed in part of landowners, and, in what is known as the neo-Assyrian period (934–609 BC), contained armoured infantry armed solely with a spear for close combat. In their own terms they fought for political freedom. The latter cannot be dismissed out of hand by comparison with 'Western' freedom. The concept of freedom cannot be universalized. The meaning of freedom varies not only between cultures but within them as it can hold different meanings for

different groups inside one culture, and those meanings can change over time.

It is far from clear that the classical cultures were as distinctive in their war-making as they liked to believe. In the 1920s an archaeological excavation of a tiny bog at Hjortspring on the island of Als in Denmark uncovered a magnificent boat and weaponry. The finds were probably deposited in the bog about 350 BC as a gift to the gods. It is likely that they were part of the equipment of a force defeated in a local war. The weaponry included swords and mailcoats, with a large number of spears, javelins, and shields. Modern interpretation has seen these finds as implying that this barbarian force, created far away from Greece and Rome, was made up of landowners, with political rights as their community understood them, organized in units of similarly equipped spearmen who used shock tactics to try to achieve a decisive result in battle; just like contemporary Mediterranean armies, especially the Roman legion of this era.

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Long after the end of the classical world, other cultures would evolve a style of battle remarkably similar to the 'Western Way of War' with little or no influence from the West. As we will see, in the early 19th century in southern Africa, the Zulus changed their military organization, tactics, and equipment to create an open, pitched battle fought hand to hand by infantry, the aim of which was a decisive result.

In reality the classical cultures did not always fight in the 'Western Way of War'. For long stretches of their history the Greeks actually seem to have been rather good at avoiding battle. In the 27 years of the bitter Peloponnesian War (431–427 BC) between Athens and Sparta and their respective allies, there were only two, or maybe three, significant land battles that approximate to the 'Western' style. Similarly, the Romans were not always dead set on fighting pitched battles themselves. Recalling the imperial prince Germanicus from campaigning beyond the Rhine in AD 16, the emperor Tiberius thought that Roman aims were better served by encouraging the Germans to turn on each other. In 48 BC, when the civil war between Julius Caesar and Pompey came to



Dyrrachium in Greece, the initial attempt to produce a result was through field fortifications rather than open battle. In AD 83, at the battle of Mons Graupius, the general Agricola drew up his army to fight the Caledonians with his auxiliaries in the front line and his Roman citizen troops to the rear. Writing this up, his son-in-law Tacitus claimed that the victory would be vastly more glorious if no Roman blood were shed.

X One factor that may encourage us to overemphasize the distinctiveness of Greek and Roman battle must always be kept in mind – that is, the types of available evidence. While archaeology can tell us a lot about their opponents, in almost all cases our literary evidence comes from the classical cultures. Had their opponents taken to comparable literary production, and had it survived, our impressions might have been very different.

The links between reality and ideology are always complex. On the one hand, the ideology of the ‘Western Way of War’ has shaped how reality has been interpreted. As we will see, in the 7th century AD the inhabitants of the eastern Roman empire still held that they fought in an open, ‘Western’ way, and that their Arab opponents did not, when in reality their armed forces went to considerable lengths to avoid pitched battle. Again, when Europeans learnt about the Zulu war machine, it was assumed that the Africans could not have created it on their own initiative, but must have copied Western models. On the other hand, the ideology can mould reality. There may have been few land battles in the Peloponnesian War, but in the opening years of the conflict the ideology meant that the Spartans marched into Athenian territory expecting to fight. If Tiberius had judged that there was the possibility that a decisive battle could have been fought in Germany in AD 17, he probably would not have ordered Germanicus to return Roman forces to the banks of the Rhine. The siege works at Dyrrachium did not settle the issue between Caesar and Pompey; that was achieved on the battlefield of Pharsalus. Tacitus might claim a victory without Roman blood as an ideal, but the legionaries at Mons Graupius were willing and able to fight.

Although the links between the two are far from straightforward, it is best for us to interpret the 'Western Way of War' more as an ideology than an objective reality. To do otherwise, to think of 'Western War' as a continuous practice, is to homogenize history. It can lead all too easily to thinking that there has always been just one 'Western Way of War', and probably by extension just one 'Other Way'. This would iron out the differences between past and present and between different cultures, and the differences between ourselves and the people of Greece and Rome are as interesting as the similarities. It might be that we learn more about ourselves when we are rather surprised to find these differences than when we just see ourselves reflected back.

Re-reading the book to write this preface, I feel that the need for brevity has led to the 6th century AD, which saw the wars of reconquest waged by the emperor Justinian, and recorded by one of the last great classical historians Procopius, being given short shrift. To remedy this in some measure, I have included some modern works on this period in the further reading section of the book. The latter should be thought of almost as an eighth chapter, and the relevant sections be read in tandem with the main text, as it puts my arguments in the context of modern scholarly interests and debate, and enables the reader to take his or her interests further.

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The book looks at both how war was done and, the far less studied topic, how war was thought about. It tacks between using specific pieces of evidence to build general observations, and analysis of some particular examples of the big themes and controversies of modern scholarship, thereby hoping to encourage readers to do similar history for themselves in other contexts.

The pleasant task remains for me to thank here various people who have helped me with this book: George Miller, editor and friend, for first commissioning it, and for clarifying various ideas in discussion; then, for constructive criticism, two colleagues and friends, Maria Stamatopoulou at Lincoln College, Oxford, and Michael Whitby at the University of Warwick; and the anonymous reader for the Press.

Finally, I would like to dedicate the book to the memory of my father, Captain Hugh Sidebottom, who on 3 September 1939 volunteered to fight in a war.

XII

# 前言

本书讨论的是公元前 750 年至公元 650 年间的战争，重点关注古希腊和古罗马，尽管也会顺带论及它们的某些敌人，例如波斯人、迦太基人、日耳曼人、匈奴人、阿拉伯人等等。除专业背景因素外，作者选取这个重点还有其他理由。

战争是古典文化<sup>1</sup>的核心，但与通常的观念相反，古代希腊和罗马并不总处于战争状态，即便征战时，也不总是寻求公开决战。总的来说在战争领域，希腊人和罗马人长期以来是成功的，他们的思想中也总是有战争的存在。古代地中海世界产生了完善的、专门论述战争的思想，其中许多在当今仍有重要意义。从战争中产生的观念在许多其他领域中用来构建思维。战争还被作为区分此文化与彼文化的一个重要因素。在古典文化中，战争在男子汉气概的建构以及男女差异的思想中均处于核心地位。源自战争的观点也被个人用来理解和建构其品格。

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<sup>1</sup> 本书所说的古典文化，是西方学术界通用的称呼，一般指古代希腊和罗马的文化，尤其是公元前 8 世纪古典希腊、罗马文明诞生到公元 4 世纪基督教取得统治地位之间的文化。古典世界大体也指这一时期的希腊和罗马人的世界。其地理方位则随着历史的发展有一个变化过程，最初局限于巴尔干半岛，后扩展到地中海和黑海地区，希腊化时代曾达到印度河流域。罗马帝国时代主要指以地中海为中心的罗马帝国统治区，其东界大体在西亚的两河流域，西北达到不列颠北部的苏格兰，北界为莱茵河和多瑙河，南为今埃及北部。西方人所说的古代世界，一般也指该时期的这个地区。——译注，下同

在希腊和罗马世界，你读到的、听到的或看到的一切，都有可能让人想起战争。

希腊人和罗马人倾向于认为，他们是在以一种既不同于更早的民族，也不同于当时的其他民族的方式进行战争。这使他们的战争成了一个独立的研究领域。有些现代学者重拾古典文化关于其战争独特性的观念，并将其与古典文化对现代西方文化产生的影响联系起来，构建了“西方式战争”的概念。他们宣称，从古代希腊到现代，战争实践一直具有连续性。对这一观念的探索和重新评价，将是本书的核心。

XIV 那些在“西方式战争”中看出连续性的学者，倾向于这样界定它：这是一种对公开的决战的渴望，其意图在于歼灭敌人。在理想状态下，它是通过重装步兵面对面的交战展开。战斗通过勇气赢得，勇气部分来自训练和纪律。人们常常把这一点和拥有政治自由和土地的战士联系起来，即所谓的“公民—尚武精神”。这种“西方式战争”观念被认为是由希腊人创造、由罗马人继承、在欧洲的中世纪得以幸存，然后在文艺复兴时代再度繁荣，而后直接进入现代西方。

本书对西方式战争作出了不同的解释。与其说西方战争是一种客观实在，一种战争实践的延续，不如说是一种强烈的意识形态，自希腊人创造这个概念以来，它就经常被、而且仍然在被再造，且每次再造都有改变。那些服膺于该意识形态的人在与他人战斗时，方式并不一定有很大不同，不过他们自己笃信他们是在用不同方式战斗。

有些较早的文化与希腊人的战斗方式并非有很大的不同。亚述人显然也寻求公开决战，以歼灭敌人。他们的军队部分由土地所有者组成，受过训练，有严明的纪律。在我们所说的新亚述时期（公元前 934—前 609），军队中有穿盔甲的重装步兵，仅用长矛武装以利近战。用他们自己的话说，那是为政治自由

而战。如果与“西方式”自由比较，对亚述人的自由我们是不能弃之不顾的。自由观念无法普遍化，自由的意义不仅在不同文化间存在差异，就是在同一文化内部，对不同的集团也有不同的意义，而且这些意义会随着时代变迁而改变。

古典文化在战争方式上是否像它们惯于相信的那样如此与众不同，这一点也远不是那么清楚。20世纪20年代，在丹麦阿耳斯岛上的小湿地胡加斯普林的考古发掘中，出土了一条华美的船只和一些武器，这些东西可能是约公元前350年作为献给诸神的礼物存放在湿地中的，它们可能是在一场当地战争中战败者的部分装备，武器中有剑和护胸甲以及大量长矛、标枪和盾牌。现代的解释认为这些发现揭示，这是一支蛮族军队，创建于远离希腊和罗马的地区。他们由土地所有者组成，拥有他们的共同体所理解的政治权利，编排到了装备相似，使用突击战术决胜负的矛兵队阵中，和当时地中海地区的军队，尤其是那时的罗马军团相像。

古代世界结束后的很长时间里，其他文化在很少或者根本没有受到西方影响的情况下，仍会发展出一套与西方式战争明显雷同的战斗方式。我们会看到，在19世纪早期的南非，祖鲁人改革了军事组织、战术和装备，创建了以步兵面对面交战为特征，目的是获得决定性胜利的公开的阵地战方法。

事实上，古典文化并不总是按照“西方式战争”模式作战。在很长的历史阶段里，希腊人似乎相当善于避免战斗。在雅典和斯巴达以及它们各自盟友之间27年艰苦的伯罗奔尼撒战争（公元前431—前427<sup>1</sup>）中，只有两次，也许是三次重大的陆上决战，与西方式战争接近。同样，罗马人也不总是死守阵地战。

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<sup>1</sup> 此处时间有误，应为公元前431—前404年。

公元 16 年，当皇帝提比略<sup>1</sup> 将杰马尼库斯<sup>2</sup> 亲王从莱茵河以东的战场上召回时，他觉得，唆使日耳曼人相互残杀对罗马人更加有利。公元前 48 年，当尤利乌斯·恺撒和庞培之间的内战在希腊的杜拉奇乌姆<sup>3</sup> 进行时，初期是希望通过战场上的防御战，而非公开的决战来决定胜负。在公元 83 年的蒙斯格劳皮尤斯战役中，将军阿格里科拉在与古代苏格兰人交战时，将辅助兵置于前列，罗马公民兵置于后排。他的女婿塔西佗<sup>4</sup> 记叙这一事件时宣称，战争如果在罗马人不流血的情况下取得胜利，那要荣耀得多。

我们必须牢记，我们现有的资料类型可能导致了我們过多强调希腊、罗马战争的独特性。虽然考古学能告诉我们许多关于他们的敌人的情况，但几乎无一例外，文献资料都来自古典希腊和罗马文化。如果他们的敌人也创造出可与之相提并论的文献作品，而且这些作品保存下来的话，那我们获得的印象可能与现在有很大不同。

现实和意识形态之间的关系历来复杂。一方面，西方式战争的意识形态已经影响了我们对现实的解释，如我们将看到的，公元 7 世纪，东罗马帝国的居民认为，他们是按公开的、“西方”的方式战斗，而他们的敌人阿拉伯人则不是这样，但在现实中，东罗马帝国的武装力量实际上尽可能地回避阵地战。还有，当欧洲人了解到祖鲁人的战争组织时，他们以为非洲人不可能独立创造出这样的形式，肯定是抄袭了西方的模式。另一方面，意识形态又会塑造现实。伯罗奔尼撒战争中可能只有很少几次

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<sup>1</sup> 罗马皇帝（14—37 年在位）。

<sup>2</sup> 提比略义子，罗马大将，曾指挥对日耳曼人的战争。后与提比略失和，据说为提比略指使手下毒死。

<sup>3</sup> 亚得里亚海北岸城市，公元前 48 年恺撒和庞培初次在此交战，后恺撒退到色萨利，与庞培在法萨卢斯决战并击败庞培。

<sup>4</sup> 公元 2 世纪罗马历史学家，著有《历史》、《编年史》、《阿格里科拉传》等。

陆上决战，但在冲突的前几年，这种意识却让斯巴达人开入雅典领土，期待决战。如果提比略判断出公元 17 年有可能在日耳曼进行一次决定性会战，那他可能不会命令杰马尼库斯将罗马军队撤回莱茵河岸。对杜拉奇乌姆的围困并没有解决恺撒和庞培之间的问题，最终胜负是在法萨卢斯战场上决定的。塔西佗可能会说，罗马人不流血取得的胜利是理想的胜利，但在蒙斯格劳皮尤斯的罗马军团还是愿意而且有实力进行战斗。

我们最好还是把西方式战争解释为一种意识形态，而非客观实际，虽然两者间的联系远不那么直接。换句话说，将西方式战争作为连续的实践，意味着将历史单一化。这样太容易让人们认为只有一种“西方式战争”存在，推而广之，只可能有一种“其他方式的战争”。这就抹去了过去与现在之间、不同文化之间的差异。我们和古希腊人、古罗马人之间的差异与相似之处一样有趣。当我们十分惊异地发现这些差异时，我们对自身的了解，也许比只是反观自己时会更多。

重读本书并作序时，我感到因篇幅有限，公元 6 世纪未得到必要关注，当时的皇帝查士丁尼<sup>1</sup>发动了再征服战争，并由一位伟大的古典历史学家普罗科皮乌斯将战事记录下来。为以某种方式弥补这一缺憾，我在补充阅读书目中收录了一些有关该时期的现代著作。补充阅读书目相当于本书的第八章，相关部分应与正文平行阅读，因为本章将我的论证置于现代学界所关注的问题和相关讨论中，使得读者对这一主题的兴趣能深入下去。

本书既着眼于战争如何进行，也着眼于人们如何思考战争，但对后一主题的研究要少得多。本书亦把使用具体资料进行概

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<sup>1</sup> 拜占庭帝国皇帝(527 - 565 年在位)。在位期间编订罗马法，出兵意大利、西班牙和北非，力图恢复昔日罗马帝国的疆域。



括总结和对现代学术某些重大问题与争议的具体例证分析结合起来，希望借此鼓励读者在其他背景下作类似的历史研究。

接下来，我要衷心感谢在本书写作过程中曾帮助过我的所有人。首先是乔治·米勒，他既是编辑，也是朋友，是他首次把这个任务委托于我，我们通过讨论明晰许多观点。然后我要感谢两位同事兼朋友提出的建设性意见，他们分别是牛津大学林肯学院的玛利亚·斯塔马托普洛和沃威克大学的迈克尔·惠特比。此外，我还要感谢牛津大学的匿名审稿人。

最后，我希望以本书纪念我的父亲休·西德博特姆上尉。

xviii 1939年9月3日，他志愿参战。