



世界政治与国际关系原版影印丛书



# 美国对外政策的未来走向

## THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

〔美〕 Eugene R. Wittkopf  
Christopher M. Jones



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# **The Future of American Foreign Policy**

**Third Edition**

*Edited by*

Eugene R. Wittkopf

*Louisiana State University*

Christopher M. Jones

*Northern Illinois University*

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## 出版说明

引进和交流,是国际研究诸学科发展壮大所不可或缺的环节和纽带。没有引进和交流,学术就难以活跃,也不易创新。每一位从事世界政治与国际关系研究的学者、每一位学习世界政治与国际关系的学生,无不深感阅读外文原文文献的重要性,他们都深知,原文的报刊、教材和专著,是获取最新国际信息、最新理论论争、最新参考资料的必不可少的重要来源,而获得这样的原文文献的机会是不均等的,因此,他们极其渴望更为方便地直接接触到原文文献。而在目前不易直接在国内购买原版书籍的情况下,采取原版影印的方式引进国际上的优秀教材和专著是解决问题的一条捷径,如此就可以使国内普通读者方便地获得最有权威的原文读物,从而可以快速了解国外同行的教学和学术成果,为深入学习和研究、为开展有效的对外学术交流、也为国际关系诸学科在我国的创新和发展,打下更坚实的基础。

这套“世界政治与国际关系原版影印丛书”,正是基于上述认识而组织出版的,并且得到了我国国际关系教学与科研领域最有权威的专家教授们的认可,他们分别来自于北京大学国际关系学院、复旦大学国际关系与公共事务学院、中国人民大学国际关系学院、外交学院、清华大学国际问题研究所、中国社会科学院世界经济与政治研究所、中共中央党校战略研究所等单位,作为本套丛书的学术顾问,他们愿意向我国该学科及相关领域的广大学者和学生共同推荐这套丛书。

本丛书第一批先行选入几本经典文献选读性质的国外优秀教材,内容主要在国际关系理论方面,也包括国际政治经济学方面的优秀教材。它们皆可称为原文中的精品,值得研读和收藏,不仅如此,由于它们本身在国外的大学课堂里都是应用较广的教材和读物,所以特别适合作为我国国际关系与世界政治专业大学教学中的参考读物,甚至可以直接作为以外文授课的课堂教材。在每本书的前面,我们都邀请国内比较权威的专家学者撰写了精彩的导论,以指导读者更好地阅读和使用这些文献。

今后,我们会陆续推出更新、更好的原版教材和专著,希望广大读者提出宝贵意见和建议,尤其欢迎更多的专家学者向我们推荐适合引进的国外优秀教材和专著,以帮助我们完善这套丛书的出版,并最终形成一套完整的世界政治与国际关系及其相关学科适用的原文教学研究参考书系。

最后也要特别提醒读者,我们引进这套丛书,目的主要在于推动学术交流、促进学科发育、完善教学体系,而其著作者的出发点和指导思想、基本观点和结论等,则完全属于由读者加以认识、比较、讨论甚至批评的内容,均不代表北京大学出版社。

# 导 言

贾庆国

九十年代初,苏联的解体使美国成为世界上唯一的超级大国,之后,IT革命使美国的生产效率大幅提高,同时也使美国的政治、经济和军事实力大幅上升,其结果是美国所面临的安全环境大为缓解,在世界上的影响空前高涨。对于许多美国人来说,美国出现了空前的繁荣和安全。在新的形势下,应当如何界定美国的国家利益?如何对这些利益进行重新排序?如何最大限度地维护这些利益?这些都是冷战结束以来美国国际关系的精英们关注的问题。

尤金·维特科普夫和克里斯托弗·琼斯(Eugene R. Wittkopf and Christopher M. Jones)编写的《美国对外政策的未来走向》一书比较系统地反映了美国政界和学术界在这些问题上的讨论。全书共分三个部分:第一部分讨论国家的利益和对外政策目标,第二部分探讨美国和其他国家的关系,第三部分分析美国的国家能力。三个部分分别收集了美国一些著名的政论家和学者的文章,其中包括前国务卿麦德琳·奥尔布赖特(Madeleine Albright)、前国防部部长助理和哈佛大学肯尼迪学院院长约瑟夫·奈(Joseph Nye)、现任国务院计划司司长理查德·哈斯(Richard Haas)、耶鲁大学政治学教授保罗·肯尼迪(Paul Kennedy)、乔治·华盛顿大学教授詹姆斯·罗森诺(James Rosenau)、加州大学洛杉矶分校教授理查德·罗斯克兰斯(Richard Rosecrance)等。

阅读全书,我们发现论文的作者们对上述问题的关切是系统和全面的。从冷战后的国际安全形势到新时期国际社会面临的各种问题,从美国和北约盟国的关系到美国和发展中国家的关系,从美国的外交方式到美国政治、军事和经济的实力,可以说都涉及到了。不仅如此,他们对许多问题的思考也是细致和深刻的。如在美国的利益问题上,美国是否应当充分利用手中的资源在国际上推行民主化,实现美国自由民主一统天下的夙愿?还是应当在来自外部的威胁基本消除的情况下,减少对国际事务的卷入程度,集中精力处理国内众多和棘手的问题?再如,在维护美国国家利益的方式问题上,美国是否应当实行多边主义的外交政策,充分利用其他国家的资源,与他国一道处理和解决众多的全球和国际问题?还是认为美国已经拥有足够的实力追求其对外关系的目标,所以它不应当让其他国家束缚自己的手脚,更不应当为了争取他国的合作在原则和利益问题上作出妥协,因此应当实行单边主义的政策?还是既承认美国的实力是有限的,也注意到美国和他国利益之间存在着某些重要的分歧和差异,所以美国应当一方面尽可能实行多边主义,同时也应当避免过多受其他国家的牵制,有选择地实行多边主义?

从书中不难看出,美国国际关系精英们在上述问题上的看法存在着许多不同的观点,有些甚至是针锋相对的,比如说在冷战后美国应当在多大程度上介入国际事务问题上,历史学家布林克利比较欣赏克林顿政府在上积极推行民主和自由贸易的做法,哈佛大学和麻省理工大学的三位学者则认为,在外部威胁大大减少的情况下,美国应抵制过多卷入国际事务的诱惑,将更多的精力和资源放在解决国内问题上。同样,在通过多边还是单边的方式处理国际问题上,奈先生认为,尽管美国具有巨大的硬实力和软实力,美国并没有强大到可以仅靠自己的力量就可以实现其所有对外政策目标的程度,所以,美国不应当单独去充当国际警察,而应当和其他国家一起解决国际问题。前布鲁金斯学会外交研究部主任哈斯则认为,虽然道理上讲美国应当实行多边主义,但为了捍卫美国的原则和利益,在没有他国支持的情况下美国也要有所作为,因此主张实行有选择的多边主义政策。

尽管美国国际关系的精英们在国际问题上的观点不尽相同,但他们的出发点却惊人地类似,即他们关心的问题是在新的形势下美国如何做才能最大限度地维护美国的国家利益。他们这种心系国家、居安思危的精神是值得他人学习的。当然,由于美国的国家利益和其他国家的国家利益之间存在着众多差异,其他国家的人自然无法完全认同他们的观点。

然而,美国的对外政策对他国利益的影响确实太大了,可以说世界上没有一个国家可以忽视这种影响,因此,不管是否喜欢美国,各国都必须努力去了解它,了解它对国际事务的看法。这样才能够最大限度地捍卫自身的利益。在这个意义上,尤金·维特科夫和克里斯托弗·琼斯主编的这本书对于人们了解美国的对外政策,制订符合自身利益的对外政策来说具有十分重要的意义,凡是关心国际关系和美国对外政策的人都有必要读一读。

## ABOUT THE EDITORS

EUGENE R. WITTKOPF received his doctorate from Syracuse University. He is currently R. Downs Poindexter Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Louisiana State University. He has also held appointments at the University of Florida and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Wittkopf is author of *Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy* (Duke University Press, 1990), coauthor, with Charles W. Kegley, Jr., of *World Politics: Trend and Transformation* (St. Martin's/Worth, 7th ed., 1999), and *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process* (St. Martin's, 5th ed., 1996), and coeditor, with James M. McCormick, of *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence* (Roman & Littlefield, 3rd ed., 1999). He has also published extensively in professional journal literature. In 1997 he received the highest award given by Louisiana State University in recognition of faculty contributions to research and scholarship when he was named the LSU Distinguished Research Master of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences.

CHRISTOPHER M. JONES received his doctorate from Syracuse University, where he was also a University Fellow. He is currently assistant professor of political science at Northern Illinois University. He previously held an appointment at Wittier College. Jones has published several book chapters on American foreign and defense policy and is completing a book entitled *King or Captive? The President and Foreign Policymaking in the New Era*.



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## INTRODUCTION: NEW PRIORITIES FOR A NEW ERA? OR AFLOAT IN UNCHARTED WATERS?

In 1941 Henry Luce, the noted editor and publisher of *Time*, *Life*, and *Fortune* magazines, envisioned his time as the dawn of the “American century.” He based his prediction on the conviction that “only America can effectively state the aims of this war [World War II],” which included, under American leadership, “a vital international economy” and “an international moral order.”<sup>1</sup> In many ways Luce’s prediction proved prophetic, not just as it applied to World War II but also to the decades-long Cold War contest with the Soviet Union that quickly followed it. But even he might be surprised that the twenty-first century looks to be an even more thoroughly American century than the twentieth. The facts at the dawn of the new millennium are simple and irrefutable: compared with all other states, the United States today is in a class by itself. No other can match the health and productivity of its economy, the extent of its scientific and technological resources, its ability to sustain massive levels of defense spending, or the power, sophistication, and global reach of its armed forces.

American power extends beyond these traditional measures as well, encompassing a wealth of less tangible assets broadly conceived as “soft power.” Included are the attraction of its culture and political beliefs and the ability of the United States to establish rules and institutions favorable to its own interests. Thus the United States continues to set the agenda in the international organizations it led in establishing in the 1940s; democracy and market economies have spread throughout the world; and American culture—ranging from pop music, blue jeans, and McDonald’s, to personal computers, Windows 98, and Internet communications in English—exhibits universal appeal in our rapidly globalizing world. Impressed with the global reach of America’s soft power, one German analyst observed that “one has to go back

to the Roman Empire for a similar instance of cultural hegemony. . . . We live in an 'American age,' meaning that American values and arrangements are most closely in tune with the new Zeitgeist."<sup>2</sup>

Little more than a decade ago, many analysts viewed America's future more dimly. In what turned out to be the waning days of the Cold War, analysts who came to be known as "declinists" worried about the consequences of what they saw as the mismatch between America's extensive foreign policy commitments and its increasingly limited economic resources. In his widely acclaimed book *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, historian Paul Kennedy argued that "[the United States] cannot avoid confronting the two great tests which challenge the *longevity* of every major power that occupies the 'number one' position in world affairs: whether it can preserve a reasonable balance between the nation's perceived defense requirements and the means it possesses to maintain those commitments; and whether . . . it can preserve the technological and economic bases of its power from relative erosion in the ever shifting patterns of global production."<sup>3</sup> The danger, he warned, is similar to that faced by hegemonic powers in earlier historical periods, notably the Spanish at the turn of the seventeenth century and the British at the turn of the twentieth. "The United States now runs the risk . . . of . . . 'imperial overstretch': that is to say, decision makers in Washington must face the awkward and enduring fact that the sum total of the United States' global interests and obligations is nowadays far larger than the country's power to defend them all simultaneously."<sup>4</sup>

Today the declinists are in retreat, even if their message is not entirely without merit. The end of the Cold War, the victory of the United States in the Persian Gulf War, the revitalization of the American economy, and the persistent economic problems faced by Germany, Japan, Russia, and others in Europe and Asia all reinforce the widespread conviction that the "next American century" is now on the horizon.

Despite the euphoria that surrounds contemporary American foreign policy, its future remains uncertain. The nation's leaders have yet to devise an overarching grand strategy for the new era that links ends and means to a common, politically popular vision. Absent vision and widespread domestic support for global involvement, "ad hocism" and unilateralism have become commonplace, often accompanied by an arrogance offensive to American friends and allies.<sup>5</sup> Meanwhile, the globalization of the world political economy, encouraged by American policies, has undermined the ability of the United States to chart its own future.

In the early years following World War II, the United States gradually developed a grand strategy—captured in the themes of globalism, anti-communism, containment, military might, and interventionism—for combating the communist and Soviet menace.<sup>6</sup> Historians and political analysts will continue for years to debate whether that strategy was the cause of the eventual U.S. Cold War "victory" over the Soviet Union, but the coincidence between early prescriptions and the eventual outcome of the extensive and intensive conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union is remarkable. In 1947,

George Kennan argued in his famous "X" article that "the United States has in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the breakup or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power."<sup>7</sup> More than forty years later, that breakup and mellowing occurred. Communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe collapsed, the Soviet Union's internal and external empires disintegrated, the Warsaw Pact disbanded, and the division of Germany ended.

Faced with these dramatic new realities, the United States now searched for a new foreign policy paradigm. President George Bush used Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and the subsequent Persian Gulf War to call for the creation of a "new world order," one "where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind—peace and security, freedom, and the rule of law." The vision embraced the tradition of moral idealism—long evident in American foreign policy, but especially since Woodrow Wilson sought early in this century to create a world safe for democracy. It also harkened back to the 1940s when the United States and the Soviet Union stood shoulder to shoulder in opposing Nazi Germany and, later, in seeking to build a structure of peace premised on the continued cooperation of wartime allies. Still, hubris in the belief that the United States alone now had a special responsibility for creating the new world order was only thinly disguised.

Despite its appeal, Bush's conception of a new world order failed to spark broad-based domestic support. The triumphant mood at home that followed the Persian Gulf War and seemed to validate a return to the role of world policeman (in disrepute since the Vietnam War) quickly faded as the U.S. economy slipped into recession. George Bush now became the victim, as Bill Clinton, governor of a small southern state, won the White House by emphasizing domestic priorities with a simple appeal: "The economy, stupid!"

Clinton's single-minded focus on the economy did have an international dimension: to compete abroad, the United States had to clean up its act at home, a theme central to declinists' prescriptions. His administration would also offer the spread of democracy and the enlargement of the community of democratic capitalist states as a core foreign policy goal. As National Security Advisor Anthony Lake explained in 1993, the successor to the foreign policy of containment "must be a strategy of enlargement . . . of the world's free community of market democracies." He later defended the strategy as one "based on a belief that our most fundamental security interest lies in the expansion and consolidation of democratic and market reform." That viewpoint reflected the long-held belief of liberal internationalists that democracies do not fight one another. Hence promotion of democratic capitalism is not only good for business, it is also good for peace.

Despite the appeal of democracy, its centrality as a pillar of American foreign policy proved as ephemeral as Bush's new world order. Almost immediately

critics complained that "democratic enlargement" "had no connection to reality and . . . was an aspiration rather than a strategy."<sup>8</sup> Later events seemed to prove them right. Interventions in Haiti and Bosnia designed to promote democracy quickly confronted the realities of grinding poverty and ethnic animosities that had prevented democracy and civil society in the first place. In the Middle East, the United States faced the uncomfortable fact that its security interests were closely linked to authoritarian states, where democratic promotion could in fact promote instability, not peace. Elsewhere the early enthusiasm that accompanied the rapid spread of democracy following the end of the Cold War cooled in the face of setbacks and retrenchment. As one observer wrote in early 1997, "The headlines announcing that country after country was shrugging off dictatorial rule and embarking on a democratic path have given way to an intermittent but rising stream of troubling reports: a coup in Gambia, civil strife in the Central African Republic, flawed elections in Albania, a deposed government in Pakistan, returning authoritarianism in Zambia, the shedding of democratic forms in Kazakstan, sabotaged elections in Armenia, eroding human rights in Cambodia."<sup>9</sup> Not surprisingly, then, by the time Clinton began his second term in office, his administration had largely abandoned its active advocacy of democratic enlargement, as pragmatism, not idealism, now characterized its foreign policy approach.

Pragmatic leaders have often received high marks from students of American foreign policy,<sup>10</sup> but in Clinton's case critics charged that his foreign policy approach had become prisoner of domestic political considerations to an unprecedented degree.<sup>11</sup> Even Clinton's effort to make the world safe for U.S. exports and investments, arguably his greatest foreign policy achievement, fell victim to charges from abroad that the administration's penchant to extend U.S. laws unilaterally to others and to impose sanctions on international sinners (as defined by the United States) smacked of domestic cronyism, not global vision. Early in Clinton's second term the journal *Foreign Policy* asked a panel of international experts, many from other countries, to rate his foreign policy performance. On the issue of strategic creativity ("the development and expression of a coherent post-Cold War vision for the world"), the eight experts queried gave the president a meager 3.7 on a 10-point scale, his lowest rating among seven questions asked.<sup>12</sup> These viewpoints mirror those of American elites. An October 1997 survey of nearly six hundred opinion leaders found that indecision and lack of direction were the principal criticisms of the Clinton administration's foreign policy record.<sup>13</sup>

From the perspective of other states, the lack of direction in American foreign policy, dictated in part by an excessive concern for domestic politics, often manifests itself in what they see as aggressive unilateralism or, less kindly, "bullying." Whether the issue is trade with Cuba, the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), containment of Iraq, banning land mines, or curbing global warming, the positions of the United States, which were (and remain) often at variance with those of its closest, longtime friends and allies, smack of an arrogance of power which they find offensive. As one commentator noted, "The United States is discovering that its behavior has

come under sharpest scrutiny from friendly nations that no longer feel prevented by Cold War loyalties from expressing their disagreements with Washington."<sup>14</sup>

Presidents always face constraints when devising foreign policy strategies. Opinion at home and abroad is important, and the reaction of Congress and others in governmental institutions can shape what the government decides to do. The nature of the international system is also an important—and arguably the most potent—explanation of the perception that Clinton, like Bush before him, was unable to define a sustainable foreign policy strategy for the new era, preferring ad hocism and unilateralism in its place.

During the Cold War, fear of communism, fear of the Soviet Union, and a determination to contain both, gave structure and purpose to American foreign policy. Ironically, the U.S. Cold War “victory” removed these guideposts, which had imposed a rough sense of order and discipline not only on American foreign policy, but also on world politics. Today globalization—which may be defined as “the intensification of economic, political, social, and cultural relations across borders”<sup>15</sup>—has radically altered the context of American foreign policy, as the spread of political democracy and market economies has contributed to the homogenization of economic, social, and cultural forces worldwide. In turn, the distinction long drawn between foreign and domestic politics has become increasingly arbitrary and dubious, and the geopolitical distinctions among states based on borders and territory are increasingly suspect.

As borders become permeable, political leaders are learning that their ability to affect the form and flow of transactions shaping the social and economic well-being of their own peoples is severely constrained. The “virtual state”<sup>16</sup> is becoming a political reality—however uncomfortable that reality may be. Even the United States has been buffeted by the force of globalization, as revealed in the turmoil its own financial and capital markets suffered as the “Asian contagion”—the currency crises and financial instabilities suffered by many Asian economies in late 1997 and early 1998—spread beyond Asia to engulf markets throughout the world.

The Clinton administration actively sought to promote the cause of open trade and open markets, which propels globalization. In little more than four years, for example, it negotiated more than two hundred market-opening agreements with other states. In turn it would claim that liberalism abroad contributed measurably to the period of sustained economic growth enjoyed at home during much of the 1990s. But there is a dark side to liberalism (and globalism) that increasingly vies for attention. Although the United States is the most powerful state in a world that is more receptive to democracy, capitalism, and American culture than at any other time in this century, American policymakers must address critical domestic issues that flow from the marginalization of individuals and groups not bettered by globalization. As Richard Gephardt, Democratic leader of the House of Representatives and a key opponent of the Clinton administration’s free trade strategy, observed during the roiling Asian economic crisis, “In a new era of globalization, the forces of



commerce and technology are weaving the world closer together but . . . pulling our own people further apart.” Thus American policymakers can no longer ignore the domestic consequences of globalization—but they must do so in an international context in which globalization has unleashed forces beyond America’s singular control. Increasingly, then, foreign policy success may come to be equated with the nation’s ability to adapt at home and collaborate abroad.

The purpose of this book is to provoke inquiry into the future of American foreign policy and the forces that will shape it. Its three parts emphasize *objectives*, *relationships*, and *capabilities*. Part I—Objectives—begins with a discussion of whether the United States should continue its global activism, revert to isolationism, or reorient its world role in other ways. The wisdom of democratic enlargement, the force of soft power, and the nature of contemporary conflict in world politics are among the topics addressed. The tension between realism and idealism as competing world views, and the forces of fragmentation and integration as characterizations of contemporary world politics, are evident in the competing viewpoints of the authors of the five chapters that begin our inquiry into the future of American foreign policy.

Following these provocative discussions, we turn to history, asking what in the American foreign policy experience applies to the new era now unfolding. Other essays in Part I direct attention to the wisdom of marrying the interests of American business to the interests of the nation’s foreign policy, the nature and consequences of the “virtual state,” the foreign policy attitudes of American opinion leaders, and the challenge to American foreign policy posed by global environmental issues. New agendas for a new era are suggested by all of the viewpoints presented in these chapters. Political pitfalls face those who would choose to pick among the challenges they present.

Part II—Relationships—focuses attention on the impact that the new era will exert on America’s relations with its former adversaries and allies in Europe and Asia, as well as with the states in the Global South that were once courted as potential partisans by the Cold War contestants. The selections highlight the critical importance of the United States’ securing its interests, largely by preserving the status quo, while not creating a level of resentment that would lead other states to challenge America’s preeminent international standing, rather than following its leadership.

Part III—Capabilities—critically examines ideas about the diplomatic resources, military means, and economic tactics appropriate for the realization of America’s foreign policy objectives in the new era. At issue are the military and nonmilitary challenges to security that the United States faces now and those it might expect in the future, the means necessary to meet those challenges, and the political feasibility of creating proper instruments of foreign policy in a domestic environment of new priorities and financial constraints. Concern for how the forces of globalization both enhance and challenge American capabilities in the new era underlies the discussion throughout the book.