

LEO TOLSTOY/ON LIFE

托尔斯泰论生命


英中文双语读本

[俄] 列·托尔斯泰 著



托尔斯泰论生命

◎李正荣译



图书在版编目 (C I P) 数据

托尔斯泰论生命 / (俄罗斯) 托尔斯泰著; 李正荣译.
北京: 团结出版社, 2004. 12
ISBN 7-80130-960-X

I. 托... II. ①托... ②李... III. 托尔斯泰, L. N.
(1828~1910) — 生命哲学 — 文集 — 英、汉
IV. B083-53

中国版本图书馆CIP数据核字 (2004) 第118003号

出版: 团结出版社

(北京市东城区东皇城根南街 84 号)

[电话: (010) 6513.3603 (发行部) 6524.4792 (编辑部)]

<http://www.tjpress.com>

E-mail: unitypub@263.net

经销: 全国新华书店

印刷: 北京市梦宇印务有限公司

开本: 787×1092 毫米 1/16

印张: 17.75

印数: 6000

字数: 222 千字


版次: 2004 年 12 月 第 1 版

印次: 2004 年 12 月 第 1 次印刷

书号: ISBN7-80130-960-X/B·45

定价: 36.00 元(平)

(如有印装差错, 请与本社联系)



1887年，这部名为《论生命》的书，单行本准备发行，但遭检查机关查封并销毁。四年之后的1891年，它才正式在日内瓦问世。

“生命”是托翁一生思考的主题，但以“生命”为书名者却只有这一部。这部书讨论爱与恨、苦与乐、幸与不幸、悲与欢、离与合……，归根到底一句话，只想告诉我们：天何以生人？天何处安人？“知天命”是知何天何命？

阅读本书的理由

车尔尼雪夫斯基说他是以其“纯洁的道德感”耳闻目睹着周围生命，以其独特的“心灵辩证法”审视社会生活中之芸芸众生。


屠格涅夫说他是“思想家”与“艺术家”。

他被视为作家、改革家，还被视为道德思想家。他坚信人类二千年来的全部历史，只是一部个人道德进步史与政府道德败坏史……

他被公认为是19世纪“最有影响的道德主义者之一”。

建议以下人群阅读本书

活得最好者或活得最差者，哲学家或小商贩，托翁崇拜者或反对者，逆境中人或顺境中人，党政干部或群众，大中小学生……



策 划：彭明哲

责任编辑：郭 强

封面文字：张耀南

封面设计：新团结工作室

50岁之前，我以为人自生到死的那种生命，就是人的全部生命。如此则总要死去的这生命的幸福，就成为人之惟一目的。我一直带着此种想法生活，并努力寻求此种幸福。但当我依此活下来，我清楚地看到，此种幸福根本不存在，且将来也永不会存在……

——托尔斯泰《基督教教义》（1897）

ISBN 7-80130-960-X



9 787801 309600 >

ISBN 7-80130-960-X/B · 45

定价：36.00元

此为试读，需要完整PDF请访问：www.ertongbook.com

Man is but a reed, the feeblest in nature, but he is a thinking reed. It is not necessary for the whole universe to arm itself to crush him. A vapour, a drop of water, is sufficient to slay him. But were the universe to crush him, man would still be nobler than that which kills him, for he knows that he dies, while the universe knows nothing of the advantage it has over him. Thus our whole dignity consists in thought. By that we should raise ourselves, and not by space and time. of morality.

PASCAL.

Two things fill my consciousness with ever fresh and increasing wonder and awe the oftener and the more deeply my mind concerns itself with them: the starry heavens above me, and the moral law within me... The first begins at the place I occupy in external nature and extends the connexion in which I stand into infinite space, with its worlds on worlds and systems of systems, and beyond that into the limitless time of their periodic movements, their commencement and duration. The second begins in my unseen self, my personality, and places me in a world that has true infinity but which is per-

Leo Tolstoy

人只不过是一根苇草,其本质十分脆弱;但他是一根能思想的苇草。用不着整个宇宙都拿起武器来才能毁灭他;一口气、一滴水就足以致他死命了。然而,纵使宇宙毁灭了他,人却仍然要比致他于死命的东西更高贵得多;因为他知道自己要死亡,而宇宙却丝毫不知它对人所具有的劣势。



因而,我们全部的尊严就在于思想。我们必须在这方面,而不是在我们所无法填充的空间和时间方面提高自己。因此,我们要努力好好地思想;这就是道德的原则。

——帕斯卡[法国17世纪著名数学家、物理学家和哲学家,这段话见他的《思想录》6:347。]

有两种东西,经常给心灵灌注时时在翻新、有加无已的赞叹和敬畏,而且对它们思考得越频繁,越认真,这种感觉就越增强:我头上的

ceptible only to the understanding, and with which I know myself to be connected not merely accidentally, as in the first case, but completely and inevitably.

KANT, Kritik derprakt. Vernunft, Beschluss.

A new commandment I give unto you, That ye love one another. JOH 13:34.

托
斯
泰
尔
论
生
命

On Life

星空和我内心的道德法则。这两者仿佛都被黑暗或无底的空间所遮盖,处在我的视界之外,我不必去研究它们,只应推测它们;我看见它们在我面前,并把它们同我自己的存在意识联系起来。前者从我在外部感官世界中所占的位置开始,并把我在其中的联系扩大到重重世界,层层星系的无限范围中,此外,还把自己的周期运动,它的开端和延续扩大到无限时间中。后者开始于我的无形的“我”,我的人格,并把我呈现在一个具有真正无限性的世界中,这个世界只有靠理性才能了解,同这个世界在一起,而且通过它也同其他可见的世界在一起,我才能不仅在偶然性的联系中,而且在普遍性和必然性的联系中认识自己。

——康德《实践理性批判》结论部分

“赐给你们一条新命令,乃是叫你们彼此相爱。”

——《圣经·约翰福音》

Introduction

LET us imagine a man whose only means of subsistence is a mill. This man, the son and grandson of a miller, knows well by tradition how to manage all parts of the mill so that it grinds satisfactorily. Without any knowledge of mechanics he adjusts the machinery as best he can, so that the flour is well ground and good and he lives and earns his keep.

But having heard some vague talk of mechanics, he begins to think about the arrangement of the mill and to observe what makes what turn.

From the mill-stones to the rind, from the rind to the shaft, from the shaft to the wheel, from the wheel to the sluice, to the dam, and to the water, he comes to the conclusion that everything depends on the dam and the

Leo Tolstoy



引 论

我们先来想像一个人,他是磨坊主的儿子或孙子,磨坊是他惟一的生活手段。耳濡目染使他熟知磨坊的一切。他知道怎样调理磨坊里的所有部件,让磨盘转动得更好。他对力学一窍不通,他只是尽其所能地调整每一部件,使辗磨顺利。他本人也依此而生活着。

但是这个人忽然思索起磨盘的构造来,他也听到了一些模糊的力学知识,于是开始观察起磨盘由于什么而转动的问题来。

从磨脐眼儿到磨底盘,又从磨底盘到辗轴,从辗轴到水轮,从水

river. And he is so delighted by this discovery that instead of testing the quality of the flour as he used to, and raising or lowering the mill-stones, clamping them, and tightening or loosening the belt, he begins to study the river. And his mill falls quite out of order. People begin to tell him he is making a mistake, but he disputes this and continues to reason about the river. And he concerns himself so much and for so long a time with this, and discusses it so eagerly and hotly with those who point out the mistake in his way of thinking, that at last he convinces himself that the river is the mill itself.

To all proofs of the error of his reasoning such a miller will reply: "No mill grinds without water, so to know the mill one must know how to let the water run, one must know the force of its current and where it comes from—in a word, to know the mill you must get to know the river."

The miller's argument is logically irrefutable. The only way to undeceive him is to show him that what is most important in any argument is not so much the argument itself as the place it occupies, that is to say, that to think

On Life

托
斯
泰
尔
论
生
命

轮到水闸、堤坝一直到水,他从这一系列追踪观察中搞清了一点,一切的一切,关键就在于堤坝与河流。他为这个发现而愉快。他不再像从前那样,为了面粉的质量,或者去提一提、降一降磨盘,或者去铲清磨盘的纹理,或者去紧一紧、松一松皮带,而是开始钻研起河流来,完全乱了套。人们对他说,他不应当做这个。他争辩着,继续思考着河流。他久久地扑在这个工作上面,同那些认为他的思想方式不正确的人不停地争论,以至于最后他自己竟相信河流就是磨坊本身。

对所有认为他的思考完全是错误的议论,这个磨坊主会回答说:没有水,任何磨坊都不能磨面。所以为了了解磨坊,应当知道如何放水,应当知道水流的力量,知道水是从哪儿来的。因此,要了解磨坊,就应当知道河流。

effectively it is essential to know what one should consider first and what later. He must be shown that a rational plan of activity differs from an irrational one in that its elements are arranged in the order of their importance: which should come first, second, third, tenth, and so on, while irrational plans lack that sequence. It is also necessary to show him that the decision of this order is not fortuitous, but depends on the purpose for which the activity is planned.

This ultimate aim also determines the sequence in which the separate reflections should be arranged so as to be sensible. An argument not connected with the end in view is absurd, however logical it may be.

The miller's aim is to grind well, and this aim, if he keeps it in view, will determine for him the indubitable order and sequence of his reflections about the mill-stones, the wheel, the dam, and the river.

Without such reference to their aim, the miller's reflections, however fine and logical and beautiful in themselves, will be false, and, above all, meaningless: they will be like the speculations of Gogol's Kifa Mokievich, who

Leo Tolstoy

这个磨坊主的想法在逻辑上是不容反驳的。使他从迷途中走出的惟一方法就是告诉他，想法的重要与否不在其本身，而在于它所占的位置。就是说，要想使思考富有成效，就必须知道先考虑什么、后考虑什么。应当告诉他，理智活动与非理智活动的差别，只在于理智活动总要把自己的想法按其重要性排列成一定的次序，哪一条应在第一位，哪一条是第二位第三位……第十位……，而非理智活动在思考时没有这些次序。还应当告诉他，这个次序不是偶然排列的，而是取决于思考的目的。



所有各种想法的目的决定这些想法应该排列的次序，这样才能做到合理。

因此，没有同所有各种想法的总目的相联系的想法是非理性的，不论它有多大逻辑性。

磨坊主的目的应当是高质量地磨面。如果他不忽视这个目的的

calculated what the thickness of an elephant's egg-shell would be if elephants were hatched from eggs, like birds.

And such, in my opinion, are the discussions of our contemporary science about life.

Life is the mill which man wishes to investigate. The purpose of a mill is to grind well, the purpose of life is to live it well. And man cannot with impunity lose sight of this aim of his researches for an instant. If he does, his arguments inevitably lose their place, and become like Kifa Mokievich's speculations as to the gunpowder needed to crack an elephant's egg.

Man investigates life in order to make it better. Only thus have men studied it who have advanced humanity on the path of knowledge. But besides these true teachers and benefactors of mankind there have always been, and still are, reasoners who lose sight of the aim of the discussion and investigate the question of the origin of life instead—investigate what makes the mill go. Some declare that it is the water, others that it is the mechanism. The dispute

话，它会为他规定出不容置疑的研究磨盘、水轮、堤坝和河流的次序。

由于不同思索的目的相联系，磨坊主的想法不论其本身多么漂亮、多么有逻辑性，都是不正确的，主要的是没有用的，就像基甫·莫捷耶维奇对大象蛋的思索一样，此人假设大象是像鸟一样从蛋中孵化出来的，就思考起大象蛋的壳会有多厚的问题来。

在我看来，我们现代科学关于生命的研究正处于这个状态。

生命就像那个磨坊主要想研究的磨坊。需要磨坊是为了能很好地磨面。需要研究生命只是为了让生命美好。人们一分钟也不能抛弃这个研究目的而不受惩罚。如果他抛弃了它，那么他的思索必然失掉自己的位置，就会变得像那位莫氏的思索一样：需要多少炸药才能打破大象蛋壳。

人们研究生命，只是为了让生命变得更好。推进人类在知识道路

grows warm, and becomes further and further removed from the purpose of the discussion, till it is supplanted by matters quite foreign to it.

There is an ancient jest about a dispute between a Jew and a Christian. The Christian, in reply to the intricate subtleties of the Jew, smacked him on his bald pate and asked him: What made the noise—your bald pate or the palm of my hand? And the dispute about faith gave way to a new and insoluble question.

Something similar has, from very ancient times, been going on parallel with humanity's real know-ledge of the question of life.

Discussions concerning the origin of life have been known from very ancient times, as to whether it comes from a non-material origin or from various combinations of matter? And these discussions still continue, and one foresees no end to them, simply because the whole aim of the discussion has been left aside. Life is discussed apart from its aim, and by the word 'life' something is referred to that is not life, but is what it proceeds from or what accompa-

Leo Tolstoy

上前进的人们,正是这样来研究生命的。然而,泥沙俱下。伴随人类这些真正的导师和行善者,总会出现这样一些研究者,他们抛掉了研究的目的,却抓住了生命从何而来的问题,就像磨坊主们探讨磨坊为什么转动一样。一些人坚持说,是由于水,另一些人说是由于它的构造。他们争论得那么热烈,离研究的对象越来越远,完全被另一些对象取而代之。

有一个古老的笑话,说犹太人和基督徒争论,基督徒在向犹太人解答一个难以理解的教义精要时,用手掌“啪”地打了一下他的秃顶,于是提出一个问题:这“啪”的一声从何而来,是由于手掌,还是由于秃顶。由此对信仰的争论被一个新的不可解决的问题代替了。

在生命问题上,类似的事情从古时起就一直与人们的真正认识相伴发生着。

从古时起,关于生命之源的思索就为许多人所热衷。生命是从非



nies it.

When speaking of life, not only in scientific books but even in conversation, people now refer not to what we all know—the life I am conscious of, the sufferings I fear and hate and the pleasures and joys I desire—but to something that may perhaps have arisen from a play of accidents in accord with certain physical laws, or perhaps from a cause that is a mystery.

The word life is now applied to something disputable, which lacks the chief characteristics of life: a consciousness of suffering and enjoyment and an aspiration towards welfare.

“Life is a dual process of composition and decomposition, general and at the same time uninterrupted. Life is a certain conjunction of heterogeneous changes occurring in sequence. Life is an organism in action. Life is a particular activity of an organic substance. Life is an adaptation of internal to external relations.”

Not to mention the inaccuracies and tautologies with which these definitions teem, their essence is.

On Life

物质中来,还是由各种物质组成,这个研究一直持续到今,而且很难说到何时结束。这正是由于总目标被抛开了,对生命的议论离开了生命的目的。生命这一词,已经不是作为生命来理解,而成了生命之源、生命之组合了。

现在,不只是在科学的书本上,就是在谈话中,只要一谈到生命,人们说的并不是我们大家所知道的生命——通过我所害怕和憎恶的痛苦、我所希望的享受和欢乐而使我意识到的那种生命;而是某种另外的东西,它可能是由于某些物理定律的偶然作用而产生的,也可能来自某种有神秘原因的东西。

现在,生命一词已经被强加给某种有争议的东西,它没有生命的主要特征:对痛苦和欢乐的意识与对幸福的追求。

“生命是各种抵制死亡功能器官的协调,生命是一个在有限的时间里,在一定的环境中延续存在的现象。”

Life is the aggregate of the functions which withstand death. Life is the aggregate of the phenomena that succeed one another for a limited period in an organized being.

always the same; they do not define what all men alike unquestionably understand by the word life, but certain processes and other phenomena which accompany life.

Most of these definitions cover a crystal in process of formation, some of them cover the activities of fermentation and decay, and all of them apply to each separate cell in my body, for which neither good nor evil exists. Certain processes that occur in crystals, in protoplasm, in the nucleus of protoplasm, and in the cells of my body and other bodies, are called by the name which to me is inseparably connected with the consciousness of an aspiration for my welfare.

To reason about certain conditions of life as if they were life itself, is the same as to discuss the river as if it were the mill.

Leo Tolstoy

“生命是普遍地、不断发生的分解与化合的双重过程。生命是顺序进行的不同种类变化的一定组合。生命是运动中的有机体，生命是有机物的特殊活动，生命是内部关系对外部关系的适应。”

不必说充斥在这些定义中的含混不清、语义反复了。它们的实质全都一样：定义的对象不是所有人对生命一词共同一致理解的东西，而是伴随着生命和其他现象的某些过程。

这些定义中的大部分适用于晶体的还原活动，另一部分适用于发酵腐化过程，而所有的定义都能适用于我们肉体的每一个单独细胞的生命，而对于细胞来说什么都无所谓，既没有好的，也没有坏的。人们把某些发生在晶体、原生质、原生质核以及我们身体和别人身体中细胞的变化过程叫做生命。实际上生命一词是同追求幸福的意识紧密融合着。

把生命的某些条件当作生命来讨论，完全等于把河流当磨坊。这



Such discussions may be very necessary for some purposes, but do not touch the subject they are intended to discuss, and consequently the conclusions about life deduced from them cannot help being false.

The word life is very short and very clear, and everybody knows what it means. But just because that is so, we ought always to use it in this universally intelligible sense. For the meaning of the word is clear to everyone not because it has been very accurately defined by other words and concepts, but on the contrary because it expresses a fundamental conception from which many others, if not all others, are deduced. So to make deductions from it, we are bound first of all to take it in the central meaning it has for everybody. And as it seems to me, just this very thing has been over-looked by the disputants in regard to the concept of life. It has happened that the basic concept of life, not having been taken in its central meaning to begin with, has, as a result of the controversies about it, been more and more drawn away from its generally recognized basis, and has eventually lost that primary meaning and received

托 斯 泰 尔 论 生 命

On Life

种议论可能对别的什么对象很有用，但是对他们要讨论的对象却毫不沾边。因此从这些议论中得出的关于生命的全部结论，不可能不是虚假的。

“生命”一词，特别简明、清晰，任何人都知道它意味着什么。但是，正因为这一点，我们必须在这个所有人都理解的含义上使用这个词。要知道，这个词被大家理解，并不是因为它是被其他的词、其他的概念确切地下了定义。相反，这个词标志着最基本的概念、许多别的概念（如果不是所有一切概念的话）都是从它引出的。因此，为了从这个概念去引出结论，我们就必须首先在它的中心意义上，在对所有人来说都是无可争议的意义上接受它。然而我觉得，正是这个中心的含义却在那些生命概念之争中失落了。于是出现了这样的情况：从一开始就没有把握住其中心意义的生命基本概念，由于对它的争论而越来越远离它的基本的、被所有人都理解的中心意

another that is inappropriate. What has happened is that the centre from which the circle was drawn has been abandoned and transferred to another point.

People dispute about whether there is life in a cell, or in protoplasm, or in still lower inorganic matter. But before disputing, we should ask ourselves whether we have a right to ascribe the idea of life to a cell.

We say, for instance, that there is life in a cell and that it is a living being. Yet the fundamental idea of human life and the idea of the life found in a cell, are not merely quite different but incompatible. The one conception excludes the other. I learn that my body is entirely composed of cells. I am told that these cells have the same property of life that I have, and are living beings like myself. But I am conscious of myself as a living being only because I feel myself, with all the cells of which I am composed, to be a single undivided living being. I am entirely composed of living cells, they tell me. To what then do I ascribe the property of life: to the cells or to myself? If I admit that the cells have life, I must eliminate from the concept of life the chief

Leo Tolstoy

义,最后完全失掉了它自己的基础意义,而获得一种别的与它完全不相符合的意义,于是作为构图出发点的中心被放弃了,转到了一个新的点上。

人们在争论:细胞或原生质,或者更低级的无机物质中有没有生命?但在争论之前,应当问一下自己,我们有没有权利把生命的概念加给细胞呢?

例如我们都在说,细胞里有生命,细胞就是活的生物。但是人类生命的最基本概念同细胞中存在的那个生命的概念完全是两个概念,他们不仅完全不同,而且是完全无法结合的,一个概念排斥另一个。我发现:我的身体是由细胞构成的。人们还告诉我,细胞同我一样具有生命的特征,它本身同我一样是一种活的生命。但我认识到我自己活着,只是因为我意识到我和构成了我的所有细胞是一个不可分割的活的生物。人们对我说,我的一切,一丝一毫全是由细胞构



indication of my own life—the consciousness that I am a separate undivided living being. But if I admit that I have life as a separate individual, it is clear that I certainly cannot attribute the same properties to the cells of which my whole body is composed and of whose consciousness I know nothing.

Either I have life, and have in me a crowd of non-living particles called cells, or there is a conglomeration of living cells and my consciousness of life is not life but only an illusion.

We do not say that in the cells there is something which we call trifle, but say that they have life. We say “life” because by that word we understand not some unknown X but a quite definite quantity we all call by the same name, and know only from within ourselves, as the consciousness we have of ourselves with the body inseparable from us, and so that conception is not applicable to the cells of which my body is composed.

Whatever investigations and observations a man may engage on, he ought, for the expression of his observations, to employ each word with the meaning

On Life

成的。那么我应当把生命的特性算在哪一个身上,是作为细胞所有,还是我自己所有?如果我假设细胞有生命,那么我必须从生命的概念中抽掉生命的主要特征,抽掉对我是个完整的生物的意识。如果我设想,我作为一个独立、自为的存在而具有生命,那么很明显,我怎么也不能认为,构成我肉体的细胞也有同样的特征,关于它们的意识我一无所知。

或者我是一个有生命的人,而在我身上有着没有生命的部分——细胞;或者我有一大堆有生命的细胞,而我所意识到的生命,不是生命,而是错觉。

要知道,我们不说细胞之中有我们称之为“基质”的东西,而是说细胞中有生命。我们说:“生命”,因为这个词不是指未知数,而是一种完全确定的值。对这个值我们大家的理解都一样,而且是只从我们自我中理解的,这就是对自我以及自我不可分割的完整统一的肉