

龚晴川 选编

思想政治教育专业英语

系列专业英语

SELECTED READINGS



IN IDEOLOGICAL
AND POLITICAL EDUCATION

武汉大学出版社

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前 言

大学的英语教学，继基础英语课之后，开设专业英语课，集中研读专业英语文献，借以达到既丰富专业知识，又增强专业英语文献的阅读和写作能力之目的，这是在新的历史条件下对人才培养的必然要求。这一要求是广泛适用的，思想政治教育专业也不例外。面向世界，借鉴和吸收外国文化的有益成果，是思想政治教育必须贯彻的正确方针。这些方针贯彻得如何，在很大程度上取决于思想政治教育专业人才的专业英语水平。据统计，我国目前共有 170 多所高等学校设置了思想政治教育专业，但迄今尚未看到一种思想政治教育专业英语教材出版发行，这种状况对思想政治教育专业英语的教学、对提高思想政治教育专业的学生的英语水平是不利的。

基于上述原因，我们尝试着选编了这本《思想政治教育专业英语》。

思想政治教育内容很广，包括思想教育、政治教育和道德教育诸方面，而一本教材的容量有限，再加上其他因素，如何选材成了一件煞费周章的事情。最终，我们把选材集中于道德教育方面。这样处理看来是利弊互见：利是使得本教材比较“专门”和“系统”，弊是未能更多地把思想教育方面和政治教育方面的内容包括其中，对此，或许以后能用续编或新编思想政治教育专业英语教材的方式来加以弥补。

本教材精选了从古希腊到 20 世纪 80 年代 8 位世界著名思想

家的 8 篇经典著作（均为摘录）。这 8 篇著作，有的属于道德教育的理论基础——道德哲学或伦理学，有的则是直接论述道德教育的。相信通过这些名著的教学，学生的道德教育知识水平和专业英语水平都会有显著提高。

这 8 篇著作在本教材中除具有指导意义的恩格斯的《反杜林论》放在卷首外，其余 7 篇则按其问世的先后加以排列。对每位作者和每篇著作，都做了简要介绍；对所摘录的部分，不仅做了较为详细的说明，而且还做了相当细致的语言注释。此外，在每篇著作的注释后面还编写了练习题，并在书后附有参考答案。

本教材除了可供高等学校思想政治教育专业的本科生和硕士研究生教学之用外，也可供一切对了解外国道德教育思想和提高英语水平有着双重志趣的人们自学之用。

陈红、黄海澜、王春嫒参与了本教程练习题及其参考答案的编写，鲁美丽参与了校对。

本教材编写时在体例上参考了北京大学出版社出版的专业英语教程，在此表示感谢。

由于我们能力有限，本教材的缺点、不足在所难免，恳切期待专家、使用本教材的教师和学生以及其他读者批评指正。

选编者

2004 年 3 月于珞珈山

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1。

Frederick Engels
(弗里德里希·恩格斯)

Anti-Dühring (反杜林论)

Frederick Engels

弗里德里希·恩格斯(1820.11.20~1895.8.5) 马克思主义的创始人之一,无产阶级革命导师,卓越的学者,马克思的亲密战友。

Anti-Dühring

《反杜林论》 写于1876年9月~1878年6月。在这部论战性的著作中,恩格斯对德国小资产阶级社会主义者杜林的观点进行了全面的批判,对马克思主义的哲学、政治经济学和科学社会主义作了系统的科学的阐述。列宁曾经指出,恩格斯的《路德维希·费尔巴哈》和《反杜林论》“这两部著作同《共产党宣言》一样,都是每个觉悟工人必读的书籍”。

《反杜林论》全书包括三版序言,引论,第一编哲学,第二编政治经济学,第三编社会主义,附有《社会主义从空想到科学的发展》英文版导言。本教材所选编的是哲学编中的第九章(道德和法——永恒真理)和第十章(道德和法——平等)的部分内容。在第九章中,作者针对杜林鼓吹的超历史、超阶级的“永恒道德”论,揭示了道德的历史性和阶级性,指出“一切以往的道德论归根到底都

是当时的社会经济状况的产物”。在第十章中，作者针对杜林关于平等观念的浅薄而拙劣的论述，阐述了人类平等观念的发展历程，揭示了平等观念的历史性和阶级性，剖析了资产阶级平等观的阶级实质，阐述了无产阶级平等要求的基本内涵，做出了“无产阶级平等要求的实际内容都是消灭阶级的要求。任何超出这个范围的平等要求，都必然要流于荒谬”的重要论断。

Part I: Philosophy

IX. Morality and Law

Eternal Truths (excerpt)

If, then, we have not made much progress with truth and error, we can make even less with good and evil. This opposition manifests itself exclusively in the domain of morals, that is, a domain belonging to the history of mankind, and it is precisely in this field that final and ultimate truths are most sparsely sown⁽¹⁾. The conceptions of good and evil have varied so much from nation to nation and from age to age that they have often been in direct contradiction to each other. — But all the same⁽²⁾, someone may object, good is not evil and evil is not good, if good is confused with evil there is an end to all morality, and everyone can do as he pleases. — This is also, stripped of all oracular phrases, Herr Dühring's opinion. But the matter cannot be so simply disposed of. If it were such an easy business there would certainly be no dispute at all over good and evil; everyone would know what was good and what was bad. But how do things stand today?⁽³⁾ What morality is preached to us today? There is first Christian-feudal morality, inherited from earlier religious times; and this is divided, essential-

ly, into a Catholic and a Protestant morality, each of which has no lack of subdivisions, from the Jesuit-Catholic and Orthodox-Protestant to loose "enlightened" moralities. Alongside these we find the modern-bourgeois morality and beside it also the proletarian morality of the future, so that in the most advanced European countries alone the past, present and future provide three great groups of moral theories which are in force⁽⁴⁾ simultaneously and alongside each other. Which, then, is the true one? Not one of them, in the sense of absolute finality; but certainly that morality contains the maximum elements promising permanence which, in the present, represents the overthrow of the present, represents the future, and that is proletarian morality⁽⁵⁾.

But when we see that the three classes of modern society, the feudal aristocracy, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, each have a morality of their own, we can only draw one conclusion: that men, consciously or unconsciously, derive their ethical ideas in the last resort⁽⁶⁾ from the practical relations on which their class position is based — from the economic relations in which they carry on production and exchange.

But nevertheless there is a great deal which the three moral theories mentioned above have in common — is this not at least a portion of a morality which is fixed once and for all⁽⁷⁾? — These moral theories represent three different stages of the same historical development, have therefore a common historical background, and for that reason alone they necessarily have much in common. Even more⁽⁸⁾, at similar or approximately similar stages of economic development moral theories must of necessity be more or less in

agreement. From the moment when private ownership of movable property developed, all societies in which this private ownership existed had to have this moral injunction in common: Thou shalt not steal.⁽⁹⁾ Does this injunction thereby become an eternal moral injunction? By no means. In a society in which all motives for stealing have been done away with⁽¹⁰⁾, in which therefore at the very most⁽¹¹⁾ only lunatics would ever steal, how the preacher of morals would be laughed at who tried solemnly to proclaim the eternal truth: Thou shalt not steal⁽¹²⁾ !

We therefore reject every attempt to impose on us any moral dogma whatsoever as an eternal, ultimate and forever immutable ethical law on the pretext that⁽¹³⁾ the moral world, too, has its permanent principles which stand above history and the differences between nations. We maintain on the contrary that all moral theories have been hitherto the product, in the last analysis, of the economic conditions of society obtaining at the time. And as society has hitherto moved in class antagonisms, morality has always been class morality; it has either justified the domination and the interests of the ruling class, or ever since the oppressed class became powerful enough, it has represented its indignation against this domination and the future interests of the oppressed. That in this process there has on the whole been progress in morality, as in all other branches of human knowledge, no one will doubt.⁽¹⁴⁾ But we have not yet passed beyond class morality. A really human morality which stands above class antagonisms and above any recollection of them becomes possible only at a stage of society which has not only overcome class antagonisms but has even forgotten them in practical life. And now one can gauge Herr Dühring's

presumption in advancing his claim, from the midst of the old class society and on the eve of a social revolution, to impose on the future classless society an eternal morality independent of time and changes in reality.⁽¹⁵⁾ Even assuming — what we do not know up to now — that he understands the structure of the society of the future at least in its main outlines.

X. Morality and Law

Equality(excerpt)

But even though we have finished with Herr Dühring's shallow, botched treatment of the idea of equality, this does not mean that we have finished with the idea itself, which especially thanks to Rousseau⁽¹⁶⁾ played a theoretical, and during and since the great revolution a practical political role, and even today still plays an important agitational role in the socialist movement of almost every country. The establishment of its scientific content will also determine its value for proletarian agitation.

The idea that all men, as men, have something in common, and that to that extent they are equal, is of course primeval. But the modern demand for equality is something entirely different from that; this consists rather in deducing from that common quality of being human, from that equality of men as men, a claim to equal political and social status for all human beings, or at least for all citizens of a state or all members of a society. Before that original conception of relative equality could lead to the conclusion that men should have equal rights in the state and in society, before

that conclusion could even appear to be something natural and self-evident, thousands of years had to pass and did pass⁽¹⁷⁾. In the most ancient, primitive communities, equality of rights could apply at most to members of the community; women, slaves and foreigners were excluded from this equality as a matter of course. Among the Greeks and Romans the inequalities of men were of much greater importance than their equality in any respect. It would necessarily have seemed insanity to the ancients that Greeks and barbarians, freemen and slaves, citizens and peregrines, Roman citizens and Roman subjects (to use a comprehensive term⁽¹⁸⁾), should have a claim to equal political status. Under the Roman Empire all these distinctions gradually disappeared, except the distinction between freemen and slaves, and in this way there arose, for the freemen at least, that equality as between private individuals on the basis of which Roman law developed⁽¹⁹⁾ — the most complete elaboration of law based on private property which we know. But so long as the antithesis between freemen and slaves existed, there could be no talk of drawing legal conclusions from general equality of *men*; we saw this even recently, in the slave-owning states of the North American Union.

Christianity knew only *one* point in which all men were equal: that all were equally born in original sin — which corresponded perfectly to its character as the religion of the slaves and the oppressed.⁽²⁰⁾ Apart from this it recognized, at most, the equality of the elect⁽²¹⁾, which however was only stressed at the very beginning. The traces of community of goods which are also found in the early stages of the new religion can be ascribed to solidarity among the proscribed rather than to real equalitarian ideas. Within

a very short time the establishment of the distinction between priests and laymen put an end even to this incipient Christian equality. —The overrunning of Western Europe by the Germans abolished for centuries all ideas of equality, through the gradual building up of such a complicated social and political hierarchy as had never existed before. But at the same time the invasion drew Western and Central Europe into the course of historical development, created for the first time a compact cultural area, and within this area also for the first time a system of predominantly national states exerting mutual influence on each other and mutually holding each other in check⁽²²⁾. Thereby it prepared the ground on which alone the question of the equal status of men, of the rights of man, could at a later period be raised.

The feudal Middle Ages also developed in their womb the class which was destined, in the course of its further development, to become the standard-bearer⁽²³⁾ of the modern demand for equality: the bourgeoisie. Originally itself a feudal estate, the bourgeoisie developed the predominantly handicraft industry and the exchange of products within feudal society to a relatively high level, when at the end of the fifteenth century the great maritime discoveries opened to it a new career of wider scope. Trade beyond the confines of Europe, which had previously been carried on only between Italy and the Levant⁽²⁴⁾, was now extended to America and India, and soon surpassed in importance both the mutual exchange between the various European countries and the internal trade within each individual country. American gold and silver flooded Europe and forced its way like a disintegrating element into⁽²⁵⁾ every fissure, rent and pore of feudal society. Handicraft industry could

no longer satisfy the rising demand, in the leading industries of the most advanced countries it was replaced by manufacture.

But this mighty revolution in the conditions of the economic life of society was, however, not followed by any immediate corresponding change in its political structure. The political order remained feudal, while society became more and more bourgeois. Trade on a large scale, that is to say, particularly international and, even more so, world trade, requires free owners of commodities who are unrestricted in their movements and as such⁽²⁶⁾ enjoy equal rights; who may exchange their commodities on the basis of laws that are equal for them all, at least in each particular place. The transition from handicraft to manufacture presupposes the existence of a number of free workers—free on the one hand from the fetters of the guild and on the other from the means whereby they could themselves utilise their labour-power — workers who can contract with the manufacturer for the hire of their labour — power, and hence, as parties to the contract, have rights equal to his. And finally the equality and equal status of all human labour, because and in so far as it is *human* labour⁽²⁷⁾, found its unconscious but clearest expression in the law of value of modern bourgeois political economy, according to which the value of a commodity is measured by the socially necessary labour embodied in it. — However, where economic relations required freedom and equality of rights, the political system opposed them at every step with guild restrictions and special privileges. Local privileges, differential duties⁽²⁸⁾, exceptional laws of all kinds affected in trade not only foreigners and people living in the colonies, but often enough also whole categories of the nationals of the country con-

cerned; everywhere and ever anew⁽²⁹⁾ the privileges of the guilds barred the development of manufacture. Nowhere was the road clear and the chances equal for the bourgeois competitors —and yet that this be so was the prime and ever more pressing demand⁽³⁰⁾.

The demand for liberation from feudal fetters and the establishment of equality of rights by the abolition of feudal inequalities was bound soon to assume wider dimensions, once the economic advance of society had placed it on the order of the day⁽³¹⁾. If it was raised in the interests of industry and trade, it was also necessary to demand the same equality of rights for the great mass of the peasantry who, in every degree of bondage, from total serfdom onwards⁽³²⁾, were compelled to give the greater part of their labour-time to their gracious feudal lord without compensation and in addition to render innumerable other dues to him and to the state. On the other hand, it was inevitable that a demand should also be made for the abolition of the feudal privileges, of the freedom from taxation of the nobility, of the political privileges of the separate estates. And as people were no longer living in a world empire such as the Roman Empire had been, but in a system of independent states dealing with each other on an equal footing and at approximately the same level of bourgeois development, it was a matter of course that the demand for equality should assume a general character reaching out beyond the individual state, that freedom and equality should be proclaimed *human rights*. And it is significant of the specifically bourgeois character of these human rights that the American constitution, the first to recognize the rights of man, in the same breath confirms the slavery of the co-

loured races existing in America: class privileges are proscribed, race privileges sanctified.⁽³³⁾

As is well known, however, from the moment when the bourgeoisie emerged from feudal burgherdom, when this estate of the Middle Ages developed into a modern class, it was always and inevitably accompanied by its shadow, the proletariat. And in the same way bourgeois demands for equality were accompanied by proletarian demands for equality.⁽³⁴⁾ From the moment when the bourgeois demand for the abolition of class *privileges* was put forward, alongside it appeared the proletarian demand for the abolition of the *classes themselves* — at first in religious form, leaning towards primitive Christianity, and later drawing support from the bourgeois equalitarian theories themselves. The proletarians took the bourgeoisie at its word⁽³⁵⁾: equality must not be merely apparent, must not apply merely to the sphere of the state, but must also be real, must also be extended to the social, economic sphere. And especially since the French bourgeoisie, from the great revolution on, brought civil equality to the forefront, the French proletariat has answered blow for blow⁽³⁶⁾ with the demand for social, economic equality, and equality has become the battle-cry particularly of the French proletariat⁽³⁷⁾.

The demand for equality in the mouth of the proletariat has therefore a double meaning. It is either—as was the case especially at the very start, for example in the Peasant War—the spontaneous reaction against the crying social inequalities, against the contrast between rich and poor, the feudal lords and their serfs, the surfeited and the starving; as such it is simply an expression of the rev-

olutionary instinct, and finds its justification in that, and in that only. Or, on the other hand, this demand has arisen as a reaction against the bourgeois demand for equality, drawing more or less correct and more far-reaching demands from this bourgeois demand, and serving as an agitational means in order to stir up the workers against the capitalists with the aid of the capitalists' own assertions; and in this case it stands or falls with bourgeois equality itself⁽³⁸⁾. In both cases the real content of the proletarian demand for equality is the demand for the *abolition* of classes. Any demand for equality which goes beyond that, of necessity passes into absurdity. We have given examples of this, and shall find enough additional ones when we come to Herr Dühring's fantasies of the future.

The idea of equality, both in its bourgeois and in its proletarian form, is therefore itself a historical product, the creation of which required definite historical conditions that in turn themselves presuppose a long previous history. It is therefore anything but an eternal truth. And if today it is taken for granted by the general public⁽³⁹⁾ — in one sense or another — if, as Marx says, it “already possesses the fixity of a popular prejudice”⁽⁴⁰⁾, this is not the effect of its axiomatic truth, but the effect of the general diffusion and the continued appropriateness of the ideas of the eighteenth century. If therefore Herr Dühring is able without more ado to let his famous two men conduct their economic relations on the basis of equality, this is so because it seems quite natural to popular prejudice. And in fact Herr Dühring calls his philosophy *natural* because it is derived solely from things which seem to him quite natural. But why they seem natural to him is a question which of course