

★ 国防语言课程系列教材

TEXTBOOKS FOR DEFENSE
LANGUAGES COURSES

总策划 张亚非
总主编 张锦涛

大国国防 战略文献 阅读翻译教程

主 编 张锦涛 杨 静



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前 言

当今世界的军事舞台上,外语的作用举足轻重,与国防的关系日益密切。一个国家军队的国防语言能力是其战斗力的重要构成,一支外语能力过硬、国际视野开阔、熟悉行动区域语言文化的军队能够更加自信地完成肩负的使命任务。为适应遂行多样化军事任务对新型军事人才国防语言能力的需要,解放军理工大学联合兄弟军队院校编写了“国防语言课程系列教材”。

“国防语言课程系列教材”是继“新军事英语系列教材”之后,军队院校外语教学内容体系又一次大胆改革。它既满足“培养具有国际视野、通晓国际规则、能够参与国际竞争的国际化人才”这一国家高等院校外语教学的基本要求,又凸显军队院校外语教学的鲜明军事特色,贴近军校学员的学习生活和部队建设的实际需要。“国防语言课程系列教材”涉及英、法、德、俄、日等五个语种,包括国防语言综合教学类教材、语言技能教学类教材和对象国军政文化教学类教材。本套教材注重实用性、时代性和开放性。

“国防语言课程系列教材”的英语技能类教材包括《军事科技英语翻译教程》、《高级英语写作教程》、《媒体英语》、《大国国防战略文献阅读翻译教程》四册。《大国国防战略文献阅读翻译教程》旨在使学生通过阅读分析世界主要大国军队和国防建设的相关战略文献,培养学生的英语阅读理解能力和文献翻译能力,在巩固学生英语实际应用能力的同时,培养学生的战略思维、国际视野和使命担当。

本教程按内容由6单元组成,共约20万字,包括国防战略、太空安全战略、国防语言战略、亚太再平衡战略以及联合作战介入概念。每个单元由以下构件组成:导论和引言、原文语篇(战略文献节选)、主要背景等介绍、应用练习、拓展阅读。

本教程在编写过程中参阅了国内外大量有关文献,谨在此致以衷心的感谢。

本教程虽几易其稿力求完善,但由于我们的水平有限,不当之处在所难免,诚望各位同行和读者提出批评和建议。

编 者

2015年4月

Contents

Unit 1	Sustaining U. S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense	001
Unit 2	Joint Operational Access and the Joint Functions	019
Unit 3	Gaining and Maintaining Access	039
Unit 4	U. S. Strategic Interests and Roles in Asia	057
Unit 5	National Security Space Strategy	077
Unit 6	Defense Language Strategy for the Armed Forces	097
Answers	120

Unit 1

SUSTAINING U.S. GLOBAL LEADERSHIP: PRIORITIES FOR 21ST CENTURY DEFENSE

Introduction

“Our nation is at a moment of transition. Thanks to the extraordinary sacrifices of our men and women in uniform, we have ended the war in Iraq, put al-Qaeda on the path to defeat. . . As Commander in Chief, I am determined that we meet the challenges of the moment responsibly, and that we emerge even stronger in a manner that preserves America’s global leadership, maintains our military superiority, and keeps faith with our troops, military families and veterans.”

—U. S. President Barack Obama

引言

第二次世界大战以来,美国一直在其一手缔造的国际秩序中扮演一个领导者的角色,并通过各种政治、经济、金融、外交、文化、军事手段维持其全球领导者的地位。冷战结束后,布什政府提出建立“世界新秩序”,强调在美国的领导下,实现一个“和平和安全、自由和法治”的世界,并按照美国的价值观和理想,建立新的国际体系,在世界上巩固和推进所谓“自由”与“民主”事业。而克林顿政府进一步提出“参与和扩展战略”,用冷战后对美总体有利的国际形势,加强介入和参与国际和地区事务的力度,“扩展自由世界”的疆界,实现美国的“世界领导地位”。9·11事件后,美国进入了一个更加强调构建强大军事力量的时代,谋求绝对的军事优势,同时加强对世界战略重心的控制。而随着中国的日益崛起与发展,美国近年来又提出了“重返亚太”战略。

有学者认为,美国统领世界的时代正在走向尽头。自第二次世界大战到目前的这70年时间里,经济制约从未像今天这样让美国捉襟见肘。金融危机之后,一切遭逢大变。飞速膨胀的财政预算,各类民生保障的权益计划,都将迫使美国在国际舞台上的表现更加低调和谦逊。这一变化将给美国乃至全世界的方方面面带来重大影响。

本文介绍了美国对其全球领导力的概念及其内涵,规划了在21世纪如何维护其领导力的举措,尤其在军事领域。正如文中所说:“美国面临着长远的挑战,这要求我们建设一支强大、灵活和有能力的部队。”而这支美国部队的任务将主要包括:“反恐和非常规战争;威慑与击败挑衅;维持一个安全、可靠和有效的核威慑;保卫国土和支持选政府。”



SUSTAINING U. S. GLOBAL LEADERSHIP: PRIORITIES FOR 21ST CENTURY DEFENSE

(An Excerpt from Sustaining U. S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012)

1 The United States has played a leading role in transforming the international system over the past sixty-five years. Working with like-minded nations, the United States has created a safer, more stable, and more prosperous world for the American people, our allies, and our partners around the globe than existed prior to World War II. Over the last decade, we have undertaken extended operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to bring stability to those countries and secure our interests. As we responsibly draw down from these two operations, take steps to protect our nation's economic vitality, and protect our interests in a world of accelerating change, we face an **inflection point**. This merited an assessment of the U. S. defense strategy in light of the changing geopolitical environment and our changing fiscal circumstances. This assessment reflects the President's strategic direction to the Department and was deeply informed by the Department's civilian and military leadership, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the Combatant Commanders. Out of the assessment we developed a defense strategy that transitions our Defense enterprise from an emphasis on today's wars to preparing for future challenges, protects the broad range of U. S. national security interests, advances the Department's efforts to rebalance and reform, and supports the national security imperative of deficit reduction through a lower level of defense spending.

2 This strategic guidance document describes the projected security environment and the key military missions for which the Department of Defense (DoD) will prepare. It is intended as a blueprint for the Joint Force in 2020, providing a set of **precepts** that will help guide decisions regarding the size and shape of the force over subsequent program and **budget cycles**, and **highlighting** some of the strategic risks that may be associated with the proposed strategy.



Primary Missions of the U. S. Armed Forces

3 To protect U. S. national interests and achieve the objectives of the 2010 National Security Strategy in this environment, the Joint Force will need to recalibrate its capabilities and make selective additional investments to succeed in the following missions:

4 **Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare.** Acting in concert with other means of national power, U. S. military forces must continue to hold al-Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents under constant pressure, wherever they may be. Achieving our core goal of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qaeda and preventing Afghanistan from ever being a safe haven again will be central to this effort. As U. S. forces draw down in Afghanistan, our global counter terrorism efforts will become more widely distributed and will be characterized by a mix of direct action and security force assistance. Reflecting lessons learned of the past decade, we will continue to build and sustain tailored capabilities appropriate for counter terrorism and irregular warfare. We will also remain vigilant to threats posed by other designated terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah.

5 **Deter and Defeat Aggression.** U. S. forces will be capable of deterring and defeating aggression by any potential adversary. Credible deterrence results from both the capabilities to deny an aggressor the prospect of achieving his objectives and from the complementary capability to impose unacceptable costs on the aggressor. As a nation with important interests in multiple regions, our forces must be capable of deterring and defeating aggression by an **opportunistic** adversary in one region even when our forces are committed to a large-scale operation elsewhere. Our planning envisages forces that are able to fully deny a capable state's aggressive objectives in one region by conducting a combined arms campaign across all domains—land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace. This includes being able to secure territory and populations and facilitate a transition to stable governance on a small scale for a limited period using standing forces and, if necessary, for an extended period with mobilized forces. Even when U. S. forces are committed to a large-scale operation in one region, they will be capable of denying the objectives of—or imposing unacceptable costs on—an opportunistic aggressor in a second region. U. S. forces will plan to operate whenever possible with allied and coalition forces.



Our ground forces will be responsive and **capitalize on** balanced lift, presence, and prepositioning to maintain the agility needed to remain prepared for the several areas in which such conflicts could occur.

6 **Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges.** In order to credibly deter potential adversaries and to prevent them from achieving their objectives, the United States must maintain its ability to project power in areas in which our access and freedom to operate are challenged. In these areas, sophisticated adversaries will use **asymmetric** capabilities, to include electronic and cyber warfare, ballistic and cruise missiles, advanced air defenses, mining, and other methods, to complicate our operational calculus. States such as China and Iran will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter our power projection capabilities, while the proliferation of sophisticated weapons and technology will extend to non-state actors as well. Accordingly, the U. S. military will invest as required to ensure its ability to operate effectively in **anti-access and area denial** (A2/AD) environments. This will include implementing the Joint Operational Access Concept, sustaining our undersea capabilities, developing a new stealth bomber, improving missile defenses, and continuing efforts to enhance the **resiliency** and effectiveness of critical space-based capabilities.

7 **Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction.** U. S. forces conduct a range of activities aimed at preventing the **proliferation** and use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. These activities include implementing the Cooperative Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) Program, and planning and operations to locate, monitor, track, **interdict** and secure WMD and WMD-related components and the means and facilities to make them. They also include an active whole-of-government effort to frustrate the ambitions of nations bent on developing WMD, to include preventing Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. In partnership with other elements of the U. S. Government, DoD will continue to invest in capabilities to detect, protect against, and respond to WMD use, should preventive measures fail.

8 **Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space.** Modern armed forces cannot conduct high-tempo, effective operations without reliable information and communication networks and assured access to cyberspace and space. Today space systems and their supporting infrastructure face a range of threats that may degrade, disrupt, or destroy assets. Accordingly, DoD will continue to



work with domestic and international allies and partners and invest in advanced capabilities to defend its networks, operational capability, and resiliency in cyberspace and space.

9 **Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent.** As long as nuclear weapons remain in existence, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective **arsenal**. We will field nuclear forces that can under any circumstances confront an adversary with the prospect of unacceptable damage, both to deter potential adversaries and to assure U. S. allies and other security partners that they can count on America's security commitments. It is possible that our deterrence goals can be achieved with a smaller nuclear force, which would reduce the number of nuclear weapons in our inventory as well as their role in U. S. national security strategy.

10 **Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities.** U. S. forces will continue to defend U. S. territory from direct attack by state and non-state actors. We will also come to the assistance of domestic civil authorities in the event such defense fails or in case of natural disasters, potentially in response to a very significant or even catastrophic event. Homeland defense and support to civil authorities require strong, steady-state force readiness, to include a robust missile defense capability. Threats to the homeland may be highest when U. S. forces are engaged in conflict with an adversary abroad.

11 **Provide a Stabilizing Presence.** U. S. forces will conduct a sustainable pace of presence operations abroad, including rotational deployments and bilateral and multilateral training exercises. These activities reinforce deterrence, help to build the capacity and competence of U. S. , allied, and partner forces for internal and external defense, strengthen alliance cohesion, and increase U. S. influence. A reduction in resources will require innovative and creative solutions to maintain our support for allied and partner **interoperability** and building partner capacity. However, with reduced resources, thoughtful choices will need to be made regarding the location and frequency of these operations.

12 **Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations.** In the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States will emphasize non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to address instability and reduce the demand for significant U. S. force commitments to stability operations. U. S. forces will nevertheless be ready to conduct limited **counterinsurgency** and other stability operations if required, operating alongside coalition forces wherever



possible. Accordingly, U. S. forces will retain and continue to refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities that have been developed over the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, U. S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.

13 Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations. The nation has frequently called upon its Armed Forces to respond to a range of situations that threaten the safety and well-being of its citizens and those of other countries. U. S. forces possess rapidly deployable capabilities, including airlift and sealift, surveillance, **medical evacuation** and care, and communications that can be invaluable in supplementing lead relief agencies, by extending aid to victims of natural or man-made disasters, both at home and abroad. DoD will continue to develop joint doctrine and military response options to prevent and, if necessary, respond to mass atrocities. U. S. forces will also remain capable of conducting non-combatant evacuation operations for American citizens overseas on an emergency basis.

14 The aforementioned missions will largely determine the shape of the future Joint Force. The overall capacity of U. S. forces, however, will be based on requirements that the following subset of missions demand: counter terrorism and irregular warfare; deter and defeat aggression; maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent; and defend the homeland and support civil authorities.

Toward the Joint Force of 2020

15 To ensure success in these missions, several principles will guide our force and program development. First, given that we cannot predict how the strategic environment will evolve with absolute certainty, we will maintain a broad portfolio of military capabilities that, in the aggregate, offer versatility across the range of missions described above. The Department will make clear distinctions both among the key sizing and shaping missions listed above and between these mission areas and all other areas of the defense program. Wholesale **divestment** of the capability to conduct any mission would be unwise, based on historical and projected uses of U. S. military forces and our inability to predict the future. Likewise, DoD will manage the force in ways that protect



its ability to regenerate capabilities that might be needed to meet future, unforeseen demands, maintaining intellectual capital and rank structure that could be called upon to expand key elements of the force.

16 Second, we have sought to differentiate between those investments that should be made today and those that can be deferred. This includes an accounting of our ability to make a course change that could be driven by many factors, including shocks or evolutions in the strategic, operational, economic, and technological spheres. Accordingly, the concept of “**reversibility**”—including the vectors on which we place our industrial base, our people, our active-reserve component balance, our posture, and our partnership emphasis—is a key part of our decision calculus.

17 Third, we are determined to maintain a ready and capable force, even as we reduce our overall capacity. We will resist the temptation to sacrifice readiness in order to retain force structure, and will in fact rebuild readiness in areas that, by necessity, were **deemphasized** over the past decade. An ill-prepared force will be vulnerable to corrosion in its morale, recruitment, and retention. Unless we are prepared to send confident, well-trained, and properly equipped men and women into battle, the nation will risk its most important military advantage—the health and quality of the All-Volunteer Force.

18 Fourth, the Department must continue to reduce the “cost of doing business.” This entails reducing the rate of growth of manpower costs, finding further efficiencies in overhead and headquarters, business practices, and other support activities before taking further risk in meeting the demands of the strategy. As DoD takes steps to reduce its manpower costs, to include reductions in the growth of compensation and health care costs, we will keep faith with those who serve.

19 During the past decade, the men and women who comprise the All-Volunteer Force have shown versatility, adaptability, and commitment, enduring the constant stress and strain of fighting two overlapping conflicts. They have also endured prolonged and repeated deployments. Some—more than 46,000 men and women—have been wounded, and still others—more than 6,200 members of the Armed Forces—have lost their lives. As the Department reduces the size of the force, we will do so in a way that respects these sacrifices. This means, among other things, taking concrete steps to facilitate the transition of those who will leave the service. These include supporting



programs to help veterans translate their military skills for the civilian workforce and aid their search for jobs.

20 Fifth, it will be necessary to examine how this strategy will influence existing campaign and contingency plans so that more limited resources may be better tuned to their requirements. This will include a **renewed** emphasis on the need for a globally networked approach to deterrence and warfare.

21 Sixth, the Department will need to examine the mix of **Active Component (AC)** and **Reserve Component (RC)** elements best suited to the strategy. Over the past decade, the National Guard and Reserves have consistently demonstrated their readiness and ability to make sustained contributions to national security. The challenges facing the United States today and in the future will require that we continue to employ National Guard and Reserve forces. The expected pace of operations over the next decade will be a significant driver in determining an appropriate AC/RC mix and level of RC readiness.

22 Seventh, as we transition out of Iraq and draw down in Afghanistan, we will take extra measures to retain and build on key advancements in networked warfare in which joint Departmental disciplines, ranging from establishing war-fighting requirements to the way our forces train together.

23 Finally, in adjusting our strategy and attendant force size, the Department will make every effort to maintain an adequate industrial base and our investment in science and technology. We will also encourage innovation in concepts of operation. Over the past ten years, the United States and its coalition allies and partners have learned hard lessons and applied new operational approaches in the counter terrorism, counterinsurgency, and security force assistance arenas, most often operating in uncontested sea and air environments. Accordingly, similar work needs to be done to ensure the United States, its allies, and partners are capable of operating in A2/AD, cyber, and other contested operating environments. To that end, the Department will both encourage a culture of change and be prudent with its “seed corn,” balancing reductions **necessitated** by resource pressures with the imperative to sustain key streams of innovation that may provide significant long-term payoffs.



Conclusion

24 The United States faces profound challenges that require strong, agile, and capable military forces whose actions are harmonized with other elements of U. S. national power. Our global responsibilities are significant; we cannot afford to fail. The balance between available resources and our security needs has never been more delicate. Force and program decisions made by the Department of Defense will be made in accordance with the strategic approach described in this document, which is designed to ensure our Armed Forces can meet the demands of the U. S. National Security Strategy at acceptable risk.

Notes

1. **All-Volunteer Force** It is a military which derives its manpower from volunteers rather than conscription or mandatory service. A country may offer attractive pay and benefits through military recruitment to attract volunteers. Many countries with volunteer militaries reserve the right to renew conscription in the event of an emergency. 全志愿兵
2. **Cooperative Threat Reduction Program** The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program (known as Nunn—Lugar based on a 1992 U. S. law sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar) is an initiative housed within the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). According to the CTR website, “the purpose of the CTR Program is to secure and dismantle weapons of mass destruction and their associated infrastructure in former Soviet Union states.” 合作降低威胁计划
3. **Hezbollah** A Shiite terrorist organization with strong ties to Iran; seeks to create an Iranian fundamentalist Islamic state in Lebanon; car bombs are the signature weapon. (黎巴嫩)真主党
4. **Joint Chiefs of Staff** It is a body of senior uniformed leaders in the United States Department of Defense who advise the Secretary of Defense, the Homeland Security Council, the National Security Council and the President on military matters. 参谋长联席会议



WORDS & EXPRESSIONS

Active Component 现役

anti-access and area denial 反介入和区域拒止

arsenal/'ɑ:sən/ *n.* 兵工厂

asymmetric/eɪsɪ'metrɪk/ *adj.* 非对称的

budget cycle 预算周期

capitalize on 利用

counterinsurgency/'kauntərɪn'sɜ:dʒənsi/
n. 反暴动;反破坏

deemphasize/dɪ'emfəsaɪz/ *v.* 不再给予强调,使……不重要

divestment/daɪ'vestmənt/ *n.* 剥夺;撤资

highlight/'haɪlaɪt/ *n.* 突出,强调

inflection point 转折点

interdict/'ɪntədɪkt/ *v.* 阻断

interoperability *n.* 互用性

medical evacuation 医疗后送

necessitate/nə'səsɪteɪt/ *v.* 使……成为必需

opportunistic/ɒpətju:'nɪstɪk/ *adj.* 机会主义的,投机取巧的

precept/'pri:sept/ *n.* 规则

proliferation/prə'lɪfə'reɪʃn/ *n.* 扩散

renew/rɪ'nju:/ *n.* 更新,重新开始

Reserve Component 预备役

resiliency/rɪ'zɪliənsi/ *n.* 弹性

reversibility/rɪ'vɜ:sə'bɪləti/ *n.* 可撤销;可逆性

stealth bomber 隐形轰炸机

EXERCISES

I. Reading Comprehension

Section A

Directions: Answer the following questions based on the information provided in the text.

1. What major factors did the U. S. take into consideration in its assessment of its defense strategy?
2. What does the new defense strategy emphasize?
3. What are the Primary Missions of the U. S. Armed Forces?
4. What capabilities are needed for credible deterrence against any potential adversary?
5. What principles guide the U. S. forces towards achieving the above missions?

Section B

Directions: Decide whether each of the following statements is true or false according to the text. Write T for True or F for False before each statement.

- _____ 1. The U. S. has completely succeeded in holding al-Qaeda under control and is now only faced with threats posed by other designated terrorist organizations,