



A Critical History of Classical Chinese Philosophy

By He Zhaowu & Peng Gang




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Preface

Some years ago, I was asked by the publisher to prepare a book for Western readers on the history of philosophy in China. Ever since accepting this invitation, I have pondered how the work should be done and in what form it should be presented. On this topic there were innumerable works and papers in circulation. And foreign works (including those by Chinese scholars) in this field are already more than one might expect. So where should I begin my task and how should I deal with it?

Systematic theoretical thinking has existed in China for more than twenty-five centuries, since Confucius, undoubtedly one of the earliest and most brilliant thinkers of world civilization. The late Prof. Feng Youlan summarized it into two periods: the period of the philosophers, and that of the scholastics. I regard this division as one of Prof. Feng's keenest insights, though it was the same path taken by Western intellectual history. The antiquity of the West was an epoch of classical civilization, while in the Middle Ages all that was entitled learning was scholastic study, and all thought was brought forth in the form of scholastic exegesis. This mediaeval feature was the same both in China and the West. The sole difference lay merely in the fact that China was in need of a modern age. But when considering traditional thought, the classical age certainly played a more important role than the scholasticism of the middle ages. Hence it was more worthy of our concern.

As for research on the history of ideas in general or on philosophy in particular, it should as a rule consist of three integral parts: (1) the revision and reconstruction of the historical sources and facts; (2) the interpretation and explanation of the theories under investigation; and (3) the criticism and evaluation of the theories and thoughts of our predecessors. All works of the first category presuppose common

agreement on the criterion for what is factual and real, while those of the second category presuppose common agreement on the criterion for what is logical and reasonable. But for what falls within the sphere of the third category, there is no commonly agreed criterion whatsoever; it is entirely the author's own product, and can by no means be substituted by that of anybody else. In view of the fact that in the first two categories so many works have already been produced by so many researchers, I am inclined to concentrate more on what falls into the third category. This is the reason why the present work is entitled *Classical Philosophy in China—A Critical History*.

On the occasion of its publication, I'd like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to some unforgettable teachers and friends. I was already too late to attend the lectures of Liang Qichao, the teacher of my teachers' generation, but a series of his writings related to this field, especially his *Main Trends of Learning in Ancient China*, *History of Learning in China in the Last Three Centuries*, *A Survey of Learning of the Qing Period* and *Studies on the Occidental Philosophers*, had been served as the introductory primers to the youngsters of my generation. In my university days, Prof. Feng Youlan conducted the course on the history of Chinese philosophy, and his epoch-making book *History of Chinese Philosophy* was then the standard textbook. Although there were polemics over his viewpoints and interpretations among our schoolmates, the many merits, insights and scrutinizing inquiries in his book could never be denied. It was also then that Prof. Zhang Xiruo gave his lecture courses on the history of Western political theory and on modern Western political theory. It was his lectures that kindled my interest in the history of ideas. Later, in the 1950s, I joined Prof. Hou Wailu's team working on intellectual history. As his student and assistant, I learned from him that the history of ideas was a part of the whole course of history and could never be treated as a purely logical structure. He was indeed a genuine Marxist that at times made him incompatible with the then prevailing current of political exegesis. As for myself, I am forever unable to let the inherent power of the idea itself shrink into total oblivion, in spite of the fact that all ideas are of necessity conditioned

by historical circumstances. I like Beethoven's music. Yet I may have no knowledge at all of Beethoven the man and his time. I may not even know that Beethoven composed this piece of music, and simply be enchanted by the piece itself. And that will do. So it is with the case of every theory and every idea. History is the mother of all theories and ideas, but once an idea was born into this world, it was instantly endowed with its own existence and life, independent of its mother. Accordingly a researcher ought to judge a theory by the merits and defects of that theory itself alone, irrespective of what its material background might be. In this regard, a researcher ought to be value-free, or to be neutral in his value judgment. Yet a researcher cannot avoid having his own sense of humanistic value. Otherwise, he would be a researcher of the natural world and not of the human. Herein dwells the duality of human history, which forever advances as though in a state of perpetual antinomy.

Mr. Peng Gang has been a helpful co-author of the present book, of which he drafted a part, and prepared the final copy of the whole manuscript. Ms. Zhou Kuijie, Ms. Zhang Haiou, Ms. Li Shujuan and Mr. Xu Jingguo of New World Press, and Mr. Ricky Jeffery have generously aided the publication of this book. It is only appropriate that in my prefatory words I thank them for their kindness.

He Zhaowu
2009, Beijing

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Introduction

When compared with the philosophy of the West, philosophy in China has had its own distinct history. The present work aims at an exposition of the history of philosophy in China from a critical point of view. In this short introduction it is hoped that some preliminary remarks will help readers to approach the general historical background of Chinese culture and thought.

[I] Philosophy, History, History of Philosophy

The scope of the history of philosophy covers both philosophy and history; it deals with the history of the specific topic of philosophy. Everything in the world has its history. Human civilization has its history, and so does the philosophical thought of mankind. The locus of the development of philosophical thought is what we delineate as the history of philosophy. But the study of philosophy differentiates itself from the study of history in an essential aspect. Ordinarily in the study of history, people may (though not always) reach a unanimous conclusion. For example, in relation to the birth year of Confucius, people could eventually reach a unanimous conclusion, because—in accordance with common sense—Confucius had to have been born in a certain year (and not any other). Even in the event that there is no year generally accepted as the definite one, it is simply due to the fact that our present studies cannot as yet afford a conclusion. It by no way means that Confucius had no definite birth year at all. Therefore, sooner or later, we may at least reach a unanimous conclusion on an exact birth date for Confucius. For another example, Mencius once said that after Confucius had developed the book *Spring and Autumn Annals*,^① all the rebellious elements were held in horror and astonishment. Some scholars citing these words as evidence argue that the book *Spring and Autumn Annals* was the work of Confucius, while others argue against this on other grounds.

Whether the book *Spring and Autumn Annals* was the work of Confucius is a question about a definite fact, on which people can and should reach a common consensus. Though we are not as yet able to give a definite assertion, nevertheless the question itself of whether Confucius ever produced such a book

① On the book *Spring and Autumn Annals*, see next chapter.

Spring and Autumn Annals still exists. Whether Confucius has written such a book or not is after all a matter of historical fact, and a historical fact is unalterable, once wrought. Common sense tells us, history consists of objective facts on which people may and should come to a definite conclusion. If a conclusion has not been reached, it is simply because we have not yet been able to perform sufficient investigation, not because such facts do not exist.

But in the study of philosophy, the case appears to be somewhat otherwise. Philosophy deals with theories and thoughts. On whether the theory or thoughts of someone are such and such, people may hold very different opinions and interpretations. The well-known Greek philosopher Socrates branded his own method of argument as that of midwifery, meaning that he merely hoped to induce his conclusions from the thinking of others. When someone was wrong in their thinking without knowing it, Socrates would come forth to help draw out wrong conclusions from that person's own theory. Thus one's own errors are shown without Socrates' (or any other's) assertion. Once when Socrates held a dialogue with someone who was proud of his own theory of running the state, Socrates did not touch on his political ideas, but only talked about that man's family life. Socrates induced him to admit that he was not on good terms with other members of his own family. Then Socrates asked: if you are not on good terms with the members of your family, how could you behave on good terms with your country and your people? This was for nothing else than to draw the wrong conclusion out from this person's own ways—that is, the theories you might preach do not matter—indeed, they are not even practicable in your own life. The above example helps to illustrate something true of any philosophical theory. A theory necessarily involves some subjective elements in our understanding or interpretation, which are in their nature very different from pure historical facts. Historical fact *per se* has nothing to do with subjective understanding or interpretation. Confucius was born exactly in the year in which he was born. Did he ever compose the book *Spring and Autumn Annals*? He did, if ever he did; he did not, if never. But the case is different with our understanding of the philosophical theories we may attribute to people. We may find in his theory what he himself has not consciously come to know or to acknowledge. In other words, the understanding of philosophy involves interpretation and intellectual reconstruction in the mind of the reader.

Now let us come back to the history of philosophy in China. When we study Confucius, we have to arrange Confucius' sayings into a theoretical system by ourselves. As a matter of fact, what Confucius has left to the present day is nothing more than a miscellany of fragmentary remarks, which Confucius

himself had no idea how to synthesize into a systematic philosophical theory. It was left to the later ages to propound or to develop it. Hence we are confronted with the problem of how to recreate Confucius' ideas into a whole—a problem never encountered by Confucius himself.

Usually, in studying philosophies in history, we are accustomed to employing certain models and paradigms to comprehend these theories—for instance, by first dealing with his life and time, his ways of thinking, then his epistemology, his cosmology, his ontology, his ethics and his social and political ideas, etc. Indeed the philosopher himself while forming his ideas had no intention to comply with such well-regulated models. This kind of structure is forced upon him by us, not by himself. Though this procedure of manipulation should not be seen as an erroneous fabrication, it is at any rate far from what the philosophers of the past originally had in mind. That is to say, his philosophy is now in essence what we have constructed through our own understanding and analysis of his sayings. Hence, whether what we have perceived in him is exactly what he originally intended to mean, and whether it corresponds with the thoughts that were in his mind, will remain a perennial question. Here arises the question of how we interpret and explain others' thoughts; and herein lies the difference between philosophy and history. Or, we may as well put it in this way; in understanding the philosophy of others, there is necessarily an element of personal subjectivity—while historical fact in a certain sense might be taken as something objectively given.

It is often believed that the study of history is necessary because understanding the past will help us understand the present. Further, in a broader sense, to understand anything is in a considerable degree only to understand its past, i.e. to grasp some historical understanding of it. This is just as in the diagnosis of a patient by the doctor, who has to consult the patient's medical record to understand the history of his illness. From the viewpoint of historiography, understanding the past is for the sake of a better understanding of the present; from the viewpoint of philosophy, understanding the past is for the sake of enriching our present theoretical knowledge. While our present theoretical knowledge is enriched, it is at the same time improved and reformed. Without this function, philosophy would be valueless. Later generations can only make progress on the shoulders of the earlier.

[III] Studies of the History of Philosophy in China

Philosophy in China traces back to very ancient times, and the same with the study of its history. In the last chapter of the *Book of Zhuang Zi*, “The World” (*Tian Xia*), there is a treatise on all the philosophical schools of ancient China and their representatives, with criticism and evaluations of their theories and ideas. It is in reality a history of ancient philosophy, written by an ancient philosopher. Later in the Han period (about a century after the great unification of Qin), Sima Tan, the father of the great historian Sima Qian and himself the royal historian, wrote a treatise *On the Essentials of the Six Schools*. It is also a history of philosophy, criticizing respectively the six main philosophical schools of ancient times. After that, there were many successive works dealing with the topic, the most well-known being *The Eminent Ming Philosophers* (*Ming Ruo Xue An*) by Huang Zhongxi, the famous scholar of the early 17th century.

This work was followed by a series of similar ones, including *The Eminent Song and Yuan Philosophers* (*Song Yuan Xue An*) by Huang and his followers and *The Eminent Qing Philosophers* (*Qing Ruo Xue An*) by others. All of them were written in the traditional fashion and hence not in line with the modern academic discipline.

The study of the history of Chinese philosophy, as that study is understood in its modern sense, dates back to the first years of the 20th century. In 1902, Liang Qichao, the forerunner of the Chinese Enlightenment, published his *The Main Trends of the Academic Ideas in China* (*Lun Zhong Guo Xue Shu Si Xiang Bian Qian Zhi Da Shi*). Liang himself was the foremost pioneer and founder of modern historiography in China, and this thesis should be deservedly ranked as one of the earliest works on the history of philosophy in China in a more strict sense. It surpassed the traditional way of thinking and its sense of value by observing ancient philosophy through modern eyes. This again relates to the above-mentioned difference between philosophy and the study of history. In Liang's treatise, what he dealt with was the philosophy of ancient times, but he discussed it from a view which is wholly new and modern. Sometime later in the year 1906, Zhang Taiyan published his *An Exposition of the Ancient Philosophers* (*Zhu Zi Xue Lun Shuo*), *Zhu Zi* meaning the various ancient philosophers and their schools. Zhang dealt with the ancient philosophers of China as well, and also considered it through a modern perspective. One of the cardinal differences between the traditional discipline and the modern lies primarily in this: in the modern perspective each school is considered respectively upon an equal

basis without discrimination, or, all philosophers are equal before the academic court; whereas in the eyes of the ancients, it is the idea of orthodoxy that reigns supreme, unorthodox philosophies being branded as heresies. For instance, the Neo-Confucians of the Song period regarded the Buddhist and the Taoist school (*Er Shi*) as heresies, presupposing that all schools of philosophy are not theoretically equal, and that the Confucianism should hold sole supremacy over all others. Soon after Liang and Zhang, Cai Yuanpei, who was then already the leader of modern learning in China, on the eve of the 1911 revolution published his work *History of Ethics in China* (*Zhong Guo Lun Li Xue Shi*), in which he also explored ancient philosophy from a modern view.

These three writers mentioned above drew back the curtain of the history of philosophy in its modern sense, but the most salient representative work in this field should be attributed to Hu Shih's *An Outline History of Philosophy in China* (*Zhong Guo Zhe Xue Shi Da Gang*). This book is of epoch-making significance in the field of the history of philosophy, and even in some way laid down the foundation of academic research in modern China at large. Here it should be noted that an academic work may be evaluated either by its own academic merit or by its historical significance. The value of a book can exist either in its own innovation or in its influence on society at large. The contributions of these masters all lie predominantly in their historical influence rather than in their academic merits. It was these persons who initiated a new current of thought, the historical significance of which we can never overestimate, no matter what credit we may attach to the academic value within them. They are the great torch-bearers of the enlightenment of modern China.

Hu's work belonged to the May Fourth Movement of 1919. A decade and a half later Feng Youlan's (also known as Fung Yulan) *A History of Chinese Philosophy* (*Zhong Guo Zhe Xue Shi*) appeared before the reading public (1930-1934). Feng was then lecturing the history of philosophy in Tsinghua University and his lectures were put in book form, which at once swayed the academic field, and which was generally acknowledged as a model work of scholarship at that time. Feng has a theoretical system and viewpoint of his own, which he made full use of in the interpretation of the ancient philosophers as he saw them. A fact in history can exist only in one way. Of a historical fact, it can be said that there should only be one assertion; but for a philosophical theory, it can never be ascertained which among the various interpretations has the right to assume exclusive priority. Different persons are each perfectly qualified to justify their own interpretations in their own fashion. There is an old Chinese proverb: "There is no final explanation of a poem," meaning that for any poem there can be no

interpretation which is so definite and exact that it should be generally accepted. Even the author himself cannot give a final explanation. Similarly, it can also be said that there is no final explanation for a philosophical theory. For any given philosophical theory of bygone days, one may explain either in this way or that, and no explanation is entitled to be assumed as the only one. Many of Feng's viewpoints nowadays may seem unacceptable, especially after the year 1949 when China was proclaimed liberated. Yet as a witness to the intellectual history of an age, this work nevertheless still holds great value in that it reflected a typical norm of the understanding of the time.

Down to the forties of the 20th century, Marxist theory (then not yet so much sinicized as decades later) began to propagate and prevail in China in a large torrent, and among the Marxist camp of scholars Hou Wailu should rightly be counted as the foremost in the study of the history of philosophy. His monumental work, *A General Intellectual History of China (Zhong Guo Si Xiang Tong Shi)* in six volumes was drafted in the early forties and completed in the late fifties. Hou's way of research is an approach from the socio-economic base to the intellectual superstructure, and then conversely from the superstructure to the base—a typically Marxist approach. As an insight to the age, this work offers a complete summation of the Marxist research into the philosophy of China.^① And since then, the study of intellectual history has become a hot topic in the fields of both historical and philosophical research. There are at the same time many scholars outside of China engaging in research work in this field, some of whom are foreign sinologists and some overseas Chinese emigrants, including the “contemporary New Confucians.”

In the above paragraphs we have sketched briefly the history of the study of the history of philosophy in China. Now the Chinese people are entering into a new age which in many ways differs greatly from the time of the fifties to the seventies. A new historical stage is unavoidably bringing forth its new points of view, with which people would reflect the past anew. Why is it that history needs to be studied again and again? Roughly speaking, the historical literature we are in possession of is rather limited in quantity, but as our ideas are ever-changing, the pictures we reconstruct in our minds' eye are always changing correspondingly. This is the reason why the study of history should be subject to an ever-renewing process of scrutiny and reflection. For instance, in studying

① The author is obliged to confess that in his university years he twice attended two courses in Professor Feng's classes and from the mid-fifties to mid-eighties he served as Professor Hou's assistant for many years. However, the views expressed in this book are wholly his own.

the ancient history of China, the sources we rely on are from Sima Qian's *Records of the Historian*. Most probably, there are certain historical facts we can know no more than he did, but still we have to engage in further study. We should not and cannot remain in the same spot where he once stood, because we have our own ideas different to his. People today are not the people of his day. Different ideas have set them apart. Different ideas beget different problems, which in turn beget different answers. Consequently historical study is a process of reinterpretation and reconstruction. This is so not only with historical understanding, but also with other subjects. The solar system varies little from what it was a hundred years (or even a thousand years) ago, but scientists still continue to study it strenuously, because the scientific knowledge and ideas of today are greatly changed from what they were a hundred years ago, and the scientists today study the solar system from a position far ahead that of a hundred years ago.

Subsequently the results of present-day research are greatly at variance with those of bygone days.

[III] Chinese Philosophy vs. Philosophy in China

The question arising in the next turn is: what are the objects of study of the history of philosophy in China? Of course, they fall within the sphere of Chinese philosophy or philosophy in China. But the following should be discerned. As early as the beginning of the thirties, when Feng Youlan completed his *History of Chinese Philosophy*, Jin Yuelin wrote a critical report of it in which we read the commentary: when an author writes a book on the *History of British Physics*, what he deals with is in reality not the history of "British physics," but the history of "the physics in Britain;" because strictly speaking, there is only physics in Britain, but no such thing as British physics, just as there is no such thing as French physics, but only physics in France. These two terms connote two different ideas. Yet one may still go on to ask: granted that there is no such thing as British physics, but is there also no such thing as British philosophy? At any rate, philosophy is after all no kind of physics. Is there such a thing as Chinese philosophy? Does the term "the history of Chinese philosophy" denote the history of philosophy in China or the history of "Chinese philosophy"? The answer is not as simple as it might seem *prima facie*. Until his very last, Feng Youlan held that there is such a thing as Chinese philosophy, and he dealt only with history of that sort of philosophy; while others think otherwise, holding

that it deals only with the history of philosophy in China. Personally I would prefer an eclectic position—a position somewhere between the two opposites. As an academic discipline, philosophy like all other disciplines deals with what is universal and universally valid. Mathematics is universal and universally valid. That $2 + 2 = 4$ is universally acknowledged, no matter whether in Britain or in China. Then is there a history of mathematics in China? Yes, there is, but only in so far as it denotes the history of mathematics in China. Apart from the idea of mathematics in China, the term “Chinese mathematics” is altogether meaningless. For a further illustration, take the example of geometry. As late as the first years of the 17th century, there had still been no geometry in China. But this by no means demonstrates that the Chinese are incapable of geometrical knowledge, or that the caliber of the Chinese mind is by nature unsuited to the study of geometry, so that geometry is not part of Chinese mathematics, or even that it cannot be mastered by the Chinese. In history, the Chinese indeed were long ignorant of geometry, but this does not make geometry by nature inassimilable to Chinese mathematics. As to why China had had no geometry, it has to be attributed to the historical background, that is, one has to resort to causes which are not inborn in Chinese minds. A national character or mind is formed through the long course of historical development; it is by no means doomed inevitably and unalterably to be so. There is no pre-determined national character or national mind whatsoever. Although it might be admitted that people in one part of the world are considerably different from others, that is entirely caused by their historical conditions, not by their nature. Some writers stress that the Chinese are not good at close analysis, and they interpret this as the reason why philosophy in China took the way of poetic apprehension rather than that of logical analysis. Let the case be so; it in no way means that Chinese minds are inappropriate for logical speculation. It is merely caused by their surrounding historical conditions. One such condition is the relative stagnation of China's natural sciences. Once the conditions are made ready, Chinese minds can just as wisely practice the learning of geometry and logic.

Philosophy has its universal objects and universal methods which are common to and equally valid for all peoples, and in this sense there is no problem of “Chinese philosophy” whatsoever. This is also the Marxist view. Engels in his *Feuerbach and the End of the German Classical Philosophy* proposed that the basic problem of all philosophies is that of thinking in relation to existence. Those who take thinking as primary are the idealists and those who take matter as primary are the materialists. This is a universal judgment, a judgment universally valid for all people whenever and wherever, including

those in Chinese philosophy. Philosophy has its object of inquiry, which is none other than the universal principles of thinking and of existence. They are equally valid and available to all persons, places and times.

For the inquiry into its object, philosophy has to employ certain ways of thinking, i.e. its methodology. To meet such needs, people are in the habit of using some sort of manipulation, such as the metaphysical method, the dialectical method, the analytic method, the intuitive method and so on. So far as the object of inquiry and their relevant method are by nature universal, the term "Chinese philosophy" can imply nothing more than "philosophy in China." Thus the history of Chinese philosophy can only mean the history of philosophy in China; just as there is nothing that may be rightfully called Chinese mathematics, except in the sense of "mathematics in China," although Chinese mathematics could and did assume some form of expression different from the West. In the West, a triangle is always denoted by A, B and C, while in the very first stage of its introduction into China it is denoted by *Jia*, *Yi* and *Bing* the first three symbols of the Ten Heavenly Stems (*Tian Gan*). But as far as geometry proper is concerned, there is no difference whatsoever between the Western and the Chinese. In reality the value of truth lies nowhere else than in its universal validity. If it did not, it would cease to be a truth. It is this universal validity that makes a truth what constitutes a truth and a principle what constitutes a principle.

Yet when viewed from another level, under the universality there co-exist unique particularities. Each nation has its own particularity closely connected with and conditioned by its own particular history. The history of each nation differs from that of others. In contrast to their commonality or universality, this difference makes up their respective particularity. For instance, any ruler or small group of rulers under no supervision or constraint whatsoever always tends to corrupt or be corrupted, and to do whatever they please by making power absolute. Such is the case with all nations in the history of mankind, and hence what Lord Acton said ("Power corrupts, absolute power corrupts absolutely") may be regarded as a universal truth. However, under different historical circumstances power corrupts in different ways, and a ruler may be much more constrained in certain conditions than in others, and the degree of corruption might be lesser than in other cases; and here is just where the particular quality lies. There is a prevailing term for this particularity in present-day China, "*guo qing*" (literally the national condition). Each nation has its own national condition which is of course worthy of being studied carefully and minutely, and which is one factor differentiating the humanities from the

natural sciences. Natural sciences place more stress on what is universal, while humanistic or historical studies stress what belongs to humanity, and hence the unique idiosyncrasies. Universality and particularity exist on different levels: what reigns universally is universality, and all idiosyncrasies are secondary and subordinate to the more general universality. It is for this reason that uniqueness should never be emphasized to such a degree as to abrogate universality entirely, as though there is such a thing as “Chinese philosophy” independent of philosophy in general. Above all, Chinese philosophy is philosophy and is a part of and subject to the universal principle of philosophy. Only in this respect, it possesses its particularity which is characteristic of the Chinese. Universal principle, after all, takes primacy, and the particular is secondary. By the same token, the so-called (and often too much quoted) national condition or character is secondary too, and priority should be placed on what is universal.

If in certain times the national condition or characteristics would happen to clash or conflict with the main trend of history, making them incapable of tolerating each other, then, as a rule, it ought to be the former that should accommodate itself to the latter, and not vice versa. One may remember that only about a hundred years ago, many Westerners were of the then prevailing opinion that it was the Chinese national way or characteristic that all males would sport pony-tails and all females were bound up in lily feet, while they both were opium-smokers. In a certain sense, such an opinion may be regarded as well-grounded, for we have not as yet come to know any other people with the practice of having the feet of their young girls bound up into a lily shape. We may fairly ask, if this practice is the national way according to which the Chinese people should comport themselves. Surely not. It is absolutely not the so-called national way or characteristic which we should adapt ourselves to; in fact it is the national way or characteristic that should comply with the historical trend of civilization. A national characteristic is always in a course of being formed and reformed, and national practices of lily feet and opium-smoking can be and ought to be reformed and abolished. It is not doomed inevitably to be so. It was also about a hundred years ago that some of the eminent Chinese took the three cardinal guides and the five constant virtues (*san gang wu chang*)^① as the national character inherent in Chinese culture. Is the principle “the sovereign guides the subjects” really so deep-rooted in the Chinese that it can never be changed, even at the price of slavery? After all is said and done, what

① The three cardinal guides are: sovereign guides subject, father guides son, and husband guides wife. The five constant virtues are: benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and fidelity.