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通识读本

动物权利

Animal Rights

A Very Short Introduction

David DeGrazia 著

杨通进 译

外语教学与研究出版社

FOREIGN LANGUAGE TEACHING AND RESEARCH PRESS

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Preface and acknowledgements

In writing this book on animal rights, I have naturally given voice to my own understanding of the associated issues. For this reason, I cannot claim to address these issues with perfect neutrality. I argue not only that sentient animals have moral status, but also that they are due equal consideration (in a specific sense of this term that is explained in Chapter 2). At the same time, because I find another view – the ‘sliding-scale model’ – to be almost as compelling, throughout the book I track the implications of both of these views about animals’ moral status. But, finding the view that sentient animals entirely lack moral status to be virtually indefensible, after attempting to refute this view I largely leave it behind.

Some years before taking up the present project I completed the much longer and more scholarly *Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Whereas that book was mainly addressed to an academic audience, the present book is written for all thoughtful people who wish to learn about ethical and philosophical issues connected with animal rights. Accordingly, I have written *Animal Rights: A Very Short Introduction* as accessibly as I could manage without oversimplification; I have also introduced each chapter with one or more vignettes and have included, for each chapter, a list of references, sources, and (in some cases) recommended further readings, rather than formal footnotes. For those who have read *Taking*

Animals Seriously, it may be of interest that the present book includes an historical overview of attitudes about animals, a discussion of the different senses of 'animal rights', and a detailed examination of the animal research issue – extending the discussion beyond the terrain covered in the earlier work.

x As I complete this book, I would like to express my gratitude to several individuals who have helped along the way. At Oxford University Press, George Miller, Editorial Director for Trade Books, invited me to submit a proposal and helped with the initial brainstorming; later, Rebecca O'Connor and Catherine Humphries provided much assistance with editorial details. Robert Garner served as an external reviewer of a draft of the manuscript, offering much encouragement and several helpful criticisms and suggestions. I have also benefited from discussions with Bernard Rollin about animals' mental lives, with Paul Shapiro about activism on behalf of animals, and with Peter Singer about a variety of ethical issues involving animals. Finally, I would like to thank my entire family, and especially Kathleen and Zoë, for their love and support.

David DeGrazia Washington, DC, July 2001

前言与致谢

在撰写这本关于动物权利的小书时，我很自然地在其中融入了自己对相关问题的理解。基于这一理由，我不能声称自己将以完全中立的态度来讨论这些问题。我不仅主张有感知能力的动物拥有道德地位，而且认为它们应获得同等的考虑(第二章将阐述这一术语的特定意义)。同时，由于我认为另一种观点——“差别对待模式”——也几乎是同样令人信服的，因此，我在本书中将同时考察关于动物道德地位的这两种观点的意涵。然而，由于我发现，那种认为有感知能力的动物完全没有道德地位的观点是站不住脚的，因此，在尝试驳斥这种观点以后，我基本上就不再讨论它了。

在撰写本书的几年以前，我写过一本篇幅更长、学术性更强的书，即《认真对待动物：精神生活与道德地位》(剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，1996)。如果说那本书所面对的读者群主要是学者的话，那么，本书则是为那些想了解与动物权利有关的伦理和哲学问题的、勤于思考的人所写的。因此，在避免过于简单化的前提下，我尽力把《动物权利》写得通俗易懂；我还在每一章加入了一幅或多幅插图，给每一章都开列了关于参考文献、资料和(在某些情况下)推荐读物的清单，而不是添加正式脚注。对于那些已经阅读过《认真对待动物》的读者来说，本书所包含的下述内容或许是有趣的：人们对动物的态度的简要

历史回顾、关于“动物权利”一词的不同含义的讨论，以及对动物实验问题的详细考察——本书对这些问题的讨论都超越了前一本书的论阈。

在本书杀青之际，我想对几位一直给我帮助的人士表达感激之情。牛津大学出版社大众图书编辑部主任乔治·米勒邀请我提交了本书的写作提案，并协助了最初的讨论使提案得以完善；后来，丽贝卡·奥康纳和凯瑟琳·汉弗莱斯在文字编辑方面又给了我诸多帮助。作为本书的外请审阅者，罗伯特·加纳给了我诸多鼓励，并提出了许多建设性的批评和建议。与伯纳德·罗林就动物的精神生活、与保尔·夏皮罗就动物保护行动主义，以及与彼得·辛格就与动物有关的一系列伦理问题所进行的讨论都使我获益良多。最后，我要感谢我所有的家人，特别是凯瑟琳和佐薇的爱和帮助。

戴维·德格拉齐亚

华盛顿，2001年7月

Contents

目次

List of illustrations VII

目次 VII

Preface and acknowledgements IX

前言及謝詞 IX

1 Introduction 1

第一章 介紹 1

2 The moral status of animals 12

第二章 動物的道德地位 12

3 What animals are like 39

第三章 動物是怎樣的 39

4 The harms of suffering, confinement, and death 54

第四章 痛苦、禁錮和死亡的害處 54

5 Meat-eating 67

第五章 肉食 67

6 Keeping pets and zoo animals 81

第六章 養寵物和動物園動物 81

7 Animal research 98

第七章 動物實驗 98

References, sources, and further reading 117

參考文獻、來源及進一步閱讀 117

Index 127

目录

图目 VIII

前言与致谢 XI

第一章 绪论 133

第二章 动物的道德地位 143

第三章 动物是什么 169

第四章 痛苦、拘禁与死亡的伤害 183

第五章 吃荤 196

第六章 收养宠物与动物园的动物 210

第七章 动物研究 227

List of illustrations

- | | | | | | |
|---|--|----|----|--|-----|
| 1 | An animal rights activist videotaping the inside of a factory farm | 2 | 7 | A pig chewing on a bar | 69 |
| | Compassion Over Killing | | | <i>Washington Post</i> ; Marc Kaufman | |
| 2 | A polar bear catching a fish in her mouth | 17 | 8 | A baby gibbon on sale | 86 |
| | Jessie Cohen | | | KSBK | |
| 3 | A fox caught in a leghold trap | 40 | 9 | An orang-utan walking on ropes | 90 |
| | The Fur-Bearers | | | Jessie Cohen | |
| 4 | A chimpanzee fishing for termites | 51 | 10 | A rhinoceros | 94 |
| | The Jane Goodall Institute | | | Jessie Cohen | |
| 5 | A tiger in a roadside menagerie | 58 | 11 | A caged monkey with an electrode implant | 100 |
| | Jessica Ehlers/Brull Coleman Inc. | | | PETA | |
| 6 | A broiler house | 64 | 12 | A mouse undergoing the LD50 test | 114 |
| | PETA | | | <i>Animal Liberation</i> | |

图目

图1. 一名正在拍摄养鸡场内
部的动物权利积极分子 134

图2. 正用嘴接住一条鱼的北
极熊 148

图3. 一只被捕兽夹困住的狐
狸 170

图4. 一只正在“钓”白蚁的黑
猩猩 181

图5. 路边动物展览园中的一
只老虎 187

图6. 一间饲养肉鸡的鸡舍 193

图7. 咬着栅栏的一头猪 198

图8. 一只待售的长臂猿幼崽
215

图9. 一只正在绳索上行走的
猩猩 219

图10. 一头犀牛 224

图11. 一只被关在笼中、植入
电极的猴子 229

图12. 一只正在接受五成致死
剂量测试的老鼠 243

Chapter 1

Introduction

Acting on an anonymous tip in April 2001, Compassion Over Killing (COK), a Washington, DC-based animal rights organization, began investigating an enormous industrial hen house owned by agricultural company ISE-America in Cecilton, Maryland. After ISE officials ignored their request for a tour, COK activists surreptitiously entered the facility at night with video cameras. The video footage, which COK representatives later revealed at a press conference, shocked many viewers. Those present saw thousands of hens, many featherless and apparently dying, crowded into small 'battery' cages made of wire and stacked atop one another. Some birds were covered in faeces; several were immobilized, caught in cage wires. A few of the chickens appeared to be dead and decomposing. The activists, who freed eight chickens – judged to be in very poor health by a local veterinarian – are, at the time of this writing, mobilizing a national campaign to ban battery cages. Thus, their target is not ISE in particular, whose facility is fairly typical, but rather the egg production system as a whole.

Such campaigns by animal activists have sometimes been successful. Facing pressure from activists, the European Union has decided to phase out battery cages by 2012. And, in summer 2000, McDonald's announced that its restaurants would purchase eggs only from suppliers who give hens 72 square inches of cage space – almost 50 per cent more than the American industry standard.



1. An animal rights activist videotaping the inside of a factory farm

These events reflect a major cultural phenomenon: the emergence of the contemporary animal rights movement, which has challenged long-standing, traditional views about non-human animals' moral status. Most people are opposed to cruelty and sense that animals have moral significance. At the same time, traditional views that sanction animal use with few constraints have deeply influenced our beliefs and everyday practices. The moral and intellectual tension one can experience in the face of such conflicting beliefs motivates an effort to sort out these issues. How should we understand the moral status of animals *vis-à-vis* human beings? Traditionalists and champions of animal rights generally agree that the answer has much to do with how we should understand animals themselves: What kinds of beings are animals and, in particular, what are their mental lives like?

In addressing these and related issues, it will be helpful to begin with a historical sketch both of traditional thinking about animals and of the emergence of the animal rights movement. The following

sketch (which is influenced by Bekoff, Egonsson, Regan and Singer, and especially Taylor – see ‘References, sources, and further reading’) is quite compressed and therefore necessarily selective in identifying principal sources of traditional and current attitudes about animals.

Historical sketch

Throughout the world, chief sources of traditional thinking about animals’ moral status have been religion and philosophy, both of which have interacted with science in shaping conceptions of what sorts of beings animals are. It is worth noting, however, that the tendency to distinguish philosophy and religion is primarily Western, while the distinction between philosophy and science is relatively modern. In the West, Aristotle influentially argued that animals, having sense perception but lacking *reason*, fall below humans in a natural hierarchy and are therefore appropriate resources for human purposes. Because animals lack rational souls, he contended, our dealings with them are not a matter of justice. Aristotle also held that men are naturally superior to women, due to men’s allegedly superior reasoning ability, and that some humans – stronger in body than in mind – are naturally suited to be slaves. Among the ancient Greeks, dissenting voices included those of Pythagoras, who believed that animals may be former humans reincarnated, and Theophrastus, who thought animals were capable of some degree of reasoning. But most subsequent Western philosophers and theologians have concurred with Aristotle’s thesis that animals exist for the use of humans, who alone are rational.

The Bible largely reinforced the Aristotelian view of animals by asserting that God created humans in his own image, and that we are free to use natural resources – including animals – for our own purposes. On the other hand, by declaring that *all* humans are made in God’s image, the Bible legitimated an egalitarian view of humanity that opposed the

aristocratic tendencies of Greek thought, including Aristotle's. In the Middle Ages, such Christian philosophers as Augustine and Thomas Aquinas underscored the claim that animals' lack of reason justified their subordination – a thesis most Christians have accepted ever since. While agreeing that animals are subordinate to humans, the more ancient tradition of Judaism has placed greater importance than has Christianity on minimizing pain caused to animals. Based on the idea that all God's creatures deserve compassion, this concern finds expression in Jewish prescriptions regarding the slaughter of animals for food and in condemnation of hunting for pleasure, bullfights, and dogfights. Meanwhile, Islam, the third Abrahamic religious tradition, concurs that humans are uniquely important and that animals exist for human use. Still, the Koran forbids cruelty to animals and arguably suggests (depending on one's reading) that animals possess some degree of rationality; moreover, the Prophet Muhammad allegedly commented, 'Whoever is kind to the creatures of Allah, is kind to himself.'

While revealing interesting differences among its representatives, Western modern philosophy – the era stemming from Descartes in the seventeenth century through the late nineteenth century – largely upheld the view of human supremacy, reflecting the influence of its dominant religion, Christianity. Conceptualizing nature in purely mechanical terms, modern science replaced the long-dominant Aristotelian view of nature as endowed with purposes and somewhat akin to a living being. With this background, Rene Descartes found it natural to regard animals, part of nature, as organic machines, entirely devoid not only of reason but of *feelings*. Humans bodies, he thought, were part of nature, whereas the essence of humanity – revealed through a unique capacity for language and innovative behaviour – was found in the human mind, spirit, or soul, which alone possessed consciousness. That animals could not even feel pain, however, struck most philosophers as contrary to common sense. Hence Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and others attributed perception and feelings